MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR 


COMPARATIVE   ADMINISTRATIVE   LAW 

2  Vols.     8vo 

"An  important  contribution  to  Comparative  Jurispru- 
dence."—  London  Times. 

"  A  work  of  great  learning  and  profound  research  ...  re- 
markable alike  for  analytical  power  and  lucidity  of  method 
.  .  .  unique  and  of  permanent  excellence."  —  New  York 
Tribune.  

MUNICIPAL    HOME  RULE 

A   STUDY    IN   ADMINISTRATION 

I2mo.    pp.  xxiv  +  283 

"  We  question  if  any  other  book  before  has  achieved  quite 
the  important  service  to  what  may  be  termed  theoretic  mu- 
nicipalism.  .  .  .  One  that  all  those  interested  in  municipal 
matters  should  read.  .  .  .  Moderate  in  tone,  sound  in  argu- 
ment, and  impartial  in  its  conclusions,  it  is  a  work  that 
deserves  to  carry  weight."  —  London  Liberal. 

"  To  a  correct  understanding  of  the  problem  of  municipal 
reform  in  all  its  bearings  Professor  Goodnow's  book  is  really 
indispensable."  —  Boston  Beacon. 

"  Here  is  without  doubt  one  of  the  most  trenchant  and 
scholarly  contributions  to  political  science  of  recent  writing, 
remarkable  for  analytical  power  and  lucidity  of  statement." 
—  Chicago  Evening  Post. 

"  Cannot  fail  of  a  wide  and  favorable  reception."  —  Albany 
Law  Journal. 


MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS  • 


BY 


FRANK  J.  GOODNOW,  A.M.,  LL.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  ADMINISTRATIVE  LAW  IN  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 
AUTHOR  OF  "MUNICIPAL  HOME  RULE" 


PUBLISHED  FOR  THE  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

THE   MACMILLAN    COMPANY 

LONDON:  MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  LTD. 
1903 

A  U  rights  reserved 


REESE 

COPYRIGHT,  1897, 
BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped  February,  1897.       Reprinted  August, 
1900  ;  January,  1902  ;   March,  1903. 


Norfocoi 

J.  8.  Gushing  &  Co.  -  Berwick  &  Smith 
Norwood  Mass.  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

IN  a  former  book,  Municipal  Home  Rule,  the 
attempt  was  made  to  ascertain  what  had  been  the 
effects  of  the  various  constitutional  provisions 
adopted  in  the  United  States  for  the  purpose  of 
securing  municipal  home  rule,  what  according  to 
the  decisions  of  our  courts  was  the  content  of  the 
sphere  of  municipal  as  distinguished  from  state 
activity,  and  what  had  been  the  success  of  the 
methods  adopted  in  foreign  countries  to  insure 
municipal  autonomy. 

Believing  that  the  position  which  the  city  occu- 
pies in  the  general  scheme  of  government  has 
great  influence  on  its  organization  and  politics,  the 
author  has  attempted  in  the  following  pages  to 
treat  the  city  rather  as  a  part  of  the  governmental 
system  than  as  an  isolated  phenomenon,  in  the 
hope  that  the  determination  of  the  question,  what 
the  city  really  is,  will  throw  light  on  most  of  the 
important  municipal  problems  of  the  present  day. 


11 


VI  PREFACE 

In  carrying  out  his  intention  it  has  been  necessary 
to  elaborate  and  develop,  even  at  the  risk  of  some 
repetition,  some  of  the  points  to  which  attention 
was  called  in  Municipal  Home  Rule. 

Acknowledgment  is  due  for  many  valuable  sug- 
gestions to  Mr.  Edmond  Kelly  of  Columbia  Uni- 
versity, who  has  read  the  work  in  manuscript ;  to 
Mr.  M.  R.  Maltbie,  Fellow  in  Columbia  University, 
for  the  index  and  a  chapter  on  the  effect  of  the 
recent  administrative  centralization  in  England ; 
and  to  Mr.  M.  N.  Forney  of  New  York,  who 
kindly  allowed  the  author  to  examine  an  unpub- 
lished article  of  his  on  preferential  voting. 

FRANK  J.  GOODNOW. 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY, 

IN  THE  CITY  OF  NEW  YORK, 

February,  1897. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   I 

PAGE 

HISTORY  OF  MUNICIPAL  ORGANIZATION  IN  THE  UNITED 

STATES        i 

English  origin  of  American  municipal  organization        .  I 

City  council  the  chief  authority 2 

Local  powers  of  city  council 2 

Disintegration  of  city  council 3 

Loss  of  organizing  power  by  city  council        ...  4 

Election  of  city  officers    .' 5 

Growth  of  powers  of  mayor 6 

Loss  of  legislative  po\\prs  of  city  council        ...  7 

Loss  by  city  of  home  rule 9 

Distrust  of  city  council 10 

Growth  of  powers  of  legislature 1 1 

Lack  of  concentration  in  municipal  organization     .         .  12 
Influence  on  municipalities  of  general  political  thought  .  15 
Importance  assigned  to  organization       .         .        .  15 
Lack  of  any  fundamental  theory  of  municipal  govern- 
ment      18 

City  should  be  treated  as  a  part  of  the  governmental 

system          .........  20 

CHAPTER  II 

THE  POSITION  OF  THE  CITY 22 

City  not  assigned  its  proper  position  in  United  States    .  22 

City  regarded  as  merely  an  agent  of  state  government   .  23 

vii 


Vlll  TABLE    OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

City  not,  however,  a  business  corporation       ...  24 
City  should  be  regarded  primarily  as  an  organization  for 

the  satisfaction  of  local  sociajjieeds^. ....  26 

Which  may  be  made  an  agent  of  state  government        .  27 

Should  be  subject  to  some  central  control    '"  .         .         .  27 

Influence  of  position  of  city  onVnunicipal  organization  .  28 

Influence  of  position  of  city  on  municipal  politics  .        '.  .    28 

Position  of  American  city  not  the  proper  one         .        .  30 

CHAPTER   III 

THE   SPHERE   OF   MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY  .           •    .       •     .       •  33 

Sphere  of   municipal   activity  determined    in    United 

States  by  legislature    ...        .  >     .        .        .  33 

City  an  authority  of  enumerated  powers          ...  34 

Narrow  construction  of  city  charters       .         .        ,        .  35 

Special  legislation  the  result  .         .        .        ...  37 

Effect  of  American  administrative  decentralization          .  39 

Failure  of  constitutional  prohibition  of  special  legislation  40 

Experience  of  Ohio          .         .         .         .         .         .        •  41 

Necessity  of  special  legislation        .        .        .         .         .46 

General  municipal  corporations  acts  in  Europe       .        .  48 

Reason  of  their  success  on  the  continent    ...        .  50 

How  evils  of  special  legislation  have  been  avoided  in 
England       .         .         .         .....         .        .        .54 

Municipal  powers  not  enumerated  in  Europe  ...  56 

What  is  municipal  business  ?  .        .        .        »     ...  57 
Benefits  which  would  result  in  United  States  from  larger 
municipal  powers         .        .        .        .        .        .        .61 

CHAPTER   IV 

THE  RELATION  OF   THE  CITY   TO   THE   STATE          .           .  63 

City  an  agent  of  state  government  .        .        •.'..'•        .  63 
Must  be  subjected  to  central  control        .        .         .         .64 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS  ix 


PAGE 


Its  financial  administration  must  also  be  subject  to  cen- 
tral control 65 

Such  control  cannot  be  exercised  exclusively  by  the 

courts 69 

In  United  States  control  is  exercised  by  legislature        .  71 

Legislative  control  inefficient 73 

Destroys  local  government 74 

Cause  of  failure  of  prohibition  of  special  legislation        .  76 

Effect  of  adoption  of  administrative  control  ...  79 
Tendency  towards  administrative  control  in  United 

States 83 

Success  of,  in  Europe 86 

Does  not  involve  greater  centralization  ....  87 

Necessity  of  abolition  of  spoils  system    ....  89 

CHAPTER  V 

THE  CENTRAL  ADMINISTRATIVE  CONTROL  OVER  CITIES 

IN  EUROPE  .                       90 

Administrative  centralization  on  the  continent        .         .  91 

Influence  of,  on  present  position  of  legislature        .         .  93 

Introduction  of  administrative  control  in  England  .         .  95 

Prussian  cities  now  organs  of  local  government      .         .  97 

Control  over  them  of  central  administration  ...  98 
Central  control  over  cities  in  France  .  .  .  .104 
Central  control  over  cities  in  England  .  .  .  .105 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  CENTRAL  ADMINISTRATIVE  CON- 
TROL IN  ENGLAND in 

Poor  law  administration  before  1834      .        .        .        .112 

Poor  law  administration  in  1836 114 

Table  relative  to  public  charity 115 

Condition  of  public  health  in  1845          •         •         •         •  117 


X  TABLE    OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Comparison  of  death-rate  in  1838  and  1893    .         .         .118 
Death-rates  from  fevers,  etc.,  in  1861  and  1887       .         .119 

Condition  of  police  in  1839 122 

Condition  in  1893 125 

Public  education  prior  to  1870       .         .         .         *        .127 
Public  education  at  present   .         .        .    ,    •.  •       .        .128 
Statistical  table     .         .  .        .    .     .        .        .129 

Central  approval  of  loans       .         .         .        .         ...     131 

Period  of  repayment  required         .         .        .         .         .     132 

Administrative  control  compared  with  legislative  control     134 

•  Audit  of  local  accounts  in  1834 138 

Present  central  audit 139 

Leniency  of  central  authorities   ....        .        .        .     140 

CHAPTER  VII 
UNIVERSAL  SUFFRAGE  .        .' 145 

Universal  municipal  suffrage  necessary  .         .         .         .145 

Not  impossible  of  limitation  .         .....     146 

Reasons  why  limitation  not  to  be  expected    .         .         .150 
Faults  of  present  representative  system  .         .         -151 

Minority  representation  in  Illinois          .        v        .         -154 
Preferential  system  of  Mr.  Forney          .         .         .         .156 

Application  to  mayoralty  election  .         .         .         .         .158 

Constitutionality  of  proportional  representation      .         .160 
Bill  of  Professor  Commons    .         ...         .         .         .161 

Criticism  of  .         .         .  164 

Too  much  not  to  be  demanded  of  changes  in  representa- 
tive system        .        . 167 

Direct  legislation  .         . 171 

Adaptation  of  town  meeting  to  cities      .         .         .         .173 

Too  much  has  been  demanded  of  universal  suffrage       .     176 
Too  many  officers  elected      .-       .        .    .. .. ...  .     .         .     181 

Particularly  true  of  cities        .         .        .         .        ,         .183 

City  government  very  technical      ...        ..„  .  '  ,,  .     .     184 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS  XI 

PAGE 

City  council  ancj  mayor  should  be  elected  .  .  .187 
Other  city  officers  should  be  appointed  .  .  .  .188 
Universal  suffrage  in  French  cities  .  .  .  -  .  191 

CHAPTER  VIII 

MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT  AND  THE  NATIONAL  POLITI- 
CAL PARTIES .    193 

Evils  of  interference  of  parties  in  municipal  government  193 
Interference  due  to  fact  of  state  agency  of  cities  .  .195 
State  government  should  be  centralized  .  .  -199 
Interference  due  to  spoils  system  .  .  .  202 

Administration  of  city  civil  service  laws  should  be  under 

central  control 204 

Opportunities  for  interference  due  to  special  legislation  .  206 
Due  also  to  too  general  adoption  of  elective  system  .  208 

Separate  municipal  elections 209 

State  parties  cannot  probably  be  driven  out  of  municipal 

politics       .........     212 

Their  influence  may  be  diminished  .  .  .  .214 

CHAPTER  IX 
THE  CITY  COUNCIL 215 

Influence  of  position  of  city  on  its  organization  .  .215 
City  councils  in  Europe  and  America  .  .  .  .216 
City  council  necessary  for  municipal  home  rule  .  .  220 
Distinction  of  politics  from  administration  .  .  .221 
Fault  of  New  York  and  Brooklyn  charters  .  .  .  222 

Proper  position  of  city  council 226 

Determination  of  its  position          .         .         .         .  227 

Council  in  England 228 

Position  of  council  in  United  States  must  be  determined 

by  law .230 

Position  of  council  in  France 231 


Xll  TABLE    OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Position  of  council  in  Prussia 232 

Formation  of  council     .......  235 

Council  districts 236 

General  ticket % .        .        .237 

Single  or  double  chambered  councils     ....  240 

Council  members  should  not  be  paid     ....  242 

Council  should  be  permanent         .        J        .        .        .  243 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  CITY  EXECUTIVE  .        .        ,                .        .        .  247 

Permanence  for  city  departments  .         .         .         .         .  248 

Not  secured  in  United  States      •  .                 .         .         .  249 

City  government  does  not  resemble  central  government  250 
"  Federal  system  "  does  not  secure  permanence     .         .251 

"  Board  system "  does    .         .         .         .         .         .         .  252 

"  Board  system "  not  popular       • .        .        .        .        .  254 

"  Federal  system  "  secures  responsibility        .         .         -255 

But  confuses  legislation  and  administration   .         .         .  256 
And  puts  control  of  city  affairs  in  hands  of  "  political 

hacks"       .         .        . 261 

Single  heads  of  departments  should  be  salaried  and  pro- 
fessional in  character          .         .         .         .         .         .  263 

Boards  secure  popular  administration    .         .         .'        .  264 

Compulsory  service  on  boards        .         .         .     '•  ''..'•      .  265 

Board  system  keeps  alive  local  public  spirit  .         ..        .  266 

Board  system  adopted  by  successful  municipal  govern- 
ments        .         .         .        .        .        .        .        .        .  267 

German  system     .        .     *  .    • ;  •',        »        .        .        .  268 
Board  system  adopted  in  United  States  school  admin- 
istration    .         .         .         .      •  .        .        '.        .        .  270 

And  where  continuity  is  required  .         .         »     ;    .         .  271 

Mayor  should  not  appoint  new  heads  of  departments     .  273 

Mayor  should  have  continuing  power  of  removal    .         .  274 


TABLE   OF  CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

But  should  be  obliged  to  state  reasons  for  his  action     .  276 

Terms  of  heads  of  departments  should  be  indefinite       .  277 

Can  proper  men  be  secured  for  mayors  ....  278 

Term  of  mayor 280 

CHAPTER  XI 

THE  METROPOLITAN   CITY 282 

Large  cities  generally  due  to  political  causes  .         .        .  282 
Large  cities  in  United  States  due  to  geographical  situa- 
tion     283 

Large  cities  present  peculiar  problems   ....  284 
Have  great  influence  on  general  politics         .         .         .285 

This  is  true  also  in  United  States 286 

Peculiar  problems  due  to  their  great  size        .        .         .  287 

Subjected  to  greater  central  control       ....  288 

Heterogeneity  of  large  cities 289 

Results  in  a  decentralization  of  their  local  organization  290 
"  Sub-municipality "  system  of  Paris      .         .         .         .291 

Decentralization  of  large  cities  in  Prussia      .         .         .  294 

Organization  of  London 295 

Report  of  London  commission 297 

Difference  between  continental  and  English  plan   of 

metropolitan  decentralization      .....  299 

London  plan  not  possible  of  adoption  in  United  States  .  302 

Necessity  of  some  decentralization         ....  303 

Conclusion 307 

INDEX 313 


MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 


CHAPTER   I 

HISTORY    OF    MUNICIPAL     ORGANIZATION    IN    THE 
UNITED    STATES 

THE  form  of  municipal  organization  obtaining  in 
the  United  States  was  derived  from  England. 
Thus  the  first  English  charter  of  the  city  of  New 
York  is  expressly  stated  to  be  modelled  on  the 
English  municipal  charters  of  the  time.1  Mayor 
Matthews,  of  Boston,  says2  that  the  organization 
provided  by  the  first  charter  of  Boston,  namely  the 
charter  of  1822,  "was  simply  an  adaptation  of  the 
form  of  municipal  government  which  had  existed 
for  centuries  in  the  commercial  towns  of  Eng- 
land." 3  By  the  English  practice  all  purely  muni- 
cipal matters,  that  is,  all  matters  which  by  the 
charter  were  to  be  attended  to  by  the  municipal 

1  Governor  Nicolls  says  in  the  proclamation  of  date  June  I2th, 
1665,  revoking  the  old  Dutch  charter,  that  the  new  charter  is  to  be 
"  according  to  the  custome  of  England  in  other  his  Ma11*'  corpora- 
cons." —  Valentine's  Manual,  1860,  p.  602. 

2  The  City  Government  of  Boston,  p.  166. 

8  See  Allinson  and  Penrose,  Philadelphia,  pp.  9  et  seq.  as  to  the 
influence  of  English  conditions  on  the  original  American  municipal 
charter. 

B  I 


2  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

corporation,  were  entrusted  to  a  council  which 
consisted  normally  of  the  mayor,  recorder,  alder- 
men, and  councillors,  all  of  whom  were  generally 
elected  by  a  narrow  body  of  freemen,  or  were 
chosen  by  the  council  itself.  The  mayor,  recorder, 
and  aldermen,  in  addition  to  being  municipal  coun- 
cillors, had  judicial  and  police  functions  to  per- 
form. Thus  in  New  York  by  the  Dongan  charter 
the  mayor's  court  was  a  very  important  authority, 
while  the  mayor  and  aldermen  had  practically  all 
the  powers  of  justices  of  the  peace.  These  func- 
tions, however,  being  regarded  as  governmental 
rather  than  corporate  in  character,  were  not  con- 
sidered as  vested  in  them  as  a  result  of  the  incor- 
poration of  the  city,  but  were  granted  to  them  by 
special  royal  commission,  sometimes  contained  in  a 
separate  document,  but  usually  to  be  found  in  the 
charter.  That  is,  pro  hac  vice  such  officers  were 
royal  agents  rather  than  municipal  officers. 

The  town  council  was  split  up  early  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  United  States,  the  mayor  becoming 
ultimately  the  appointee  of  the  people  of  the  city 
instead  of  the  council,  as  was  at  first  frequently, 
and  indeed  normally,  the  case,1  while  the  judicial 

1  See  Dillon,  Municipal  Corporations,  Vol.  I,  p.  69;  Bryce, 
American  Commonwealth,  1st  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  594.  The  mayor  was 
to  be  elected  in  Boston  by  the  first  charter,  namely  that  of  1822. 
Johns  Hopkins  University  Studies  in  History  and  Political  Science, 
Vol.  VI,  p.  34.  In  New  York  the  people  were  given  the  power  to 
elect  the  mayor  in  1834,  in  Philadelphia  in  1839  Laws  N.  Y.  of 
1834,  Chap.  23;  J.  H.  U.  S.,  Vol.  V,  p.  35. 


HISTORY   OF  MUNICIPAL    ORGANIZATION         3 

functions  of  the  mayor  and  aldermen  were  vested 
in  officers  quite  separate  from  the  administrative 
authorities  of  the  city.  In  New  York  these  judi- 
cial functions  are  now  discharged  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  state,  the  Court  of  General  Sessions, 
and  by  the  district  and  police  courts.  During  the 
period  when  all  municipal  administrative  functions 
were  discharged  by  the  city  council,  i.e.  when  the 
council  was  practically  the  only  municipal  author- 
ity known  to  the  law,  that  body  had  the  power  to 
determine  by  ordinance  the  detailed  administrative 
organization  of  the  city.  This  was  done  by  the 
formation  of  council  committees  for  the  different 
branches  of  municipal  administration  which  were 
established.1  This  is  at  present  the  rule  in  Eng- 
land. These  council  committees  had,  subject  to 
the  approval  of  the  council,  the  power  to  appoint 
the  various  subordinate  officers  necessary  for  the 
city  administration,  and  provided  for  by  the  coun- 
cil. Later  the  council  in  certain  instances  formed 
separate  city  executive  departments.  Thus  in 
New  York  the  charter  of  1830,  which,  by  the  way, 
it  is  interesting  to  note,  was  framed  by  a  munici- 
pal convention,  and  adopted  by  the  people  of  the 
city,  and  afterwards  enacted  into  law  by  the  legis- 
lature, provided  that  the  executive  business  of  the 
city  should  be  attended  to  by  departments  which 
were  to  be  organized,  and  whose  heads,  although 
not  members  of  the  common  council,  were  to  be 

1  See  e.g.  Matthews,  The  City  Government  of  Boston,  p.  166. 


4  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

appointed  by  it.1  The  council  soon,  however,  lost 
its  organizing  power  together  with  its  power  of 
appointing  municipal  officers.  Thus  in  New  York, 
in  1849,  tne  state  legislature  itself  finally  deter- 
mined what  executive  departments  should  exist,  and 
took  away  from  the  council  the  power  of  appoint- 
ing the  heads  of  such  departments.2  A  perusal  of 
city  charters,  as  well  those  to  be  found  in  special 
acts  as  those  contained  in  general  municipal  cor- 
poration acts,  which  as  a  result  of  constitutional 
provision  have  been  so  frequently  passed  in  recent 
years,  will  show  that  the  attitude  of  the  legislature 
of  the  state  of  New  York  towards  the  city  of 
New  York,  was  not  the  exception,  but  rather  the 
rule.3  The  methods  by  which  the  heads  of  these 

1  See  also  Corporation  Ordinances,  Revised,  1845. 

2  Laws  of  1849,  Chap.  187,  Sec.  20.     In  1846,  a  municipal  con- 
vention to  amend  the  charter  had  again  been  held.    The  result  of 
its  deliberations  was  to  make  the  heads  of  departments  elective  by 
the  people  of  the , city.     One  of  the  members  of  this  convention 
expressed  the  sense  of  that  body  when  he  said  that  the  election  of 
these  officers  by  the  common  council  had  led  to  the  "  banishment 
of  the  true  exercise  of  decorum  and  political  virtue  from  our  legis- 
lative halls,  and  had  created  in  the  city  government  an  unsteady, 
ill-directed,  and  changeable  course  of  policy."      Report  of  Mr. 
Porter,  City  Convention  of  1846,  Debates,  pp.  163  and  167. 

8  See  the  summary  of  special  city  charters  and  general  municipal 
corporation  acts,  contained  in  Vol.  V  of  New  York  Senate  (Fassett) 
Committee  on  Cities  Report,  transmitted  to  the  New  York  legis- 
lature in  1891.  See  also  the  Proceedings  of  the  National  Muni- 
cipal League  of  1894-95.  There  are  at  the  present  time,  however, 
city  councils  which  have  considerable  organizing  power.  See  the 
Illinois  General  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1872. 


HISTORY  OF  MUNICIPAL    ORGANIZATION         5 

executive  departments  thus  made  independent  of, 
or  at  any  rate  separated  from,  the  common  coun- 
cil have  been  appointed,  have  varied  considerably. 
For  a  time  they  were  in  accordance  with  the  dic- 
tates of  democracy,  which  was  so  rampant  every- 
where about  the  middle  of  this  century,  elected  by 
the  people  of  the  city.  This  method,  however, 
proved  in  many  cases  unsatisfactory ;  but  in  most 
cases  where  a  change  was  made,  the  old  power  of 
appointment  was  not  restored  to  the  city  council. 
The  council  had  itself  become  discredited  in  the 
eyes  of  the  people.  Mr.  Matthews  says  : 1  "  A  dis- 
trust of  municipal  legislatures  and  of  the  capacity 
of  their  committees  to  conduct  the  executive  busi- 
ness of  a  city  government  has  been  the  chief  feat- 
ure of  municipal  development  in  this  country 
during  the  past  thirty  years."  The  development  of 
the  independence  of  the  mayor  and  the  executive 
departments  is  evidence  of  this  fact ;  but  not  con- 
clusive evidence,  inasmuch  as  the  separation  of 
the  mayor  and  the  executive  departments  from  the 
council  was  due,  partly,  at  any  rate,  to  the  influ- 
ence of  the  principle  of  the  separation  of  powers, 
which  had  been  adopted  in  the  state  and  national 
governments,  and  which  it  was  believed  could, 
with  advantage,  be  adopted  in  the  municipal 
organization.  In  some  cases  the  demand  was 
made  that  the  heads  of  certain  of  these  execu- 
tive departments  be  appointed  by  the  state  execu- 

1  The  City  Government  of  Boston^  p.  170. 


6  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

tive,  the  governor.  This  demand  has  been  acceded 
to  quite  frequently,  in  the  case  of  the  police  de- 
partment, and  even  now  in  not  a  few  instances  the 
police  commissions  in  the  larger  cities  are  ap- 
pointed by  the  governor,  or  by  the  governor  and 
the  senate,  in  some  cases  even  by  the  legislature. 
In  other  cases,  indeed  the  majority  of  cases,  it 
was  provided  that  the  heads  of  municipal  depart- 
ments were  to  be  appointed  by  the  mayor  and  con- 
firmed by  the  council.  The  democratic  methods 
of  the  middle  of  the  century  have  not,  however, 
been  totally  abandoned.  Thus  it  is  not  uncom- 
mon at  the  present  time  to  find  the  chief  financial 
officer  of  the  city,  that  is  the  comptroller  or 
treasurer,  elected  by  the  people.1  In  some  of  the 
larger  cities  the  appointment  of  the  heads  of  de- 
partments is  to  be  made  by  the  mayor  alone,  unin- 
fluenced by  the  council.  This  would  seem  to  be 
the  modern  tendency.  As  regards  the  tenure  of 
office  of  these  heads  of  departments,  there  is  no 
uniform  or  universal  rule,  though  the  idea  is  grow- 
ing that  they  should  be  removable  by  the  mayor. 

Not  only  has  the  council  very  generally  lost  its 
power  of  organizing  and  appointing  the  official 
service  of  the  city,  it  has  also  lost  very  many  of  its 
former  financial  and  legislative  powers.  This  loss 
is  possibly  more  marked  in  the  case  of  larger  cities 

1  Certain  other  heads  of  departments  are  also  sometimes  elected 
by  the  people.  See  the  summary  of  the  Fassett  Committee's  Report, 
already  referred  to,  Vol.  V. 


HISTORY  OF  MUNICIPAL    ORGANIZATION         7 

in  the  state  of  New  York  than  elsewhere ;  but 
everywhere  the  importance  of  the  council  has  very 
largely  diminished.  The  distrust  of  the  city  coun- 
cil has  been  so  great  that  even  when  it  has  re- 
mained the  nominal  guardian  of  the  finances  of 
the  city,  its  financial  powers,  i.e.  its  powers  of  ap- 
propriating money  for  city  expenses,  and  of  levy- 
ing taxes  and  making  loans,  have  really  been 
seriously  limited.  This  has  been  done  through 
the  continual  passage  of  laws  actually  special  in 
their  operation  which  determine  the  amount  given 
cities  shall  expend  for  given  purposes.  As  the 
courts  hold  in  such  cases  that  municipal  authori- 
ties are  obliged  to  make  provision  for  such  ex- 
penses and  in  the  amounts  decided  on  by  the 
legislature,  the  function  of  the  council  as  to  such 
matters,  even  if  it  possesses  the  taxing  power,  be- 
comes a  merely  ministerial  one.1  Of  late  years, 
however,  there  has  been  a  reaction  against  this 
regulation  of  local  finances  by  central  legislative 
action,  and  in  so  far  as  this  has  found  expression 
in  the  constitutional  prohibition  of  special  legisla- 
tion relative  to  cities  or  in  the  grant  to  municipal 
authorities  of  a  suspensive  veto  power  as  to  cer- 
tain special  legislation,  as  was  provided  by  the  last 
New  York  constitution,  city  authorities  are  recov- 
ering in  part  their  former  financial  and  legislative 

1  See  People  ex  rel.  Wright  v.  Common  Council  of  Buffalo,  16 
Abbott's  N.  C.  affirmed  in  38  Hun,  N.  Y.  637  ;  Brewster  z/.  Syra- 
cuse, 19  N.  Y.  116;  Perkins  v.  Slack,  86  Pa.  St.  283. 


8  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

powers.  What  has  been  said  of  the  financial 
powers  of  cities  is  true  also  of  other  essentially 
legislative  powers.  Thus  the  powers  of  passing 
local  ordinances  once  exercised  by  the  local,  muni- 
cipal council  are  now  frequently  exercised  by  the 
central  state  legislature,  which  has  incorporated  its 
will  into  the  city  charter  and  its  amendments,  or 
by  the  mayor  or  the  various  executive  departments 
to  whom  the  ordinance  power  has  been  granted  by 
statute.  A  striking  example  of  this  centralization 
of  local  ordinance  powers  in  the  state  legislature  is 
found  in  the  present  charter  of  New  York,1  which, 
as  a  result  of  statutes  passed  almost  every  year,  has 
grown  into  an  enormous  code.  Exclusive  of  those 
laws  which  do  not  in  terms  but  do  in  fact  amend 
it,  it  contains  at  the  present  time  2143  sections, 
and  is  comprehensible  to  few  even  of  the  learned.2 
Again,  in  New  York  city  at  the  present  time  it  will 
be  found  that  many  of  the  most  important  ordi- 
nances are  issued  not  by  the  council  but  by  one  of 
the  executive  departments,  as,  e.g.,  the  Health  De- 
partment, which  has  perhaps  wider  powers  of  or- 
dinances than  most  of  the  other  city  executive 
departments. 

1  Consolidation  Act  of  1882. 

2  Judge  Church  says  (62  N.  Y.  459)  :  "  It  is  scarcely  safe  for 
any  one  to  speak  confidently  of  the  exact  condition  of  the  law  in 
respect  to  public  improvements  in  the  cities  of  New  York  and 
Brooklyn."    This  difficulty  is  in  the  opinion  of  the  Fassett  Com- 
mittee as  great  as  to  all  of  the  othey  cities  of  the  state  of  New  York. 
Report,  Vol.  V,  p.  n. 


HISTORY  OF  MUNICIPAL    ORGANIZATION         9 

This  short  sketch  of  American  municipal  develop- 
ment reveals  two  facts.  In  the  first  place,  it  shows 
that  the  people  of  the  cities  have  very  largely  lost 
their  original  powers  of  local  self-government. 
City  charters  which  were  originally  conceived  of 
as  in  the  nature  of  agreements  or  contracts 1  have 
come  to  be  regarded  as  nothing  but  laws  which 
may  be  amended  and  repealed  by  the  legislature 
as  it  sees  fit,  without  regard  to  the  wishes  of  the 
people  of  the  cities  affected  by  them.  The  city 
is  treated  merely  as  one  of  the  long  series  of  ad- 
ministrative authorities.  Its  powers  and  compe- 
tence are  delimited  from  time  to  time  by  the 
law-making  power  of  the  state  in  the  same  way  as 
it  delimits  the  powers  of  the  well-recognized  state 
administrative  authorities.  Municipal  administra- 
tion has  thus  come  to  be  regarded  as  almost  a 
part  of  general  state  administration.  This  view  of 
the  city's  position  has  arisen  very  largely  from  the 
desire  for  administrative  simplicity,  and  from  the 
reluctance  to  maintain  within  the  district  of 
the  city  two  sets  of  administrative  authorities. 
Whenever  possible,  the  state  has  made  use  of  the 
city  authorities  for  the  transaction  of  state  busi- 
ness, and  in  many  cases  where  the  city  is  a  large 
one,  has  consolidated  city  and  town  and  even 

1  Judge  Spencer  says  in  the  case  of  the  Mayor  v.  Ordinaux,  12 
Johns.  125,  it  was  "the  almost  invariable  course  of  procedure  for 
the  legislature  not  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  a  corporation 
without  its  consent." 


IO  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

county  administration  in  the  hands  of  the  city 
authorities.  The  more  public  and  general  charac- 
ter assigned  to  the  city  administration  has  really 
had  the  effect  of  decreasing  the  powers  of  the 
city.  For  the  legislature,  being  called  upon  to 
regulate  frequently  those  matters  attended  to  by 
the  cities,  but  of  vital  interest  to  the  state  as  a 
whole,  has  almost  forgotten  that  the  cities  have 
local  duties  to  perform,  in  which  it  should  not  in- 
terfere without  the  consent  of  the  city  concerned, 
has  treated  all  administrative  functions  discharged 
by  cities  as  part  of  general  state  administration 
and  as  therefore  subject  to  legislative  regulation 
and  control. 

Another  factor  which  has  exerted  an  influence 
in  decreasing  the  local  autonomy  of  cities  is  to  be 
found  in  the  increasing  distrust  of  the  city  council, 
which  has  had  the  result,  as  has  been  pointed  out, 
of  the  destruction  of  the  powers  of  that  body. 
The  weakening  of  the  position  of  the  city  council 
has  had  the  result  of  decreasing  the  local  autonomy 
of  cities  because  there  are  many  matters  pertain- 
ing to  city  government  which  have  not  been  in  the 
past  and  are  not  at  the  present  time  considered  in 
other  governmental  relations  as  proper  subjects 
for  executive  action.  Among  them  may  be  men- 
tioned the  determination  of  municipal  expenses. 
If  there  is  anything  which  is  settled  in  our  consti- 
tutional law,  it  is  that  the  taxing  power  and  the 
power  of  appropriating  money,  through  whose 


HISTORY  OF  MUNICIPAL    ORGANIZATION       II 

exercise  governmental  policy  is  determined,  are 
legislative  in  character.  This  is  so  because  it  is 
believed  that  the  people  who  are  to  be  taxed  and 
whose  money  is  to  be  spent  is  best  represented  in 
a  body  which  is  chosen  by  it,  that  the  members 
of  such  a  body  reflect  more  clearly  the  different 
phases  in  feeling  which  are  to  be  found  among  the 
people  than  any  one  man  or  any  small  body  of 
men  can  ever  reflect  them.  It  is  so,  also,  because 
the  action  of  a  legislative  body  is,  as  a  rule,  pre- 
ceded by  discussion  in  which  these  phases  of  feel- 
ing will  naturally  be  brought  to  light  and  because 
of  the  fact  that,  owing  to  the  length  of  time  con- 
sumed by  the  action  of  a  legislative  body  and  the 
publicity  by  which  it  is  generally  accompanied, 
public  opinion  is  given  a  chance  to  express  itself 
and  to  influence  the  final  result  of  the  deliberation. 
This  is  not  the  case  with  executive  action.  So 
firmly  fixed  is  this  idea  in  the  minds  of  the  people, 
that  even  where  the  municipal  council  has  been 
deprived  of  what  are  in  their  essence  legislative 
powers,  the  loss  by  the  council  has  not  enured  so 
much  to  the  benefit  of  the  municipal  executive 
authorities  as  to  that  of  the  central  legislature. 
The  result,  therefore,  of  the  destruction  of  the 
municipal  council  has  not  been,  it  will  be  noticed, 
the  abandonment  of  the  council  system  of  muni- 
cipal government.  Municipal  legislative  functions 
are  discharged  now  as  they  were  before  by  a  coun- 
cil, but  that  council  is  no  longer  a  local  council, 


12  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

with  any  sense  of  responsibility  to  the  people  of 
the  city,  but  a  central  council,  the  legislature, 
elected  by  the  people  of  the  state  as  a  whole,  and 
not  by  the  municipal  population,  a  legislature 
which  can  in  the  nature  of  things,  even  with  the 
best  of  will,  know  little  of  the  particular  municipal 
conditions  which  it  attempts  to  regulate  —  a  legis- 
lature, further,  which  has  not  been  actuated  always 
by  the  best  of  intentions  towards  the  cities,  but 
dominated,  and  naturally  dominated,  by  the  state 
political  parties,  and  regarding  the  cities  as  pawns 
in  the  great  game  of  national  and  state  politics,  has 
not  scrupled  to  sacrifice  them  where  ultimate  ad- 
vantage for  the  more  important  end  of  partisan 
political  supremacy  has  been  anticipated. 

The  second  fact  to  be  noted  is  the  establish- 
ment of  municipal  executive  departments,  inde- 
pendent of  the  council  and  for  a  time  quite 
universally,  and  even  now  commonly,  independent 
of  any  municipal  authority.  Each  of  these  depart- 
ments or  boards  is  often  a  law  to  itself,  determin- 
ing subject  to  the  statutes  of  the  state  legislature 
the  policy  which  it  shall  follow,  regardless  of  the 
interests  of  the  city  in  other  directions,  and  only 
controlled  by  the  fact  that  the  amount  of  money 
which  it  may  spend  is  generally  determined  by 
some  authority  other  than  itself.  The  authority 
which  determines  municipal  expenses  is  often, 
however,  the  legislature  of  the  state,  so  that  there 
is  frequently  no  local  financial  control  at  all. 


HISTORY  OF  MUNICIPAL    ORGANIZATION       13 

Sometimes  these  departments  are  so  independent 
of  municipal  control  that  their  accounts  are  not 
audited  by  the  regular  city  auditor  or  finance  de- 
partment. The  heads  of  these  independent  execu- 
tive departments  are  not  infrequently  of  different 
political  views,  and  being,  perhaps,  more  devoted 
to  party  than  to  the  city,  or  at  any  rate  holding 
different  views  as  to  municipal  policy  as  a  result 
of  their  varied  party  membership,  they  are  often 
unable  to  pull  together.  Their  wrangles  have 
often  almost  caused  a  cessation  of  municipal  busi- 
ness, and  the  power  which  they  have  had  in  those 
states,  where  special  municipal  legislation  is  per- 
mitted, to  apply  to  the  legislature  for  such  special 
legislation  as  will  be  of  peculiar  advantage  to  their 
own  department,  or  to  the  party  which  they  repre- 
sent, has  been  made  use  of  either  to  magnify  their 
own  importance  or  to  benefit  the  party  to  which 
they  belong,  at  the  expense  of  the  general  welfare 
of  the  city.1  This  lack  of  cohesion  and  of  concen- 
trated organization  it  has  been  attempted  to  do 
away  with  of  late  years  by  subjecting  the  heads 
of  the  various  departments  to  the  control  of  the 
mayor,  who  is  not  infrequently  given  the  right  to 
appoint  them  at  the  beginning  of  his  term  of  office, 
and  less  frequently,  but  still  in  several  important 
instances,  also  the  power  to  remove  them  during 
their  term  of  office.  While  this  increase  in  the 

1  See   Fassett  Committee   Report,   Vol.   V,    pp.   13,    690.      See 
also  Allinson  and  Penrose,  Philadelphia,  p.  271. 


14  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

power  of  the  mayor  does  much  to  bring  about  that 
concentrated  organization  without  which  good 
municipal  government  is  extremely  difficult,  it 
does  not  at  all  affect  the  general  relation  of  the 
city  to  the  legislature.  No  matter  how  concen- 
trated may  be  the  executive  municipal  organi- 
zation, it  still  remains  true  that  its  policy  may 
be  determined  very  largely  by  the  legislature. 
Municipal  home  rule  and  local  autonomy  are  as 
difficult  of  attainment  under  a  concentrated  system 
as  under  the  loosely  organized  board  system  of 
former  years,  so  long  as  the  legislature  treats 
municipal  administration  as  a  part  of  state  admin- 
istration. 

Such  has  been  the  history  of  municipal  govern- 
ment in  the  United  States  and  such  is  its  condition 
at  the  present  time.  Starting  with  large  local  self- 
government  and  a  municipal  organization  concen- 
trated under  the  management  of  a  local  council, 
we  are  now  governed  by  a  central  council,  the 
state  legislature,  which  often  has  not  large  know- 
ledge of  city  affairs  nor  a  strong  desire,  on  account 
of  its  subjection  to  political  influences,  to  reach  the 
best  solution  of  municipal  problems,  and  whose 
municipal  policy  is  carried  out  in  a  haphazard  way 
by  a  series  of  municipal  departments,  largely  inde- 
pendent of  each  other,  and  often  owing  no  alle- 
giance to  any  common  municipal  or  even  central 
administrative  superior.  We  have  reached  this 
position  after  trying  almost  all  the  experiments  in 


HISTORY  OF  MUNICIPAL    ORGANIZATION       15 

mere  details  of  municipal  organization  that  the 
mind  of  man  could  well  devise,1  experiments  which 
are  in  many  cases  contradictory  one  with  the  other. 
Hardly  any  two  city  charters  will  be  found  to 
agree  in  even  the  important  details  of  municipal 
organization.  Indeed,  the  perusal  of  the  charter 
of  a  single  city  will  oftentimes  reveal  the  fact  that 
its  organization  is  not  based  on  any  fundamental 
theory.  Thus  we  often  find  in  the  same  city 
certain  executive  officers  elected  by  the  people, 
others  appointed  by  the  mayor  and  council,  and 
still  others  appointed  even  by  the  state  governor 
or  legislature.  Most  city  charters  further  show 
the  influence  upon  them  of  all  the  great  waves  of 
general  political  thought  which  have  swept  over 
the  country  during  the  past  century.  Thus  we 
find  very  commonly  the  influence  of  the  principle 
of  the  separation  of  powers.  While  this  principle 
lies  at  the  foundation  of  our  state  and  national 
government,  it  has  been  held  by  the  courts  never 
to  apply,  unless  expressly  so  provided,  to  our  local 
government.  Further,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  did 
not  govern  the  organization  of  municipalities  at 
the  time  the  early  constitutions  which  adopted  it 

1  As  Dr.  Shaw  well  says  {Municipal  Government  in  Conti- 
nental Europe,  p.  305)  :  "In  the  United  States  the  reformers  .  .  . 
are  forever  overhauling,  repairing,  and  reconstructing  the  form  of 
municipal  government."  "  Their  attention  has  been  devoted  to  the 
structure  and  mechanism,  and  .  .  .  they  keep  changing  it  per- 
petually." 


16  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

for  the  state  governments  were  put  into  force. 
But  in  hardly  any  city  in  which  the  separation  of 
the  mayor  and  executive  departments  from  the 
council  has  been  provided,  has  there  been  a  clear 
distinction  made  between  what  is  really  adminis- 
trative and  executive  and  what  is  legislative  in 
character.  The  power  to  make  contracts  is  often 
left  with  the  council,  while  the  power  of  appoint- 
ment which,  if  the  mayor  and  council  are  to  be 
separated,  should  be  entrusted  to  the  mayor  alone, 
is  most  frequently  exercised  by  the  mayor  and 
council  conjointly. 

Again,  we  find  the  elective  principle  applied 
generally  to  municipal  officers,  regardless  of  their 
character  and  introduced  at  about  the  time  that 
the  principles  of  democracy  exercised  so  strong  an 
influence  on  all  parts  of  our  organic  law  which 
were  susceptible  of  change  in  this  direction.  The 
elective  principle  and  the  principle  of  separation 
of  powers  were  introduced  into  the  municipal 
organization,  not  because  they  were  well  suited  to 
it,  but  because  they  had  long  been  adopted  in  the 
state  or  county  and  town  governments,  and  had 
been  reasonably  successful  there.  Again,  the 
bicameral  system  for  the  council  was  introduced 
in  many  cases,  not  because  it  was  specially  suited 
to  municipal  government,  but  because  it  was  the 
recognized  method  of  organizing  the  legislature  of 
the  state  and  nation,  and  what  was  good  for  the 
state  and  nation  was  presumably  good  for  the  city. 


HISTORY  OF  MUNICIPAL-  ORGANIZATION       I? 

In  almost  all  these  cases  changes  were  made 
in  the  primitive  Anglo-American  municipal  organi- 
zation, not  because  those  who  were  responsible  for 
them  had  any  experience  applicable  to  municipal 
conditions,  —  for  at  the  time  these  changes  were 
made  no  one  can  be  said  to  have  had  this  experi- 
ence, as  the  modern  city  is  a  very  new  thing,  — 
but  because  these  changes  were  in  accordance  with 
principles  which  it  was  universally  believed  had 
been  successfully  applied  in  the  national  and  state 
governments.  It  is  not  intended  by  what  has  just 
been  said  to  convey  the  idea  that  all  these  changes 
were  made  simply  for  the  sake  of  changing  or  for 
the  mere  purpose  of  applying  to  a  successful 
system  of  municipal  government  principles  which 
it  was  hoped  would  make  it  more  successful.  It 
is  doubtless  the  case  that  municipal  conditions 
were  such  during  the  first  half  of  this  century 
that  changes  of  some  sort  seemed  advisable.  But 
it  is  contended  that  the  changes  that  have  been 
made  have  not  generally  been  made  after  a  care- 
ful study  of  the  municipal  problem  and  with  par- 
ticular reference  to  the  special  needs  of  cities.  Too 
much  weight  has  been  allowed  to  the  teachings  of 
a  doctrinaire  political  science,  certainly  too  little 
attention  has  been  given  to  distinctly  municipal 
needs,  while  little  or  no  attention  at  all  would 
seem  to  have  been  given  to  the  way  in  which 
problems  similar  to  those  confronting  the  cities  of 
this  country  had  been  solved  in  foreign  countries. 


1 8  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

At  the  present  time,  finally,  after  all  the  experience 
which  this  half  century  of  experimentation  should 
have  given  us,  it  must  be  confessed  we  have  no 
generally  accepted  theory  of  municipal  govern- 
ment. No  better  proof  of  this  can  be  found  than 
the  proceedings  of  the  National  Municipal  League 
at  the  conferences  at  Minneapolis  and  Cleveland. 
Papers  were  read  by  gentlemen  from  all  parts  of 
the  country  on  all  sorts  and  conditions  of  muni- 
cipal government,  with  the  result  of  an  almost 
complete  lack  of  agreement  upon  the  part  of  those 
present  as  to  the  proper  system  of  municipal 
organization  for  this  country. 

This  lack  of  any  fundamental  theory  of  munici- 
pal government,  both  upon  the  part  of  the  legis- 
lature which  controls  the  formation  of  city  charters; 
and  upon  the  part  of  those  most  interested  in 
municipal  reform,  who  are  the  makers  of  public 
opinion,  is  due,  it  is  believed,  to  the  fact  that  we 
have  not  in  this  country  assigned  the  proper  place 
to  the  city  in  our  governmental  system.  Our 
failure  is  due  partly  to  historical,  partly  to  legal 
reasons.  On  the  one  hand,  as  a  people  we  have 
been  so  occupied  in  determining  the  position  of 
the  state  in  our  public  polity  that  we  have  had 
little  time  to  devote  to  the  city,  which  is  a  very 
recent  development,  and  which  has  been  treated 
very  much  as  we  have  treated  the  county  and  the 
town.  On  the  other  hand,  the  solution  of  the 
problem  how  to  protect  private  rights  under  a 


HISTORY  OF  MUNICIPAL    ORGANIZATION       19 

democratic  form  of  government  has  confined  our 
study  of  questions  of  public  law  almost  entirely 
to  those  of  a  constitutional  character.  Adminis- 
trative questions  have  been  relegated  to  the  back- 
ground, or  when  they  have  imperatively  demanded 
attention,  they  have  been  solved  by  resort  to  tem- 
porary and  often  unwise  expedients,  —  expedients 
in  many  cases  inconsistent  one  with  the  other  and 
seldom  based  on  any  fundamental  theory.  In  the 
case  of  the  city  our  attention  has  been  directed 
almost  exclusively  to  the  problem  of  its  internal 
organization.  Almost  all  our  attempts  at  munici- 
pal reform  have  been  made  in  the  matter  of  muni- 
cipal organization.  One  plan  after  another  has 
been  tried  until  it  may  be  said  that  almost  all 
forms  of  municipal  organization  possible  of  adop- 
tion have  been  subjected  to  the  test  of  experience. 
And  while  we  have  undoubtedly  improved  some- 
what our  municipal  conditions,  it  is  still  true  that 
we  are  far  from  having  reached  an  ideal  solution 
of  the  problem  of  municipal  government,  and,  if 
we  are  to  judge  by  results,  are  at  the  same  time 
much  behind  what  has  been  done  both  on  the 
continent  and  in  England.  Further,  the  improve- 
ment to  be  noted  in  our  city  government  would 
not  seem  to  be  commensurate  with  the  time  and 
effort  that  have  been  expended  upon  the  prob- 
lem by  the  thinking  classes  of  the  community. 
Finally,  the  fact  that  England  and  the  continental 
countries  have  been  reasonably  successful  in  their 


20  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

solution  of  this  problem,  notwithstanding  that 
they  have  systems  of  municipal  organization 
which  are  quite  different  one  from  the  other, 
although  in  a  general  way  they  all  resemble  the 
organization  which  we  abandoned  long  ago  as 
productive  of  the  most  evil  results,  would  seem 
'to  indicate  that  our  trouble  is  not  in  our  form  of 
municipal  organization,  but  rather  in  the  position 
which  has  been  assigned  to  our  cities  in  our  gen- 
eral system  of  government.  The  facts,  that  our 
numerous  changes  in  municipal  organization  have 
resulted  in  comparatively  little  improvement,  and 
that  the  results  which  have  so  far  attended  the 
study  of  foreign  municipal  institutions  are  of  very 
slight  importance  in  helping  us  to  solve  our  prob- 
lems, go  far  to  prove  that  in  our  attempts  both  at 
domestic  municipal  reform  and  to  derive  benefit 
from  foreign  municipal  experience,  we  have  re- 
garded the  city  too  much  as  an  isolated  phenome- 
non and  too  little  as  a  part  of  a  general  scheme  of 
administration.  If  we  change  our  point  of  view, 
if  we  consider  the  city  not  as  an  organism  com- 
plete in  itself,  but  as  merely  a  member  of  a  much 
larger  organism,  —  in  other  words,  if  we  consider 
the  position  which  the  city  occupies  in  our  system 
of  government,  and  if  we  then  compare  it  with 
the  position  which  it  occupies  in  those  countries 
in  which  municipal  government  has  been  success- 
ful, —  it  is  believed  that  a  new  line  of  investigation 
will  have  been  undertaken  from  which  much  good 


HISTORY  OF  MUNICIPAL    ORGANIZATION      21 

may  result.  The  attempt  will  be  made  in  the  fal- 
lowing pages  to  ascertain  what  is  the  correct  posi- 
tion which  the  city  should  occupy  and  what  effects 
the  assignment  to  it  of  such  a  position  will  have 
upon  American  municipal  government. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE   POSITION   OF   THE   CITY 

THE  cause  of  the  fluctuating  and  often  incon- 
sistent policy  of  the  legislature  on  the  one  hand, 
and  of  the  attitude  of  municipal  reformers  on  the 
other,  towards  the  organization  of  cities  in  the 
United  States,  it  has  been  pointed  out,  is  to  be 
found  in  the  failure  to  assign  to  the  city  its  proper 
position  in  the  governmental  system.  Whatever 
may  have  been  the  origin  of  the  city,  and  what- 
ever may  have  been  the  original  position  of  the 
city  in  the  American  law,  the  American  city,  at 
the  present  time,  is,  in  all  but  a  very  few  respects, 
like  the  county  and  the  town,  a  mere  administra- 
tive circumscription  of  the  state.  It  is  "possessed, 
it  is  true,  as  are  also  the  county  and  the  town,  of 
certain  corporate  powers;  but  it  is- almost  abso- 
lutely subject  to  the  power  of  the  legislature  in 
the  absence  of  specific  constitutional  provision. 
"A  municipal  corporation  .  .  .,"  says  no  less  an 
authority  than  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,1  "  is  a  representative  not  only  of  the  State, 

1  United  States  v.  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad  Co.,  17  Wallace, 

332- 

22 


THE  POSITION  OF   THE    CITY  2$ 

'  but  is  a  portion  of  its  governmental  power.     It  is 
r  one  of  its  creatures,  made  for  a  specific  purpose, 
to  exercise  within  a  limited  sphere  the  powers  of 
•  the  State.    The  State  may  govern  .  .  .  the  local 
territory  as  it  governs  the  State  at  large.     It  may 
enlarge  or  contract  its  powers,  or  destroy  its  exist- 
ence."    While  such  a  description  of  the  legal  posi- 
tion of  the  city  is,  of  course,  made  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  constitutional  power  of  the  legis- 
lature over  cities,  it  is  none  the  less 'true  that  it 
expresses  not  merely  the  power  which  must,  in 
any  country  that  has  arrived  at  an  adequate  con- 
ception of  sovereignty,  be  in  theory  accorded  to 
the  legislature ;  it  also,  unfortunately,  expresses  as 
well  the  policy  of  most  of  the  American  legislat- 
ures towards  the  cities.     The  legislatures,  it  would 
seem,  have  come  to  believe  that  the  absence  of 
constitutional  limitations  on  their  powers  is  indica- 
tive not  merely  of  the  theoretical  extent  of  their 
power,  but  also  of  the  legislative  policy  which  they 
are  to  follow.     The  average  American  legislature 
has,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  treated  the  city  as  a  mere 
agent  of  the  state  government,  whose  institutions 
it  is  not  merely  free  to  organize  as  it  sees  fit, 
but  whose  policy  it  may  itself  properly  determine. 
Many  persons,  conscious  of  the  evils  due  to  the 
theory  that  municipal  administration  is  merely  a 
part  of  state  administration,  have  put  forward  the 
view  that  the  city  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as 
a  governmental  agent.     They  assert  that  the  city 


24  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

'  is  really  a  business  corporation,  and  that  its  organ- 
*  ization  should  be  determined  and  its  management 
'  conducted  on  what  are  called  "business  principles." 
While  this  is  a  view  which  has  had  little,  if  any, 
influence  on  the  law,  it  is  believed  to  be  acquiring 
more  and  more  adherents  among  that  largely  in- 
creasing class  of  persons  who  are  interesting  them- 
selves in  the  study  of  municipal  problems.  This 
view  is,  however,  as  false  as  the  view  which  our 
legislatures  seem  to  have,  that  the  city  is  a  mere 
state  agent,  and  if  adopted  would  undoubtedly  re- 
sult in  as  great  disadvantages  as  have  followed  the 
adoption  of  the  other  view. 

The  determination  of  the  proper  position  of  the 
city  is  of  much  more  than  mere  academic  interest. 
It  has  an  important  influence  on  all  phases  of  the 
municipal  problem.  *  If  the  city  is  a  mere  business 
•corporation,  as  so  many  have  said  that  it  is,  it 
•should  be  governed  in  accordance  with  the  prin- 
•ciples  of  business.     If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
a  governmental  organ,  it  should  be  governed  in 
accordance  with  the  principles  of  government.     If 
'a  city  is  a  business  corporation,  the  members  of 
'the   corporation  —  that   is,    those   who    ultimately 
•control    its   policy  —  should,    in    accordance   with 
the   principles  of   business,  be   those  pecuniarily 
interested  in  its  affairs.     If  it  is  an  organ  of  gov- 
ernment,  the    members   of    the    city   corporation 
should   be   those  to  whom  the  law  of   the   land 
gives  the  ultimate  determination  of  governmental 


THE  POSITION  OF  THE   CITY  2$ 

policy.  What  now  is  in  theory  the  proper  position 
for  the  city  to  occupy  ?  "  Municipal  corporations," 
as  Mr.  Matthews  has  well  said,  "  are  organized  not 
to  make  money,  but  to  spend  it.  Their  object  is 
government,  not  profit."  l  Municipal  corporations 
are  bodies  both  politic  and  corporate ;  they  are,  fur- 
ther, more  politic  than  they  are  corporate.  They 
have,  from  the  beginning  of  their  history,  had  more 
political  than  corporate  functions  to  discharge.  In- 
deed, in  their  original  English  form  they  were  bodies 
politic  without  being  corporate  at  all.  But  when 
the  original  English  municipality  became  a  corpora- 
tion, it  ceased  to  be  merely  a  governmental  agent, 
It  became  as  well  an  organ  for  the  satisfaction  of 
local  needs,  needs  which  while  quite  distinct  from 
the  general  governmental  needs  of  the  country 
were  still  of  a  social  and  governmental,  and  not  of 
a  mere  business  character.  A  municipal  corpora- 
tion is  to  be  differentiated  from  the  ordinary  gov- 
ernmental authority,  not  because  its  work  is  of  a 
business  character,  but  because  it  is  of  a  local 
character  interesting  only  indirectly  the  state  as  a 
whole.  For  the  sake  of  administrative  simplicity, 
and  in  order  to  obtain  decentralized  administra- 
tion—  what  Anglo-Saxon  peoples  call  local  self- 
government —  the  municipal  corporation  may  be 
made  use  of  by  the  state  as  its  agent.  But  the 
fact  that  it  acts  as  an  agent  of  the  state  does  not 
cause  it  to  cease  to  be  an  organ  for  the  satisfac- 

1  The  City  Government  of  Boston,  p.  189. 


26  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

tion  of  local  needs  any  more  than  it  causes  the 
state  business  to  which  the  city  attends  to  become 
municipal  business.  To  be  more  concrete,  the  fact 
that  a  city  has  charge  of  the  police  and  schools 
neither  takes  away  from  the  state  as  a  whole  its 
vital  interest  in  the  police  and  schools,  nor  causes 
such  matters  as  street  cleaning  and  municipal 
water  supply  to  be  matters  of  general  state  con- 
cern. In  the  one  case  the  city  is  acting  as  the 
agent  of  the  state.  In  the  other  it  is  ministering 
to  local  needs. 

The  statement  of  the  proper  position  of  the  city 
in  the  governmental  system  is,  therefore,  that  it  is 
always  a  public,  i.e.  a  governmental,  corporation. 
It  is,  however,  primarily  an  organ  for  local  gov- 
ernment—  for  the  satisfaction  of  local  needs.  It 
may  be,  and  often  is  secondarily,  an  agent  of 
state  government.  The  two  functions  which  the 
city  discharges  should  further  be  kept  distinct  the 
one  from  the  other. 

The  fact  that  a  city  which  occupies  its  proper 
position  in  the  governmental  system  has  two  some- 
what separate  spheres  of  action  leads  to  several 
concrete  results.  In  the  first  place,  the  fact  that 
a  city  is  an  agent  of  the  central  state  government, 
makes  it  necessary  to  give  to  the  central  state  gov- 
ernment some  control  over  it.  The  extent  of  this 
control  must,  of  course,  depend  upon  the  extent  to 
which  the  city  is  an  agent  of  the  state  government. 
If  it  is,  as  is  the  American  city,  attending  to 


THE  POSITION  OF  THE   CITY  2J 

almost  all  matters  of  central  concern  attended  to 
within  the  district  of  the  city,  this  control  must  of 
necessity  be  a  large  one.  If  it  is  a  large  one, 
American  experience  goes  far  to  prove  that  the 
legislative  authority,  which  in  our  system  of  gov- 
ernment both  ultimately  determines  the  bounds  of 
municipal  competency,  and  exercises  what  central 
control  over  cities  there  is,  is  apt  to  confuse  the 
sphere  of  local  competency  with  the  sphere  of 
state  agency,  and  to  extend  the  central  control 
over  both  spheres  of  action  indiscriminately.  If 
this  is  the  case,  the  position  of  the  city  as  an 
organ  for  the  satisfaction  of  local  needs  is  over- 
looked, as  is  actually  the  case  in  the  United 
States ;  and  the  city  is  ultimately  deprived  of  suf- 
ficient freedom  of  action  to  permit  of  any  great 
municipal  development,  and  even  of  good  govern- 
ment. If,  on  the  one  hand,  sufficient  account  is 
not  taken  of  the  important  central  state  functions 
which  the  city  discharges,  lack  of  uniformity  in 
administration  of  matters  of  general  concern, 
where  such  uniformity  is  one  of  the  prerequi- 
sites of  efficient  administration,  will  result.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  sufficient  attention  is  not 
directed  to  the  fact  that  the  city  is  an  important 
organ  for  the  satisfaction  of  local  needs,  the  city 
loses  its  powers  of  local  autonomy,  and  any  vigor 
ous  municipal  development  is  made  impossible. 

In  the  second  place,  the    position  of   the   city 
influences,  to   a   large   degree,   the   form   of   the 


28  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

municipal  organization.  For  if  the  city  is  merely 
an  organ  of  state  government,  the  determination 
of  the  policy  to  be  pursued  by  the  city  as  such 
state  agent  may  safely  and  properly  be  entrusted 
to  the  state  legislature,  which  is  the  body  that  de- 
termines the  policy  of  the  state  at  large.  No  local 
legislative  body  is  necessary.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  city  is  an  organ  for  the  satisfaction  of 
local  needs,  it  will  then  have  a  local  policy  which 
should  be  determined  by  some  local  legislative 
body,  if  the  principles  at  the  basis  of  representa- 
tive government  are  to  be  applied  in  the  case  of 
the  city.  Such  is  clearly  the  teaching  of  the  his- 
tory of  American  municipal  development.  The 
emphasis  given  to  the  state  agency  of  cities  has,  on 
account  of  the  failure  of  the  legislature  to  recog- 
nize any  sphere  of  municipal  activity,  resulted  in 
the  loss  by  the  cities  of  their  local  legislative 
powers ;  has  led  almost  to  the  destruction  of  the 
local  legislative  body,  the  city  council.  This  de- 
crease in  the  importance  of  the  municipal  legislat- 
ure has  itself  resulted  in  further  encroachment  by 
the  legislature  on  the  sphere  of  municipal  auton- 
omy, since  there  are  so  many  matters  connected 
with  the  determination  of  municipal  policy  which 
cannot  be  entrusted  to  executive  authorities  so 
long  as  we  continue  to  hold  to  our  general  prin- 
ciples of  government. 

Finally,  the  actual  position  of  the  city  in  the 
governmental  system  cannot  fail  to  have  an  im- 


THE  POSITION  OF  THE   CITY  29 

portant  influence  on  the  political  organization  and 
action  of  its  people,  and  on  the  attitude  of  the 
political  parties  of  the  state  as  a  whole  towards 
city  affairs.  In  the  first  place,  the  fact  that  it  is  a 
governmental  organization  makes  it  necessary  that 
universal  suffrage  shall  be  adopted  if  it  is  the  rule 
in  the  state.  In  the  second  place,  the  fact  that  the 
city  is  an  organization  for  the  satisfaction  of  local 
needs  will  have  an  important  influence  on  the 
political  action  of  its  citizens.  For  in  so  far  as  its 
local  and,  so  to  speak,  corporate  character  is  em- 
phasized, it  will  be  both  easier  for  the  municipal 
electors  to  give  to  purely  municipal  problems  the 
attention  they  deserve  and  must  have,  if  municipal 
government  is  to  be  actuated  by  purely  local  and 
municipal  motives  —  if  the  municipal  government  is 
to  have  regard  for  municipal  needs.  On  the  other 
hand,  just  so  far  as  the  state  agency  of  the  city  is 
emphasized,  just  so  far  will  the  people  of  the  city 
be  apt  to  carry  into  their  municipal  policy  the 
passions  and  prejudices  which  they  have  as  state 
electors.  For  the  issues  of  state,  and  in  the 
United  States  of  national  politics  as  well,  being  so 
much  larger,  and  from  one  point  of  view,  so  much 
more  important,  cannot  fail  to  overshadow  local 
issues.  Just  as  the  treatment  of  the  city  as  an 
agent  of  the  state,  rather  than  as  an  organ  for  the 
satisfaction  of  local  needs,  never  fails  to  result  in 
a  gradual  extension  of  the  central  control  over  local 
matters,  so  under  similar  conditions  do  local  politics 


30  MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 

become  subordinated  to  state  and  national  politics. 
The  fact  that  the  system  of  administration  in  force 
in  a  country  is  decentralized,  tends,  if  anything,  to 
increase  the  influence  of  state  and  national  poli- 
tics over  municipal  administration.  For,  in  such 
a  case,  it  is  all  the  easier  to  confuse  local  and  state 
issues.  Uncontrolled  local  administration  of  gen- 
eral laws  practically  not  only  results  in  the  grant 
of  ^Wewt-legislative  power,  certainly  a  local  veto 
power,  to  local  administrative  authorities,  but  also 
tends,  on  account  of  the  fact  that  the  central  legis- 
lature is  the  only  body  which  can  exercise  any 
control  over  the  localities  at  all,  to  lead  the  legis- 
lature, in  which  state  political  parties  must  have 
great  influence,  to  exercise  its  control  indiscrimi- 
nately over  matters  of  both  central  and  local  con- 
cern ;  tends  to  induce  the  feeling  on  the  part  both 
of  the  legislature  and  the  political  parties  that  all 
matters  attended  to  by  city  officers  are  of  interest 
to  the  state  as  a  whole,  are  a  part  of  state  politics. 
The  position  assigned  to  the  American  city  is 

wthus  not  the  proper  one.  While  we  must  concede 
that,  in  order  to  avoid  the  dangers  of  state  disinte- 
gration, the  legislature  should  theoretically  have 
large  powers  over  cities,  at  the  same  time  we 

.  ought  to  insist  that  the  legislative  policy  should  be 
such  as  to  permit  of  the  development  of  a  large 
sphere  of  municipal  action  in  which  the  cities  may 
move  free  from  legislative  interference.  Such, 
however,  has  not  been  the  policy  of  our  legisla- 


THE  POSITION  OF   THE   CITY  31 

.  tures,  which  have  made  use  of  their  large  powers 
.  over  cities  to  regulate  in  detail  all  the  actions  of 
.  cities,  thus  reducing  them  to  the  position  of  mere 
.  agents  of  general   state  administration.     The  re- 
sults of  this  theoretically  false  position  which  has 
been  assigned  to  our  cities,  have  been,  in  the  first 
place,  a  gradual  centralization  of  the  affairs  of  the 
city  in  the  hands  of  the  state  legislature,  and  the 
loss  by  the  city  of  local  legislative  powers ;  and,  in 
the  second  place,  the  determination  of  questions  of 
municipal  policy  by  other  than  municipal  consid- 
erations—  the  intrusion  of  the  state  and  national 
parties   into  municipal  politics.      This  last  result 
has  been  made  easier,  as  a  result  of  the  legislative 
centralization   just  referred  to,  since  of  necessity 
legislative  policy  generally  must  be  determined  by 
considerations  of  state  politics,  and  so  far  as  state 
r  politics  are  connected  with   national  politics,  by 
«  considerations  of   national  politics.     Undoubtedly 
•  the  proper  position  assigned  to  our  cities  by  the 
.  American  law  and  the  American  legislative  prac- 
\  tice  is  not  altogether  responsible  for  the  acknow- 
\  ledged  defects  of  American  municipal  government. 
I  Our  entire  government  has  been  debauched  by  the 
,  spoils  system,  against  which  vigorous  attacks  have 
been  made  in  the  immediate  past,  and  are  being 
made  now,  and  from  whose  destruction  great  good 
may  be  anticipated.     Further  false  principles  of 
administrative    organization   have   unquestionably 
been  followed  in  the  formation  of  our  city  govern- 


32  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

ments,  largely  as  a  result  of  the  attempt  to  cast 
our  municipal  organization  in  the  same  mould  as 
the  general  governmental  organization  of  the  state. 
But  that  the  position  assigned  to  the  city  by  the 
American  law  has  been  one  of  the  causes  of  the 
present  conditions  of  municipal  government  in 
the  United  States  cannot  be  successfully  denied. 
In  the  following  chapters  it  will  be  attempted 
to  ascertain  what  changes  in  the  American  ad- 
ministrative system  must  be  made  in  order  that  a 
correct  position  may  be  assigned  to  our  cities,  so 
that  they  both  may  be  sufficiently  subject  to  cen- 
tral control  to  form  efficient  agents  of  state  ad- 
ministration, and  have  sufficient  freedom  of  local 
action  to  permit  a  vigorous  municipal  develop- 
ment. Later  the  attempt  will  be  made  to  deter- 
mine what  effect  the  assignment  to  cities  of  their 
proper  position  will  have  on  the  political  organiza- 
tion of  the  municipal  population,  and  what  is  the 
form  of  municipal  administrative  organization 
which  is  demanded  by  American  conditions. 


CHAPTER   III 

THE   SPHERE   OF   MUNICIPAL    ACTIVITY 

IT  has  been  shown  that  the  city  has  primarily 
most  important  local  duties  to  perform,  and  in  their 
performance  must  be  allowed  large  freedom  of 
action  if  we  are  to  expect  great  local  development. 
How  now  should  its  sphere  of  local  activity  be  de- 
limited and  what  should  be  the  content  of  that 
sphere  ?  In  the  first  place,  how  shall  we  delimit  the 
city's  sphere  of  local  activity  ?  Up  to  the  present 
time  the  sphere  of  local  activity  of  the  American 
city  has  been  delimited  in  detail  by  the  legislature. 
The  reason  why  such  a  method  of  delimitation  has 
been  adopted  is  to  be  found  in  English  history. 
The  early  suppression  in  England  of  feudalism, 
with  its  ideas  of  local  autonomy,  made  impossible 
the  existence  of  autonomous  communities.  All 
parts  of  the  English  kingdom  were,  at  quite  an 
early  time,  subjected  to  the  law-making  power  of 
Parliament.  So  far  was  legislative  centralization 
carried  in  England  that  originally  all  corporate 
capacity  in  the  localities  was  denied.  In  other 
words,  localities  had  legallv  no  individuality,  no 
spnere  01  action  ol  their  own,  whicn  could  t>e  ais 
">  33 


34  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

tinguished  from  the  general  sphere  of  action  of 
the  state  as  a  whole.  They  were  from  the  point 
of  view  of  legislative  policy  mere  divisions  or  cir- 
cumscriptions in  which  the  general  statutes  of  the 
kingdom  were  administered.  The  boroughs  did, 
it  is  true,  obtain  at  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century t 
corporate  capacity,  but  the  corporate  capacity  they 
obtained  was  not  extended  to  any  other  of  the 
localities  until  very  recently.  The  English  county 
became  a  corporation  only  in  1888,  the  parish  only 
in  1894.  Further,  the  corporate  capacity  con- 
ferred upon  the  boroughs  merely  made  it  possible 
for  them  to  own  property  and  sue  and  be  sued,  i.e. 
gave  them  a  legal  individuality  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  private  law.  It  did  not  at  first  have 
any  influence  upon  their  governmental  position, 
i.e.  it  did  not  have  any  appreciable  influence  on 
their  public  legal  relations.  The  idea  was  held, 
after  as  before  the  grant  to  them  of  corporate 
capacity,  that  boroughs  were,  so  far  as  the  exer- 
cise of  governmental  powers  was  concerned,  merely 
the  delegates  of  the  central  Parliament  or  legisla- 
ture in  which  was  concentrated  ultimately  all  gov- 
ernmental power.  The  concrete  legal  effect  of 
this  idea  upon  the  position  of  the  modern  city, 
both  English  and  American,  and  more  particularly 
upon  the  latter,  as  a  result  of  our  last  century  of 
development,  is  that  it  is  practically  an  authority 
of  enumerated  powers.  The  courts  as  well  as  the 
legislature  are  responsible  for  this  condition  of 


THE   SPHERE    OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY         35 

things,  inasmuch  as  they  have  very  generally 
adopted  the  rule  that  the  powers  granted  in  muni- 
cipal charters  are  to  be  given  a  strict  construction. 
But  even  when  they  have  treated  municipal  powers 
in  a  more  liberal  spirit,  their  efforts  have  been  very 
largely  unavailing.  For  the  discharge  of  the  func- 
tions of  the  modern  complex  municipal  organiza- 
tion requires  the  expenditure  of  an  enormous 
amount  of  money.  This  it  is  impossible  for  most 
American  cities,  which  are  not  generally  endowed 
with  large  amounts  of  property,  to  obtain,  without 
resorting  to  the  taxing  power,  directly  through  the 
levying  of  taxes,  including  within  these  local  assess- 
ments, indirectly  through  borrowing  money  to  be 
paid  out  of  the  proceeds  of  taxation.  Now  the 
English  and  American  law  has  always  followed 
the  rule  that  the  taxing  power  can  be  exercised 
only  with  the  consent  of  the  people,  which  is  to 
be  given  by  its  representatives,  to  be  found  in 
the  legislature.  The  fact  is  then  that,  as  a  result 
of  our  ideas  of  the  supremacy  of  the  legislature, 
and  of  our  habits,  based  on  long  years  of  prece- 
dents, of  legislative  centralization,  the  American 
city  is  completely  at  the  mercy  of  the  legislature, 
both  so  far  as  its  local  governmental  powers  and  its 
financial  resources  are  concerned.  The  constitu- 
tions which  have  been  adopted  in  this  country  have 
not  protected  it,*  so  far  as  its  public  powers  were 
concerned,  since  the  grant  of  governmental  powers 
has  never  been  construed  as  a  contract  whose  obli- 


36  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

gation  could  not  be  impaired.  As  no  legislature 
is  far-seeing  enough  to  be  able  to  determine  for  all 
time  what  powers  it  may  be  expedient  for  a  city  to 
exercise,  the  legislature  cannot,  even  under  the 
regime  of  special  charters  for  cities,  give  a  city 
powers  which  will  be  permanently  satisfactory  so 
long  as  these  powers  are  enumerated.  The  regime 
of  special  charters  may  be  satisfactory  as  a  means 
of  differentiating  cities  on  the  basis  of  geographi- 
cal and  other  local  variations.  It  can  never,  so 
long  as  charter  powers  are  enumerated,  make 
allowance  for  the  changes  in  municipal  conditions 
brought  about  by  the  mere  passage  of  time.  As 
a  result  of  these  changing  conditions,  American 
cities  are  forced  to  apply  continually  to  the  legis- 
lature for  new  and  extended  local  powers.  Such 
powers  are  often  granted  nuncpro  tune  -through  the 
exercise  of  the  power  the  legislature  possesses  to 
ratify  illegal  action.  Although  the  exercise  of  such 
a  power  is  subject  to  abuse,  its  recognition  seems 
to  be  absolutely  necessary,  for  the  legislature  which 
delimits  the  sphere  of  municipal  competence  is  not 
always  in  session,  and  in  many  cases  municipal 
authorities  are  not  able  to  wait,  before  exercising 
necessary  powers,  until  the  legislature  can  be 
called  together  and  pass  the  necessary  legislation. 
Such  powers  must  be  exercised,  and,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  they  are  exercised,  and  then  appeal  is 
made  to  the  legislature  to  ratify  the  action  already 
had  of  the  local  authorities.  No  better  illustration 


THE   SPHERE    OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY       37 

of  this  method  of  action  can  be  found  than  is  given 
in  the  case  of  Hasbrouck  v.  Milwaukee.1  Here 
the  city  was  empowered  to  spend  a  certain  sum  on 
its  harbor.  It  spent  more,  and  the  question  arose 
as  to  the  power  of  the  legislature  to  ratify  its 
action.  In  this  particular  case  it  was  decided  that 
while  the  legislature  might  take  such  action  when 
requested  so  to  do  by  the  city,  it  could  not  with- 
out the  assent  of  the  city.  Further,  our  system  of 
administration  is  not  a  professional  one,  and  the 
authorities  which  exercise  administrative  powers 
have  not  great  legal  knowledge.  Indeed,  one  of 
the  effects  of  special  legislation  itself  is  to  make 
it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  even  bodies  quite 
learned  in  the  law  to  know  exactly  what  the  law 
is.2  So  that  with  the  best  of  intentions  it  is  not 
infrequently  the  case  that  administrative  bodies 
will  exceed  their  powers,  and  will  have  to  appeal 
to  the  legislature  to  ratify  their  actions.  A  large 
part  of  the  work  of  the  legislature  under  the 
regime  of  special  legislation  consists  thus  in  ratify- 
ing illegal  acts  of  local  bodies.  This  has  been 
generally  held  by  the  courts  to  be  a  perfectly 
proper  exercise  of  legislative  power. 

The  necessity  of  changing  and  extending  local 
powers,  which  are  enumerated  by  the  legislature 
in  great  detail,  has  brought  about  an  immense 
amount  of  special  legislation,  and  the  legislature, 

1  13  Wisconsin,  37. 

2  See  the  remarks  of  Judge  Church,  cited  above,  p.  8. 


38  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

accustomed  to  regulate  by  special  act  municipal 
affairs,  on  the  proposition  of  the  various  cities,  and 
obliged  to  exercise  through  special  legislation  the 
necessary  central  control  over  matters  attended  to 
by  cities,  but  of  vital  interest  to  the  state  as  a 
whole,  has  got  into  the  habit  of  passing  special 
legislation  with  regard  to  purely  municipal  matters 
of  its  own  motion,  not  only  without  the  consent  of 
the  local  people,  but  often  against  their  will  and 
for  reasons  not  infrequently  unconnected  in  any 
way  with  the  local  welfare,  —  reasons  connected 
rather  with  the  exigencies  of  partisan  politics. 
The  condition  of  things  which  has  resulted  from 
this  habit  of  the  legislature  is  one  about  which 
there  is  no  difference  of  opinion.  Whatever  dif- 
ferences of  opinion  there  may  be  as  to  details  in 
municipal  organization,  and  that  there  are  many 
with  regard  to  most  important  details  we  must 
admit,  all  who  have  studied  the  subject  agree  on 
this  point,  that  the  continual  interference  of  the 
legislature  in  purely  municipal  matters  is  gradu- 
ally depriving  the  cities  of  the  United  States  of 
almost  all  local  self-government,  so  far  as  the  de- 
termination of  the  policy  of  the  municipality  is 
concerned.  In  those  states  where  such  central 
interference  has  been  most  marked,  the  people  of 
the  cities  have  very  largely  lost  interest  in  muni- 
cipal government,  and  whenever  they  desire  to 
see  some  concrete  municipal  policy  adopted,  their 
point  of  attack  is  the  state  legislature  rather  than 


THE   SPHERE   OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY       39 

any  local  and  municipal  organ.  Thus  it  will  be 
remembered  that  in  the  city  of  New  York,  when 
it  was  desired  to  reform  the  system  of  cleaning  the 
streets,  most  of  the  agitation  which  was  carried  on 
was  carried  on  with  the  purpose  of  obtaining  legis- 
lative rather  than  municipal  action.  In  New  York 
city  the  people  have  become  so  accustomed  to  this 
method  of  action  that  they  regard  it  as  perfectly 
natural  and  normal.  The  only  fact  which  has 
saved  us  from  a  complete  centralization,  has  been 
the  existence  of  our  historic  decentralized  adminis- 
trative system,  that  is,  our  local  self-government, 
to  which  attention  will  be  directed  in  the  next 
chapter.  '  While  legislative  matters  have  been 
highly  centralized,  our  administrative  system,  which 
was  decentralized  when  we  received  it  from  Eng- 
land, has  been  further  decentralized  in  its  devel- 
opment in  this  country  particularly  through  the 
adoption  of  the  principle  of  local  election,  and 
through  the  grant  to  locally  chosen  municipal 
officers  of  functions  of  general  government.  The 
power  of  the  local  people  to  elect  their  own 
officers,  is,  indeed,  protected  by  constitutional  pro- 
visions in  many  states.  While  administrative  de- 
centralization may  have  accelerated  the  tendency 
towards  legislative  centralization,  because  of  the 
fact  that  under  such  a  system  the  legislature  is 
the  only  guardian  of  the  general  interests,  is  the 
only  body  which  may  exercise  any  central  control 
over  cities,  it  has  undoubtedly  somewhat  amelio- 


4O  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

rated  our  condition.  For  local  administration  of 
general  legislation  really  means  adaptation  by 
local  bodies  of  general  laws  to  local  conditions. 
As  a  necessary  result  local  administration  has  had 
a  part  to  play  in  the  determination  of  municipal 
policy.  It  cannot  be  questioned  that  the  giving 
of  the  power  to  local  bodies,  to  administer  a  law 
which  may  be  theoretically  of  general  interest, 
really  makes  the  law  a  question  of  municipal 
policy,  as  witness  the  attitude  of  local  bodies 
towards  the  excise  and  prohibition  laws.  The  de- 
termination of  municipal  policy  thus  practically 
put  into  the  hands  of  municipal  authorities,  is, 
however,  negative,  rather  than  positive.  That  is, 
municipal  authorities  may  practically,  and  do  some- 
times actually,  refuse  or  neglect  to  enforce  general 
statutes  of  the  legislature  which  they  regard  as 
unsuited  to  the  localities  which  they  represent,  but 
they  cannot  by  any  positive  action  enlarge  or 
change  the  policy  of  the  city,  as  this  is  determined 
by  the  statutes  which  delimit  their  competence. 

This  determination  by  the  legislature,  in  detail, 
by  means  of  special  legislation,  of  the  policy 
of  the  cities,  it  has  been  said,  all  are  agreed 
is  improper.  The  conviction  of  its  impropriety  is 
seen  in  the  more  recent  state  constitutions,  a 
majority  of  which  have  forbidden  special  legisla- 
tion relative  to  cities.1  These  constitutional  pro- 
visions prohibiting  special  legislation  relative  to 

1  See,  for  details,  Goodnow,  Municipal  Home  Rule,  Chap.  V. 


THE  SPHERE   OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY      41 

cities  have  proven  almost  complete  failures. 
Their  failure  is  due  to  the  attitude  which  the 
courts  have  assumed  towards  them.  Very  gen- 
erally the  courts  have  held  that  the  existence  of 
such  constitutional  provisions  does  not  prevent  the 
legislature  from  so  classifying  municipal  corpora- 
tions that  at  the  time  the  classification  is  made, 
only  one  city  will  be  found  in  a  class.  The  courts 
regard  classification  as  necessary,  believing  that, 
without  it,  certain  cities,  peculiarly  situated,  would 
be  deprived  of  all  means  of  development.1  The 
result  is  that  legislation  which  is  really  special  in 
its  application,  i.e.  affects  one  city  only,  will,  be- 
cause it  is  general  in  form,  i.e.  may  apply  in  the 
future  to  more  than  one  city,  be  perfectly  constitu- 
tional notwithstanding  a  constitutional  provision 
forbidding  special  legislation  regarding  cities.  In 
Ohio,  which  it  is  believed  was  the  first  state  to 
adopt  the  rule  requiring  general  legislation  rela- 
tive to  cities,  the  failure  of  the  provision  is  most 
marked.  Hon.  E.  J.  Blandin  says : 2  "To  exhibit 
the  absurd  length  to  which  this  vice  of  classifica- 
tion has  been  carried,  under  this  unfortunate  atti- 
tude of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  state,  I  cannot 
do  better  than  quote  a  few  words  from  an  address 
by  Judge  A.  C.  Voris,  of  Akron,  recently  delivered 

1  Ibid.     See  also  Wheeler  v.  Philadelphia,  77  Penn.  St.  338. 

2  In  an  article  on  the  "  Uniform  Organization  for  Cities  in  Ohio," 
contained  in  the  report  of  the  "  Minneapolis  and  Cleveland  Confer- 
ences for  Good  City  Government,"  p.  454,  particularly  on  p.  455. 


42  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

before  a  Committee  of  the  Ohio  State  Board  of 
Commerce.  He  said :  '  Here  is  the  way  the  last 
general  assembly  classified  municipal  corporations 
for  the  state  —  and,  by  the  way,  it  is  the  second 
act  of  the  same  legislature  for  the  same  purpose. 
By  act  of  March  13,  1894,  amending  the  act  of 
February  6,  a  law  just  five  weeks  old,  municipal 
corporations  are  divided  into  cities,  villages,  and 
hamlets ;  cities  are  divided  into  two  classes,  first 
and  second ;  cities  of  the  first  class  are  divided 
into  three  grades,  first,  second,  and  third ;  cities  of 
the  second  class  are  divided  into  seven  grades,  first, 
second,  third,  third  grade  A,  third  grade  B,  fourth 
and  fourth  grade  A  ;  and  cities  of  the  second  class, 
which  thereafter  become  cities  of  the  first  class, 
shall  constitute  the  fourth  grade  of  the  latter  class ; 
and  villages  which  thereafter  become  cities,  shall 
belong  to  the  fourth  grade  of  the  second  class. 

" '  This  division  is  based  upon  the  following 
numerical  basis  of  inhabitants :  First  class,  first 
grade,  200,000  and  upwards ;  first  class,  second 
grade,  more  than  90,000  and  less  than  200,000; 
first  class,  third  grade,  more  than  31,500  and  less 
than  90,000;  first  class,  fourth  grade,  cities  ad- 
vanced from  second  class  thereafter ;  second  class, 
first  grade,  over  30,500  and  less  than  31,500;  sec- 
ond class,  second  grade,  over  20,000  and  less  than 
30,500;  second  class,  third  grade,  over  10,000  and 
less  than  20,000;  second  class,  third  grade  A, 
over  28,000  and  less  than  33,000;  second  class, 


THE   SPHERE    OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY       43 

third  grade  B,  over  16,000  and  less  than  18,000; 
second  class,  fourth  grade,  over  5,000  and  less 
than  10,000;  second  class,  fourth  grade  A,  over 
8,330  and  less  than  9,500;  villages,  first  class  over 
3,000  and  less  than  5,000 ;  villages,  second  class, 
over  200  and  less  than  3,000. 

" '  An  analysis  of  this  classification  will  show 
that  second  class,  third  grade  A,  for  all  such  cities 
having  31,500  inhabitants,  and  upwards  to  33,000, 
are  embraced  in  first  class  cities  of  the  third  grade, 
and  all  such  cities  having  more  than  28,000  and 
less  than  30,500  are  embraced  in  second  class 
cities  of  the  second  grade;  and  second  class  cities 
of  third  grade  B  come  wholly  within  cities  of  the 
second  class,  third  grade;  and  all  second  class 
cities  of  the  fourth  grade  A  come  wholly  within 
the  fourth  grade  of  second  class  cities.  The 
grades  designated  by  the  letters  A  and  B  consti- 
tute insensible  grades,  because  by  general  law  no 
city  advances  to  a  higher  grade  by  force  of  the 
statute  until  the  city  shall  have  first  secured  the 
consent  of  its  voters,  given  at  an  election  had  for 
that  purpose.  So  that  a  reasonable  classification 
based  upon  similar  conditions  can  readily  be  ac- 
commodated to  the  wishes  of  the  inhabitants  who 
may  remain  at  will  or  advance  in  grade  as  they 
may  see  fit,  having  the  requisite  population.  The 
city  of  Akron  might  be  a  city  of  the  first  class, 
third  grade,  if  its  inhabitants  wanted  it,  instead  of 
being  a  city  of  the  second  class,  third  grade,  as  it 


44  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

now  is,  and  at  the  election  of  its  inhabitants.  I  said 
Akron  was  recognized  as  a  second  class  city  of  the 
third  grade ;  it  is  so,  nominally,  but  it  has  so  many 
other  hybrid  grades  applicable  to  it  by  special  enact- 
ments, under  the  guise  of  general  laws,  that  no  man 
knows  what  laws  are  applicable  to  it.  You  may 
think  this  an  extravagant  statement,  but  for  years 
our  mayors,  city  solicitors,  common  councils,  and 
other  ofBcers  have  radically  disagreed  as  to  its  legal 
status,  as  caprice  and  partisan  interest  dictated,  and 
acted  officially  accordingly.' 

"The  usual  way  of  enacting  forbidden  special 
laws  by  this  specious  method  of  classification  is 
illustrated  by  the  following :  '  That  in  cities  of  the 
second  class,  third  grade,  which  at  the  Federal 
Census  of  1890  had,  or  at  any  subsequent  Federal 
Census  shall  have,  a  population  of  not  less  than 
27,690  nor  more  than  27,720,  the  office,'  etc.,  an 
attempted  classification  based  on  a  difference  of 
only  thirty  inhabitants,  a  condition  not  likely  ever 
to  arise  for  any  other  city,  and  if  it  did  arise,  fur- 
nishing no  reason  whatever  why  an  office  therein 
should  be  either  created  or  abolished,  or  that  the 
officer  should  be  chosen  for  any  different  term  of 
office  or  elected  with  any  other  different  functions 
or  powers. 

"  To  everybody  except  the  honorable  judges  of 
the  Supreme  Court  this  is  a  plain  evasion  of  the 
Constitution,  and  to  everybody  except  the  partisan 
politicians  who  make  use  of  the  opportunity  it 


THE  SPHERE   OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY      45 

affords  to  jockey  away  a  market  inspector  in 
Cleveland  for  a  street  commissioner  in  Cincinnati, 
and  another  plum  in  Toledo  for  still  another  in 
Columbus,  by  using  the  general  assembly  to  au- 
thorize the  deal,  it  is  as  humorously  absurd  as  it  is 
deeply  to  be  regretted  by  all  honest  people. 

"  In  this  long  list  of  classes  and  grades  of  cities, 
thus  sanctioned  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  an  evil 
hour,  there  are  as  many  different  forms  of  or- 
ganization as  there  are  grades  and  classes.  No 
two  are  alike,  and  no  one  of  them  all  is  likely  to 
remain  as  it  is  through  the  next  session  of  the 
legislature.  With  each  recurring  election  partisan 
interests  will  see  a  way  by  which  some  official  can 
be  displaced  by  a  special  act  and  another  appointed 
by  some  local  or  state  authority  friendly  to  the 
aspirant  for  the  place  thus  made  vacant.  This  is 
done  repeatedly  without  the  knowledge  of  the  peo- 
ple of  the  city  affected,  and  without  the  knowledge 
or  care  of  any  member  of  the  general  assembly  ex- 
cept those  locally  concerned,  and  all  in  compliance 
with  a  constitutional  provision,  which  requires  the 
act  to  be  uniform  throughout  the  state."1 

The  peculiar  form  in  which  the  constitutional 
provisions  of  Ohio  were  put,  was  undoubtedly 
partially  responsible  for  the  attitude  of  the  courts ; 
but  it  is  as  undoubtedly  true  that  the  needs  of 

1  See  also  Wilcox,  Municipal  Government  in  Michigan  and 
Ohio,  p.  72  et  seq. ;  Columbia  College  Studies  in  History,  Economics, 
and  Public  Law,  Vol.  V. 


46  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

cities  actually  required  special  legislation.  The 
fact  that  the  courts  of  other  states,  when  called 
upon  to  construe  similar  constitutional  provisions, 
similar  at  any  rate  from  the  point  of  view  of  their 
purpose,  reached  the  same  conclusion,1  is  evidence 
that  in  the  present  state  of  our  law,  constitutional 
provisions  absolutely  prohibiting  special  legislation 
relative  to  cities  are  impracticable.  The  reason 
why  they  are  impracticable  is  that  in  almost  all 
cases  the  powers  conferred  by  general  municipal 
corporations  acts  passed  in  pursuance  of  such  con- 
stitutional provisions  are  either  inadequate  or  are 
enumerated  in  such  detail  that  changes  in  them  in 
the  case  of  particular  cities  are  absolutely  necessary 
if  municipal  government  therein  is  to  be  carried 
on  satisfactorily.  Here  the  experience  of  Ohio  is 
very  instructive.  The  law  passed  in  i852,2  to 
which  reference  has  already  been  made,  sinned 
in  these  two  particulars.  Judge  Dillon3  calls  at- 
tention to  the  fact  that  the  powers  and  privileges 
of  the  bodies  formed  by  this  act  were  "  specified 
with  great  minuteness,  twenty  sections  of  the  act 
being  devoted  to  this  purpose."  Further,  a  perusal 
of  the  act  will  show  that  the  extent  of  the  financial 
powers  given  to  cities,  upon  which  will  depend  the 
actual  extent  of  their  municipal  powers,  as  has  been 

1  See  Goodnow,  Municipal  Home  Rule,  Chap.  V. 

2  Act  of  May  3,  1852. 

8  In  the  third  edition  of  his  work  on  Municipal  Corporations, 
on  p.  57,  Note  I. 


THE   SPHERE    OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY      47 

shown,  was  very  narrow.  The  power  to  tax  was 
indeed  given,  but  was  seriously  limited.  The 
power  of  local  assessment  was  also  given,  but  was 
also  subject  to  serious  limitations,  while  the  power 
to  borrow  money  was  not  recognized  at  all,  except 
in  anticipation  of  revenue,  and  never  to  exceed 
certain  specified  amounts.  An  examination  of  the 
special  legislation  passed  afterwards,  will  show 
that  by  far  the  greater  part  was  due  to  the  ne- 
cessity of  applying  to  the  legislature  for  further 
financial,  particularly  borrowing,  powers,  whose 
exercise  was  absolutely  necessary  if  undertakings 
necessary  to  the  welfare  of  the  cities  concerned 
were  to  be  entered  into.  Thus,  from  1876  to 
1892,  594  out  of  1 202  special  acts  affecting  cities 
and  villages  conferred  power  to  borrow  money ; 
while  1124  of  the  1202,  or  over  ninety-three  per 
cent,  conferred  financial  powers.  Sixty  of  these 
permitted  the  levy  of  special  taxes,  and  470  the 
transfer  of  funds.1  General  municipal  corpora- 
tions acts  are  then  impracticable,  so  long  as  the 
principle  of  enumerating  powers,  narrow  in  extent, 
is  adhered  to.  The  imperious  demands  of  specific 
cities  will  override  all  constitutional  provisions 
requiring  general  municipal  corporations  acts. 

But  are  we  then  to  abandon  the  idea  of  general 
acts,  and  reconcile  ourselves  to  the  regime  of 
special  acts  which,  it  has  been  shown,  are  so 
fraught  with  evil  ?  Such  a  step  does  not  seem  to 

1  Wilcox,  op.  cit.  p.  79. 


48  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

be  necessary.  The  experience  of  France,  Prussia, 
and  England,  which,  in  the  order  named,  adopted 
the  principle  of  general  municipal  corporations 
acts,  and  whose  successful  experience  in  municipal 
government  has  been  so  exhaustively  described  by 
Dr.  Albert  Shaw,1  would  seem  to  indicate  that 
such  a  conclusion  is  not  only  unnecessary,  but 
would  actually  be  the  wrong  one  to  make.  While 
the  adoption  of  these  general  municipal  corpora- 
tions acts  on  the  continent  was  either  the  means  by 
which  the  crown  realized  its  purpose  to  subject  all 
cities  to  the  central  power,  as  in  France,  or  conse- 
quent upon  the  assumption  of  power  over  them  by 
the  central  government,  as  in  Prussia,  the  actual, 
final  result  of  their  adoption  was  both  to  confer 
upon  cities  a  large  measure  of  home  rule  in  purely 
local  matters,  and  to  provide  a  method  by  which 
the  general  system  might  be  adapted  to  local  con- 
ditions. In  Prussia  this  result  was  reached  first. 
This  was  accomplished  in  the  Municipal  Corpora- 
tions Act  of  1808,  which,  framed  by  Baron  Stein, 
was  strongly  influenced  by  English  principles  of 
local  self-government.  In  France,  where  the  Na- 
poleonic centralization  retarded  the  development, 
the  result  was  not  reached  until  the  passage  of  the 
Municipal  Code  of  April  5th,  1884.2  In  England 

1  Municipal   Government  in    Great  Britain   and  Municipal 
Government  in  Continental  Europe. 

2  For  a  translation  of  this  act,  which,  apart  from  the  provisions 
relative  to  local  autonomy,  was  a  consolidation  of  an  act  of  1800 


THE  SPHERE   OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY      49 

the  development  was  somewhat  different.  There 
the  mediaeval  municipal  corporations  never  had  the 
same  powers  as  were  possessed  by  the  continental 
cities  of  the  same  period,  owing  to  the  greater 
centralization  in  Parliament  of  all  legislative  mat- 
ters, to  which  attention  has  been  called.  Further, 
their  connection  with  the  central  politics  of  the 
country  had  quite  early  in  their  history  incapaci- 
tated them  for  the  performance  of  administrative 
work.  As  Dr.  Shaw  well  says : l  "  Their  character 
as  parliamentary  constituencies  tempted  the  arbi- 
trary Tudor  sovereigns  and  still  more  their  suc- 
cessors, the  Stuarts.  It  was  for  the  interest  of 
these  sovereigns  to  restrict  the  corporations  to  the 
smallest  membership,  to  make  them  as  close  and 
non-representative  as  possible,  and  to  bring  them, 
by  every  available  means,  under  royal  influence 
and  control.  The  course  of  their  degeneration  is 
a  long  story,  the  details  of  which  are  different  for 
each  town.  But  the  principle  at  work  was  usu- 
ally the  same.  The  immediately  governing  body 
in  most^ towns  gradually  became  a  handful  of  men 
forming  a  close,  self -perpetuating  corporation.  In 
many  instances  the  crown  packed  the  town  gov- 
erning bodies  with  honorary  non-resident  freemen. 

together  with  its  amendments,  see  the  appendix  to  Shaw,  Munici- 
pal Government  in  Continental  Europe.  As  the  latest  general 
municipal  corporations  act,  and  because  of  its  large  grant  of  local 
power  to  cities,  it  is  deserving  of  careful  study. 

1  Municipal  Government  in  Great  Britain^  p.  23. 
E 


50  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

The  corporations  of  men  chartered  to  rule  the 
communities  became  less  and  less  representative 
of  the  mass  of  the  town  dwellers,  and  more  and 
more  irresponsible."  The  reform  came,  however, 
in  1835,  when  a  general  act  was  passed  whose 
purpose  was  to  restore  to  the  people  of  the  cities 
the  powers  which  had  been  usurped  by  narrow 
cliques  of  persons  more  interested  in  national  poli- 
tics than  in  municipal  development. 

Why  is  it  now  that  general  municipal  corpora- 
tions acts  have  worked  successfully  on  the  conti- 
nent and  in  England,  and  have  not  been  successful 
in  this  country  ?  The  reason  of  their  success  on 
the  continent  is  apparent,  and  is  to  be  found  in 
the  fact  that  the  local  powers  conferred  on  cities 
are  not  enumerated,  but  are  to  be  found  in  a  gen- 
eral grant.  The  most  notable  example  of  this  is 
to  be  found  in  the  French  Municipal  Code  of 
1884.  In  Article  61  is  contained  the  grant  of 
power,  which  is  as  follows :  "  The  municipal  coun- 
cil regulates  by  its  deliberations  the  affairs  of  the 
commune."  The  same  is  true  of  the  Prussian  muni- 
cipal corporations  acts.1  In  other  words,  the  con- 
tinental municipal  corporations  acts  are  general  in 
more  senses  than  one.  They  are  not  only  general 
in  that  they  apply  to  all  cities ;  they  are  also  gen- 
eral in  that  they  do  not  descend  into  much  detail 
as  to  the  competence  of  the  corporations  which 
they  establish.  To  us,  who  are  accustomed  to  the 

1  See  Goodnow,  Mtmicipal  Home  Rule,  p.  252. 


THE  SPHERE    OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY      51 

enumerated  powers  given  to  our  cities  by  our 
state  legislatures,  this  idea  is  difficult  to  grasp. 
Further,  with  our  preconceived  ideas  in  favor  of 
legislative  centralization,  which  are  based  on  long 
centuries  of  experience,  such  a  method  of  distribut- 
ing powers  seems  dangerous.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered, however,  that  such  a  general  grant  of  power 
does  not  erect  a  city  into  an  imperium  in  imperio, 
for  the  grant  of  power  is  only  as  to  the  "  affairs  of 
the  city."  It  does  not  in  and  of  itself  confer  any 
powers  of  a  general  character,  which  are  still  pos- 
sessed by  the  state  government ;  but  it  does  insure 
to  the  cities  a  large  measure  of  local  autonomy,  so 
far  as  the  determination  of  mere  municipal  policy 
is  concerned.  Under  such  a  system  what  are  local 
and  what  are  general  affairs  must,  of  course,  be 
determined ;  and  such  a  determination  is  reached 
by  a  consideration  of  the  entire  administrative  law. 
If  any  provision  of  that  law  confers  a  specific 
power  upon  some  other  authority  than  a  municipal 
council,  whatever  may  be  the  theoretical  nature  of 
that  power,  it  ceases  to  be  a  municipal  power,  and 
as  such  within  the  competence  of  the  municipal 
council.  But  as  a  result  of  this  method  of  deter- 
mination, it  may  be  said  that  the  city  is  an  author- 
ity of  general,  rather  than  of  enumerated  powers. 
This,  it  will  be  admitted,  is  a  very  important  step 
taken  in  the  direction  of  local  autonomy,  particu- 
larly as  the  power  of  fixing  the  details  of  the  muni- 
cipal organization  is  vested  almost  completely  in 


52  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

the  council  and  the  municipal  executive  elected 
by  it.  That  is,  each  city,  through  its  organs  pro- 
vided by  the  general  act,  can  adapt  the  general 
scheme  to  its  own  peculiar  local  conditions.  The 
extraordinary  elasticity  of  such  a  scheme  is  brought 
out  most  emphatically  when  attention  is  called  to 
the  fact  that  the  French  act  of  1884  applies  in  its 
general  provisions  not  merely  to  all  cities  but  also 
to  all  villages  and  townships,  and  that  it  has 
worked  satisfactorily  in  both  cases  for  more  than 
three-quarters  of  a  century,  the  general  plan  of 
the  act  of  1884  having  been  taken  from  an  act  of 
1800.  But  a  further  perusal  of  the  act  of  1884,  as 
indeed  of  any  of  the  continental  municipal  cor- 
porations acts,  will  show  that  the  municipality  is 
not  allowed  absolutely  free  hand,  either  in  the 
management  of  its  finances  or  in  the  discharge  of 
its  functions  as  an  agent  of  the  state  government. 
In  these  cases,  as  also  in  a  few  others,  it  is  sub- 
jected to  a  central  control,  the  character  and  ex- 
tent of  which  will  be  considered  later. 

In  England,  conditions  are  somewhat  different. 
Although  a  general  municipal  corporations  act 
was  adopted  in  1835,  and  has  been  retained  up  to 
the  present  time,  being  re-enacted,  with  the  amend- 
ments made  to  it  in  the  mean  time,  in  1882,  it  can 
hardly  be  said  that  the  success  which  has  attended 
the  English  system  of  municipal  government  has 
been  due  to  any  general  grant  of  local  power  con- 
tained in  the  act.  The  idea  of  legislative  cen- 


THE   SPHERE    OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY       53, 

tralization  and  enumerated  local  powers  was  too 
deeply  imbedded  in  the  English  mind  to  permit 
of  the  adoption  of  such  a  method  of  granting  local 
powers.  The  English  cities  still  remained,  under 
the  act  of  1835,  as  they  were  before  its  passage, 
authorities  of  enumerated  powers,  and  the  needs 
of  special  and  particular  cities  have  made  it  neces- 
sary to  encroach  somewhat  on  the  general  act,  which 
has  been  modified  in  its  application  to  specific  cities 
by  the  passage  of  considerable  special  legislation.1 
Further  experience  has  proved  that  the  powers 
granted  by  the  general  act  were  in  many  cases  in- 

1  See  De  Franqueville,  Le  Parlement  et  le  Gouvernemtnt  Brit- 
taniques,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  206.  It  is  said  here  in  a  foot-note  that  since 
the  year  1800,  two  hundred  and  fifty  special  acts  have  been  passed 
relative  to  the  city  of  Glasgow.  On  page  207  the  author  calls  atten- 
tion to  the  necessity  of  special  legislation  under  the  English  system 
of  enumerated  powers,  in  the  following  language:  "Thus  local 
authorities  are  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  the  legislature  just  so 
soon  as  they  wish  to  act  outside  of  the  comparatively  narrow  sphere 
of  their  ordinary  powers."  Again,  on  page  206,  he  says :  "  Much  is 
said,  and  with  reason,  of  the  system  of  decentralization  which  leaves 
to  local  authorities  so  much  freedom  of  action ;  but  it  is  too  often 
forgotten  that  there  is  a  central  control,  that  is,  the  power  which  is 
reserved  to  the  legislature.  A  mayor  is  independent  of  the  execu- 
tive power  to  a  very  large  degree,  but  neither  he  nor  his  municipal 
council  can  authorize  a  company  to  open  a  street  of  the  city  to  put 
their  gas  pipes  or  water*  pipes  there.  The  Metropolitan  Board  of 
Public  Wosks  of  London  could  not  place  upon  a  pedestal  an  Egyp- 
tian obelisk  which  was  offered  to  it,  nor  bind  itself  to  maintain 
this  monument,  without  obtaining  a  private  bill ;  and  when  it  asked 
for  authorization  to  accept,  in  the  future,  gifts  of  this  character,  and 
the  power  to  maintain  them,  Parliament  absolutely  refused  its  per- 
mission," citing  act  of  35  and  36  Victoria,  Chap.  91. 


54  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

adequate,  and  as  the  experience  of  particular  cities 
has  proved  that  they  were  inadequate,  new  and 
greater  powers  have  been  granted  to  such  particu- 
lar cities  by  special  acts,  so  that,  strictly  speak- 
ing, the  experience  of  England  has  been  the 
same  as  that  of  this  country.  General  municipal 
corporations  acts,  so  long  as  only  narrow  local 
powers  have  been  granted,  and  so  long  as  such 
powers  were  enumerated,  have  shown  themselves 
to  be  inadequate.  The  English  law  has  not  been 
reduced  to  the  absurd  condition  of  the  American 
law  in  this  respect,  as  seen  in  the  law  of  Ohio, 
because  the  English  Parliament  was  nowhere  for- 
bidden to  pass  special  acts.  But  while  special 
legislation  relative  to  cities  has  not  been  uncom- 
mon since  the  passage  of  the  general  act  of  1835, 
several  things  have  tended  to  prevent  it  from 
having  the  evil  results  which  it  is  generally  be- 
lieved to  have  had  in  this  country.  In  the  first 
place,  the  general  municipal  corporations  act  does 
not  determine  in  detail  the  organization  of  the 
city,  but  leaves  that  to  be  worked  out  by  the  city 
councils  themselves.  That  is,  with  very  few  ex- 
ceptions, the  city  councils  determine  what  city 
offices  shall  be  established,  arid  how  they  shall 
be  filled.  As  to  the  details  of  municipal  organiza- 
tion, the  English  act  resembles  the  continental 
acts  in  giving  general  organizing  powers  to  the 
city  councils.  In  the  second  place,  as  new  needs 
have  shown  themselves  from  the  experience  of 


THE  SPHERE    OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY       55 

particular  cities,  Parliament  has  as  a  result  of  such 
experience  passed  a  series  of  "  Clauses  Acts,"  as 
they  are  called,  into  which  are  incorporated  general 
principles  relative  to  particular  subjects  needing 
frequent  regulation  by  special  legislation.  Since 
their  passage  special  legislation  has  largely  con- 
sisted in  applying  the  particular  "  Clauses  Act " 
which  was  applicable  to  the  particular  city  desiring 
the  increase  of  powers.1  In  the  third  place,  such 
rigorous  formalities  are  required  by  the  general 
orders  of  Parliament  for  the  passage  of  private 
bills,  formalities  compliance  with  which  causes 
great  expense,  that  not  only  are  private  bills  most 
carefully  considered  and  the  interests  of  all  per- 
sons, including  the  municipal  corporations  them- 
selves, affected  by  them,  safeguarded,  but  also 
they  are  not  brought  before  Parliament  unless  the 
necessity  for  them  is  very  urgent.2  It  is  to  be 
noted,  also,  that  in  England,  the  establishment  of 
a  more  centralized  administration  —  the  grant  of 
large  powers  of  control  to  the  central  administra- 
tive authorities  over  the  local  authorities,  including 
among  them  authorities  which  would  in  this  country 
be  regarded  as  municipal  authorities  —  has  enabled 
Parliament  to  roll  off  a  great  deal  of  work  on  the 

1  See  De  Franqueville,  Ibid.  Vol.  Ill,  p.  126,  where  it  is  said,  in 
note  2,  that  in  1856  clauses  from  such  acts  had  been  incorporated 
in  more  than  3000  acts,  and  saved  the  reprinting  of  as  much  as 
130,000  pages  of  matter. 

2  Ibid.  p.  20. 


56  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

administration.  Thus  the  Local  Government  Board 
has  at  the  present  time  to  give  its  approval  before 
most  of  the  cities  can  borrow  money.  The  exer- 
cise of  this  power  by  this  board  makes  unnecessary 
a  large  amount  of  special  legislation.1  Finally,  it 
is  to  be  remembered  that  the  English  city  is  much 
more  a  local  organ  than  is  the  American  city ;  and 
that  many  matters  of  central  concern  which  are  in 
the  United  States  attended  to  by  the  city  as  agent 
of  the  state,  are  attended  to  in  England  by  the 
central  administrative  authorities  directly,  or  under 
their  immediate  supervision.  Thus  in  England  the 
city  administration  proper  never  attends  to  the 
schools  and  public  charity,  and  while  it  attends 
to  police  and  public  health,  acts  there  under  a 
strong  central  administrative  control.  The  legis- 
lature thus  does  not  have  to  exercise  in  the  interest 
of  the  state  as  a  whole  any  control  over  the  city's 
management  of  such  matters,  as  is  the  case  in 
ths  United  States,  but  the  necessary  control  is 
exercised  by  the  administration.  The  temptation 
to  interference  in  municipal  matters  is  therefore 
not  nearly  so  great  as  here,  and  the  attitude  of 
Parliament  towards  the  cities  is  quite  different 
i'rom  that  of  our  state  legislatures. 

Our  comparison  of  the  way  in  which  the  com- 
petence of  the  city  and  its  authorities  is  deter- 
mined in  the  United  States  and  Europe  shows  then 

1  See  supra,  p.  47,  as  to  the  amount  of  special  legislation  neces- 
sary to  permit  cities  to  borrow  money. 


THE   SPHERE    OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY       57 

that  there  are  great  points  of  difference  between 
the  American  and  European  methods.  Further, 
the  failure  of  our  attempts  to  regulate  cities  by 
general  acts  would  seem  to  be  very  largely,  if  not 
entirely,  due  to  the  principle,  almost  universally 
applied  here,  of  enumerating  in  detail  the  cities' 
powers.  Finally,  many  of  the  evils  of  special 
legislation  would  seem  to  be  due  to  our  failure  to 
surround  the  passage  of  special  acts  with  sufficient 
formalities  to  insure  their  full  publicity,  and  that 
all  interested  in  their  passage  shall  have  a  chance 
to  be  heard. 

So  far  we  have  considered  merely  the  method 
by  which  the  sphere  of  municipal  competence  or  . 
activity  is  delimited.  A  few  words  must  be  said 
about  the  content  of  that  sphere.  Here,  how- 
ever,  we  are  met  by  great  difficulties.  The  city 
is,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  essentially  a  govern- 
mental  rather  than  a  business  corporation.  It  is 
true  that  a  large  part  of  its  work  is  local ;  but  it 
is  not  the  less  governmental.  That  is,  the  city  is 
acting  in  the  interest  of  that  portion  of  society  of 
which  it  is  composed  and  not  for  the  purposes  of 
private  gain.  For  this  reason  much  property, 
such  as  water  works,  which  legally  belongs  to  the 
city  so  fully  that  it  may  not  be  deprived  of  it  by 
the  state  under  our  system  of  constitutional  restric- 
tions without  giving  it  compensation  or  obtaining 
its  consent,1  it  is  still  so  governmental  in  character 

1  Webb  v.  The  Mayor,  64  Howard's  Pr.  10. 


58  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

that  it  may  not  be  sold  on  execution,  even  in  those 
states  which  permit  execution  in  case  of  the  busi- 
ness or  private  property  of  municipal  corpora- 
tions.1 In  other  words,  a  function  of  municipal 
government  which  from  one  point  of  view  is 
regarded  by  the  courts  as  quasi-private  is  treated 
from  another  point  of  view  as  ^a^z-governmental. 
From  one  point  of  view  it  is  governed  by  the  rules 
of  the  private  law,  from  another  point  of  view,  by 
the  rules  of  the  public  law.  The  difficulty  of 
delimiting  satisfactorily  the  sphere  of  municipal 
competence  has  been  apparent  to  the  courts. 
They  are  unquestionably  inclined  to  regard  all 
work  which  is  actually  attended  to  by  city  officers 
as  within  the  sphere  of  municipal  activity,  whether 
it  is  theoretically  so  or  not.2  This  tendency  is 
undoubtedly  due  to  the  long-continued  existence 
of  our  decentralized  administration.  As  has  been 
pointed  out,  while  all  legislation  is  considered  to  be 
a  part  of  the  general  business  of  the  state,  almost 
all  administration  of  state  legislation  has  been 
regarded  as  local  in  character.  Thus  even  police 
officers  have,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  power 
of  the  legislature  to  provide  for  their  central  ap- 
pointment, been  regarded  not  infrequently,  though 
still  not  universally,  as  local  officers.3  A  considera- 
tion of  the  general  law  of  municipal  corporations 

1  See  New  Orleans  v.  Morris,  105  U.  S.  600. 

a  See,  for  example,  Horton  v.  Mobile,  43  Ala.  598. 

8  See  People  v.  Albertson,  55  N.  Y.  128. 


THE  SPHERE    OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY       59 

will,  it  is  believed,  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
safest  guide  in  the  determination  of  the  competence 
of  cities  is  to  be  found  in  the  attitude  of  the  courts 
relative  to  the  liability  of  municipal  corporations 
for  torts ;  for  nowhere  in  this  branch  of  the  law  is 
the  distinction  more  clearly  made  between  the 
public  and  the  local  functions  of  cities.  As  to 
this  matter,  the  courts  have  held  that  the  sphere 
of  local  action  is  to  be  found  merely  in  the  action 
of  the  city  in  undertaking  and  maintaining  public 
works,  such  as  water  works,  streets,  bridges,  sew- 
ers, etc.,  from  whose  management  either  pecun- 
iary gain  or  peculiarly  local  advantage  is  to  be 
derived.1  They  therefore  generally  hold  muni- 
cipal corporations  liable  for  negligence  in  the  per- 
formance of  duties  connected  with  these  branches 
of  municipal  administration  in  about  the  same 
way  as  private  persons  are  so  held  liable.  It  is 
not  intended  to  assert  that  all  of  the  decisions  on 
all  of  these  subjects  are  in  harmony,  but  merely 
that  some  such  general  conclusion  may  be  arrived 
at  after  a  consideration  of  them.  Nor  is  it  in- 
tended to  assert  that  even  if  it  is  admitted  that 
such  is  the  true  sphere  of  municipal  activity  it  is 
a  sphere  upon  which  the  legislature  may  not  en- 
croach. The  old  principle  of  legislative  omnipo- 
tence and  centralization  has  still  too  great  an 
influence  on  the  law  to  permit  that  idea  to  be 
entertained.  In  some  instances  the  cities  are  pro- 

1  Goodnow,  Municipal  Home  Rule,  p.  229. 


60  MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 

tected  from  legislative  interference  by  constitu- 
tional provisions ;  in  the  great  majority  of  cases 
they  are  not.  All  that  is  meant  by  this  statement 
is  that  where  cities  are  acting  in  these  directions 
the  courts  will  apply  to  them  the  rules  of  the  pri- 
vate law  rather  than  those  of  the  public  law,  con- 
sidering them  rather  as  assimilated  to  private 
corporations  than  as  governmental  authorities, 
and  certainly  laying  great  emphasis  on  their  local 
characteristics.  Where  they  are  acting  in  other 
directions,  as,  for  example,  in  preserving  the  peace, 
caring  for  the  public  health  and  safety,  either 
through  the  adoption  or  enforcement  of  local 
police  ordinances,  supporting  the  poor,  educating 
the  ignorant,  or  collecting  revenue  either  for  the 
use  of  the  state  or  for  their  own  use,  the  courts,  on 
the  other  hand,  consider  cities  as  agents  of  the 
state  government  and  subject  to  the  rules  of  the 
public  rather  than  the  private  law.  The  cities  are 
not  therefore  liable  for  negligence  in  these  connec- 
tions any  more  than  is  the  government  of  the  state 
liable.  In  making  this  distinction  between  the 
corporate  or  private  and  the  governmental  or 
public  functions  of  cities  our  courts  follow  very 
closely  the  principles  on  which  the  central  control 
over  foreign  municipalities  is  based.  In  Europe 
the  ground  of  distinction  between  public  and  gov- 
ernmental and  local  and  municipal  work  is  to  be 
found  in  the  central  control  exercised  over  the 
city.  Where  the  supervisory  authorities  are  per- 


THE   SPHERE    OF  MUNICIPAL  ACTIVITY       6 1 

mitted  to  interfere  with  the  discretionary  actions 
of  municipal  officers  it  will  be  found  that  those 
actions  almost  always  relate  to  functions  of  inter- 
est to  the  state  at  large,  and  are  almost  identical 
with  those  acts  of  American  cities  which  our 
courts  hold  they  perform  as  agents  of  the  central 
state  government. 

The  agreement  the  world  over  on  this  matter  is 
so  marked  that  one  can  hardly  refrain  from  feeling 
that  a  constitutional  provision  protecting  the  sphere 
of  municipal  activity  as  above  described  would  be 
effectual.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  it  is 
extremely  difficult  to  foresee  all  the  difficulties 
which  would  be  likely  to  arise.  Our  experience 
of  constitutional  provisions  relative  to  cities  has 
been  so  unfortunate  that  expectations  of  their 
efficacy  cannot  as  a  general  rule  be  very  strong. 
In  any  case  it  is  certainly  true  much  good  would 
be  done,  a  long  step  would  be  taken  in  the  solution 
of  the  municipal  problem  in  this  country,  so  far  as 
the  determination  of  the  city's  relation  to  the  state 
government  is  concerned,  if  the  courts  would  aban- 
don the  principle  of  strict  construction  of  municipal 
powers.1  Much  good  would  also  be  done  if  the 
state  legislature  would  abandon  the  method  of 
enumerating  the  powers  of  municipal  corporations, 
and  adopt  the  continental  plan  of  a  general  grant 

1  A  late  case  in  Indiana,  viz.  Crawfordsville  v.  Braden,  130  Indi- 
ana, 149,  30  American  State  Reports,  214,  shows  a  decided  ten- 
dency towards  broad  construction. 


62  MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 

of  municipal  power  in  general  municipal  corpora- 
tions  acts,  stating  specifically  in  its  legislation  what 
powers  are  to  be  exercised  by  other  than  municipal 
authorities,  or  if  when  exercised  by  them  are  to  be 
subject  to  central  control,  leaving  to  the  courts  to 
determine  whether  specific  powers  assumed  by 
cities  have  been  properly  assumed  —  are,  in  other 
words,  municipal  in  character.  The  decisions  in 
the  case  of  torts  by  municipal  corporations  are,  so 
far  as  the  general  principles  are  concerned,  so  clear 
and  so  in  harmony  one  with  another  that  it  seems 
as  if  the  courts  would  have  little  difficulty,  with 
the  help  the  legislature  could  give,  in  its  determi- 
nation of  the  nature  of  specific  powers,  in  working 
out  a  satisfactory  delimitation  of  the  sphere  of 
municipal  competence.  Such  a  delimitation  it  is 
believed  might  be  obtained  from  a  careful  con- 
sideration of  the  decisions  already  made  in  the 
law  of  municipal  corporations. 

The  grant  of  greater  local  powers  to  cities,  what- 
ever may  be  the  method  by  which  the  grant  is  to 
be  made,  will  necessitate  the  formation  of  some 
sort  of  control  over  them.  The  reasons  for  the 
establishment  of  such  a  control,  and  the  func- 
tions discharged  by  municipal  corporations  which 
should  be  subjected  to  it,  will  be  discussed  in 
the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  RELATION  OF  THE  CITY  TO  THE  STATE 
%•** 

THE  city,  and  particularly  the  American  city,  is 
not  only  an  organ  for  the  satisfaction  of  local 
needs ;  it  is  in  many  cases  a  most  important  agent 
of  the  state  government,  and  municipal  officers  are 
not  infrequently  called  upon  to  attend  to  matters 
which  interest  the  citizens  of  the  city  only  as  they 
are  citizens  of  the  state  —  matters  which  do  not 
directly  interest  municipal  government  proper  at 
all.  While  originally  the  English  municipal  char- 
ters laid  great  emphasis  upon  the  purely  local 
duties  of  cities,  the  American  state  legislature  has, 
as  a  result  of  our  policy  of  administrative  decen- 
tralization, —  our  local  self-government,  as  we  call 
it,  —  gradually  come  to  regard  cities  more  and  more 
as  agents  of  public  government,  putting  into  their 
hands  a  great  number  of  matters  which  are  not 
peculiarly  local  in  character,  and  conferring  upon 
them  or  their  officers  a  large  number  of  essen- 
tially governmental  powers,  such  as  police  and  tax- 
ing powers,  and  powers  relative  to  the  state  and 
national  elections,  the  administration  of  justice, 
the  school  administration,  and  the  support  of  the 
poor.  In  so  far  as  the  city  is  thus  made  the 

63 


64  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

agent  of  the  state,  the  state  must  see  to  it  that 
the  city  discharges  its  duties  and  discharges  them 
properly.  The  state  cannot,  with  due  regard  for 
its  safety,  permit  municipal  corporations  or  their 
officers  free  hand  in  the  discharge  of  such  func- 
tions. For  if  anything  is  proven  by  English  and 
American  administrative  history,  it  is  that  uncon- 
trolled local  administration  of  general  matters  both 
leads  to  great  lack  of  administrative  uniformity 
and  harmony,  where  uniformity  of  treatment  is  W 
necessary,  and  is  both  slovenly  and  inefficient.  If 
The  most  noted  example  of  this  fact  is  to  be  found 
in  the  administration  of  the  English  Poor  Law  of 
the  seventeenth  century.  The  evils  which  resulted 
from  the  way  in  which  local  authorities  adminis- 
tered this  law  are  too  well  known  to  make  anything 
more  than  a  mere  reference  to  them  necessary. 
We  have,  however,  nearer  home  an  example  of  the 
inefficiency  of  uncontrolled  local  administration  of 
laws  regarded  as  of  general  interest,  in  the  case 
of  the  prohibition  and  excise  laws  in  the  United 
States.  In  the  case  of  the  English  Poor  Law,  the 
local  authorities,  which  were  the  Justices  of  the 
Peace,  made  use  of  the  large  discretionary  powers 
granted  to  them  in  the  interest  of  the  locality  they 
represented,  totally  disregarding  the  interests  of 
the  state  at  large.  In  the  case  of  prohibition  and 
excise  laws,  local,  and  particularly  municipal,  au- 
thorities in  the  United  States  have  very  commonly 
refused  or  neglected  to  exercise  powers  regarded 


RELATION  OF  THE   CITY  TO    THE  STATE     65 

by  law  as  purely  ministerial,  where  they  have  con- 
sidered the  enforcement  of  the  laws  to  be  contrary 
to  the  interests  of  the  communities  they  repre- 
sented, or  the  laws  themselves  as  opposed  to  the 
feelings  of  the  local  inhabitants.  Whether  local 
authorities  act  rightly  or  wrongly  in  such  cases  is 
not  to  be  determined  here.  It  is  undeniably  the 
fact,  however,  that  this  is  the  attitude  they  as- 
sume.1 Other  instances  of  the  inefficiency  of  a 
purely  local  government,  due  either  to  positive 
intention,  or  to  neglect  of  local  authorities  in  the 
administration  of  matters  of  general  interest,  might 
be  cited.  But  it  is  believed  that  what  has  been 
said  is  enough  to  show  that  if  uniformity  of  admin- 
istration of  matters  of  general  interest  is  needed, 
uncontrolled  local  administration  of  those  matters 
is  not  the  way  to  obtain  it. 

Further,  a  control  over  the  financial  administra- 
tion of  municipalities  is  necessary.  Thus  the  exer- 
cise of  the  taxing  power  and  the  power  of  local 
assessment  should  be  subjected  to  central  control. 
For  such  powers  are  essentially  governmental 
powers,  and  their  uncontrolled  exercise  by  munici- 
pal authorities,  which  in  our  present  municipal 
conditions  need  to  raise  large  amounts  of  money, 

1  See  an  interesting  and  impartial  article  by  William  McDonald 
on  "  Prohibition  in  Maine,"  in  the  Evening  Post,  New  York,  Janu- 
ary 25th,  1896,  where  it  is  said,  and  this  would  seem  to  be  the  point 
of  the  article :  "  That  a  certain  appreciable  degree  of  violation  of 
the  law  is  expected,  and  public  feeling  is  aroused  only  when  that 
normal  point  is  reached." 
F 


66  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

might  seriously  derange  the  general  finances  of 
the  state.  Not  only  should  the  kinds  of  taxes  and 
assessments  which  may  be  levied  by  local  authori- 
ties, be  specified,  but  the  way  in  which  such  levies 
may  be  made  should  be  determined,  for  the  exer- 
cise of  the  power  to  tax  is. a  way  both  of  depriving 
the  citizen  of  his  property  and  of  regulating  his 
occupation.  A  great  deal  might  be  said  in  favor 
of  having  the  central  government  of  the  state  not 
only  specify  the  kinds  of  taxes  which  may  be 
levied  and  the  way  in  which  they  shall  be  levied, 
but  also  fix  the  rates  of  such  taxes,  so  that  some 
limit  may  be  imposed  upon  the  amount  of  money 
which  may  be  demanded  by  the  municipalities  of 
the  local  taxpayers.  For  in  the  social  conditions 
obtaining  in  modern  cities  property  is  so  unequally 
distributed  that  a  small  proportion  of  the  people 
who,  with  universal  suffrage,  vote  the  municipal 
taxes,  feel  their  burden  directly  where  a  system 
of  property  taxation  is  adopted.  Theoretically  the 
same  reasons  do  not  exist  for  limiting  the  borrow- 
ing power  of  municipal  corporations.  That  is,  a 
condition  of  things  can  be  conceived  of  where  the 
exercise  of  the  power  to  borrow  money  will  have 
no  influence  upon  the  interests  of  the  state  as  a 
whole.  This  is  the  case  where  a  city  has  a  large 
amount  of  revenue-bearing  property  which  may  be 
pledged  as  security  for  the  loan,  and  where  the 
loan  is  not  therefore  to  be  paid  out  of  the  pro- 
ceeds of  taxation.  This,  perhaps,  accounts  for  the 


RELATION  OF  THE   CITY  TO    THE  STATE     67 

rule  of  the  American  law,  that  while  a  municipal 
corporation  may  not  impose  a  tax  without  special 
authority,  it  may  borrow  money.  But  such  is  not, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  condition  of  most  Ameri- 
can cities,  or,  for  that  matter,  of  most  cities  in  any 
part  of  the  world.  Persons  who  loan  money  to 
municipal  corporations  must  as  a  general  thing 
look  to  the  exercise  of  the  taxing  power  as  the 
means  by  which  the  money  will  be  raised  which 
will  go  to  pay  the  city's  debts.  Therefore  very 
generally  there  are  the  same  reasons  for  limiting, 
by  the  action  of  the  state  government,  the  city's 
power  to  incur  indebtedness,  as  its  power  to  tax ; 
and  very  generally,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  power 
of  cities  to  borrow  money  is  subjected  to  some 
sort  of  central  control.  Indeed,  the  courts  of  the 
United  States  hold  on  this  account  that  the  taxing 
power  is  indirectly  exercised  by  cities  when  they 
borrow  money,  and  that  therefore  limitations  of 
the  taxing  power  are  limitations  of  the  borrowing 
power  as  well. 

Such  are  the  functions  of  municipalities  which 
must  in  a  well-ordered  system  of  municipal  gov- 
ernment be  subjected  to  a  central  control ;  and  it 
will  be  noticed  that,  on  account  of  the  fact  that 
municipalities  are  dependent  for  their  necessary 
resources  on  the  exercise  of  public  powers,  that  is, 
the  taxing  and  the  borrowing  powers,  this  control 
may,  if  care  is  not  taken  in  its  formation  and  in 
the  manner  of  its  exercise,  very  easily  be  extended 


68  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

unduly,  so  as  to  deprive  cities  of  that  sphere  of 
municipal  autonomy  which  they  must  have  if  we 
are  to  expect  any  great  municipal  development 
and  the  existence  of  great  municipal  public  spirit. 
Indeed,  the  development  of  the  public  character  of 
American  cities  has  had  the  result  in  our  system, 
which  does  not  make  a  clear  distinction  between 
local  and  central  powers,  of  subjecting  the  city  in 
its  purely  local  concerns  to  a  very  large  central 
control.  The  central  control  properly  exercised 
over  them  by  the  legislature,  so  far  as  they  were 
state  agents,  has  been  easily  and  quite  naturally 
extended  —  naturally,  for  the  reasons  indicated  in 
the  last  chapter  —  to  their  purely  local  matters. 
It  becomes,  therefore,  a  matter  of  the  greatest  im- 
portance so  to  organize  this  central  control  as  at 
the  same  time  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  the  state 
as  a  whole,  and  to  preserve  as  free  as  possible  from 
encroachment  the  cities'  freedom  of  action. 

How,  now,  may  this  important  problem  be 
solved  ?  It  is  unquestionably  true  that  in  many 
cases  the  interests  of  the  state  may  be  safeguarded 
by  subjecting  municipal  corporations  to  the  same 
control  to  which  all  persons  and  public  authorities 
are  subjected.  Thus  the  mere  fact  that  cities  are 
incorporated  subjects  them  as  juristic  persons,  and 
therefore  subjects  of  the  private  law,  to  all  the 
applicable  rules  of  the  private  law.  The  fear  of 
being  mulcted  in  damages  for  breach  of  contracts 
made  by  them  and  for  the  commission  of  tortious 


RELATION  OF  THE    CITY   TO    THE   STATE      69 

acts  will  undoubtedly  tend  to  keep  them  within  the 
limits  assigned  by  the  law  of  the  land  to  their 
sphere  of  action.  Again,  as  public  authorities,  i.e. 
as  subjects  of  the  public  law,  municipal  corpora- 
tions and  their  officers  may  be  subjected  to  the 
jurisdiction  which  the  courts  possess,  in  our  sys- 
tem of  judicial  control  of  administrative  action, 
over  the  acts  of  all  public  officials.  The  mere  fact 
that  municipalities  are  corporations,  that  is,  juristic 
persons,  and  at  the  same  time  public  authorities, 
will  thus,  in  many  cases,  obviate  the  necessity  of 
forming  any  special  means  of  control  over  them. 
Further,  their  officers  as  public  officers  will  be  sub- 
jected to  the  control  which  the  criminal  courts  pos- 
sess over  all  public  officers.  On  account  of  the 
emphasis  which  is  given  in  our  decentralized  sys- 
tem of  administration  to  the  judicial  control,  this 
control  is  theoretically  a  very  large  one.  But,  on 
account  of  the  fact  of  the  popular  and  local  char- 
acter which  the  existence  of  our  jury  system  and 
the  local  election  of  the  judges  give  to  the  control 
o£  the  criminal  courts  and  to  a  certain  extent  to 
that  of  all  the  courts,  this  control  becomes  practi- 
cally useless  as  a  means  of  safeguarding  the  inter- 
ests of  the  state  as  a  whole,  if  there  is  serious 
conflict  between  the  state  and  the  localities.  What- 
ever may  in  theory  be  the  power  of  the  jury  to 
judge  of  the  law  as  well  as  of  the  facts  in  criminal 
cases,  the  interpretation  which  has  been  put  on  the 
constitutional  provision  that  no  man  shall  be  put 


X 


MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 


twice  in  jeopardy,  has  brought  it  about  that  as  a 
matter  of  fact  acquittal  by  a  jury  of  a  prisoner, 
contrary  to  the  instructions  of  the  judge,  is  usually 
unappealable,  and  that  the  jury  is  thus  supreme. 
In  other  words,  the  supposed  central  control  of  the 
courts  is  in  many  cases,  particularly  in  the  case  of 
crimes,  really  a  local  control  and  is  not  uncom- 
monly exercised  more  in  the  interest  of  the  locality 
from  which  the  judge  and  the  jury  come  than  in 
that  of  the  state  at  large.  This  has  been  our  ex- 
perience in  enforcing  the  prohibition  law.  It  is 
said  that,  when  a  few  years  ago  an  attempt  was 
made  in  Maine  to  punish  illegal  selling  of  liquor, 
by  both  fine  and  imprisonment,  the  juries  refused 
to  convict;  and  a  judge  of  one  of  the  state  courts 
is  reported  to  have  said  that  to  imprison  a  well- 
known  and  respectable  citizen  for  violating  the 
liquor  law  would  in  many  cases  almost  provoke 
a  riot.1  The  control  of  the  criminal  courts,  and  in 
some  cases  also  of  the  civil  courts,  cannot,  where 
there  is  great  difference  of  opinion  between  the 
state  as  a  whole  and  a  locality,  be  counted  on  to 
accomplish  much  in  the  interest  of  the  state. 
Further,  the  courts  are  as  a  whole  unsuited  to  ex- 
ercise all  the  central  control  over  cities  which  is 
necessary.  This  is  so  because  the  judicial  control 
is  exercised  mainly  in  the  interest  of  the  mainte- 
nance of  existing  law,  while  the  central  control  must, 
in  many  cases,  to  be  efficient,  be  exercised  more  from 

1  Prohibition  in  Maine,  loc.  cit. 


RELATION  OF   THE    CITY   TO    THE   STATE      71 

the  point  of  view  of  expediency,  than  from  that  of 
insuring  legality  in  the  action  of  local  bodies. 

In  the  United  States,  after  English  examples, 
this  judicial  control  has  been  supplemented  by 
the  legislative  control.  The  legislature  has  large 
powers  of  control  over  the  concrete  actions  of 
municipalities.  The  one  great  characteristic  of 
the  original  English  and  American  administrative 
system  was  the  allegiance  of  all  officers  to  the 
statutes  of  the  legislature.1  The  system  of  admin- 
istration was  so  decentralized,  particularly  in  its 
American  development,  that  the  subjection  of  local 
officers  and  authorities  to  the  control  of  the 
central  administration  was  out  of  the  question. 
There  being  no  opportunity  in  such  a  system  for 
central  administrative  instructions,  the  duty  of 
issuing  such  central  instructions  as  were  neces- 
sary devolved  upon  the  legislature,  which  in  its 
statutes  descended  into  the  most  minute  details. 
As  a  French  writer,  Mr.  Arminjon,  who  has 
recently  written  on  English  local  government,2 
says,  "  Parliament  has  placed  the  local  authorities 
within  very  narrow  limits,  permitting  them  to 
exceed  them  only  with  its  own  authorization,  ac- 
corded by  special  acts.  English  legislation  does 
not  contain  any  of  those  'juridical  monuments' 
[monuments  juridiques~]  drawn  up  in  a  few  short 

1  See  Freund,  "  American  Administrative  Law,"  Pol.  Set.  Quar. 
IX,  pp.  403,  409. 

2  L' Administration  Locale  dc  L'Angleterre,  p.  253. 


72  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

paragraphs,  in  concise  style,  and  intended  to 
announce  principles,  whose  application  some  min- 
ister is  called  upon  to  make,  and  whose  conse- 
quences he  is  to  bring  out.  On  the  contrary,  at 
the  expense,  it  is  true,  of  great  prolixity  and  fatigu- 
ing repetitions,  it  attempts  always  to  foresee  all 
difficulties,  to  settle  in  advance  all  controversies, 
and  in  this  way  to  take  away  from  the  agents  of 
the  government  charged  with  its  execution,  all 
pretext  for  arbitrary  action."  We  are  in  the 
habit  of  calling  this  system  of  government  a 
decentralized  one.  It  is  decentralized,  however, 
only  from  the  administrative  point  of  view.  It 
involves  a  great  deal  of  legislative  centralization.1 
Hence  the  system  of  special  legislation  about 
which  so  much  has  already  been  said,  and  which, 
as  at  present  organized  in  the  United  States,  is 
attended,  all  are  agreed,  by  so  many  evils.  As 
has  been  pointed  out,  the  attempt  made  to  do 
away  with  special  municipal  legislation  by  con- 
stitutional provisions  requiring  the  legislature  to 
pmss  genera^  municipal  corporations  acts  has 
practically  failed,  and  failed  because  special  mu- 
nicipal legislation  was,  under  our  system,  posi- 
tively necessary.  Such  special  legislation  was 
necessary,  first,  because  of  our  system  of  narrow 
and  enumerative  municipal  powers;  particularly 
because  of  the  narrow  financial  powers  recognized 

1  See  the  remarks  of  De  Franqueville,  op.  cit.t  p.  206,  supra, 
P-  S3- 


V  >A 


C  F 


7 


73 


i  H 


;:  r 


:m 


74  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

been  pointed  out,  has,  on  account  of  its  too  fre- 
quent and  indiscriminate  exercise,  all  but  de- 
stroyed local  autonomy. 

While  constitutional  provisions  prohibiting  gen- 
erally special  legislation  in  relation  to  cities  have 
failed  to  accomplish  what  was  expectecl  of  them,  it 
is  still  true  that  constitutional  provisions  which 
recognize  the  city  as  possessing  certain  rights  of 
which  they  may  not  be  deprived  by  the  legislature, 
are  of  some  use  in  preventing  this  destruction  of 
local  autonomy.  Such,  for  example,  are  the  pro- 
visions giving  to  cities  the  right  to  elect  directly  or 
indirectly  their  own  officers.1  Such  are  also  the 
provisions  which  recognize  that  cities  possess  cer- 
tain rights  in  the  nature  of  property  rights  in  the 
streets.  One  of  the  causes  of  the  most  frequent 
violation  of  the  principles  of  municipal  home  rule 
is  to  be  found  in  the  power  of  the  legislature  over 
street  franchises.  The  rule  adopted  by  the  courts 
as  to  the  absolute  control  of  the  legislature  over 
streets  and  their  uses  has  made  it  possible  for  the 
legislature  to  grant  street  franchises  without  con- 
sulting at  all  the  wishes  of  the  cities.  In  this  way 
in  the  early  part  of  our  municipal  history  a  large 
proportion  of  the  streets  in  cities  were  given  over 
to  private  corporations  which  obtained  the  right  to 
lay  car  tracks  and  gas  and  water  pipes  without 
making  any  compensation  to  the  cities  for  the 

1  See  in  the  case  of  Detroit  and  of  the  cities  in  Michigan,  Wilcox 
on  Municipal  Government  in  Michigan  and  Ohio,  Chap.  Ill,  p.  35. 


RELATION  OF   THE    CITY   TO    THE   STATE      75 

privileges  they  thus  obtained.  This  use  of  the 
power  of  the  legislature  over  cities  has,  however, 
been  generally  recognized  as  improper,  and  most 
of  the  later  constitutions  recognize  that  streets  are 
really  municipal  property,  in  the  disposition  of 
which  the  cities  shall  have  something  to  say,  and 
it  is  generally  admitted  that  the  abuses  relative  to 
the  grant  of  street  railway  franchises  by  the  legis- 
lature which  existed  before  the  passage  of  such 
provisions  have  been  largely  remedied.  But 
while  certain  specific  abuses,  like  the  central  ap- 
pointment of  municipal  officers,  and  the  profligate 
granting  of  street  railway  franchises  by  the  legis- 
lature, may  have  been  largely  remedied  by  the 
adoption  of  specific  constitutional  provisions,  the 
general  system  of  special  legislation,  with  its 
attendant  evils,  has  not  been  changed  by  the  later 
state  constitutions  forbidding  generally  special 
legislation ;  and  has  not  been  changed,  because 
special  legislation  was  absolutely  necessary  under 
a  system  of  enumerated  powers  and  administrative 
decentralization. 

The  adoption  of  provisions  forbidding  special 
legislation  for  cities  was  not,  however,  a  leap  in 
the  dark.  Those  who  secured  their  adoption  had 
reasons  for  supposing  that  they  would  be  success- 
ful. Special  legislation  relative  to  a  large  number 
of  private  rights  had  been  previously  prohibited. 
The  legislature  was  thus  very  generally  forbidden 
by  the  constitution  to  grant  divorces  by  special 


76  MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 

act.  There  is  hardly  any  one  at  the  present  time 
who  would  advocate  a  return  to  the  former  system. 
Why,  now,  has  the  prohibition  of  special  legislation 
been  successful  in  one  class  of  cases  but  unsuc- 
cessful in  another?  The  reason  is  not  far  to 
seek.  In  the  one  class  of  cases,  of  which  the 
matter  of  divorce  is  a  good  example,  it  was  recog- 
nized that  special  action  was  necessary,  and  pro- 
vision was  made  for  some  authority  by  which  it 
might  be  taken.  That  is,  the  legislature  passed  a 
general  law  providing  that  the  courts,  in  the  proper 
cases,  and  for  certain  specified  causes,  might  grant 
divorces  in  concrete  and  special  instances.  In  the 
case  of  special  legislation  as  to  cities,  however,  it 
was  not  recognized  that  special  action  was  neces- 
sary, and  no  provision  was  made  for  it.  No 
authority  was  provided  which  under  the  general 
regulation  of  the  legislature  could  take  the  neces- 
sary special  action.  The  result  was  that  the  press- 
ure on  the  legislature  for  modification  by  special 
legislation  of  the  laws  relative  to  cities,  which,  it 
will  be  remembered,  descended  into  great  detail, 
was  as  great  after  as  before  the  adoption  of  the 
constitutional  provisions  prohibiting  special  legisla- 
tion. To  this  pressure  the  legislature  was  obliged 
by  the  force  of  circumstances  to  yield,  if  municipal 
government  was  to  be  advantageously  carried  on. 
It  may  be  said  that  the  legislature  might  have  and 
should  have,  if  it  had  desired  to  carry  out  the 
wishes  of  the  people  in  making  the  constitutional 


RELATION  OF   THE    CITY   TO    THE  STATE      77 

provisions,  relegated  the  matters  whose  determina- 
tion needed  special  action,  to  the  cities  themselves 
for  settlement.  This  it  might  unquestionably  have 
done  where  the  questions  concerned  were  purely 
local  in  character.  But  it  must  be  remembered 
that  purely  municipal  questions  have  not  as  yet 
been  clearly  differentiated ;  that  the  tendency,  not 
only  of  the  people  as  a  whole,  who  were  repre- 
sented in  the  legislature,  but  also  of  the  courts 
themselves,  which  were  called  upon  to  make  this 
differentiation,  was,  when  looking  at  the  matter 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  control  of  the  legis- 
lation, to  regard  everything  within  the  administra- 
tive competence  of  cities,  as  fixed  by  law,  as 
municipal  in  character.  With  this  very  wide  con- 
ception of  local  powers,  which  resulted  from  our 
ideas  of  local  self-government,  the  effect  of  dele- 
gating to  the  cities  the  power  to  regulate  absolutely, 
and  subject  to  no  central  control,  the  matters 
entrusted  to  their  administration,  would  have  been 
the  destruction  of  almost  all  state  unity,  and  the 
establishment  of  imperia  in  imperio.  This  step 
the  legislature  was  naturally  unwilling  to  take. 
We  must  remember  also  that  the  tendency  of 
municipal  development,  certainly  in  the  larger 
cities,  has  been  in  the  direction  of  weakening  of 
the  position  of  the  city  council,  which  was  the 
body  in  the  municipal  government  to  which  such 
a  delegation  of  local  powers  would  naturally  have 
been  made.  Finally,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind 


78  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

that  the  principle  of  centralization  of  all  matters 
under  the  state  legislature  which  we  have  inherited 
from  England,  with  its  traditions  of  a  theoretically 
omnipotent  Parliament,  almost  completely  denied 
local  autonomy,  and  had  resulted  in  the  adoption 
in  our  law  of  the  principle  that  the  powers  of 
municipal  corporations  were  enumerated  and  were 
to  be  strictly  construed.  These  considerations 
made  it  practically  impossible  for  the  legislature 
to  take  any  other  position  than  the  one  taken, 
unless  the  traditions  of  centuries  were  to  be 
abandoned. 

Special  legislation  is  thus  practically  unavoid- 
able in  our  decentralized  administrative  system. 
It  certainly  cannot  be  avoided  by  mere  constitu- 
tional prohibition ;  and  the  reason  of  the  failure 
to  prevent  special  legislation  by  constitutional 
prohibition  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  some 
special  action  is  absolutely  necessary.  If  special 
action  on  the  part  of  the  legislature  is  prohibited, 
provision  must  be  made  for  special  action  by  some 
other  authority.  If  such  other  authority  be  pro- 
vided, our  experience  shows  us  that  special  legis- 
lation will  cease,  or  at  any  rate  become  very  much 
less  common  than  it  is  at  present. 

It  has  been  pointed  out  that  the  experiences  of 
the  early  part  of  this  century  forced  the  conclusion 
that  the  legislature  was  not  the  proper  body  to 
determine  in  special  cases  a  long  series  of  matters. 
Many  of  these,  like  divorce  and  the  change  of 


RELATION  OF  THE    CITY   TO    THE  STATE      79 

names,  were  regarded  as  matters  which  should  be 
determined  by  judicial  bodies.  Therefore  in  some 
states  the  constitution,  but  in  others  the  legislature 
itself,  provided  explicitly  that  these  matters  were 
to  be  attended  to  by  the  courts,  acting  under  the 
general  direction  of  the  legislature,  to  be  expressed 
in  general  law.  In  other  cases,  however,  the  fit- 
ness of  judicial  bodies  for  the  performance  of  the 
necessary  special  action  was  not  so  marked.  For 
a  series  of  these  matters,  like  the  organization 
of  private  corporations,  administrative  authorities 
seemed  to  be  the  proper  bodies  for  the  exercise 
of  such  powers.  Therefore  it  was  provided  that 
certificates  of  incorporation  should,  in  the  class  of 
cases  laid  down  in  a  general  way  by  the  legisla- 
ture, be  granted  by  some  administrative  body,  which 
was  given  pretty  wide  powers  to  determine  in  con- 
crete cases  whether  the  conditions  required  by  the 
legislature  had  been  complied  with.1  In  all  of 
these  cases  it  is  generally  considered  that  the  pro- 
hibition of  special  legislation  has  been  successful ; 
and  in  all  of  these  cases  it  will  be  noticed  that 
the  constitution  or  legislature,  in  following  out  its 
mandates,  did  not  consider  that  the  mere  prohibition 
of  special  legislation  was  enough,  but  the  further 

1  See  People  v.  Nelson,  46  N.  Y.  477,  where  mandamus  was 
refused  to  force  the  Secretary  of  State  to  file  a  certificate  of  incor- 
poration, previously  approved  by  a  judge  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
where  the  secretary  believed  the  corporation  to  be  formed  thereby 
was  not  formed  for  one  of  the  purposes  for  which  by  the  statutes 
corporations  might  be  formed. 


80  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

step  was  taken  of  providing  some  authority  which 
might  take  that  special  action  which  it  had  been 
recognized  must  be  taken  in  order  to  regulate 
those  matters  needing  special  regulation.  In  the 
case  of  constitutional  provisions  prohibiting  special 
regulation  of  municipal  affairs,  it  has  seldom  been 
the  case  that  such  authorities  have  been  provided. 
The  necessary  central  control  over  municipalities 
had,  after  as  well  as  before  the  adoption  of  the 
constitutional  provisions  prohibiting  special  legis- 
lation, to  be  exercised  by  the  legislature ;  and  as 
such  central  control  had,  in  order  to  be  effective, 
to  be  special  in  character,  the  legislature  was 
forced  to  pass  a  large  amount  of  special  legisla- 
tion, an  amount  almost  as  great  after  as  before 
the  adoption  of  the  constitutional  provision  theo- 
retically prohibiting  it.  What  our  American  ex- 
perience teaches  us,  then,  is  that  in  order  to  do 
away  with  special  legislation,  provision  must  be 
made  for  the  exercise  of  the  central  control  over 
cities,  which  we  have  seen  is  necessary,  by  some 
authority  other  than  the  legislature.  In  some 
instances  it  is  unquestionably  true  that  this  au- 
thority may  be  a  court.  The  New  York  constitu- 
tional amendment  of  1875  is  a  good  example  of 
the  success  attending  such  a  method.  By  this  it 
is  provided  that  no  "  law  shall  authorize  the  con- 
struction or  operation  of  a  street  railroad  except 
upon  the  condition  that  the  consent  of  the  owners 
of  one-half  in  value  of  the  property  bounded  on, 


RELATION  OF  THE   CITY  TO    THE  STATE      8 1 

and  the  consent  also  of  the  local  authorities  having 
the  control  of  that  portion  of  the  street  or  high- 
way upon  which  it  is  proposed  to  construct  or 
operate  such  railroad,  be  first  obtained.  Or,  in 
case  the  consent  of  such  property  owners  cannot 
be  obtained,  the  General  Term  of  the  Supreme 
Court  in  the  district  in  which  it  is  proposed  to  be 
constructed,  may,  upon  application,  appoint  three 
commissioners  who  shall  determine,  after  a  hear- 
ing of  all  parties  interested,  whether  such  railroad 
ought  to  be  constructed  or  operated;  and  their 
determination  confirmed  by  the  court  may  be  taken 
in  lieu  of  the  consent  of  the  property  owners." 
This  amendment  has  now  been  in  force  over 
twenty  years,  and  up  to  the  present  time  no  de- 
mand has  been  made  for  its  repeal  or  modification. 
The  work  done  under  it  has  been  in  almost  all 
instances  satisfactory,  the  judges  having  confined 
themselves  for  the  most  part  to  protecting  the 
rights  of  owners  of  private  property  who  have  not 
consented  to  the  operation  of  the  road.  But  it  is 
certain  that  we  cannot  rely  entirely  upon  the  .courts 
for  the  exercise  of  this  control ;  for,  as  has  been 
pointed  out,  the  courts  are  by  nature  adapted  more 
to  the  performance  of  the  duty  of  forcing  all  per- 
sons within  their  jurisdiction  to  obey  the  law,  than 
to  exercise  political  duties,  as,  for  example,  the 
determination  of  the  expediency  of  taking  concrete 
measures.  In  so  far  as  we  demand  of  the  courts 
the  performance  of  such  political  duties,  we  neces- 

G 


82  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

sarily  introduce  politics  into  the  administration  of 
justice,  which  is  always  to  be  deprecated.  It 
would  seem,  therefore,  that  other  than  judicial  au- 
thorities should  exercise  the  central  control  which 
is  so  necessary.  Not  only  our  own  experience  in 
such  matters  as  the  incorporation  of  private  corpora- 
tions, but  also  European  experience,  would  seem 
to  indicate  that  the  proper  authority  to  exercise 
such  control  over  the  localities,  particularly  the 
municipalities,  is  some  administrative  authority. 
But,  except  in  a  very  few  instances,  such  a  method 
of  solving  the  problem  seems  hardly  to  have  oc- 
curred to  us.  This  is  the  more  remarkable  because 
the  administration  of  the  national  and  the  general 
state  governments  has  tended  within  the  last  forty 
years  to  become  more  and  more  centralized.  The 
national  administration  has  been  completely  cen- 
tralized, while  those  new  branches  of  activity 
which  the  state  government  has  been  obliged,  on 
account  of  the  greater  complexity  of  modern  social 
conditions,  to  enter  into,  have  almost  invariably 
been  put  into  the  hands  of  the  central  admin- 
istrative organization  of  the  state  government. 
Thus  such  matters  as  railway  supervision,  factory 
inspection,  supervision  of  certain  agricultural  prod- 
ucts, and  labor  matters  are  now  in  the  direct  ad- 
ministration of  the  central  state  government.  In 
these  branches  of  administrative  activity  the  local 
corporate  organizations  of  the  state  have  little,  if 
anything,  to  do.  Further,  various  matters  which 


RELATION  OF  THE   CITY  TO    THE  STATE     83 

formerly  were  attended  to  by  the  localities,  are 
now  taken  out  of  their  jurisdiction  and  are  at- 
tended to  by  the  central  state  administration. 
Such  is  •  the  case  in  several  of  the  states  in  the 
matter  of  state  taxation.  Formerly  the  rule  was 
universal  that  the  state  taxes  were  assessed,  levied, 
and  collected  by  local  bodies.  Now  the  state  gov- 
ernment has  sometimes  its  own  system  of  taxation, 
separate  and  apart  from  the  system  of  local  taxation. 
This  is  the  tendency  of  the  recent  tax  legislation 
in  New  York.  Here  the  state  has  several  separate 
sources  of  revenue  apart  from  the  general  prop- 
erty tax  which,  even  when  made  use  of  for  the 
payment  of  state  expenses,  is  still,  as  formerly, 
collected  by  the  localities.  Thus  the  state  itself 
levies  and  collects  the  taxes  on  corporations,  in- 
heritances, and  on  the  sale  of  liquor.  In  New 
York,  also,  quite  recently,  the  charge  of  pauper 
lunatics  and  the  administration  of  the  Excise  Law 
have  been  taken  from  the  localities  in  the  same 
way  and  assumed  by  the  central  state  government. 
The  same  is  very  generally  true  of  the  prison  ad- 
ministration which,  formerly  a  matter  of  local,  is 
now  largely  a  matter  of  central  state  administration. 
The  attempt  has,  however,  seldom  been  made  to 
unite  local  and  central  administration  by  subject- 
ing the  powers  exercised  by  local  bodies  to  the 
control  of  some  central  administrative  authority. 
Such  an  attempt  has  still  been  made  in  a  few 
cases.  Thus  experience  showed  that  the  common 


84  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

schools  could  not,  with  due  regard  to  their  best 
interests,  be  left  in  the  uncontrolled  management 
of  local  bodies ;  and  in  almost  all  states  there  has 
been  established  a  central  administrative  authority 
which  is  to  exercise  an  extensive  control  over  the 
actions  of  the  local  school  authorities.  In  some 
states,  as  in  New  York,  the  powers  of  the  central 
authority  are  very  large.1  There  is  no  question 
that  the  adoption  of  the  central  administrative 
control  has  been  of  the  greatest  benefit  in  the 
field  of  education.2  Again,  it  has  been  found  that 
where  the  state  has  entrusted  the  assessment  of  its 
taxes  to  local  officers,  their  uncontrolled  exercise 
of  assessment  powers  leads  to  gross  inequalities 
in  the  burdens  of  state  taxation.  For  that  reason 
State  Boards  of  Equalization  and  Assessors  have 
been  established,  with  powers,  sometimes  on  ap- 
peal by  parties  or  localities  interested,  sometimes 
of  their  own  motion,  to  equalize  the  assessment 
valuations  for  the  purposes  of  state  taxation,  by 
modifying  the  determinations  reached  by  local 
bodies.  We  can  also  see  the  germs  of  a  central  \ 
administrative  control  in  several  states  in  the  } 
administration  of  the  public  health  and  public 
charity. 

It  will  be  seen  thus  that  the  establishment  of  a 

1  See  the  Law  of  New  York  of  1864,  Chap.  555. 

2  See  articles  on  "  Recent  Centralizing  Tendencies  in  State  Edu- 
cational Administration,"  by  W.  C.  Webster,  in  Educational  Reviewt 
January  and  February,  1897. 


RELATION  OF  THE   CITY  TO    THE  STATE     8$ 

central  administrative  control  over  the  powers 
which,  while  exercised  by  local  bodies,  have  still  a 
serious  influence  upon  the  general  interests  of  the 
state,  is  not  by  any  means  unknown  in  our  system 
of  state  government.  But  up  to  the  present  time 
practically  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  extend 
this  control  over  municipal  corporations  as  such.1 
An  interesting  proposition  to  this  effect  is  to  be 
found  in  the  Reports  of  the  Commissions  appointed 
by  the  governor  of  New  York  in  1895  to  draw  up 
charters  for  cities  of  the  second  and  third  class. 
Here  it  was  proposed  that  a  municipal  govern- 
ment board  be  established  which  should  be  given 
quite  large  powers  of  supervision,  particularly 
over  the  financial  administration  of  cities  of  the 
second  and  third  class.2  The  proposition,  however, 
did  not  receive  any  very  general  approval,  and 
has  not  as  yet  been  incorporated  into  the  statutes. 
Generally,  however,  reliance  has  been  placed  al- 
most entirely  on  the  control  which  the  legislature 
can  exercise  over  such  bodies  through  legislation 
more  or  less  special  in  character.  As  this  method 
has  proved  unsatisfactory,  and  as  the  attempt  to 
abandon  it  without  substituting  some  other  means 
of  control  has  proved  a  failure,  may  we  not  con- 

1  The  city  of  St.  Paul  has  been  very  lately  subjected  to  the  finan- 
cial control  of  a  State  Examiner  of  Accounts.     Commons,  "  State 
Supervision  of  Cities,"  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Social 
and  Political  Science,  Vol.  V,  p.  865. 

2  Holls,  State  Boards  of  Municipal  Control,  Baltimore  Confer- 
ence for  Good  City  Government,  p.  226. 


86  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

elude  both  that  some  sort  of  central  control  over 
cities  is  necessary,  and  that  the  time  is  ripe  for 
resort  to  a  method  of  administrative  control  which 
has  proved  satisfactory,  not  only  in  this  country, 
in  those  few  instances  in  which  it  has  been  adopted, 
but  also  in  Europe  ?  If  we  answer  this  question  in 
the  affirmative,  will  it  not  be  wise  to  study  care- 
fully the  relation  existing  between  the  European 
city  and  the  central  administration  ?  For,  while 
the  Anglo-American  race  has  taught  the  world  a 
valuable  lesson  in  showing  them  how  government 
should  be  organized  in  order  to  secure  civil  liberty 
and  provide  for  the  expression  of  the  will  of  the 
people,  it  is  certainly  true  that  continental  Europe, 
with  its  Roman  legal  traditions,  has  done  much 
towards  the  solution  of  purely  administrative 
problems. 

Before  entering,  however,  upon  the  discussion 
of  European  methods  of  central  administrative 
control  over  localities,  and  particularly  over  cities, 
it  will  be  well  to  forestall  certain  objections  that 
may  be  advanced  against  this  so-called  centraliza- 
tion of  the  administration.  At  the  outset  it  must 
be  noticed  that  the  plan  of  a  central  administrative 
control  which  has  been  advocated  does  not  in 
reality  propose  any  further  centralization  than  we 
now  possess.  There  is  now,  and  always  has  been, 
a  central  control  over  cities.  It  has  been  legisla- 
tive ;  the  plan  proposed  merely  changes  its  char- 
acter. It  makes  it  administrative,  but  it  makes  it 


RELATION  OF   THE   CITY   TO    THE   STATE       8/ 

no  more  central  than  it  has  always  been.  Take, 
for  example,  the  case  of  a  city  which  desires  to 
incur  a  debt.  Under  our  present  arrangements 
such  city  must  ordinarily  apply  to  the  legislature 
for  a  special  act  giving  it  the  necessary  authority. 
Under  the  plan  proposed  such  application  would 
have  to  be  made  to  the  governor  or  state  comp- 
troller, or  to  a  municipal  or  local  government 
board,  whose  consent,  within  the  limits  fixed  by 
general  legislation,  would  be  the  necessary  author- 
ity. Further,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  central 
administrative  control  has,  wherever  it  has  worked 
most  successfully,  gone  hand  in  hand  with  large 
local  powers ;  and  that  it  has  nowhere  been  so  far 
extended  as  to  take  from  the  localities  subject  to 
it,  the  power  to  decide  for  themselves  their  own 
affairs,  —  provided,  of  course,  their  decision  did 
not  involve  the  expenditure  of  so  much  money  as 
to  necessitate  the  imposition  of  high  taxes,  or  to 
seriously  mortgage  the  future.  Therefore,  cen- 
tral administrative  control  does  not  involve  as 
great  centralization  as  central  legislative  control, 
to  which  all  American  localities  are  practically 
now  subject.  The  European  method  of  regulating 
the  relation  of  the  localities  with  the  central  gov- 
ernment involves,  notwithstanding  its  central  ad- 
ministrative control,  a  larger  measure  of  home  rule 
than  is  now  accorded  by  the  American  method  of 
regulating  this  relation. 

But  it  will  be  said  that  this  centralization  of  the 


88  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

administration  will  result  in  the  building  up  of  a 
great  state  machine  which  can  be  made  use  of  to 
control  politics.  Such  a  claim,  however,  loses 
sight  of  the  fact  that  the  extremely  centralized 
administration  of  the  United  States  Federal  Gov- 
ernment has  not  had  this  result ;  that,  indeed,  the 
attempts  which  have  undoubtedly  been  made  so 
to  make  use  of  the  Federal  administration  have 
recoiled  against  their  authors,  who  have  lost 
rather  than  gained  by  their  attempt.  The  re- 
sponsibility in  the  case  of  the  Federal  administra- 
tion is  so  concentrated  that  the  officers  in  the 
control  of  it  cannot  shirk  the  odium  which  any 
attempts  of  that  sort  will  bring  upon  them.  In 
the  states  where  similar  attempts  have  been  made 
and  have  been  somewhat  more  successful,  —  that 
is,  from  the  point  of  view  of  temporary  but  not 
permanent  success,  —  the  responsibility  has  not 
been  so  concentrated,  owing  to  the  more  general 
adoption  of  the  elective  principle  in  the  filling  of 
public  office.  Such  a  method  of  filling  state  offices 
need  not,  however,  be  regarded  as  permanent.  / 
Again,  the  danger  of  building  up  a  political  ma-^ 
chine  is  due  altogether  to  the  existence  of  the  \ 
spoils  system ;  and  there  are  few,  it  is  thought, 
at  the  present  time,  who  believe,  in  the  face  of 
the  great  growth  of  the  Civil  Service  Reform 
movement  in  the  last  ten  years,  that  the  spoils 
system,  with  all  of  its  undeniable  evils,  will  long 
remain  with  us.  In  any  case,  no  plan  of  govern- 


RELATION  OF  THE   CITY  TO    THE  STATE      89 

mental  reform  can  be  regarded  as  of  great  value 
so  long  as  the  spoils  system  exists.  It  may  also 
be  said,  indeed  is  said,  that  at  the  present  time, 
under  our  local  self-government  system,  the  evils 
of  the  spoils  system,  which  we  are  told  we  must 
take  into  account  in  any  reforms  that  we  consider, 
are  localized  and  therefore  tend  to  neutralize  each 
other ;  but  that  if  the  administration  were  further 
centralized,  the  machine  that  was  formed  would  be 
organized  for  the  benefit  of  one  party,  and  on 
account  of  its  greater  cohesiveness  and  greater 
size  would  be  more  difficult  to  overthrow.  There 
is  apparently  much  truth  in  this  claim,  but  it  is 
to  be  remembered  that,  so  far  as  our  experience 
goes,  such  has  not  been  the  case.  Machines  have 
been  formed  in  the  state  administration  where  it 
has  been  centralized,  but  they  have  been  short- 
lived and  their  authors  have  derived  little  per- 
manent advantage  from  their  control.  Finally, 
it  must  again  be  said,  that  we  must  not  assume 
that  the  spoils  system  on  which  machine  politics 
rests  will  continue.  If  a  salutary  reform  is  to  be 
delayed  merely  because  such  a  system  now  exists, 
our  efforts  must  be  redoubled  to  cause  its  destruc- 
tion and  to  place  our  administration  on  the  basis 
of  merit,  where  it  once  stood,  where  it  will  stand 
again  in  the  near  future,  and  where  every  adminis- 
trative system  which  is  capable  of  accomplishing 
much  for  the  community  must  ever  stand. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE    CENTRAL    ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL     OVER 
CITIES    IN    EUROPE 

WHILE  in  England  and  the  United  States  all 
instances  of  a  central  administrative  control  are 
evidences  of  the  spread  of  ideas  of  administrative 
centralization,  on  the  continent,  on  the  contrary, 
paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,  they  are  to  be  regarded 
as  evidence  of  the  development  of  the  idea  of 
local  autonomy.  In  England,  where  legislative 
centralization  was  reached  at  quite  an  early  time 
in  her  history,  the  administration,  beginning  with 
the  sixteenth  century,  was  decentralized  in  the 
extreme.  The  various  administrative  officers 
scattered  throughout  the  localities  owed  alle- 
giance to  the  Parliament  rather  than  to  any  ad- 
ministrative superior;  and  that  they  performed 
their  duties  as  laid  down  in  the  minute  legislation, 
of  Parliament  was  assured  by  the  control  over 
them  given  to  the  royal  courts.  But  the  ex- 
periences of  the  last  century  showed  that  local 
administration  of  matters  of  general  interest, 
uncontrolled  in  any  other  way,  resulted  in  admin- 
istrative inefficiency  and  lack  of  harmony  and 

90 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL  IN  EUROPE       91 

uniformity,  and  the  continental  principle  of  cen- 
tral administrative  control,  introduced  into  the 
administration  of  the  Poor  Law  in  1834,  has  since 
been  adopted  in  almost  all  branches  of  local  ad- 
ministration, until  at  the  present  time  England's 
administrative  system  may  be  regarded  as  quite 
highly  centralized. 

On  the  continent  the  course  of  things  was  quite 
different.  The  greater  influence  there  of  the< 
ideas  of  Feudalism  did  not  permit  the  idea  of  the, 
unity  of  the  state  to  develop,  and  no  popular  cen- 
tral legislative  authority  was  established.  There 
were  formed  both  in*France  and  Germany  local 
legislative  bodies  whose  powers  varied  consider- 
ably in  extent  at  different  times.  The  only  unity 
there  was  in  the  state  government  was  to  be  found 
in  the  administration  with  the  crown  at  its  head. 
The  purpose  of  the  absolute  monarchy  everywhere 
was  to  realize  the  idea  of  national  unity,  of  which 
the  people  were  only  dimly  conscious.  The  abso- 
lute monarchy  on  the  continent  did,  it  is  true,  try, 
with  varying  degrees  of  success,  to  extend  its 
centralization  to  matters  of  legislation  as  well  as 
of  administration.  But  the  main  success  of  the 
crown  in  its  attempts  at  centralization  was  in 
the  domain  of  administration.  By  the  time  of  the 
French  Revolution  its  success  here  was  almost 
complete.  In  France,  so  far  as  the  cities  were 
concerned,  it  had  succeeded  in  forcing  its  general 
scheme  of  municipal  administration  on  all  cities 


92  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

in  the  kingdom,  and  had,  as  a  result  of  the  general 
ordinances  in  which  this  scheme  was  to  be  found, 
secured  a  very  large  control  over  the  administra- 
tion of  municipal  affairs,  appointing  most  of  the 
important  officers.1  The  influence  of  the  French 
Revolution  was  in  the  same  direction.  It  secured 
unity  for  France,  and  the  great  law  of  i8oo2  made 
the  city  but  a  part  of  the  central  administration, 
giving  the  central  administration  the  appointment 
of  all  city  officers,  and  subjecting  their  actions  to 
a  most  strict  central  administrative  control.  After 
the  unity  of  the  state  was  reached,  however,  and 
the  supremacy  of  the  central  legislative  power  > 
had  been  acknowledged,  the  administration  began 
to  be  decentralized.  This  decentralization  did  not 
by  any  means,  however,  result  in  the  denial  of  the 
right  of  the  central  administration  to  control  the 
administration  of  the  cities  or  other  localities  where 
that  administration  affected  the  interests  of  the 
state  as  a  whole.  But  it  merely  provided  that 
where  privileges  of  local  government  could,  with 
due  regard  to  the  interests  of  the  state,  be  granted, 
it  was  better  that  this  should  be  done. 

The  same  is  true  of  Prussia.  The  centralization 
of  local  and  particularly  of  municipal  administra- 
tion was  accomplished  by  Frederick  William  the 
First  and  Frederick  the  Great,  and  the  result  was 

1  Dareste  de  la  Chavanne,  Histoire  de  L?  Administration,  Vol.  I, 
Chap.  6,  Sees.  2  and  3.  ' 

2  The  Law  of  28th  of  Pluviose,  an  VIII. 


ADMINISTRATIVE   CONTROL  IN  EUROPE       93 

the  same  as  in  France ;  namely,  the  practical 
absorption  of  all  municipal  administration  in 
central  state  administration.1  In  Prussia,  further, 
as  in  France,  and  largely  due  to  the  same  causes, 
the  central  representative  legislature  played  a  very 
unimportant  role.  Indeed  it  does  not  appear  in 
Prussian  history  until  about  1848.  The  adminis- 
tration with  the  crown  at  its  head  attended  to 
legislative  as  well  as  to  administrative  matters. 
Since  1808,  the  date  of  the  passage  of  the  great 
Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  Baron  Stein,  the 
administration  has,  as  in  France,  been  much  de- 
centralized. Particularly  is  this  the  case  within 
the  last  twenty-five  years.  But,  as  in  France, 
notwithstanding  the  grant  of  large  privileges  of 
local  government  to  the  localities  and  particularly 
to  the  cities,  the  central  administration  has  re- 
served to  itself  very  large  powers  of  control  over 
the  actions  of  the  cities  in  so  far  as  these  affect 
the  interests  of  the  state  as  a  whole. 

The  unimportance,  indeed  the  absence  for  so 
long  a  time  of  any  central  legislative  authority, 
had,  of  course,  an  important  influence  on  the  posi- 
tion which  the  administration  occupied  in  the 
post-revolutionary  system  of  governmental  polity. 
Whereas  in  England,  owing  to  the  early  recogni- 
tion of  the  supremacy  of  Parliament,  —  the  cen- 
tral legislative  body,  —  administrative  officers  owed 

1  Bornhak,  Gcschichtc  des  Premsischen  Verwaltungsrechtt  Vol.  II, 
pp.  24,  156,  289. 


94  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

their  immediate  allegiance  to  that  body,  and  official 
duties  were  minutely  prescribed  in  its  mandates, 
on  the  continent,  on  account  of  the  absence  of  any 
central  legislature,  administrative  officers  owed  im- 
mediate allegiance  to  some  administrative  superior, 
whose  instructions  delimited  their  competence  and 
prescribed  their  duties.  When  the  central  state 
legislature  was  finally  established  on  the  continent, 
it  naturally  occupied  a  position  very  different  from 
that  of  the  English  Parliament.  The  fact  that 
the  detailed  duties  of  subordinate  administrative 
officers  had  from  time  immemorial  been  prescribed 
by  ministerial  circulars  of  instruction  made  it  per- 
fectly natural  for  the  legislature,  so  far  as  it  inter- 
fered with  the  administration  at  all,  to  confine  its 
interference  merely  to  the  laying  down  of  general 
principles  which  were  to  be  elaborated  in  detail  by 
executive  ordinance  and  administrative  instruction, 
and  to  permit  the  administration  to  continue  to  ex- 
ercise in  the  future,  as  it  had  exercised  in  the  past,  a 
control  over  the  administration  of  the  governmental 
affairs  of  the  localities.  This  control  hereafter  dif- 
fered from  what  it  had  been  in  the  past  only  in  that 
it  was  no  longer  entirely  arbitrary,  but  was  to  be  ex- 
ercised within  the  general  limits  fixed  by  the  statutes 
of  the  legislature.  But  the  predominant  position 
of  the  administrative  organization,  and  its  recog- 
nized efficiency,  made  it  not  only  unnecessary  but 
also  inexpedient  and  unnatural  for  the  legislature 
to  assume  to  exercise  the  same  special  control  over 


ADMINISTRATIVE   CONTROL  IN  EUROPE       95 

administrative  matters  which  it  had  been  the  recog- 
nized policy  of  the  English  Parliament  to  exercise. 
On  this  account  special  legislation  is  almost  un- 
known on  the  continent.  This  does  not  mean  that 
special  action  similar  to  special  legislation  is  un- 
known. That  is  impossible.  It  merely  means 
that  what  is  in  England  and  the  United  States 
done  by  special  legislation,  is  on  the  continent  ordi- 
narily done  by  executive  ordinance  and  administra- 
tive action  within  the  general  limits  fixed  by  the 
statutes. 

To  these  reasons  is  due  the  fact  that  on  the  con- 
tinent the  central  administrative  control  exercised 
over  municipal  corporations,  which  is,  as  has  been 
shown,  the  remnant  now  left  of  the  idea  that  all 
administration  was  central  state  administration,  is 
merely  a  part  of  the  general  administrative  cen- 
tralization, and  is  exercised  by  the  ordinary  central 
administrative  authorities,  either  the  ministerial 
departments  at  the  capital  of  the  state  or  the  gen- 
eral representatives  which  the  central  administra- 
tion has  always  had  and  now  has  in  the  localities, 
and  which  are  an  essential  part  of  a  centralized 
administrative  system.  In  England,  however,  the 
central  control,  which  has  been  developed  since 
1834,  could  not  be  organized  in  this  way.  The 
original  local  self-government  system  of  England 
could  not  adapt  itself  to  the  changed  conditions 
necessitated  by  the  existence  of  a  central  admin- 
istrative control,  without  being  completely  re- 


g6  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

modelled.  The  central  administration  had  no 
representatives  in  the  provinces,  but  matters  of 
general  interest  were  attended  to  there  by  local 
officers,  namely,  the  Justices  of  the  Peace.  There- 
fore the  new  legislation  of  Parliament,  beginning 
with  the  Poor  Law  Amendment  Act  of  1834, 
superimposed  upon  the  original  local  self-govern- 
ment system,  a  new  system  of  administration  with 
what  is  now  the  Local  Government  Board  at  Lon- 
don at  its  head,  which  has  been  given  large  powers 
of  control  over  the  new  local  authorities,  estab- 
lished since  I834.1  A  comparison  of  the  present 
continental  and  English  systems  must  therefore 
start  from  different  points  of  view.  On  the  conti- 
nent the  start  must  be  made  from  a  completely 
centralized  administration.  In  England  we  must 
start  from  a  completely  decentralized  system. 

On  the  continent,  then,  at  the  beginning  of -this 
century,  the  city  was  merely  a  part  of  the  general 
administration,  and  its  authorities  were  for  the 
most  part  appointed  by  the  central  administrative 
authorities.  The  first  change  was  made  in  Prussia, 
where  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1808  was 
passed  as  a  result  of  the  influence  of  Stein.  'As 
Leidig  says  :  "  The  modern  legal  conception  of  the 
control  of  the  state  over  the  cities,  finds  its  origin 

1  It  will  be  noticed  this  is  somewhat  the  same  development  which 
has  taken  place  in  the  United  States.  The  only  difference  is  that 
the  United  States  development  has  not  been  carried  so  far  as  has 
been  the  English. 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL  IN  EUROPE       97 

in  the  Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  1808.  In  this 
law  it  was  first  recognized  that  the  corporations 
which  formed  a  part  of  the  state  organization  had 
their  own  personality  distinct  and  apart  from  that 
of  the  state,  and  that  they  should  pursue  their  own 
ends  independently,  within  the  sphere  of  compe- 
tence delimited  by  the  action  of  the  state.  From 
now  on  the  duty  of  the  state  was  merely  to  dis- 
charge functions  of  general  interest,  not,  as  for- 
merly, to  attend  to  matters  of  merely  municipal 
concern."1  The  later  development  of  the  city  has 
had  two  results :  first,  the  strengthening  of  the 
control  of  the  central  administration  over  the  city 
in  order  that  the  city  may  be  more  easily  kept 
within  the  limits  of  its  competence  as  fixed  by 
general  legislation;  and  second,  the  grant  to 
municipal  authorities  of  greater  authority  in  the 
discharge  of  functions  relative  to  the  general  in- 
terests of  the  state.  But  notwithstanding  the 
great  steps  which  have  been  taken  in  recognizing 
that  cities  have  a  sphere  of  action  which  is  theo- 
retically independent  of  the  sphere  of  action  of 
the  central  government,  the  old  idea  that  cities 
are  parts  of  the  general  system  of  administration 
is  still  of  influence  on  their  relations  with  the  cen- 
tral government.  It  is  seen  in  the  powers  which 
the  central  state  administration  has  to  veto  the 
choice  by  the  city  councils  of  their  most  impor- 
tant executive  officers,  and  to  dissolve  the  city 

1  Leidig,  Preussisches  Stadtrccht,  p.  498. 
H 


98  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

councils  themselves.  Up  to  1883,  the  central  ad- 
ministration had  the  further  power  of  uncondi- 
tionally vetoing  all  resolutions  of  the  city  council 
and  city  executive.  Since  1883,  however,  the  coun- 
cil or  the  executive  may  appeal  to  the  proper  court 
from  such  veto,  which  theoretically  may  be  made 
only  in  case  the  resolution  in  question  is  beyond 
the  competence  of  the  authority  passing  it.  A 
similar  power  of  appeal  is  given  to  the  council 
against  the  exercise  of  the  veto  power,  which  is 
recognized  as  belonging  to  the  town  executive 
over  council  resolutions.  As  the  proper  court  to 
entertain  the  appeal  is  not  controlled  altogether 
by  officers  learned  in  the  law,  but  is  of  a  popular 
and  lay  character,  the  powers  of  veto  of  the  pro- 
fessional central  administration  or  of  the  town 
executive,  in  whose  formation  this  central  admin- 
istration participates  through  its  power  of  approv- 
ing the  appointments  of  the  council,  can  neither 
be  arbitrarily  exercised,  nor  be  exercised  altogether 
in  the  interests  of  the  central  administration.  The 
popular  character  of  the  body  which  ultimately 
determines  when  and  where  it  shall  be  exercised, 
effectually  prevents  this.  Finally  the  central  ad- 
ministration may,  when  the  local  authorities  neglect 
or  refuse  to  do  so,  insert  in  the  budget  of  the  city 
appropriations  for  obligatory  expenses ;  that  is,  ex- 
penses for  branches  of  administration  which  the 
law  says  shall  be  supported  by  the  cities,  and  may, 
if  necessary,  make  provision  for  the  levying  of 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL  IN  EUROPE       99 

taxes  to  provide  the  necessary  moneys.  Appeal 
from  its  decision  may  be  taken  to  the  Supreme 
Administrative  Court,  a  body  of  purely  profes- 
sional character.  The  difference  in  the  body  to 
which  appeals  go  in  these  cases  is  due  to  the  dif- 
ference in  the  nature  of  the  decisions  appealed 
from.  Those  of  a  political  nature  to  be  decided 
from  the  point  of  view  of  expediency  go  to  a  pop- 
ular body;  those  of  a  legal  nature  go  to  a  body 
learned  in  the  law.  So  far  it  will  be  noticed  that 
with  the  exception  of  the  power  of  dissolution  and 
of  approving  municipal  appointments,  the  control 
which  has  been  considered  has  been  formed  mainly 
with  the  idea  of  keeping  the  city  within  the  bounds 
of  its  legal  competence.  While  this  is  ultimately 
determined  by  judicial  bodies,  the  powers  of  con- 
trol of  the  central  administration  are  very  valuable, 
inasmuch  as  the  law  thus  makes  it  expressly  the 
business  of  the  central  administration  to  force  the 
cities  to  obey  the  law.  Reliance  is  not  placed 
upon  private  interest  as  in  this  country,  where 
practically  the  only  way  in  which  the  courts  can 
keep  the  cities  or  other  authorities  within  the  law 
is  upon  application  of  private  persons  whose  rights 
have  been  violated  by  the  illegal  action  of  the 
authorities  complained  of. 

But  the  control  of  the  central  administration 
over  cities  in  Prussia  is  much  more  extensive.  It 
is  directed  not  merely  towards  maintaining  the  law 
as  laid  down  in  the  statutes ;  it  is  also  directed 


100  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

towards  preventing  the  municipality,  either  as 
agent  of  the  state  government,  or  as  a  local  gov- 
ernmental organ,  from  taking  unwise  action.  As 
has  been  indicated,  the  latest  legislation  makes  the 
city  the  agent  of  the  state  government  in  a  number 
of  cases.  Thus  a  city  of  25,000  inhabitants  is 
exempted  from  the  circle,  —  a  division  roughly 
corresponding  to  the  county,  but  generally  smaller, 
—  and  forms  by  itself  an  urban  circle,  as  it  is 
called.  All  the  duties  devolved  upon  the  ordi- 
nary circle  then  are  devolved  upon  the  city.  In 
the  second  place,  the  city  generally  attends  to  the 
administration  of  the  schools,  to  the  care  of  the 
poor,  and  has  functions  to  discharge  relative  to 
the  administration  of  justice.  Where  it  is  not 
of  large  size,  it  also  has  the  care  of  the  police, 
which  term  is  used  in  its  widest  sense,  embracing 
not  only  the  preservation  of  the  peace,  but  also 
the  care  of  the  public  health,  and  the  protection 
of  the  safety  of  the  people  generally,  such  as  the 
prevention  and  the  extinguishment  of  fires.  Iri^ 
the  case  of  the  larger  cities,  however,  the  law 
recognizing  that  the  police  is  not  a  local  matter 
gives  the  central  administration  power,  if  it  sees 
fit,  to  take  this  matter  into  its  own  hands,  by  ap- 
pointing the  persons  who  are  to  have  charge  of 
it.  Where  this  is  done,  the  expense  of  the  police 
administration  is  shared  between  the  city  and  the 
central  government  in  the  proportions  provided  for 
by  law.  In  all  these  cases,  however,  it  is  distinctly 


ADMINISTRATIVE   CONTROL  IN  EUROPE     ioi 

recognized  that  the  city  is  acting  as  agent  of  the 
central  government,  and  as  such  it  is  subjected  to 
the  regular  central  administrative  control  exercised 
over  these  branches  of  governmental  activity  in 
the  country  at  large.  The  fact  that  they  are 
attended  to  by  the  city  does  not  change  their 
character.  While  the  cities  are  given  certain  dis- 
cretionary powers  relative  to  these  matters,  mainly 
of  a  supplementary  character,  the  central  admin- 
istration does  not  lose  its  power  to  insist  upon 
the  taking  of  a  certain  minimum  of  action,  or 
upon  wise  action  by  the  municipality.  This  fact 
comes  out  most  clearly  in  the  school  administra- 
tion, which  is  one  of  the  most  important  matters 
attended  to  by  the  city.  In  the  first  place,  the 
general  system  of  instruction  is  prescribed  by 
central  legislation  and  controlled  by  the  central 
administration,  although  the  city  school  board, 
which  consists  partly  of  members  appointed  by 
the  central  administration,  partly  of  members 
elected  by  the  town  council,  attends  to  the  details 
of  school  administration :  such  as  managing  the 
school  property,  the  carrying  out  of  the  provisions 
of  the  school  budget,  which  is  ultimately  fixed  by 
the  city  council,  the  supervision  of  the  execution 
of  the  school  law,  and  the  compelling  of  atten- 
dance at  school.  In  the  second  place,  the  town 
council  generally  appoints,  subject  to  the  approval 
of  the  central  administration,  all  teachers;  and, 
most  important  of  all  its  school  duties,  attends  to 


102  MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 

the  school  finances.  Here,  however,  the  council 
is  subject  to  the  control  of  the  central  adminis- 
tration, which  may  force  it  to  provide  necessary 
school  buildings  and  apparatus,  and  money  for 
compensation  of  teachers.  In  case,  however,  of 
difference  of  opinion  between  the  city  and  the 
central  administration  as  to  new  school  build- 
ings or  repairs  of  old  buildings,  the  matter  is 
decided  by  the  proper  administrative  court,  and 
in  making  provision  for  new  teachers  the  super- 
visory authority  has  to  bear  in  mind  the  financial 
condition  of  the  city,  as  well  as  the  needs  of  the 
school.  While  every  city  is  obliged  by  law,  which 
it  may  be  forced  by  the  central  administration  to 
obey,  to  support  the  necessary  primary  schools,  it 
may  undertake  the  maintenance  of  higher  schools. 
Where  this  is  done,  the  city  school  board  has 
charge  merely  of  the  economic  conditions  of  the 
schools,  the  pedagogical  part  of  their  administra- 
tion being  under  the  control  of  the  principals  and 
of  the  central  school  authorities.  Finally,  it  is  to 
be  noticed  that  the  'central  state  government,  in 
case  of  necessity,  gives  aid  to  the  cities  to  enable 
them  to  maintain  both  the  higher  and  the  lower 
schools.1 

The  central  control  is,  further,  quite  strong  over 
the  financial  administration  of  the  city.  Thus, 
subject  to  certain  limitations  contained  for  the 
most  part  in  the  German  Constitution  and  adopted 

1  Leidig,  op.  cit.,  p.  464  et  seq. 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL  IN  EUROPE     103 

in  the  interest  of  German  unity  and  the  Imperial 
finances,  Prussian  cities  have  the  power,  with  the 
consent  of  the  central  administration,  to  impose 
any  kind  of  tax  they  see  fit.  They  may,  how- 
ever, without  such  consent,  impose  direct  taxes, 
the  same  as  the  state  direct  taxes,  to  an  amount 
not  exceeding  fifty  per  cent  of  the  amount  raised 
by  the  state  in  the  city,  provided  such  municipal 
taxes  are  equally  distributed  among  the  various 
state  taxes,  which  are  on  land,  buildings,  income, 
and  trade.1  Where  fifty  per  cent  is  exceeded, 
or  the  amount  raised  is  distributed  unequally 
among  the  state  direct  taxes,  the  consent  of  the 
central  administration  is  necessary.  Finally,  the 
central  administrative  approval  of  all  new  loans 
is  necessary.  This  is  to  be  given  by  one  of  the 
popular  authorities  referred  to. 

It  will  be  seen  from  this  description  of  the  cen- 
tral administrative  control  over  cities  in  Prussia 
that  while  it  is  directed  primarily  towards  keeping 
the  city  within  the  bounds  of  its  competence  as 
fixed  by  law,  and  of  keeping  the  municipalities  up 
to  the  performance  of  their  duties  as  state  agents, 
it  is  made  use  of  also  incidentally,  and  particularly 
in  the  administration  of  the  municipal  finances 
with  the  idea  of  preventing  the  municipality  from 
acting  unwisely  even  in  purely  municipal  matters. 
The  late  reforms  in  Prussia  have,  however,  sub- 
jected the  exercise  of  this  central  administrative 

1  Loaning,  Dcutsches  Verwaltungsrccht,  p.  188  et  seq 


104  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

control  in  so  many  cases  to  the  control  of  popular 
bodies  and  courts  where  it  has  not  been  provided 
that  the  control  itself  shall  be  exercised  by  such 
bodies,  that  it  cannot  be  arbitrarily  exercised.  The 
system  is  really  one  of  large  local  powers. 

In  France  the  main  features  of  the  system  are 
the  same,  although  the  control  is  not  nearly  so 
complicated  as  a  result  of  the  greater  simplicity  of 
the  general  French  system  of  administration.  We 
find  the  central  administration  has,  as  in  Prussia, 
the  power  to  dissolve  the  municipal  councils  and 
remove  the  executive,  namely,  the  mayor  and  his 
deputies,  although  its  approval  of  their  election  is 
not  necessary.  Further,  the  mayor,  who  is  re- 
garded as  the  direct  agent  of  the  central  adminis- 
tration in  the  city,  acts  as  such  agent  under  the 
supervision  and  control  of  the  central  administra- 
tion, which  may  not  only  suspend  him  from  office, 
but  itself  ,may  perform  any  of  the  duties  of  the 
mayor  which  he  may  refuse  to  perform,  and  may 
disapprove  any  of  the  police  ordinances  which  he 
has  the  power  to  issue.  We  find,  also,  the  central 
administration  has  the  same  powers  as  in  Prussia, 
to  force  a  municipality  to  perform  the  duties  im- 
posed upon  it  by  the  law  by  inserting  in  the  budget 
appropriations  for  obligatory  expenses,  in  the  case 
of  the  refusal  of  the  city  council  to  act,  and  to  pre- 
vent it  from  exceeding  its  powers.  The  same  sort 
of  control  is  given  to  -the  central  administration 
over  the  financial  administration.  Finally,  the 


ADMINISTRATIVE   CONTROL  IN  EUROPE      105 

same  principle  has  been  adopted,  of  allowing  the 
cities  to  appeal  from  the  decisions  of  the  central 
administration  vetoing  resolutions  of  the  munici- 
pal council  on  the  ground  of  excess  of  powers. 
The  appeal  goes  to  the  administrative  courts, 
which,  in  France,  are  not,  however,  at  all  popular 
in  character,  but  are  almost  a  part  of  the  profes- 
sional central  administration.1 

Such  is  the  way  in  which  the  central  administra- 
tive control  over  cities  is  organized  and  exercised 
on  the  continent.  It  is,  as  has  been  said,  a  part  of 
the  general  administrative  system,  and  is  a  relic  of 
a  time  when  municipal  administration  was  regarded 
as  a  part  of  general  state  administration.  But  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  under  it  municipal  corpora- 
tions have  a  very  large  sphere  of  local  action,  and 
that,  whether  due  to  it  or  to  the  form  of  organiza- 
tion or  to  some  other  unknown  causes,  municipal 
government  has  been,  particularly  in,  Germany, 
very  successful. 

In  England  the  central  control  over  cities  is 
quite  differently  organized.  The  English  munici- 
pal organization  proper  is  a  part  of  the  old  Eng- 
lish local  government  system,  which,  it  will  be 
remembered,  was  quite  decentralized.  The  origi- 
nal English  city  had  few  functions  of  central  gov- 
ernment to  discharge  ;  really  only  the  preservation 
of  the  peace  through  the  provision  of  a  police 
force  and  the  power  to  pass  police  ordinances. 

1  See  Article  67  of  the  Law  of  April  5,  1884. 


IO6  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

It  was  only  as  Justices  of  the  Peace,  appointed  so 
by  special  commission,  that  really  municipal  officers 
exercised  judicial  functions.  The  only  original 
method  of  central  administrative  control  over  cities 
is  to  be  found  in  the  power  of  the  Privy  Council  to 
disapprove  city  ordinances.  All  other  central  con- 
trol was  exercised  through  special  legislation,  of 
which  we  have  seen  there  has  been  a  good  deal 
even  since  the  general  act  of  1835.  With  the 
course  of  time,  however,  the  power  of  the  central 
administration  over  cities  has  been  strengthened. 
This  has  come  about  in  two  ways.  In  the  first 
place,  as  the  general  administrative  system  of  the 
country  has  been  more  centralized,  the  city,  upon 
which  new  functions  of  a  public  character  have 
been  imposed,  has  been  subjected  to  the  central 
administrative  control  in  the  same  way  as  other 
local  authorities.  In  the  second  place,  the  general 
spread  of  centralization  has  not  failed  to  have  its 
influence  on  the  purely  municipal  affairs  of  the 
city. 

The  first  step  taken  in  centralizing  English  ad- 
ministration was  made  in  the  Poor  Law  Amend- 
ment Act  of  1834,  which  established  a  central 
Poor  Law  Board  to  control  the  actions  of  the  local 
poor  law  boards  which  were  then  established. 
The  city  was,  it  is  true,  never  given  the  charge  of 
the  poor,  and  a  municipal  district  bears  no  relation 
to  the  poor  law  district,  the  union.  But  the  next 
step  taken  in  the  Public  Health  Act,  passed  about 


ADMINISTRATIVE   CONTROL  IN  EUROPE      IO/ 

the  middle  of  the  century,  and  later  consolidated 
with  its  amendments  into  the  Consolidated  Act  of 
1875,  made  the  city  an  urban  sanitary  district,  and 
the  city  council  an  urban  sanitary  authority.  As 
such  urban  sanitary  authority  it  is  subject,  as  are 
all  sanitary  authorities,  to  a  very  strict  central  con- 
trol, which  is  exercised  by  the  Local  Government 
Board  at  London,  established  in  1871,  and  the  suc- 
cessor of  the  old  Poor  Law  and  Health  boards. 
When  public  schools  in  the  American  sense  of  the 
word  were  established  in  1870,  the  city  was  made 
a  school  district ;  but,  as  in  the  case  of  the  poor  law 
administration,  the  city  council  did  not  become  the 
local  school  authority,  which  is  a  school  board, 
elected  as  are  all  other  school  boards.  But  the 
city  council,  although  it  has  no  control  over  the 
school  board,  which  itself  is  under  the  control  of 
a  central  education  department,  must  raise  the 
necessary  funds  to  carry  on  the  schools.  These  are 
raised  as  part  of  the  borough  rate.  It  is  thus  seen 
what  an  influence  in  subjecting,  what  in  America 
would  be  called  municipal  administration,  to  cen- 
tral administrative  control,  the  centralization  of 
the  general  system  of  English  administration  has 
had. 

In  the  second  place,  matters  always  attended  to 
by  municipal  boroughs  have  felt  the  influence  of 
these  centralizing  tendencies.  Acts  of  1856  and 
1888  have  provided  for  a  consolidation  with  the 
county  police  of  the  police  force  of  all  boroughs 


108  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

of  less  than  ten  thousand  inhabitants.  The  Act 
of  1856  further  introduced  a  central  control  over 
the  matter  of  police,  by  providing  that  the  central 
government  should  aid  all  boroughs  in  maintaining 
the  police  force,  provided  that  a  certain  standard 
of  efficiency  was  maintained,  which  was  to  be 
evidenced  by  the  certificate  of  the  Home  Secretary, 
granted  only  after  inspection.  The  financial 
powers,  particularly  the  borrowing  power,  of  cities 
have  been  limited  in  that  they  have  frequently 
been  subjected  to  the  central  administrative  con- 
trol now  exercised  by  the  Local  Government 
Board  at  London.1  But  this  control  has  been 
much  weakened  through  the  passage  of  special 
acts  of  Parliament,  giving  the  permission  to  de- 
part from  the  rules  laid  down  in  the  general  law, 
—  a  fact  which  shows  how  much  less  useful  is  the 
legislative  than  the  administrative  control.2  While 
all  other  localities  in  England,  as  well  as  cities  in 
France,  are  subjected  to  the  central  audit  of  ac- 
counts, the  English  borough  is  not;  although 
after  the  local  audit  has  been  had,  the  accounts 
must  be  filed  within  a  month  with  the  Local  Gov- 
ernment Board  at  London.  Somewhat  the  same 
plan  is  adopted  in  Prussia. 

The  central  control,  which  had  been  distributed 
among  various  central  authorities  for  each  branch 
of  administration  into  which  the  central  control 

1  See  Article  72  of  the  Local  Government  Act  of  1888. 

2  See  Arminjon,  L  Administration  Locale  de  L'Angleterre,  p.  215. 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL  IN  EUROPE     109 

had  been  introduced,  was,  after  the  report  of  the 
Royal  Sanitary  Commission  in  1869,  centralized, 
with  the  exception  of  that  over  school  matters,1  in 
the  Local  Government  Board  at  London.  This 
authority  has  under  it  a  corps  of  officers,  inspectors, 
auditors,  etc.,  who  go  about  the  country  supervis- 
ing the  administration  of  the  localities.  A  perusal 
of  this  report  will  show  how  necessary  the  central 
administrative  control  was  regarded.  The  commis- 
sioners say : 2  "  However  local  the  administration 
of  affairs,  a  central  authority  will,  nevertheless,  be 
always  necessary  in  order  to  keep  the  local  execu- 
tive everywhere  in  action,  to  aid  it  when  higher 
skill  or  information  is  needed,  and  to  carry  out 
numerous  functions  of  central  superintendence. 
The  causes  of  the  present  inefficiency  of  the  cen- 
tral sanitary  authority  are  obvious :  First,  its  want 
of  concentration,  the  reference  of  general  questions 
of  local  government  being  made  to  the  Local  Gov- 
ernment Act  Department  of  the  home  office,  that 
of  measures  '  for  diseases  prevention '  to  the 
Privy  Council,  and  that  of  other  matters  to  the 
Board  of  Trade.  Second,  the  want  of  central  offi- 
cers, there  being,  for  instance,  no  staff  whatever 
for  constant,  and  a  very  small  one  for  occasional 
inspection.  Third,  the  want  of  constant  and  offi- 
cial communication  between  central  and  local 

1  In  school  matters  the  central  control  is  exercised  mostly  by  the 
Education  Department. 

8  Quoted  from  Chalmers,  Local  Government,  p.  149. 


110  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

officers  throughout  the  kingdom.  A  new  statute, 
therefore,  should  constitute  and  give  adequate 
strength  to  one  central  authority.  There  should 
be  one  recognized  and  sufficiently  powerful  minis- 
ter, not  to  centralize  administration,  but  on  the 
contrary,  to  set  local  life  in  motion,  —  a  real  motive 
power  and  an  authority  to  be  referred  to  for  guid- 
ance and  assistance  by  all  the  sanitary  authorities 
for  local  government  throughout  the  country. 
Great  is  the  vis  inertia  to  be  overcome,  the  repug- 
nance to  self-taxation ;  the  practical  distrust  of 
science ;  and  the  number  of  persons  interested  in 
offending  against  sanitary  laws,  even  amongst 
those  who  must  constitute  chiefly  the  local  authori- 
ties to  enforce  them." 

While  so  far  as  the  continent  is  concerned  we 
have  no  opportunity  to  compare  the  results  of 
central  administrative  control  with  lo.cal  self-gov- 
ernment pure  and  simple,  inasmuch  as  the  latter 
system  never  existed  there,  we  have  such  an  op- 
portunity in  England.  The  effects  of  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  central  administrative  control  in 
England  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  CENTRAL  ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND1 

THE  central  administrative  control  which  was 
introduced  into  English  local  government  by  the 
Poor  Law  Amendment  Act  of  1834,  but  has 
been  elaborated  by  subsequent  legislation,  has  not 
had  the  effect  of  centralizing  local  government  in 
the  sense  of  providing  for  the  central  appoint- 
ment of  local  officers.  It  has  consisted  merely 
in  giving  to  the  central  authorities  established  for 
its  exercise,  powers  of  supervision  over  local 
officials.  Such  powers  are  to  be  exercised  in  the 
first  place  to  prevent  unwise  action  on  the  part  of 
the  local  authorities,  in  the  second  place  to  over- 
come negligence  on  their  part,  and  in  the  third 
place  to  secure  obedience  to  the  law  fixing  their 
competence.  The  central  powers  of  supervision 
are  not,  however,  altogether  concentrated  in  one 
authority,  but  are,  on  the  contrary,  entrusted  to 
several  authorities,  the  most  important  of  which 
is  the  Local  Government  Board.  Further,  both 

1  By  Milo  Roy  Maltbie,  sometime  University  Fellow  in  Adminis- 
trative Law  in  Columbia  University. 

ill 


112  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

because  of  the  different  needs  of  different  branches 
of  administration,  and  because  the  system  is  the 
result  of  a  long  and  not  altogether  symmetrical 
development,  the  control  over  one  branch  of  ad- 
ministration is  somewhat  different  from  what  it 
is  over  another.  In  what  will  be  hereafter  said, 
therefore,  attention  will  be  directed  to  each  specific 
branch  of  administration  which  has  been  subjected 
to  the  central  control,  and  the  attempt  will  be  made 
to  ascertain  what  has  been  the  effect  of  the  control 
upon  it.  First  in  order  is  the 

I.   Poor  Law  Administration 

The  immediate  change  for  the  better  attending 
the  Poor  Law  Amendment  Act  of  1834,  which 
introduced  into  English  local  government  the  prin- 
ciple of  central  administrative  control,  has  often 
been  noted.  The  woeful  conditions  which  existed 
during  the  first  part  of  this  century  are  generally 
known,  but  to  estimate  correctly  the  effect  of  cen- 
tral control  it  is  necessary  to  contrast  the  condi- 
tions previous  to  its  introduction  with  the  present.1 

"  The  poor-rate,"  says  Harriet  Martineau,  in  de- 
scribing the  conditions  before  1834,  "had  become 
public  spoil.  The  ignorant  believed  it  an  inex- 
haustible fund  which  belonged  to  them.  To  obtain 

1  For  an  extended  description  the  reader  must  be  referred  to 
the  invaluable  report  of  the  Poor  Law  Commission  of  1832-34,  Ses- 
sional Papers,  1834,  Vol.  27. 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND     113 

their  share,  the  brutal  bullied  the  administrators; 
the  profligate  exhibited  their  bastards,  which  must 
be  fed ;  the  idle  folded  their  arms,  and  waited  till 
they  got  it;  ignorant  boys  and  girls  married  upon 
it;  poachers,  thieves,  and  prostitutes  extorted  it  by 
intimidation ;  county  justices  lavished  it  for  popu- 
larity, and  guardians  for  convenience.  This  was 
the  way  the  fund  went.  As  for  whence  it  arose, 
—it  came  more  and  more  every  year  out  of  the 
capital  of  the  shopkeeper  and  the  farmer,  and  the 
diminishing  resources  of  the  country  gentleman. 
The  shopkeeper's  stock  and  returns  dwindled,  as 
the  farmer's  land  deteriorated,  and  the  gentleman's 
expenditure  contracted.  The  farmer's  sons,  wait- 
ing, at  the  age  of  five-and-thirty,  for  ability  to 
marry  in  comfort,  saw  in  every  ditch  and  field  on 
the  estate,  lads  under  twenty,  whose  children  were 
maintained  by  the  rates  which  were  ruining  their 
employer.  Instead  of  the  proper  number  of  labor- 
ers to  till  his  lands, — laborers  paid  by  himself,— 
the  farmer  was  compelled  to  take  double  the  num- 
ber, whose  wages  were  paid  partly  out  of  the 
rates ;  and  these  men,  being  employed  by  compul- 
sion on  him,  were  beyond  his  control, — worked  or 
not  as  they  chose  —  let  down  the  quality  of  his 
land,  and  disabled  him  from  employing  the  better 
men  who  would  have  toiled  hard  for  indepen- 
dence. These  better  men  sank  down  among  the 
worse ;  the  rate-paying  cottager,  after  a  vain  strug- 
gle, went  to  the  pay-table  to  seek  relief ;  the  mod- 


114  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

est  girl  might  starve,  while  her  bolder  neighbor 
received  is.  6d.  per  week  for  every  illegitimate 
child.  Industry,  probity,  purity,  prudence,  —  all 
heart  and  spirit,  the  whole  soul  of  goodness, — 
were  melting  down  into  depravity  and  social  ruin, 
like  snow  under  the  foul  internal  fires  which  pre- 
cede the  earthquake."  l 

"Before  two  years  were  out  [i.e.  after  1834] 
wages  were  rising  and  rates  were  falling  in  the 
whole  series  of  country  parishes ;  farmers  were 
employing  more  laborers;  bullying  paupers  were 
transformed  into  steady  workingmen ;  the  decrease 
of  illegitimate  births,  chargeable  to  the  parish, 
throughout  England,  was  nearly  ten  thousand,  or 
nearly  thirteen  per  cent ;  clergymen  testified  that 
they  were  relieved  from  much  of  the  pain  and 
shame  of  having  to  celebrate  marriages  where  the 
bride  was  on  the  point  of  becoming  a  mother,  or 
where  the  parties  were  mere  children,  with  no 
other  prospect  than  the  parish  pay-table;  and, 
finally,  the  rates,  which  had  risen  nearly  a  million 
in  their  annual  amount  during  the  five  years  be- 
fore the  poor  law  commission  was  issued,  sank 
down  in  the  course  of  five  years  after  it,  from 
being  upwards  of  seven  millions  to  very  little 
above  four."2 

The  following  statistics  are  interesting  as  giving 

1  Harriet  Martineau,  History  of  ike  Peace,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  324,  325, 
Boston,  1866,  Bk.  IV,  Chap.  VII. 

2  Harriet  Martineau,  op.  cit.,  p.  333. 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND     115 


a  quantitative  measure  of  the  great  reforms  the 
last  sixty  years  have  seen. 


Year 

ended 
at 
Lady- 
day 

Price  of 
Wheat 
per 
Quarter  J 

Population 
deduced  from 
Census  Re- 
turns 1 

Expended  for 
the  Relief 
and  Mainte- 
nance of  the 
Poor1 

Rate  per 
Cap.  of 
the  Popu- 
lation 1 

Amount 
raised. 
Rate 
per  &  of 
Ratable 
Value8 

Paupers 
per  1000 
of  Popu- 
lation * 

s.  d. 

£ 

s.d. 

s.d. 

1803 

648 

9,210,000 

4,077,891 

8  loj 

1818 

84  I 

11,876,200 

7,870,801 

133 

1824 

62  o 

12,517,900 

5,736,900 

92 

1832 

634 

14,105,600 

7,036,969 

100 

1834 

51   " 

14,372,000 

6,3I7»255 

89* 

1835 

442 

14,564,000 

5,526,418 

77 

1837 

526 

14,955,000 

4,044,741 

55 

1843 

544 

16,194,000 

5,208,027 

65i 

— 

75  (?)* 

1848 

646 

17,150,018 

6,180,764 

72* 

— 

62.76 

1852 

394 

17,982,849 

4,897,685 

55i 

— 

5°-9 

1856 

754 

l8,829,OOO 

6,004,244 

64i 

— 

48.7 

1861 

55  10 

19,902,713 

5,778,943 

591 

— 

44-4 

1866 

436 

21,145,151 

6,439,5!  7 

61 

I  5.4 

43-3 

1871 

49  8£ 

22,501,316 

7,886,724 

70 

164 

46.1 

1876 

455 

24,045,385 

7,335,858 

61* 

13-5 

31-2 

1881 

437 

25,714,288 

8,102,136 

63^ 

I  2.3 

30.8 

1886 

320 

27,220,105 

8,296,230 

6i* 

i  1.8 

28.7 

1891 

328 

28,762,287 

8,643,318 

60 

11.8 

26.4 

1892 

372 

29,081,047 

8,847,678 

6  i 

1  1.2 

25.6 

1893 

284 

29,403,346 

9,2i7,5I4 

63i 

11.6 

25.8 

1894 

— 

•~~ 

— 

— 

— 

26.5 

1  Rep.  of  P.  L.  B.,  S.  P.,  Vol.  23,  1850,  pp.  146-7,  App. 
Rep.  of  L.  G.  B.,  S.  P.,  Vol.  31,  1876,  p.  282,  App. 
Ibid.  Vol.  38,  1894,  p.  390,  App. 

2  Ibid.  p.  390,  App.  4  Estimate  for  1841,  Fowle,  p.  156. 

3  Ibid.  p.  324,  App.  6  Figure  for  1849. 


Il6  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

But  these  facts  do  not  begin  to  express  the 
full  extent  of  the  reform.  The  decrease  in  the 
rate  of  expenditure  and  the  proportional  number 
of  paupers  tell  us  nothing  of  their  treatment  or 
the  conditions  of  the  vast  laboring  and  merchant 
classes  which  are  not  dependent  upon  aid  from 
the  state.  Even  those  dependent  upon  the  poor 
rates  are  much  better  cared  for  than  formerly; 
indeed,  as  is  claimed  by  some,  to  the  extent  that 
pauperism  is  made  too  inviting  instead  of  being 
extremely  repulsive. 

II.   Public  Health 

Central  administrative  control  was  first  intro- 
duced in  the  administration  of  public  health  in 
1848,  but  here  it  was  not  made  complete  until 
1871.  It  is  proper  then  to  consider  three  periods 
in  the  development:  first,  conditions  previous  to 
1848;  second,  those  in  1870;  and  third,  conditions 
obtaining  at  present. 

Two  important  investigations  were  made,  one  in 
1843,!  one  in  1844  and  1845,2  of  the  conditions 
existing  under  the  regime  of  local  government 
pure  and  simple  of  the  public  health.  Their  results 
have  been  summarized  as  follows :  — 

1  Report  on  the  Sanitary  Condition  of  the  Laboring  Population 
of  Great  Britain,  S.  P.,  1843,  Vol.  12. 

2  Reports  of  the  Commissioners  for  Inquiring  into  the  State  of 
Large  Towns  and  Populous  Districts,  S.  P.,  1844,  Vol.  17  ;  S.  P., 
1845,  Vol.  18. 


ADMINISTRATIVE   CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND 


"  Out  of  fifty  towns  visited  on  behalf  of  the 
Commissioners,  the  drainage  was  reported  as  bad 
in  forty-three,  the  cleansing  in  forty-two,  the  water- 
supply  in  thirty-two.  In  Liverpool  40,000,  and  in 
Manchester  15,000,  of  the  working  class  lived  in 
cellars,  '  dark,  damp,  dirty,  and  ill-ventilated  '  ; 
Nottingham  contained  11,000  houses,  of  which 
8000  were  built  back  to  back  and  side  to  side,  so 
that  no  ventilation  was  possible;  .  .  .  even  in 
Birmingham,  then,  as  now,  a  model  town,  the 
water  supplied  to  some  of  the  poorer  districts  is 
described  as  being  '  as  green  as  a  leek/  The 
results  of  this  state  of  things  were  clearly  seen. 
Whilst  the  death-rate  in  country  districts  was  18.2 
per  thousand,  in  towns  it  was  26.2,  in  Birmingham 
and  Leeds  it  was  27.2,  in  Bristol  30.9,  in  Man- 
chester 33.7,  in  Liverpool  34.8.  .  .  .  The  average 
age  at  death  in  Rutland  and  Wiltshire  was  36^ 
years,  whilst  in  Leeds  it  was  21,  in  Manchester 
20,  in  Liverpool  I/."1 

If  we  institute  a  comparison  between  present 
conditions  and  those  of  this  early  period,  we  shall 
find  a  marked  contrast,  and  all  the  evidence  points 
towards  more  rapid  progress  since  1871  than  before. 

Considering  the  death-rate,  which,  although  it 
is  not  an  infallible  index  of  sanitary  conditions, 
may  be  taken  as  a  fairly  accurate  standard  of  com- 
parison when  the  same  country  is  considered  and 
decimal  periods  are  used,  it  is  found  that  the  aver- 

1  Edinburgh  Review,  Vol.  1  73,  p.  69. 


Il8  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

age  death-rate  for  the  eleven  years,  1838-48,  was 
22.23  Per  mille;  from  1849  to  l872>  22-34J  and 
from  1873  to  1893,  19.99;  being  19.2  for  the 
single  year,  1893.  Or  to  state  it  more  vividly: 
if  the  death-rate  for  1893  had  been  the  same  as 
that  from  1838  to  1848,  there  would  have  been 
upwards  of  90,000  more  deaths  during  that  year 
than  there  really  were.  This  saving  of  90,000 
persons  annually  has  great  economic  importance ; 
for  the  direct  effect  of  improved  sanitation  has 
been  to  increase  the  duration  of  life,  and  this  in- 
crement has  come  not  to  the  very  old  or  to  the 
very  young,  but  to  the  middle-aged,  at  the  time 
when  personal  activity  is  at  or  near  its  height.1 

If  one  takes  into  account  upon  the  one  hand  the 
fact  that  medical  science  has  become  more  able  to 
cope  with  disease,  that  the  laws  of  hygiene  have 
become  more  widely  known ;  and  upon  the  other, 
the  facts  that  the  death-rate  is  only  a  very  imper- 
fect index  of  the  amount  of  sickness  which  does 
not  terminate  fatally,  and  that  it  is  universally 
conceded  that  sickness  has  greatly  diminished,  it 
becomes  evident  that  the  improvement  in  sanitary 
conditions  is  much  greater  than  the  death-rate 
would  indicate.2  And  it  should  not  be  forgotten 

1  For  discussion  and  proof  consult  Vol.  37  of  the  Journal  of 
Statistical  Society,  London  ;  "  The  Value  of  Death  Rates,  as  a  Test 
of  Sanitary  Condition,"  by  N.  A.  Humphreys. 

2  Sex  and  age  distribution  might  influence  these  figures  some, 
but  the  corrections  that  need  to  be  made  when  the  same  country  is 
dealt  with  and  for  long  periods  are  slight  indeed. 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND     I  19 

in  this  connection  that  although  the  crowding  of 
people  into  large  cities  is  not  a  cause  of  greater 
mortality  and  sickness,  yet  there  is  a  strong  ten- 
dency for  the  two  to  be  found  in  unison,  and  that 
in  spite  of  the  rapid  growth  of  cities  since  1850, 
the  death-rate  is  at  present  much  lower  than  pre- 
vious to  that  date. 

But  to  ascertain  more  directly  the  change  pro- 
duced, one  may  consult  the  death-rate  due  to 
zymotic  diseases,  which  are  more  directly  affected 
by  the  state  of  sanitation  than  any  other  class ;  or 
to  specialize  still  further,  the  deaths  due  to  fever 
might  be  studied,  with  the  following  result. 

DEATH-RATE  PER  1000  OF  POPULATION1 


1861-70 

1871-80 

1881-87 

Zymotic  diseases    .     . 
Fever 

4.25 
088 

3-38 

O  dQ 

245 
O  21 

\j.*$ 

DEATHS  FROM  TYPHUS,  ENTERIC,  CONTINUED  FEVER  2 


1850 

1855 

i860 

1865 

1870 

1875 

1880 

1885 

1887 

Per  i,  000,000  living 

865 

875 

654 

1089 

796 

543 

342 

209 

207 

Per  1,000  deaths 

43 

39 

31 

47 

35 

24 

17 

ii 

10 

A  comparison  of  the  death-rates  of  urban  and 
rural  districts  is  also  interesting. 


1  Newsholme,  Vital  Statistics,  p.  173. 


2  Ibid.  p.  185. 


120  MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 

DEATH-RATE  PER  1000  POPULATION1 


1851-60 

1861-70 

1871-80 

1881-93 

1893 

Rural  districts   .     . 

19.9 

19.7 

19.0 

17-5 

17.4 

Urban  districts  .     . 

24.6 

24.8 

23.1 

20.3 

20.2 

PROPORTION  OF  POPULATION! 


1871 

1881 

1891 

Rural  districts    .     .     . 

43% 

41% 

36% 

Urban  districts  .     .     . 

57% 

59% 

64% 

It  is  thus  seen  that  the  decrease  has  been 
greater  in  urban  than  in  rural  districts,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  the  former  have  been  increasing  in 
population  much  more  rapidly  than  the  latter,  and 
therefore  have  been  confronted  with  more  difficult 
problems.  The  decrease  in  the  death-rate  in 
urban  districts  as  compared  with  rural  districts 
may  be  due  to  two  causes.  One  is  that  the  urban 
districts  have  more  generally  undertaken  works  of 
sanitary  improvements,  the  other,  which  may  be 
partially  responsible  for  the  former,  is  that  the 
central  administrative  control  is  greater  over  urban 
than  it  is  over  rural  districts. 

In  the  statistics  that  have  been  given,  it  has 
probably  been  noticed  that  a  decline  began  about 


1  Compiled  from  the  Reports  of  the  Registrar-General. 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND     121 

1870  to  1875,  or,  if  there  had  been  any  decline 
previously,  that  at  or  about  this  time  it  became 
more  rapid.  This  is  no  coincidence.  There  is 
another  explanation.  A  plan  for  a  strong  central 
supervision  of  local  administration  was  introduced 
in  1848,  and  although  quite  energetically  operated 
for  a  few  years,  was  almost  abandoned  after  1854. 
Again  in  1866,  the  powers  of  the  government 
began  to  be  strengthened,  and  in  1872  and  1875  a 
quite  complete  system  was  established.  Previous 
to  this  time,  the  chief  work  of  the  central  depart- 
ment was  that  of  arousing  interest,  making  known 
the  exact  status  of  affairs,  and  by  other  direct 
means  inciting  action  and  progress.  Its  success  is 
seen  in  the  small  increase  in  the  death-rate  from 
1849  to  I^72>  which  would  probably  have  gone 
much  higher  had  nothing  been  done  to  counteract 
the  tendencies  of  a  rapidly  increasing  urban  popu- 
lation. When  the  acts  of  1872  and  1875  com- 
pleted the  scheme,  progress  was  more  rapid,  and 
the  evidence  shows,  as  is  usually  conceded,  that 
the  relation  was  one  of  cause  and  effect,  not  of 
coincidence.1 

III.    Constabulary 

Legislative  acts  of  a  general  character  dealing 
with  the  establishment,  maintenance,  and  control 
of  a  local  police  force  are  extremely  modern.  In 

1  Cf.  Report  of  Registrar- General,  1881,  p.  xv;  Newsholme, 
op.  cit.,  p.  127. 


122  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

the  first  ones  of  any  importance,  which  were 
passed  during  the  fourth  decade  of  the  present 
century,  slight  traces  of  a  central  control  are  to 
tie  found;  but  it  was  not  until  1856  that  a  plan 
for  genuine  control  can  be  said  to  have  been  es- 
tablished, at  least  to  have  been  actually  enforced. 
Here  again  one  finds  an  enormous  difference 
between  the  conditions  that  existed  prior  to  this 
date  and  those  of  modern  times.  Here  again, 
also,  one  finds  a  marked  improvement  immediately 
after  the  central  government  began  to  exercise  its 
powers  of  direction  and  supervision. 

The  Parliamentary  Commission  of  1839,  aP- 
pointed  to  report  upon  the  establishment  of  an 
efficient  constabulary  force,  stated  as  a  summary 
of  the  evidence  gathered,  relative  to  the  success  of 
local  government,  pure  and  simple,  in  preserving 
the  peace : — 

"That  a  large  proportion  of  the  highways  are 
left  without  any  protection  whatsoever,  from  any 
constabulary  or  other  civil  force. 

"That  on  the  highways  of  a  large  part  of  the 
country,  commercial  travellers  and  strangers  who 
travel  singly,  otherwise  than  by  public  convey- 
ances, and  carry  money  about  them,  abstain  from 
travelling  after  dark,  from  fear  of  robbery  and 
violence ;  and  that  farmers  return  from  market  in 
company,  from  like  fear,  after  dark.  .  .  . 

"  Having  investigated  the  general  causes  of 
depredation,  of  vagrancy,  and  mendicancy,  as  de- 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL   IN  ENGLAND     12$ 

veloped  by  examinations  of  the  previous  lives  of 
criminals  or  vagrants  in  the  gaols,  we  find  that  in 
scarcely  any  cases  is  it  ascribable  to  the  pressure 
of  unavoidable  want  or  destitution ;  and  that  in  the 
great  mass  of  cases  it  arises  from  the  temptation 
of  obtaining  property  with  a  less  degree  of  labor 
than  by  regular  industry,  which  they  are  enabled  to 
do  by  the  impunity  occasioned  by  the  absence  of  the 
proper  constitutional  protection  of  the  subject."  1 

In  the  seventeen  years  between  1839  an^  1856 
not  much  improvement  was  made  except  in  the 
larger  cities,  and  in  many  of  these  the  force  was 
inefficient,  both  as  regards  numbers  and  discipline. 
The  less  populous  centres  and  country  districts 
had  done  very  little,  if  anything.  Many  of  the 
members  of  the  constabulary  followed  various 
trades  and  occupations,  viewing  their  official  posi- 
tion as  a  matter  of  minor  importance.  Small  riots 
at  elections  could  not  be  put  down,  and  in  many 
instances  the  aid  promised  the  localities  by  the  early 
statutes  relative  to  police  was  refused  because  it 
was  thought  the  needy  locality  had  not  done 
what  it  should  to  improve  the  condition  of  its 
police.2  Twenty  counties,  including  two  Ridings 
in  Yorkshire,  had  not  adopted  the  act  of  3  and  4 
Victoria,3  —  the  last  important  act  relative  to  the 

1  Sessional  Papers,  1839,  Vol.  19,  pp.  180,  181. 

2  Report  of  Select  Commission,  S.  P.,  1852-53,  Vol.  36. 

3  Sir  George  Gray  in  Hansard's  Debates,  III  Series,  Vol.  140, 
p.  231. 


124  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

police  passed  by  Parliament.  The  county  of  Rut- 
land had  only  one  constable,  who  was  supposed  to 
oversee  a  population  of  22,g8$.1  Cumberland  was 
some  better,  having  only  5333  under  the  guardian- 
ship of  one  officer.  The  larger  boroughs,  as 
Liverpool,  Birmingham,  and  Manchester,  had  fair 
systems,  but  the  others  were  described  as  "nurs- 
eries of  crime."  Stockport,  with  a  population  of 
54,000,  possessed  fifteen  constables ;  Ashton-under- 
line,  30,000,  seven  constables.2  But  these  figures 
are  too  favorable,  for  they  represent  the  facts  in 
the  fall  of  1856,  after  improvement  had  been  made 
in  order  to  obtain  the  government  subsidy  for  the 
coming  year.  It  must  be  remembered  also  that 
the  individual  and  collective  efficiency  of  these 
constables  was  much  lower  than  that  of  the  same 
number  to-day. 

Proceeding  now  to  compare  this  period  with  the 
present,  it  is  interesting  to  note  the  decline  in 
the  number  of  localities  —  counties  or  boroughs  — 
which  did  not  secure  aid  from  the  central  govern- 
ment, because  they  had  not  during  the  previous 
year  maintained  a  police  force  in  such  a  degree  of 
efficiency  as  to  justify  the  Secretary  of  State  in 
granting  a  certificate  of  efficiency.  The  following 
expresses  the  truth  as  correctly  as  would  the  figures 
for  each  year. 

1  Report  of  Inspectors  of  the  Constabulary,  S.  P.,  1857-58,  Vol. 
47,  p.  24. 

2  Hansard,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  140,  pp.  231-2. 


ADMINISTRATIVE   CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND     125 


1857 

'60 

'65 

'TO 

'75 

'80 

'85 

'go 

Boroughs,  cities,  counties,  etc., 

receiving  no  grants1   .     .     . 

120 

78 

59 

56 

38 

32 

25 

00 

This  table  is  of  little  value  until  this  fact  is  added : 
that  the  standard  of  efficiency  which  a  force  was 
obliged  to  reach  to  receive  the  subsidy  has  been 
raised  every  year.  No  locality  was  allowed  to  con- 
tent itself  with  past  achievements,  but  was  obliged 
to  make  further  progress  or  lose  the  subsidy.2 

Comparing  the  number  of  inhabitants  with  the 
numerical  strength  of  the  constabulary,  it  is  found 
that  whereas  in  1856  there  were,  upon  an  average, 
1784  persons  to  one  constable,  the  number  had 
decreased  by  1893  to  971.  In  other  words,  while 
the  population  increased  46  per  cent  the  constabu- 
lary increased  168  per  cent.3 

Another  and  greater  transformation,  for  which 
there  is  no  quantitative  measurement,  has  been 
made.  It  is  the  great  increase  in  efficiency,  both 
when  taken  individually  and  collectively.  Figures 
might  be  given  as  to  the  number  of  crimes  com- 


1  Compiled  from  the  Annual  Reports  of  the  Inspectors  of  the 
Constabulary,  and  from  the  Judicial  Statistics. 

2  Colchester  was  reported  inefficient  in  1893.     S.  P.,  1894,  Vol. 
42,  p.  5. 

8  These  figures  are  based  upon  the  census  returns  of  1851  and 
1891,  and  the  reports  of  the  inspectors  for  1856  and  1893. 


126  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

mitted,  of  arrests,  and  convictions,  but  as  there 
are  so  many  other  influences  besides  the  efficiency 
of  the  police  which  cannot  be  disengaged,  any 
conclusions  drawn  therefrom  would  be  almost 
valueless.  But  the  statement  is  never  questioned 
that,  whatever  may  be  the  faults  of  the  present 
police  system  in  England,  there  is  no  comparison 
between  the  present  system  and  that  which  existed 
previous  to  1856.  The  men  are  personally  more 
capable.  They  realize  the  duty  resting  upon  them 
to  enforce  the  law  and  to  bring  offenders  to  justice. 
Discipline  is  also  immeasurably  better.  Methods 
to  secure  greater  efficiency  from  the  same  amount 
of  exertion  have  been  invented  and  applied.  The 
telephone  and  telegraph  have  been  utilized  with 
highly  beneficial  results.  As  a  result,  laws  are 
better  enforced,  offenders  are  more  quickly  ap- 
prehended, and  the  safety  and  security  of  life 
and  property  is  assured.  And  this,  too,  in  spite 
of  the  extension  of  the  functions  and  duties  of 
the  government  and  the  great  increase  in  urban 
population. 

IV.  Elementary  Education 

When  the  birth  of  the  Reformation  and  the 
overthrow  of  the  monasteries  made  necessary  a 
change  in  the  support  and  management  of  schools, 
private  individuals,  through  the  instrumentality  of 
the  church  or  other  voluntary  organizations,  took 
up  the  task  of  educating  the  youth.  The  state  re- 


ADMINISTRATIVE   CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND     1 27 

mained  inactive.  Not  until  1816  was  it  asserted 
by  even  a  semi-official  authority  that  education  was 
a  matter  of  concern  to  the  state,1  and  not  until 
seventeen  years  later  did  it  undertake  to  aid  the 
feeble,  spasmodic,  and  erratic  attempts  of  private 
individuals  by  appropriating  $100,000  for  the  erec- 
tion of  schoolhouses  in  Great  Britain.2 

The  period  from  1833  to  the  present  day  is 
naturally  divided  into  two  periods,  of  which  the 
year  1870  may  be  said  to  mark  the  point  of  tran- 
sition. In  the  earlier  period  the  central  govern- 
ment undertook  to  improve  educational  conditions 
by  appropriations,  to  be  distributed  among  the 
schools  maintained  by  the  churches  or  private 
individuals  upon  compliance  with  certain  condi- 
tions which  the  central  government  imposed.  In 
1870  the  power  of  the  Education  Department  was 
largely  increased  by  giving  it  certain  powers  of 
compulsion,  as  those  of  appointing  local  officers 
in  case  the  requirements  of  the  law  are  not  ful- 
filled and  of  issuing  by-laws  making  attendance 
at  school  compulsory.  It  was  but  the  carrying 
of  the  theory  of  central  control  to  its  logical  con- 
clusion ;  but  it  may  be  well  to  notice,  when  ascer- 
taining what  has  been  accomplished,  how  far  the 
two  systems  have  been  successful.  Considering 
the  development  statistically,  the  following  table 
is  of  interest.  The  statistics  for  the  fourth  decade 

iS.  P.,  1888,  Vol.  35,  p.  4. 
2  3  and  4  Wm.  TV,  c.  96,3.  17. 


128  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

are  so  imperfect  and  inaccurate  that  they  have 
been  omitted,  for  any  conclusions  therefrom  would 
be  valueless. 

Concerning  the  period  from  1833  to  1870  it  is 
evident  that  there  was  considerable  reform;  for 
although  statistical  comparisons  have  no  value,  the 
figures  given  on  p.  129  show  that  quite  an  educa- 
tional system  had  been  developed  in  the  thirty-seven 
intervening  years.  Yet  the  conditions  of  1870  are 
to  be  admired  only  when  compared  with  those  of  the 
previous  period.  There  was  still  great  need  and 
room  for  further  advance.  That  it  came  is  indi- 
cated by  the  opposite  table.  When  the  move- 
ment began  in  the  fourth  decade,  it  was  slow  and 
faltering ;  but  its  pace  gradually  quickened,  becom- 
ing more  rapid  when  the  legislation  of  1870  and 
the  following  years  rendered  the  system  of  central 
supervision  complete.  The  most  significant  facts 
are  the  great  increase  in  \htpercapita  expenditure 
for  each  scholar,  the  salaries  of  teachers,  and  the 
accommodation  of  schools  and  average  attendance 
of  pupils.  One  should  not  fail  to  observe  that  the 
accommodation  of  day  schools  has  increased  at  a 
much  more  rapid  rate  than  the  population,  the 
former  rate  being  over  two  and  one-quarter  times 
the  latter.  And  the  average  attendance  has  in- 
creased at  a  still  more  rapid  pace,  but  is  excelled 
by  the  increase  in  the  number  of  teachers.  These, 
indeed,  are  important  signs,  for  a  progressive  edu- 
cational system  should  exhibit  just  such  tendencies. 


ADMINISTRATIVE  CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND     12$ 


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I3O  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

Should  it  be  asked,  What  is  the  present  effi- 
ciency of  the  educational  system  in  England  ?  I 
would  answer  briefly  that  it  is  about  the  same  as 
ours.  In  some  points  the  United  States  excels, 
while  in  others  England  leads,  and  a  more  definite 
answer  depends  upon  the  relative  importance  of 
these  features.  All  in  all,  the  reader  will  very 
nearly  grasp  the  truth  of  the  situation  if  he  decides 
that  Elementary  Education  in  England  is  about  as 
practical,  thorough,  and  efficient  as  Primary  Educa- 
tion in  the  United  States.1 

V.   Local  Finance — Expenditure 

The  plan  of  making  the  approval  of  a  central 
authority,  such  as  the  Local  Government  Board  or 
the  Board  of  Trade,  necessary  to  the  purchase  of 
waterworks,  the  purchase,  renting,  or  sale  of  lands, 
the  levying  of  tolls,  or  the  many  other  acts  of  this 
nature,  has  apparently  worked  very  well.  Since 
its  adoption  by  the  Poor  Law  Amendment  Act, 
1834,  it  has  been  embodied,  to  a  greater  or  less 
degree,  in  the  many  subsequent  acts  which  have 
attempted  to  reform  other  branches  of  local  gov- 
ernment. As  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  there  have 
been  no  attacks  upon  the  plan,  and  it  seems  to 
have  been  quite  successful.  The  general  prin- 
ciple is  that  when  the  acquirement  of  property  or 

1  Further  information  may  be  quickly  gathered  from  a  recent 
book  by  Dr.  Isaac  Sharpless,  English  Education,  New  York,  1892. 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND     131 

privileges  is  for  a  purpose  of  great  necessity  and 
one  in  which  the  local  authority  is  not  likely  to 
exceed  its  proper  sphere  nor  violate  private  rights, 
the  conditions  are  simple,  easy  of  fulfilment,  and 
the  approval  of  a  central  authority  is  not  required; 
but  when  the  tendency  is  in  the  opposite  direction, 
the  action  of  the  local  authority  is  beset  with  many 
restrictions,  and  the  one  most  common  is  that  re- 
quiring the  consent  of  a  central  department.  To 
be  sure,  this  kind  of  central  control  often  acts 
more  through  its  potentiality  than  through  the 
actual  refusal  of  the  central  authority  to  give  its 
consent,  but  this  does  not  lessen  its  utility.  Its 
practical  operation  has  been  so  satisfactory  that  it 
will  in  all  probability  be  continued. 

The  effects  of  the  plan  of  requiring  the  local 
authorities  to  secure  the  consent  of  the  central 
government  to  the  raising  of  loans — the  excep- 
tions are  very  few  —  have  been  much  more  notice- 
able. To  study  them,  we  need  not  go  back  of 
1870;  for  the  plan  is  a  restrictive  measure,  and 
previous  to  that  date,  the  problem  was  how  to 
arouse  the  localities  to  action,  rather  than  how  to 
prevent  them  from  plunging  too  rapidly  into  debt. 
In  the  last  two  and  a  half  decades  conditions  have 
changed,  and  now  the  problem  is  how  to  keep 
local  indebtedness  within  proper  bounds ;  how  to 
prevent  the  raising  of  loans  for  unnecessary  pur- 
poses ;  how  to  keep  the  period  of  repayment  down 
so  that  future  generations  will  not  be  obliged  to 


132 


MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 


bear  burdens  from  which  they  have  received 
no  benefits ;  and  how  to  assure  proper  methods 
of  repayment,  sinking  funds,  and  prompt  cancel- 
lation of  bonds. 

One  of  the  most  noticeable  effects  of  this  kind 
of  central  control  is  that  the  periods  of  repayment 
sanctioned  by  the  Local  Government  Board  have 
been  far  within  the  statutory  limits.  All  loans 
authorized  by  the  public  health  acts  might  extend 
through  a  period  of  sixty  years,  if  the  approval  of 
the  board  could  be  secured ;  but  it  is  seldom  a 
term  of  fifty  years  is  exceeded.  Even  in  1874, 
when  much  greater  leniency  was  the  rule  than  at 
present,  the  restraining  influence  of  the  board  was 
quite  important,  as  the  following  table  shows.1 


Periods  in  Years 

Per  cent  of  Total 
Amount  of  Loans 

Per  cent  of  Total  Num- 
ber of  Loans  Approved 
by  L.  G.  B. 

57 

1.0 

0.4 

50 

14.0 

5-0 

3i 

0-5 

0.4 

30 

61.0 

6I4 

20-29 

9.0 

13.0 

10-19 

3-9 

10.3 

1-9 

4.2 

6.8 

Not  given 

6-3 

2.7 

Total,  ;£940,937-     Loans,  223. 


1  Report  L.  G.  B.,  Sessional  Papers,  1874,  Vol.  25,  pp.  682-686, 
App. 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND     133 


In  1892  the  figures  for  loans  sanctioned  to  urban 
and  rural  sanitary  districts  were  : l — 


Period  of  Payment 

Per  cent  of  the  Total  Number 

50 

9-3 

31-39 

i«3 

30 
20-29 
10-19 

41.5 
21.7 
1  6.0 

1  1  22  loans. 

1-9 

10.2 

In  other  words,  one-tenth  exceeded  thirty  years, 
between  six  and  seven-tenths  lay  between  twenty 
and  thirty  inclusive,  and  the  remaining  two  and 
one-half  tenths  fell  below  twenty.  Of  the  104 
loans,  extending  over  a  period  of  fifty  years,  eighty- 
nine  were  specifically  mentioned  as  being  for  the 
purchase  of  land,  and  the  remainder  were  distrib- 
uted as  follows :  sewerage  and  sewage  disposal, 
two ;  street  improvement,  seven ;  water  supply,  one ; 
depot,  one ;  repayment  of  loans,  four.  Consulting 
the  purposes  for  which  the  loans  were  made,  one 
finds  that  by  far  the  greater  portion,  both  in  num- 
ber and  amount  of  capital,  were  for  street  improve- 
ment, water  supply,  sewerage,  and  sewage  disposal. 
From  these  facts  and  other  evidence  to  be  found 
in  the  reports,  one  is  soon  convinced  that  the 
board  has  exercised  a  very  restrictive  influence  • 

1  Ibid.  1893,  Vo1-  43»  PP-  394-4".  4I5~4I9»  APP- 


134  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

that  the  period  of  utility  and  repayment  have  usu- 
ally agreed,  and  that  therefore  the  plan  of  central 
control  has  been  extremely  beneficial,  especially  as 
over  against  a  control  through  legislative  enact- 
ment, which  could  not  possibly  have  secured  the 
same  results.  Whereas  statutory  limits  must  of 
necessity  be  more  or  less  rigid  and  cannot  decide 
each  case  upon  its  merits,  but  must  be  high  enough 
to  prevent  the  constant  resort  to  special  acts,  with 
the  result  that  all  loans  are  apt  to  reach  the  limit 
which  in  theory  only  a  few  should  attain,  an  ad- 
ministrative authority  can  investigate  each  case, 
decide  it  in  reference,  not  to  the  nature  of  the  pur- 
pose, but  to  the  period  of  utility,  and  consequently 
give  a  just  and  equitable  decision. 

If  we  compare  the  legislative  control  as  exer- 
cised through  local  acts  with  the  central  adminis- 
trative control,  we  again  see  the  superiority  of  the 
latter.  Even  during  the  period  from  1875  to  1880, 
when  the  Local  Government  Board  rarely  allowed 
the  term  to  exceed  fifty  years,  it  was  the  exception 
rather  than  the  rule  for  the  time  set  by  local  acts 
to  be  below  sixty  years,  and  instances  are  given 
where  it  reached  85,  90,  100,  or  even  no  years.1 
Since  1880,  the  difference  between  the  results  of 
the  two  methods  has  become  less.  The  tendency 
of  Parliament  has  been  to  grant  the  requests  of 
localities  which  seek  to  lengthen  unduly  the  period 

1  Reports  of  L.  G.  B.,  particularly  for  1879,  1880,  i88i,and  1883. 
Also  the  Edinburgh  Review,  April,  1881,  Vol.  153,  p.  553. 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND     135 

of  repayment,  and  the  present  lack  of  excessively 
long  periods  is  due  to  the  plan  of  securing  and  fol- 
lowing the  advice  of  the  central  departments  which 
have  almost  invariably  restrained  the  local  authori- 
ties, and  thereby  lessened  the  evils  which  might 
have  resulted  from  a  control  entirely  legislative. 

What  has  been  said  regarding  the  period  of 
repayment  applies,  mutatis  mutandis,  to  other 
matters  which  are  involved  in  the  negotiation  and 
repayment  of  loans;  viz.  sinking  funds,  regular 
payment  of  interest,  expenditure  for  purposes 
ascribed,  and  the  many  other  matters  prescribed 
both  by  law  and  sound  finance.  Through  the 
power  to  issue  orders  remedying  any  misappro- 
priation of  loans,  which  orders  may  be  enforced 
by  a  writ  of  mandamus •,  and  through  the  indirect 
method  of  refusing  to  approve  loans  whenever 
they  think  advisable,  the  central  departments  pos- 
sess a  power  of  no  mean  importance.  Private 
interest,  here  as  elsewhere,  has  proven  inadequate, 
and  legislative  control  cannot  reach  the  subject  at 
all.  Administrative  supervision  has,  upon  the 
other  hand,  been  extremely  beneficial.  Hardly  a 
single  report  of  the  Local  Government  Board  fails 
to  call  attention  to  its  beneficial  results.  The  fre- 
quency with  which  resort  has  been  had  to  local 
acts  strongly  attests  the  wide  influence  and  the 
desire  to  escape  this  dictatorial  power. 

The  question  whether  central  administrative 
control  has  kept  the  localities  from  making  loans 


136  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

for  improper  purposes,  and  from  plunging  too 
heavily  into  debt,  is  more  difficult  to  answer.  That 
it  has  been  a  factor  of  no  small  importance  in  pre- 
venting the  acceptance  of  excessive  estimates  is 
usually  admitted ;  but  whether  local  indebtedness 
has  been  permitted  to  accumulate  too  rapidly  is 
a  much-disputed  question.  The  answer  depends 
primarily  upon  the  view  taken  of  the  proper  func- 
tions of  government.  A  thorough  consideration 
would  involve  a  lengthy  discussion,  for  which  there 
is  no  place  in  this  brief  resume.  A  few  brief  com- 
parisons may,  however,  be  given.  All  the  evi- 
dence at  hand  points  towards  an  affirmative  answer 
of  both  questions  as  first  stated. 

Nearly  every  general  act  fixes  a  ratio  of  indebt- 
edness which  may  be  incurred  for  the  purposes 
enumerated  in  the  act,  and  this  ratio  limits  not 
only  the  local  authority,  but  also  the  amount  that 
the  central  authority  may  approve  as  well.  Com- 
plete statistics  are  not  to  be  had,  but  if  one  com- 
pares the  ratable  value  of  all  England  with  the 
local  indebtedness,  a  wide  margin  is  found  between 
the  actual  ratio  and  the  statutory  limit.  Remem- 
bering that  over  half  is  due  to  local  acts  where  no 
approval  of  a  central  administrative  authority  has 
been  required,  one  is  easily  convinced  of  the  restric- 
tive tendency  of  the  plan.  Statutory  limitations 
have  been  of  little  value,  and  as  between  the  two, 
the  central  administrative  control  has  exercised  by 
far  the  greater  restraining  influence.  The  custom 


ADMINISTRATIVE   CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND     137 

has  been  for  localities  to  appeal  to  Parliament  for 
power  to  do  what  they  would  not  be  permitted  to 
do  by  the  departments,  or  what  they  thought 
would  not  be  approved  should  an  application  be 
made,  with  the  result,  as  noted  above,  that  more 
indebtedness  has  been  incurred  under  local  acts  than 
under  sanction  of  the  Local  Government  Board. 
The  present  plan  of  requiring  these  acts  to  be  con- 
sidered and  reported  upon  by  some  central  depart- 
ment is  gaining  ground,  with  the  result  that  even 
the  local  acts  are  conforming  more  and  more  to 
the  principles  laid  down  by  the  departments  as  to 
approval  of  loans,  and  that  they  deal  more  with 
exceptional  instances  than  with  questions  plainly 
within  the  realm  of  the  central  departments.  This 
is  itself  a  result  brought  about  by  the  Local  Govern- 
ment Board,  and  is  evidence  that  the  central  con- 
trol is  much  more  efficient  when  exercised  by  an 
administrative  authority  than  when  exercised  by 
the  legislature  through  the  passage  of  special 
legislation. 

VI.    Central  Audit 

The  present  system  of  having  the  accounts  of 
the  local  authorities  audited  by  agents  of  the  cen- 
tral government  appointed  by  the  Local  Govern- 
ment Board  had  its  origin  in  the  department  of 
poor  relief,  but  gradually  extended  until  now 
hardly  a  local  authority  exists  which  is  not  obliged 
to  submit  its  accounts  to  the  district  auditors.  The 


138  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

only  prominent  exception  is  the  borough  council, 
but  it  is  an  exception  only  when  acting  as  a  munici- 
pal authority.  When  performing  other  functions, 
as  those  of  a  district  council,  it  is  subject  to  the 
general  rule. 

The  conditions  previous  to  1834,  when  the  first 
step  was  taken  towards  central  control,  were 
chaotic.  About  the  only  similarity  manifest  was 
that  the  auditing,  such  as  it  was,  was  conducted 
by  the  local  authorities  themselves  or  by  persons 
appointed  by  them.  The  defects,  from  a  stand- 
point of  theory,  in  such  a  plan  prepare  one  for 
the  facts.  There  were  rare  instances  where  a 
thorough  and  efficient  audit  was  had,  and  viewing 
the  country  as  a  unit,  the  report  of  an  assistant 
commissioner  to  the  Poor  Law  Commission  of 
1832-34  may  be  considered  as  a  very  representative 
picture.  "  To  talk  of  auditing  and  examining  par- 
ish accounts  is  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten  a  perfect 
mockery.  It  is  true  that  in  some  parishes  they 
are  said  to  be  examined  half-yearly,  and  in  others 
quarterly ;  but  the  fact  is  that  in  the  great  ma- 
jority of  parishes  a  meeting  of  parishioners  is 
convened  at  the  end  of  the  year  to  examine  the 
overseers'  accounts  previous  to  being  passed  by 
the  magistrates.  This  is  the  only  examination 
they  undergo.  A  whole  year's  account,  consisting 
of  hundreds  of  items,  and,  in  general,  obscurely 
arranged,  is  professed  to  be  investigated  in  the 
course  of  a  few  hours  to  the  satisfaction  of  a  most 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND     139 

intelligent  and  scrutinizing  audience,  the  majority 
of  whom  are  in  all  probability  friends  and  partisans 
of  the  overseers  !  After  this  solemn  and  public  audit 
by  the  parish,  they  are  submitted  to  the  magistrates, 
are  sworn  to  by  the  overseers,  and  the  signature  of 
magisterial  approbation  is  affixed,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  without  examination,  perhaps  without  even 
a  cursory  glance.  .  .  .  The  present  system  (if  sys- 
tem it  can  be  called)  offers  an  almost  irresistible 
temptation  to  dishonesty,  by  rendering  the  chances 
of  detection  extremely  difficult  if  not  impossible."  l 

The  present  central  audit  has  been  reached  by 
slow  development.  The  strict  central  control  now 
exercised  was  not  achieved  at  a  single  bound,  but 
each  step  being  attended  with  better  results,  the 
movement  continued.  The  present  conditions  are 
as  follows :  — 

As  to  the  district  auditors  themselves,  it  may  be 
said  that  they  are  a  highly  capable,  efficient,  and 
independent  class  of  men.  Local  and  personal 
influences  have  little  effect,  and  although  it  is 
never  possible  to  remove  them  absolutely,  they 
have  been  reduced  to  a  minimum.  The  law  is 
applied  with  a  vigor  that  often  arouses  the  ani- 
mosity of  local  officers,  and  were  it  not  for  the 
privilege  of  appeal  to  the  Local  Government 
Board,  some  transformation  would  have  to  take 
place.  Fifteen  years  ago,  it  was  not  infrequent  to 

1  From  the  report  of  an  assistant  commissioner  appointed  by  the 
P.  L.  Com.  of  1832-34,  S.  P.,  Vol.  28,  p.  666,  App.  A. 


140  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

find  such  charges  as  these  in  the  disallowances  of 
the  auditor :  Destruction  of  five  foxes,  £3 ;  de- 
struction of  moles  contracted  for  at  the  rate  £3 
per  year  for  fourteen  years ;  "  Theatre,  4-r."  ;  two 
silver  keys,  £12  \l  travelling  expenses,  when  no 
travelling  had  been  done ;  local  festivities,  as  per- 
ambulating parish  boundaries ;  "  Coppers  scram- 
bled for  en  rotite,  £i  2s" ;  "  Coppers  given  with  a 
bun  to  each  child  attending  the  perambulation, 
13^-.  io<^."  2  Similar  items  are  much  less  frequently 
found  to-day,  and  chiefly  because  the  auditor  has 
disallowed  them,  although  such  expenditures  had 
been  the  custom  for  years.  That  they  have  not 
more  rapidly  and  completely  disappeared  is  due 
not  to  any  fault  of  the  auditor,  but  to  a  cause  to 
be  spoken  of  subsequently.  The  number  of  ap- 
peals from  the  allowances  of  the  auditors  furnishes 
another  evidence  of  their  efficiency.  From  1876 
to  1893  inclusive,  only  282  appeals  were  taken,  an 
average  of  sixteen  per  year.  Of  this  number,  the 
Local  Government  Board  reversed  the  decisions  in 
but  six  per  cent  of  the  cases. 

As  to  the  power  of  the  Local  Government  Board 
to  decide  appeals  brought  against  the  decisions  of 
the  auditors,  there  is  conclusive  evidence  to  show 
that  the  board  has  been  very  lenient  with  the 
local  authorities  from  the  first.  The  statistics  for 
three  periods  are  as  follows :  — 

1  Report  of  L.  G.  B.,  S.  P.  1882,  Vol.  30,  pp.  54-56. 
"  Ibid.  1883,  Vol.  28,  p.  49. 


ADMINISTRATIVE   CONTROL  IN  ENGLAND     141 


Confirmed 
and 
Remitted 

Confirmed 
and  not 
Remitted 

Reversed 

Otherwise 
Decided 

1852-53.  2  yrs  

83°2 

4.8 

8.6 

34 

1880-83,  4  yrs  

83-8 

5-7 

9-7 

•7 

1890-93,  4  yrs  

82.4 

5.8 

10.4 

M1 

It  is  thus  shown  that  there  has  been  no  practical 
decrease  in  the  proportion  of  cases  where  the 
legality  of  the  auditor's  course  was  upheld,  but 
where  the  power  of  rendering  what  the  board 
thought  to  be  an  equitable  decision  was  exercised. 
In  close  union  with  this  statement,  the  fact  is  to 
be  noted  that  whereas  in  1880-83  29-9  per  cent 
of  the  whole  number  of  disallowances  and  sur- 
charges were  appealed,  in  1890-93  40.1  per  cent 
were  appealed.  Combining  both  facts,  it  is  found 
that  in  the  former  period  25.2  per  cent  of  the 
disallowances  and  surcharges  were  remitted,  and 
in  the  latter  33.4  per  cent.  It  is  true  that  since 
1 88 1  there  has  been  a  great  decrease  in  the 
absolute  numbers,  but  as  the  largest  falling  off 
has  come  since  1887,  when  the  Local  Authorities' 
Expenses  Act  was  passed,  whereby  appeal  was 
permitted  before  audit,  and  as  this  privilege  has 
been  widely  used,  this  decrease  cannot  be  cited 
as  contradicting  the  above  conclusions.2 

1  Reports  of  L.  G.  B. 

2  Hardly  a  report  since  1888  fails  to  declare  that  the  decrease  is 
due  to  this  act. 


142  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

The  frequency  with  which  the  board  has  con- 
firmed and  remitted  the  decisions  of  the  auditors, 
thus  freeing  the  local  authorities  from  any  penal- 
ties, is  the  principal  reason  that  disbursements  for 
illegal  purposes  have  not  more  rapidly  disappeared 
from  accounts.  Local  authorities  know  that  if  the 
auditor  disallows  the  expenditure,  they  can  appeal 
to  the  board,  plead  that  they  were  unaware  of  the 
illegality,  and  be  relieved  from  paying  the  penalty. 
This  course  also  removes  the  incentive  to  inform 
themselves  as  to  what  are  legal  expenses,  and  no 
doubt  furnishes  the  explanation  for  the  increase  — 
in  per  cent  —  of  the  number  of  appeals.  A  pre- 
mium is  placed  upon  ignorance  of  the  law  and  the 
use  of  the  right  of  appeal. 

It  should  be  said  in  favor  of  the  attitude  of  the 
board,  however,  that  a  too  rigid  exercise  of  its 
powers  would  have  brought  down  upon  its  head 
severe  condemnation  and  perhaps  resulted  in  the 
repeal  of  the  law.  The  Englishman's  inbred  op- 
position to  centralization  must  never  be  forgotten. 
Every  advance  has  been  bitterly  opposed,  and  only 
by  slow  degrees  has  the  present  situation  been 
attained.  It  is  very  probable  that  had  the  board 
held  the  local  authorities  to  the  very  letter  of  the 
law,  public  opinion  would  have  demanded  the  re- 
moval of  this  central  control  and  far  inferior  results 
would  have  been  secured  than  in  reality  have  been. 
The  fault  is  one  capable  of  being  remedied,  and 
probably  will  be  as  time  moves  on.  All  in  all,  the 


ADMINISTRATIVE    CONTROL   IN  ENGLAND     143 

system  recommends  itself  to  students  of  adminis- 
trative law  as  not  only  founded  upon  correct 
theory,  but  as  proven  to  work  satisfactorily  by 
experience. 

This  brief  consideration  of  the  effects  of  the 
establishment  of  the  central  administrative  control 
in  England  cannot  fail  to  force  the  conclusion 
that  the  frank  recognition  in  the  recent  English 
legislation  that  the  state  as  a  whole  has  a  vital 
interest  in  the  performance  by  the  local  authori- 
ties of  many  of  the  functions  of  government 
entrusted  to  them,  and  the  subjection  of  such 
functions  of  government  to  central  administrative 
supervision,  have  been  among  the  causes  which 
have  transformed  English  social  and  political  con- 
ditions during  the  present  century.  The  marked 
improvement  in  English  local  government,  the 
great  increase  of  its  efficiency,  have  been  secured 
also  without  an  undue  centralization,  without  dimin- 
ishing local  public  spirit,  which,  as  seen  in  the  ac- 
tions of  the  English  municipalities,  was  at  no  time 
in  English  history  greater  than  it  is  at  present. 
While  in  America  we  have  been  extending  the 
powers  of  the  legislature  over  our  cities,  largely  as 
a  result  of  the  previous  decentralization  of  our 
administrative  system,  until  municipal  administra- 
tion has  —  from  the  point  of  view  of  legislative  in- 
terference therein  —  come  to  be  regarded  almost 
as  a  part  of  general  state  administration,  England 


144  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

has  turned  aside  from  her  historic  administrative 
decentralization,  her  local  self-government,  and 
after  continental  examples,  has  resolutely  entered 
upon  the  pathway  of  administrative  centralization 
wherever  the  needs  of  administrative  uniformity 
have  made  such  a  step  seem  necessary.  The  re- 
sult has  been  to  reduce  legislative  interference  in 
local  government  to  a  minimum,  to  increase  enor- 
mously the  efficiency  of  local  government,  and  by 
clearly  differentiating  the  state  agency  of  cities 
from  their  sphere  of  action  as  local  organizations, 
to  open  the  way  for  a  great  expansion  of  municipal 
activity  to  be  seen  in  the  vigorous  way  with  which 
the  English  cities  have  grappled  with  distinctively 
municipal  problems,  such  as  the  housing  of  the 
poor  and  the  better  care  generally  of  the  local  in- 
terests of  their  inhabitants. 

It  is  confidently  believed  that  the  adoption  of  a 
similar  policy  in  the  United  States  cannot  fail  to 
be  followed  by  the  same  results. 


CHAPTER  VII 

UNIVERSAL    SUFFRAGE 

THE  position  of  the  city  has  an  effect  not  only 
on  its  relations  with  the  state  legislature  and  the 
state  government,  generally,  but  also  on  the  deter- 
mination of  the  questions  of  who,  among  the  munici- 
pal population,  shall  ultimately  regulate  municipal 
affairs,  i.e.  who  shall  vote  at  municipal  elections, 
and  how  they  shall  organize  politically,  as  well  as 
upon  the  form  of  municipal  organization.  In  this 
and  the  succeeding  chapters,  attention  will  be 
directed  to  the  subjects  of  municipal  suffrage  and 
municipal  politics,  and  the  attempt  will  be  made 
to  ascertain  what  effect  the  assignment  of  its 
proper  position  to  the  American  city  and  its 
proper  organization  will  have  both  in  diminishing 
the  evils  of  universal  municipal  suffrage,  and  in 
separating  municipal  from  state  politics. 

The  fact  that  a  city  is  an  agent  of  government, 
makes  it  necessary  to  regard  universal  municipal 
suffrage  necessary  in  a  country  where  universal 
state  suffrage  is  adopted.  Where  the  city  is  as  im- 
portant an  agent  of  state  government  as  it  is  in 
the  United  States,  the  reasons  for  universal  munici- 
pal suffrage  are  still  stronger  if  universal  suffrage 
L  145 


146  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

is  regarded  as  proper  in  the  state  government, 
or  if  we  introduce  limited  municipal  suffrage,  and 
still  permit  the  city  to  act  as  the  agent  of  the  state 
government,  we  run  great  danger  of  conflict  be- 
tween the  state  electors,  who  determine  the  mak- 
ing of  the  law,  and  the  municipal  electors,  who 
determine  how  it  shall  be  enforced  in  the  city. 
Centralization  in  legislation  and  decentralization 
in  administration,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  cause 
considerable  conflict  even  under  universal  munici- 
pal and  state  suffrage.  The  danger  of  conflict 
under  limited  municipal  suffrage  would  be  much 
greater.  Where  the  city's  position  as  agent  of  the 
state  government  is  unimportant,  and  where,  when 
it  is  acting  as  such  agent,  it  is  subjected  to  some 
more  efficient  central  control  than  is  at  present  to 
be  found  in  the  American  system  of  government,  it 
might  be  proper  to  provide  for  limited  municipal 
suffrage.  But  so  long  as  the  city  is  an  important 
agent  of  general  government,  so  long  must  uni- 
versal suffrage  for  municipal  officers  be  retained, 
if  it  is  retained  for  state  officers.  This  statement 
must  not  be  taken  as  meaning  that  universal  suf- 
frage is  to  be  considered  as  irrevocably  adopted  in 
the  state  government.  If  it  shall  be  determined 
to  be  wise  to  limit  the  suffrage,  it  will  be  undoubt- 
edly an  exceedingly  difficult  task  to4  realize  that 
determination.  But  that  it  will  be  impossible  no 
one  can  say  in  the  light  of  the  experience  which 
we  have  had  in  the  last  few  years.  In  the  South, 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  147 

in  several  instances,  the  people  have  determined  to 
limit  the  suffrage  by  introducing  into  the  organic 
law  educational  qualifications.  In  these  cases 
there  were  undoubtedly  peculiar  local  reasons 
which  do  not  exist  in  other  parts  of  the  country. 
The  existence  of  a  large  ignorant  negro  popula- 
tion in  those  states  which  have  adopted  such  quali- 
fications, threatened  so  serious  dangers  to  good 
government  that  the  white  population  could  quite 
easily  reconcile  itself  to  an  abridgment  of  what 
in  our  government  has  been  generally  considered 
a  natural  right.  The  Fifteenth  Amendment  of  the 
Federal  Constitution  stood  in  the  way  of  a  more 
direct  exclusion  of  the  negroes  from  the  right  to 
vote,  and  the  introduction  of  an  educational  quali- 
fication seemed  to  be  the  only  way  constitutionally 
to  attain  the  desired  end.  While  the  fact  that  the 
white  population  of  the  South  were  willing  to  sub- 
mit to  a  serious  limitation  of  their  former  political 
rights,  when  the  dangers  with  which  universal  suf- 
frage in  their  peculiar  social  conditions  threatened 
them  became  really  serious,  is  too  patent  to  deny, 
it  may  be  said  that  it  is  useless  to  expect  the  same 
result  in  other  parts  of  the  country.  This,  how- 
ever, is  merely  a  prophecy,  which  recent  events  in 
California  show  to  be  erroneous.  In  1892  the 
matter  was  laid  before  the  people  of  that  state, 
and  by  a  vote  of  151,320  in  favor  of  to  41,059 
against,  a  similar  educational  qualification  was 
adopted. 


148  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

We  cannot,  therefore,  conclude  that  the.  people 
of  this  country  are  irrevocably  committed  to  the 
i3ea  of  universal  suffrage,  but  must  believe,  rather, 
that  if  once  convinced  that  universal  suffrage  in- 
evitably must  result  in  inefficient  and  corrupt  gov- 
ernment, it  will  be  abandoned.  Further,  attention 
must  be  called  to  the  fact  that  the  Federal  Consti- 
tution, which  is  the  only  one  of  our  constitutional 
documents  practically  not  susceptible  of  amend- 
ment, does  not  make  the  change  impossible.  The 
only  provisions  of  that  instrument  which  apparently 
stand  in  the  way  are  the  Fourteenth  and  Fifteenth 
Amendments.  The  Fifteenth  Amendment  merely 
provides  that  the  right  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States  to  vote  shall  not  be  denied  or  abridged  by 
the  United  States  or  by  any  state  on  account  of 
race,  color,  or  previous  condition  of  servitude. 
This  amendment  does  not,  of  course,  prevent  the 
adoption  of  an  educational  or  property  qualifica- 
tion. In  the  case  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment 
the  matter  is  not,  however,  so  clear.  This  provides 
that  "when  the  right  to  vote  at  any  election  for 
the  choice  of  electors  for  President  and  Vice- 
President  of  the  United  States,  representatives  in 
Congress,  the  executive  or  judicial  officers  of  the 
state  or  the  members  of  the  legislature  thereof,  is 
denied  to  any  of  the  male  inhabitants  of  such 
states,  being  twenty-one  years  of  age  and  citizens 
of  the  United  States,  or  in  any  way  abridged  ex- 
cept for  participation  in  rebellion  or  other  crimes, 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  149 

the  basis  of  representation  [that  is,  of  the  state  in 
Congress]  shall  be  reduced  in  the  proportion  which 
the  number  of  such  male  citizens  shall  bear  to  the 
whole  number  of  male  citizens  twenty-one  years  of 
age  in  such  state."  This  amendment  is,  however, 
an  injunction  addressed  to  the  National  Legislature 
rather  than  a  provision  of  the  positive  law,  and, 
when  taken  with  the  power  conferred  later  oX  on 
Congress,  to  enforce  the  provision  by  appropriate 
legislation,  must  be  regarded  as  appealing  rather 
to  the  discretion  of  that  body  than  as  mandatory 
upon  it.  This  would  be  the  inference  tp  be  derived 
from  those  decisions  which  have  been  made  rela- 
tive to  laws  passed  without  limitations  by  the  legis- 
lature under  constitutional  provisions  requiring  the 
legislature  to  limit  the  powers  of  taxation  and 
assessments  of  localities.1  But  whatever  may  be 
the  rule  of  the  courts  on  this  point,  it  is  difficult  to 
see  how  in  the  absence  of  Congressional  action  the 
subject  could  get  before  the  courts.  As  Congress 
reflects  the  feelings  of  the  people,  such  action  on 
its  part  is  not  to  be  expected,  provided  there  is 
substantial  unanimity  on  the  part  of  the  people  as 
to  the  desirability  of  educational  or  other  qualifica- 
tions. Further,  the  feeling  of  the  people  and  of 

1  See  Hill  v.  Higdon,  5  Ohio  St.  248,  where  it  is  said  "  a 
failure  to  perform  this  duty  [that  is,  of  so  restricting  the  exercise  of 
local  powers  of  taxation  as  to  prevent  abuse]  may  be  of  very  serious 
import,  but  lays  no  foundation  for  judicial  correction."  See  also 
cases  cited  on  this  point  in  Dillon,  Law  of  Municipal  Corporations, 
4th  ed.,  p.  85,  Note  6. 


I5O  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

Congress,  as  evidenced  by  the  recent  repeal  of  the 
Federal  Election  Laws,  is  that  election  and  suf- 
frage matters  shall  be  left  to  be  determined  by 
the  states.  The  question  of  universal  suffrage 
may  therefore  be  considered  still  an  open  one,  to 
be  settled  in  accord  with  the  people's  ideas  of 
expediency. 

It  must,  however,  be  recognized  that  as  yet  the 
people  are  not  generally  convinced  of  the  impro- 
priety of  universal  suffrage.  It  will  unquestion- 
ably take  long  years  of  agitation  to  bring  such  a 
conviction  home  to  them,  and  it  will  have  to  be 
shown  that  the  present  recognized  evils  of  our  gov- 
ernmental system  are  without  doubt  due  to  univer- 
sal suffrage  before  they  will  be  brought  to  make 
any  change.  At  the  present  time  it  is  believed  that 
this  cannot  be  done.  It  cannot  be  done  for  three 
reasons :  In  the  first  place,  the  feeling  is  spread- 
ing at  the  present  time,  that  the  evils  which  are 
attributed  to  universal  suffrage  may  result  from 
our  present  system  of  representation.  It  is  claimed 
that  our  present  system  of  representation,  which  is 
representation  of  locality,  is  due  only  partly  to 
natural  circumstances,  that  it  is  due  in  great  part 
to  historical  tradition.  Historically,  all  states  are 
based  more  or  less  on  the  federal  idea.  All 
modern  states  have  been  formed  really  as  the 
result  of  the  union  of  more  or  less  separate  and 
independent  localities.  So  long  as  the  federal 
idea  exists,  the  locality  principle  of  representation 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  151 

is  based  on  natural  conditions.  Further,  so  long 
as  there  is  a  difference  in  local  needs,  based  on 
geographical  and  other  similar  variation,  the  sys- 
tem of  representation  must  be  based  to  an  extent, 
at  any  rate,  on  locality.  In  many  cases,  however, 
and  particularly  in  the  case  of  municipalities,  which 
are  comparatively  homogeneous  so  far  as  their  local 
conditions  are  concerned,  the  necessity  for  the 
adoption  of  the  locality  principle  of  representation, 
it  is  claimed,  is  not  so  apparent ;  but  as  a  result  of 
the  fact  that  from  time  immemorial  our  representa- 
tion has  been  local,  we  have  come  to  believe  that 
the  locality  principle  is  the  only  method  of  repre- 
sentation even  for  a  homogeneous  community. 
In  the  case  of  such  homogeneous  communities  — 
homogeneous  at  any  rate  from  the  point  of  view  of 
geographical  variation  —  the  locality  principle  of 
representation,  it  is  said,  is  improper.  For  there 
are  really  no  localities  to  be  represented :  and  if 
the  representative  system  has  for  its  purpose  to 
reflect  the  opinions  of  those  represented,  a  method 
of  representation  which  is  based  entirely  on  local- 
ity ceases  to  reflect  the  opinions  of  the  people,  in 
other  words,  ceases  to  be  representative  where 
there  is  a  comparatively  slight  local  variation,  and 
makes  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  obtain  rep- 
resentation of  opinions  based  on  other  than  local 
causes  of  variation.  Finally  it  is  said,  the  local- 
ity system,  even  when  based  on  local  variation, 
makes  it  easy  to  elect  incompetent,  if  not  evil- 


152  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

intentioned  persons,  particularly  where  it  is  car- 
ried so  far,  as  is  generally  the  case,  as  to  insist 
that  candidates  for  office  shall  not  merely  repre- 
sent the  localities  from  which  they  are  elected, 
but  shall  also  reside  therein.  The  locality  system 
of  representation  also  has  in  the  past,  it  is  pointed 
out,  been  productive  of  the  gerrymander,  whose  so 
frequent  occurrence  is  itself  evidence  of  the  fact 
that  the  necessity  for  purely  locality  representa- 
tion no  longer  'exists,  or  any  rate  is  not  so  pressing 
as  it  formerly  may  have  been.  If  local  variation 
really  exists,  these  evils  can  be  submitted  to  in  the 
belief  that  the  advantage  of  obtaining  the  expres- 
sion and  representation  of  opinions  based  on  local 
conditions  is  greater  than  the  evils  resulting  from 
the  abuses  of  the  system ;  but  if  there  is  no  great 
local  variation,  the  evils  of  the  locality  principle 
of  representation,  particularly  the  gerrymander, 
which,  if  carried  too  far,  completely  nullifies  the 
theoretical  advantages  of  the  locality  principle, 
are  so  great  that  it  should  be  abandoned. 

If,  however,  the  locality  principle  is  to  be  aban- 
doned, what  shall  be  substituted  for  it  ?  We  can; 
not  well  resort  exclusively  to  a  general  ticket 
elected  by  a  mere  majority  or  a  plurality;  for  by 
that  system  only  the  opinions  of  a  majority  or  of  a 
plurality,  which  is  only  a  minority  of  all  the  voters, 
will  ever  receive  expression.  We  do,  it  is  true, 
commonly  resort  to  such  a  method  in  the  case  of 
the  election  of  executive  officers.  But  it  is  to  be 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  153 

remembered  that  in  theory  the  executive  is  to  en- 
force the  law  rather  than  make  it.  Such  a  method 
for  the  election  of  a  body  entrusted  with  the  mak- 
ing of  the  law  and  the  determination  of  govern- 
mental policy,  is  almost  universally  regarded  in 
this  country  as  improper.  The  determination  of 
governmental  policy  should,  so  far  as  possible,  be 
the  result  of  a  deliberation  in  which  all  important 
phases  of  public  opinion  should  have  received  ex- 
pression. It  is  claimed,  therefore,  that  in  a  com- 
munity where  differences  of  opinion  are  not  the 
result  of  local  variation,  some  means  should  be 
provided  by  which  opinions  not  based  on  local 
variations,  when  held  by  large  numbers  of  the  vot- 
ing population,  should  be  given  representation. 

Here,  however,  it  must  be  remembered  that  it  is 
seldom,  if  ever,  the  case,  that  in  large  and  even 
quite  homogeneous  communities  variations  in  local 
conditions  do  not  cause  some  differences  of  opin- 
ion, so  that  whatever  scheme  of  representation  of 
opinions  in  such  large  communities  may  be  adopted, 
the  locality  principle  of  representation  must  receive 
some  recognition.  But  that  recognition  should  not 
be  greater  than  the  actual  conditions  demand. 
How,  now,  may  we  obtain  in  our  system  of  repre- 
sentation, representation  of  opinions  and  principles 
rather  than  of  arbitrarily  arranged  localities  based 
upon  no  difference  in  local  conditions?  The  an- 
swer that  is  most  commonly  given  to  this  question 
is  by  some  system  of  proportional  or  minority  rep- 


154  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

resentation,  in  accordance  with  which  large  groups 
of  persons  who  desire  to  uphold  certain  principles 
in  a  district  where  several  candidates  are  to  be 
elected  may  so  distribute  their  votes  or  organize 
their  voting  strength  as  to  give  expression  to  their 
views. 

There  have  been  many  schemes  proposed  for 
realizing  this  desire,  some  of  which  have  received 
actual  trial  in  this  country.  One  of  these  is  the 
system  of  cumulative  voting  adopted  in  Illinois, 
whose  constitution  provides  that  each  assembly 
district  shall  be  represented  by  three  members  of 
the  legislature  and  that  each  voter  may  cast  as 
many  votes  for  each  candidate  as  there  are  repre- 
sentatives to  be  elected  or  may  distribute  his  votes, 
or  equal  parts  thereof,  among  the  candidates  as  he 
sees  fit.1  Where  such  a  plan  is  adopted  in  the 
constitution,  of  course  no  question  as  to  its  consti- 
tutionality can  arise ;  but  it  is  doubtful  whether 
such  a  provision,  if  contained  in  a  statute  merely, 
would  be,  under  the  usual  American  state  consti- 
tution, upheld  by  the  courts.2 

1  Constitution  of  Illinois,  Art.  4,  Sees.  7  and  8.    The  General 
Municipal  Corporations  Act  permits  this  plan  to  be  adopted   by 
cities. 

2  See  Governor  Hoffman's  Message  of  1872,  cited  in  Commons, 
Proportional  Representation,   p.   252.      Indeed,   it  has  been  held 
unconstitutional  for  the  legislature  to  provide  that  no  voter  shall 
vote  for  more  than  a  certain  number  of  candidates  less  than  the 
whole  number,  for  the  reason  that  each  voter  under  the  usual  con- 
stitutional provision  that  electors  "shall  be  entitled  to  vote  at  all 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  155 

But  even  if  cumulative  voting  is  constitutional, 
it  is  questionable  whether  its  adoption  is  expedient. 
The  testimony  of  those  having  experience  of  its 
workings  in  Illinois  is  to  the  effect,  it  is  true,  that 
it  has  practically  stopped  gerrymandering,  one  of 
the  greatest  evils  of  the  district  system;  that  it 
gives  a  representation  to  the  minority  in  all  dis- 
tricts where  the  minority  party  has  at  least  a  quar- 
ter of  the  votes ;  that  it  is  perfectly  practicable  in 
its  operations,  and  although  there  is  some  conflict 
on  this  point,  that  it  produces  a  better  legislative 
body  than  the  old  district  system  in  that  the  char- 
acter of  the  minority  representatives  is  better  than 
those  elected  by  the  majority.  It  has,  however, 
the  serious  disadvantage  of  permitting  a  large  loss 
of  voting  strength  on  account  of  the  inability  of 
the  voters  to  know  how  far  they  must  concentrate 
their  vote  on  one  candidate.  This  has  resulted, 
though  not  frequently,  in  the  election  of  two  mi- 
nority candidates  out  of  three  to  be  elected  ;  makes 
in  almost  all  cases  party  discipline  very  strong, 
and  favors  the  union  of  party  machines  so  that 
the  result  of  the  election  is  apt  to  be  decided  by 


elections  "  has  the  right  to  vote  for  each  officer.  See  State  v.  Con- 
stantine,  42  Ohio  St.  437,  51  American  Reports,  833.  Such  a  sys- 
tem of  limited  voting  further  was  tried  in  the  New  York  Charter  of 
1873,  but  was  later  abandoned  as  unwise.  Its  application  in  Boston 
is  regarded  in  the  same  light.  See  Matthews,  City  Government  of 
Boston,  p.  13.  Here  it  is  said  that  limited  voting  "is  admitted  on 
all  hands  to  have  been  a  failure." 


I  $6  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

the  nominating  conventions.1  Testimony  of  the 
workings  of  cumulative  voting  in  England  is  the 
same  as  in  Illinois;  namely,  that  it  is  quite  pos- 
sible under  it  for  the  minority  of  the  voters  to 
control  the  body  elected,2  and  that  it  necessitates 
strong  party  discipline  and  perfect  party  organiza- 
tion; that  independent  candidates  have  very  small 
chances  of  election.3 

The  faults  of  the  cumulative  system,  pure  and 
simple,  have  led  to  the  proposal4  that  the  voters 
shall  be  given  the  opportunity  to  indicate  on  their 
ballots  their  preference  for  the  several  candidates, 
either  by  voting  for  these  candidates  in  the  order 
they  are  placed  on  the  ticket,  or  if  some  other  order 
is  preferred,  by  marking  after  each  candidate's  name 
the  numbers  1,2,  3,  and  so  on,  in  the  order  desired. 
Mr.  Forney  shows  6  that  by  dividing  the  first-choice 

1  See   Forney,  Political  Reform  through  the  Representation  of 
Minorities,  Chaps.  6  and  7. 

2  A  similar  system  of  cumulative  voting  was  adopted  in  1870  by 
the  English  school  boards,  and  in  the  Educational  Review,  June, 
1896,  p.  2,  Mr.  T.  J.  MacNamara  says  "it  is  pretty  well  discredited 
now.     It  works  out  grotesquely.  ...     A  majority  of  the  votes  does 
not  thereby  mean  a  majority  of  the  members  elected.     At  the  last 
election  twenty-six  '  Progressives '  were  returned  with  an  aggregate 
vote  of  706,506,  while  twenty-nine  'Moderates'  sailed  in  on  602,622. 
Such  are  the  surprises  of  the  cumulative  system.      Shortly  I  hope 
the  cumbrous  divisional  system  will  give  way  to  single  or  double 
member  constituencies  and  straightforward  voting." 

8  See  Parliamentary  Papers*  1885,  No.  275. 
*  Made   originally  by   Burnitz  and  Varrentrapp.     See  Forney, 
op.  cit. 

6  In  a  paper  which  has  not  yet  been  published,  and  in  which 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  157 

votes  for  each  candidate  by  one,  the  sum  of  the 
first  and  second  choice  votes  by  two,  and  the 
sum  of  the  first,  second,  and  third  choice  votes  by 
three  and  so  on,  and  by  declaring  those  candidates 
having  the  highest  of  such  quotients  to  be  elected, 
up  to  the  number  of  positions  which  it  is  desired 
to  fill,  the  difficulty  of  distributing  the  votes  under 
the  cumulative  system  pure  and  simple  would  be 
avoided,  the  preferences  of  the  voters  would  be 
indicated,  and  minority  representation,  which  is  at 
the  same  time  mathematically  proportional,  would 
be  secured.  All  of  these  advantages,  it  is  said, 
would  be  secured  without  complicating  the  process 
of  voting.  On  account,  however,  of  the  fact  that 
the  processes  of  counting  the  votes  are  somewhat 
complicated,  it  is  not  believed  that  such  a  system 
would  be  applicable  in  a  constituency  electing 
more  than  nine  representatives.  Further,  it  is  be- 
lieved that  such  a  system  of  voting  would  not  vio- 
late any  of  the  ordinary  constitutional  provisions. 
The  provision  which*  has  been  considered  as  pre- 
venting the  adoption  of  any  system  of  cumulative 
voting  is  the  one  which  says  that  each  voter  shall 
be  entitled  to  vote  at  all  elections,  and  has  been  in- 
terpreted as  meaning  that  each  vote  cast  at  an 
election  shall  be  equal  in  value  to  any  other  vote 
cast.1  It  can  be  shown  that  by  Mr.  Forney's 

he  proposes  a  modification  of  the  original  Burnitz  system  to  prevent 
the  election  of  the  majority  of  candidates  by  the  minority  party. 
1  See  Governor  Hoffman's  Message  cited  supra,  p.  154. 


158  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

modification  of  the  Burnitz  system  of  preferential 
voting,  under  no  circumstances  is  one  vote  counted 
more  than  once.  In  other  words,  there  is  no  cumu- 
lation of  votes.1 

Finally,  it  is  possible  to  apply  the  principles  of 
the  Burnitz  system  to  elections  for  single  constitu- 
encies including  mayoralty  elections.  It  is  often 
the  case  that  where  a  plurality  is  sufficient  to  elect, 
which  is  the  usual  rule  in  this  country,  the  candi- 
date elected  will  be  elected  by  a  minority  of  the 
electors.  To  avoid  this  the  election  laws  on  the 
Continent  of  Europe  sometimes  prescribe  that  if 
on  the  election  no  candidate  receives  a  majority  of 
the  votes,  another  election  shall  be  had,  when  all 
voters  shall  be  confined  to  voting  for  the  two  can- 
didates having  the  highest  number  of  votes  at  the 
first  election.  While  such  a  system  has  the  advan- 
tage that  under  it  the  candidate  elected  will  always 
have  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast,  it  has  the  serious 
disadvantage  of  doubling  the  work  of  the  elector 
and  the  expenses  of  election.  If  one  of  the  princi- 

1  Thus  suppose  a  party  has  450  votes  and  distributes  them  in 
such  a  way  as  to  give  candidate  A  228  first-choice  votes,  and  222 
second-choice  votes,  candidate  B  222  first-choice  votes  and  228 
second-choice  votes.  Such  a  distribution  gives  the  greatest  possible 
effect  to  the  party  vote.  In  no  case  can  the  quotient  of  either  of 
these  candidates  be  greater  than  225  (that  is,  the  sum  of  228  and 
222,  namely  450,  divided  by  2),  except  a  greater  number  than  225 
be  cast  as  first-choice  votes,  as  in  the  case  of  A,  who  receives  228 
first-choice  votes,  and  who  is  therefore  entitled  to  228  as  his 
elective  quotient. 


UNIVERSAL  SUFFRAGE  '159 

iples  lying  at  the  basis  of  the  Burnitz  system  of 
I  counting  the  votes  is  adopted  in  these  cases,  it  is 
j  believed  that  all  of  the  advantage  of  an  election 
by  majority  may  be  secured,  and  at  a  single  elec- 
tion. If  the  voters'  actions  in  the  case  of  the  two 
[elections  are  analyzed,  it  will  be  found  that  they 
[consist  in  expressing  a  first  and  a  second  choice. 
IThere  is  no  reason  why  this  may  not  be  done  at  a 
j  single  election.  It  might  be  provided  that  every 
voter  shall  mark  on  his  ballot  his  first  and  his  sec- 
ond choice,  no  one  being  allowed  to  indicate  as  his 
second  choice  the  candidate  who  had  received  his 
first-choice  vote ;  and  that  if  after  the  count  of  the 
first-choice  votes,  it  is  found  that  none  of  the  candi- 
dates has  a  majority  of  such  first-choice  votes,  all 
second-choice  votes  for  the  two  candidates  having 
the  highest  numbers  of  first-choice  votes  shall  be 
counted  for  such  candidates ;  the  candidate  receiv- 
ing the  highest  number  of  such  first  and  second 
choice  votes  to  be  elected;  in  case  of  a  tie,  the 
candidate  having  the  greatest  number  of  first- 
choice  votes  to  be  preferred.  If  such  a  scheme 
were  adopted,  all  danger  of  the  election  of  the 
mayor  by  a  minority  would  be  avoided,  a  single 
election  would  be  all  that  would  be  necessary ;  all 
the  demands  of  political  justice  would  be  satisfied, 
and  nothing  but  what  was  reasonable  would  be  de- 
manded of  the  voter.1  If  it  is  deemed  advisable 
to  adopt  the  principle  of  minority  or  proportional 

1  See  also  Remsen,  Primary  Elections. 


l6o  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

representation,  the  Burnitz  system  as  modified  by 
Mr.  Forney  would  seem  to  be  the  best  yet  devised, 
both  because  it  is  the  simplest,  and  because,  with: 
the  modifications  proposed  above,  it  is  capable  of 
adaptation  to  single  member  constituencies,  among 
them  being  included  mayoralty  elections. 

The  representation  of  opinions  may  also  be  se- 
cured by  some  one  of  the  different  systems  of  so- 
called  "proportional  representation."  These  are 
practically  all  based  on  the  proposition  that  the 
voters  are  to  be  confined  to  voting  for  party  can- 
didates officially  put  in  the  field  before  election. 
Such  a  limitation  of  the  voter's  freedom  of  action, 
it  is  not  certain,  is  constitutional.1  If  it  is  not  re- 

1  The  question  has  arisen  under  the  recent  Australian  Ballot 
Acts  whether  the  legislature  may,  under  the  usual  constitutional 
provisions,  provide  that  the  individual  voter  shall  be  confined  in 
voting  to  choosing  between  candidates  regularly  put  in  nomination 
before  the  election.  The  cases  of  Bowers  v.  Smith  (in  Mo.  45, 
also  reported  in  33  American  St.  Repts.  491)  and  Allen  v.  Glynn 
(18  Colo.  338,  also  reported  in  31  American  St.  Repts.  304)  would 
seem  to  indicate  that  such  action  is  unconstitutional.  These  cases 
are  not,  however,  directly  in  point,  although  they  seem  to  be  decided 
upon  the  theory  that  such  action  would  be  improper.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  case  of  State  v.  McElroy  (44  La.  An.  796,  32  American 
St.  Repts.  355)  holds  explicitly  that  a  statute  requiring  the  names  of 
all  persons  to  be  voted  for  to  be  printed  on  one  ticket  or  ballot  is 
constitutional,  and  that  ballots  upon  which  a  name  which  had  been 
printed  had  been  erased  and  another  name  written  in  its  place, 
were  under  such  a  law  illegal  ballots  and  could  not  be  counted.  A 
somewhat  similar  case  is  that  of  Parvin  v.  Wimberg  (130  Ind.  564, 
also  reported  in  30  American  St.  Repts.  254).  This  holds  that  the 
legislature  may  pass  statutes  in  order  to  provide  for  the  secrecy  of 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  l6l 

garded  as  constitutional  so  to  limit  the  voter,  of 
course  the  constitution  can  be  changed  so  as  to  ad- 
mit of  this  limitation  of  his  rights,  or  of  any  method 
of  representation  or  voting  deemed  to  be  desirable. 
A  plan  of  proportional  representation  which  has 
been  received  with  favor  is  a  combination  of  pro- 
portional representation  pure  and  simple;  that  is 
the  "free  list  plan"  in  use  in  Switzerland  and  "lim- 
ited voting,"  so  as  to  give  some  effect  to  the  indi- 
vidual preferences  of  the  voters.  A  bill  has  been 
drawn  up  formulating  this  plan  in  the  work  on 
Proportional  Representation^  recently  published 
by  Professor  J.  R.  Commons.  By  it  elections  are 
to  be  by  general  ticket,  in  large  cities  or  in  the 
state  the  territory  being  divided  into  districts  in 

the  ballot,  which  invalidate  all  ballots  cast  where  the  voter's  choice 
is  not  indicated  by  placing  a  stamp  in  a  square  either  at  the  head 
of  the  ticket  or  by  the  side  of  the  names  of  each  of  the  candidates. 
Another  case  holding  to  the  same  rule  is  that  of  Taylor  v.  Bleakley 
(55  Kas.  i,  reported  in  49  American  St.  Repts.  233).  Appended  to 
the  report  of  this  last  case  in  49  American  St.  Repts.  240,  is  a  mono- 
graphic note  upon  the  Australian  Ballot  Law,  particularly  upon 
what  distinguishing  marks  will  invalidate  the  ballot.  The  general 
purport  of  this  note  is  to  the  effect  that  in  order  to  provide  secrecy 
for  the  ballot,  the  legislature  has  the  constitutional  power  to  declare 
all  ballots  illegal  which  have  any  marks  upon  them  that  will  aid 
in  the  identification  of  the  ballot,  and  therefore  in  destroying  its 
secrecy.  The  result  will  follow  then,  that  if  this  rule  of  law  is 
regarded  as  the  proper  one,  the  legislature  may  oblige  the  voter 
to  choose  between  the  candidates  put  in  nomination  before  elec- 
tion, and  that  this  objection  to  the  proportional  system  of  repre- 
sentation will  cease  to  have  any  effect. 
JP.  119. 

M 


1 62  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

order  to  give  recognition  to  the  locality  idea,  each 
district  electing  several,  preferably  a  reason ablv 
large  number  of  members  of  the  council  or  legis- 
lature, as  the  case  may  be.  Voters,  by  this  plan, 
would  seem  to  be  confined  in  their  choice  to  the 
tickets  put  in  the  field,1  each  of  which  may  include 
a  list  to  be  printed  separately  of  candidates  less  in 
number  than  the  number  of  places  to  be  filled. 
Candidates  may  be  placed  on  several  tickets,  but 
they  must  choose  in  favor  of  one  of  them.  If  they 
do  not  so  choose,  they  are  assigned  to  one  of  the 
tickets  by  lot,  and  in  each  case  votes  cast  for  them 
count  for  their  ticket  as  well  as  for  them  individu- 
ally. Each  voter  has  as  many  votes  as  there  are 
persons  to  be  elected,  which  votes  he  may  distrib- 
ute as  he  chooses  among  the  candidates,  giving 
not  more  than  one  vote  to  any  one  candidate ;  and 
votes  thus  cast  are  known  as  "individual  votes" 
and  count  both  for  the  candidate  receiving  them 
and  for  the  ticket  to  which  the  candidate  belongs. 
If  the  voter  does  not  use  the  total  number  of  votes 
to  which  he  is  entitled  by  voting  for  that  number 
of  candidates,  the  remainder  of  his  votes  are  known 
as  "  ticket  votes "  and  shall  be  counted  for  any 
ticket  as  a  whole  which  he  may  designate.  If  he 
does  not  so  designate  a  ticket,  only  his  "  individual 
votes  "  are  to  be  counted  and  his  ballot  as  a  whole 

1  This,  however,  is  not  a  necessary  part  of  the  scheme  of  propor- 
tional representation,  though  considerable  complication  in  counting 
the  vote  will  follow  if  it  is  not  adopted. 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  163 

will  be  void  if  he  designates  more  than  one  ticket. 
The  individual  and  ticket  votes  are  to  be  cast  as 
under  the  present  New  York  law ;  that  is,  by  mark- 
ing, in  the  one  case,  the  name  of  the  candidate  and 
in  the  other,  the  ticket.  The  votes  cast  are  to  be 
counted  in  such  a  way  as  to  indicate  both  the  in- 
dividuals and  the  tickets.  The  total  number  of 
ticket  votes,  that  is,  including  "  ticket  votes  "  and 
"  individual  votes  "  cast  for  the  ticket,  is  to  be  di- 
vided by  the  total  number  of  persons  to  be  elected, 
and  the  quotient,  ignoring  fractions,  is  to  be  the 
"unit  of  "representation."  Then  the  number  of 
votes  (both  "ticket"  and  "individual")  cast  for 
each  ticket  is  to  be  divided  by  the  "  unit  of  repre- 
sentation," and  each  ticket  shall  be  entitled  to  a 
number  of  persons  to  be  elected,  equal  to  the  quo- 
tient thus  obtained,  ignoring  fractions.  If  the 
sum  of  the  quotients  thus  obtained  be  less  than  the 
number  of  seats  to  be  filled,  the  remainder  is  to 
be  given  to  the  ticket  or  tickets  having  the  largest 
remainder  or  remainders.  After  thus  obtaining  the 
number  of  seats  to  go  to  each  ticket,  such  seats 
are  to  be  given  to  the  persons  on  the  ticket  receiving 
the  highest  number  of  individual  votes.  In  case  of 
a  tie  the  lot  decides.  Finally,  if  the  ticket  obtains 
more  representatives  than  there  are  candidates,  the 
number  of  seats  to  be  filled  is  distributed  among  the 
other  tickets  in  proportion  to  votes  cast.  In  case  a 
vacancy  occurs  in  any  seat,  the  candidate  who  re- 
ceived at  the  last  election  the  greatest  number  of 


164  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

votes  after  the  last  one  elected,  in  the  party  or  group 
in  which  the  vacancy  occurred,  is  chosen  to  fill  it. 
There  are  several  objections  to  this  plan;  some 
are  constitutional,  some  are  general.  The  former 
affect  all  kinds  of  proportional  representation, 
whose  result  will  give  an  elective  office  to  one  who 
has  less  than  a  majority  or  plurality  of  votes. 
Like  the  objection  noted  above  to  confining  the 
voter's  choice  to  the  candidates  nominated,  this 
might  be  done  away  with  by  a  constitutional 
amendment.  The  other  objections  are  rather  to 
the  particular  method  proposed  than  to  the  general 
scheme  of  proportional  representation.  In  the 
first  place,  this  kind  of  proportional  representa- 
tion is  applicable  only  to  elections  for  members  of 
a  comparatively  large  body.  It  is  absolutely  inap- 
plicable to  the  election  of  a  single  officer,  like  the 
mayor,  and  the  mayor  is  often  as  unrepresentative 
of  a  city  as  is  its  council.  In  the  second  place,  it 
will  be  remembered  that  in  case  a  seat  or  seats 
remain  to  be  filled  after  apportioning  the  seats  in 
the  legislative  body  to  the  various  parties  by  the 
application  of  the  exact  "  unit  of  representation," 
such  seat  or  seats  are  to  be  given  to  the  party  or 
parties  having  the  largest  remainder  or  remainders. 
This  is  the  system  called  in  Europe  that  of  "  forced 
fractions."  It  was  tried  in  the  Swiss  Canton  of 
Ticino  in  1890,  and  led  to  such  unlooked-for  results 
that  it  was  abandoned  in  1892,*  when  a  system 

1  Law  of  December  2,  1892. 


UNIVERSAL  SUFFRAGE 


16S 


which  has  been  adopted  also  in  Neuchatel  was 
introduced.  This  consisted  in  giving  the  remain- 
ing seat  or  seats  after  the  distribution  of  seats  in 
accordance  with  the  unit  of  representation  to  the 
party  or  parties  casting  the  largest  vote  or  votes 
instead  of  to  the  party  having  the  largest  fraction 
or  fractions  after  the  distribution.  A  hypothetical 
instance  of  what  may  result  from  the  system  of 
"  forced  fractions "  in  a  three-cornered  constitu- 
ency is  given  in  La  Representation  Proportionnellel 
Suppose  that  there  are  in  such  a  district  3000 
voters,  and  three  parties  with  a  voting  strength  of 
1600,  750,  and  650  respectively.  We  have  then 
1600  votes  belonging  to  party  A,  750  votes  be- 
longing to  party  B,  650  votes  belonging  to  party 
C,  with  three  seats  to  fill,  a  total  of  3000  votes, 
which,  divided  by  three,  the  number  of  parties, 
gives  1000  for  the  "  unit  of  representation." 


Parties 

Votes 

Unit  of  Representation 

Candidates 
elected 

A 

1600  -f- 

1000  =  I  plus  a  remainder  of  600 

I 

B 

75°- 

1000  =  o  plus  a  remainder  of  750 

I 

C 

650  -f- 

1000  =  o  plus  a  remainder  of  650 

I 

A  will  get  one  seat,  but  so  will  B  and  C.  The 
result  is  that  a  majority  of  the  total  number  of 
voters  will  have  a  minority  of  the  seats.  The 


1  Vol.  ii,  p.  78. 


1 66  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

I 

tendency  will  be  for  the  minority  party  to  split  up 
into  factions,  which,  if  done  with  sufficient  ability, 
may  easily  lead  to  the  above  result.  This  is  not 
merely  a  theoretical  objection.  It  was  what  actu- 
ally happened  in  the  Canton  of  Ticino  under  the 
law  of  1890,  which  adopted  the  system  of  "forced 
fractions."  In  the  report  of  the  commission  ap- 
pointed to  look  into  this  matter  by  the  Canton  of 
Neuchatel1  it  is  said  :  "  Every  one  remembers  that 
the  parties  in  Ticino  .  .  .  organized  by  shrewd  subdi- 
visions to  obtain  the  benefits  resulting  from  having 
the  largest  remainders."  Too  much  weight,  how- 
ever, should  not  be  given  to  this  objection,  since  such 
a  result  as  is  seen  in  the  instance  given  above  is  not 
liable  to  occur  where  the  constituency  is  large  and 
elects  five  or  seven  members.  The  method  of  obtain- 
ing the  "  unit  of  representation  "  or  elective  quotient 
proposed  by  this  plan  has  also  been  abandoned  by 
the  latest  Ticino  law ;  namely,  that  of  December  2, 
1892.  Mathematical  calculations  prove  that  it  is 
fairer  to  add  one  to  the  number  of  seats  to  be  filled 
and  divide  the  votes  cast  by  the  total  thus  obtained 
than  to  use  as  divisor  the  number  of  seats  to  be 
filled.  Further,  this  system  of  voting  is  very  com- 
plicated, and  complicated  in  just  the  point  where 
it  ought  to  be  simple ;  i.e.  in  the  method  of  marking 
the  ballot.  It  may  well  be  questioned  whether 
the  average  voter  has  sufficient  intelligence  to 
vote  with  judgment  by  this  method.  The  Swiss 

1  La  Representation  Proportionnellc,  Vol.  10,  p.  278. 


UNIVERSAL  SUFFRAGE  167 

plan  pure  and  simple  is  preferable  on  this  account. 
Here  the  voter  is  confined  to  the  tickets  which 
he  must  vote  straight  and  does  not  vote  for  indi- 
viduals :  and  those  candidates  placed  first  on  the 
tickets  are  elected,  each  ticket  electing  a  number 
of  candidates  proportionate  to  the  number  of  votes 
cast  for  it.  Such  a  method  of  voting,  .however, 
makes  the  party  machine  supreme. 

Finally,  it  must  be  admitted  that  there  are  so 
many  plans  of  "  proportional  representation,"  in 
each  of  which  its  advocates  have  the  greatest  con- 
fidence, that  it  may  be  well  to  wait  before  adopting 
any  one  of  them  until  greater  agreement  is  reached 
by  the  believers  in  this  system  of  representation. 
This  is  particularly  true,  since  Switzerland  seems 
at  the  present  time  to  be  a  place  for  experimenta- 
tion. There  are  at  least  three  different  plans  in 
operation  there  ;  namely,  that  of  Ticino,  Neuchatel, 
and  Geneva.  The  experience  of  the  Swiss  may 
help  us  to  determine  the  question. 

But  whatever  method  of  representation  or  voting 
may  be  adopted,  too  much  ought  not  to  be  ex- 
pected from  this  particular  reform.  Our  past 
experience  should  lead  us  to  remember  that  mi- 
nority representation  twenty-five  years  ago  was 
as  enthusiastically  advocated  as  is  proportional 
representation  or  preferential  voting  now.  But 
wherever  adopted,  it  has  failed  to  fulfil  the  antici- 
pations of  its  supporters.  Means  were  found  not 
only  to  neutralize  the  good  effects  which  were 


1 68  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

anticipated  from  its  adoption,  but  also  to  make  use 
of  it  to  increase  the  power  of  the  party  machine. 
The  same  thing  may  happen  again.  Finally,  it  is 
to  be  remembered  that  even  if  some  sort  of  minor- 
ity for  proportional  representation  is  adopted,  the 
majority  will  rule  and  ought  to  rule,  and  it  seems 
doubtful,  to  say  the  least,  if  any  system  of  propor- 
tional representation  will  bring  into  our  legislative 
assemblies  a  much  better  majority.  Minority 
representation,  as  seen  in  Illinois,  cannot  be  said  to 
have  done  so,  although  practically  all  the  testimony 
is  to  the  effect  that  those  members  of  the  legis- 
lative bodies  elected  by  the  minority  have  been 
rather  better  in  character  than  those  elected  by  the 
majority.  The  advocates  of  proportional  repre- 
sentation have  very  strong  hopes  that  the  adoption 
of  this  system  will,  on  account  of  its  provision  for  a 
general  ticket,  result  in  the  election  of  men  of 
better  character  to  the  various  legislative  bodies. 
Perhaps  they  are  right  —  perhaps  not.  There  is 
nothing,  however,  in  the  experience  of  the  coun- 
tries which  have  adopted  it,  to  make  us  expect  a 
great  improvement  in  the  character  of  the  persons 
to  be  elected  by  the  system  of  proportional  repre- 
sentation.1 Further,  almost  everywhere  where  pro- 
portional representation  has  been  adopted,  it  has 

1  As  Mr.  Matthews  says  ( The  City  Government  of  Boston,  p. 
14)  :  "  It  would  be  foolish,  indeed,  to  expect  that  .  .  .  any  recon- 
struction of  our  municipal  legislature  will  remove  all  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  securing  an  economical  and  business-like  government. 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  169 

been  adopted  in  order  to  remedy  the  abuses  of  the 
general  ticket  combined  with  election  by  majority 
or  plurality.  Election  by  general  ticket  generally 
results  in  a  representative  assembly  in  which  there 
is  no  minority,  or,  where  there  are  three  parties 
and  a  plurality  vote  is  sufficient  to  elect,  in  an 
assembly  not  only  in  which  there  is  no  minority, 
but  which  actually  represents  a  minority  of  the 
voters.  A  good  example  of  this  fact  is  to  be  found 
in  a  late  election  in  Marseilles.  Here  there  were 
three  parties,  —  the  Conservative,  the  Liberal,  and 
the  Socialist.  The  election  was  by  general  ticket 
and  the  Socialist  party,  although  having  a  minority 
of  the  actual  voters,  still  contained  the  largest 
group  of  voters,  and  the  result  of  the  election  was 
a  municipal  council  in  which  every  member  elected 
was  a  socialist.  These  facts  explain  the  ardor  of 
the  advocates  of  proportional  representation  in 
Switzerland  and  Belgium.  They  certainly  do  not 
justify  us  in  supposing  that  a  better  majority  will, 
as  a  result  of  its  adoption,  be  elected  to  our  city 
councils.  It  may  be  worth  while  to  try  some 
system  of  minority  representation,  preferably,  on 
account  of  its  simplicity,  preferential  voting  with 
the  Forney  method  of  counting  the  votes  described 
above ;  for  the  ordinary  American  Common  Coun- 
cil could  not  be  much  less  representative  than  it 

The  representatives  of  the  citizens,  howsoever  elected,  will  continue 
to  represent  with  more  or  less  fidelity  the  wishes  and  principles  of 
their  constituents." 


I/O  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

has  been  in  many  cases  under  either  the  general 
ticket  or  district  ticket  system  of  representation 
which  we  now  have ;  and  whatever  may  be  the 
practical  success  of  preferential  voting,  it  has  in  its 
favor  the  theoretical  advantages  of  justice  and  of 
being  adapted  to  present  municipal  conditions. 

In  the  second  place,  universal  suffrage  ought  not 
to  be  held  responsible  for  many  of  the  evils  for 
which  it  is  made  responsible,  but  which  it  is  be- 
lieved result  from  the  imperfect  character  of  all 
representative  systems.  No  matter  what  may  be 
the  method  adopted  for  insuring  representation,  it 
is  very  likely  that  the  persons  elected  will  cease 
after  a  time  to  represent  the  opinions  of  the  people 
who  elected  them  and  whom  they  may  have  repre- 
sented at  the  time  of  the  election.  Such  a  misrep- 
resentation of  the  people  is  much  more  likely  to 
happen  under  our  present  system  of  reliance  upon 
parties  for  the  choice  of  candidates  to  be  voted  for. 
For  at  the  time  the  candidates  are  put  in  nomina- 
tion, not  all  the  questions  which  these  candidates 
are  to  decide,  if  elected,  will  in  the  nature  of  things 
have  been  discussed.  Further,  it  is  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  organize  parties  after  the  manner  of 
existing  political  parties  which  will  give  promi- 
nence to  more  than  one  or  two  issues.  Many  an 
elector,  at  the  present  time,  is  obliged  to  vote  with 
a  party  which  does  not  clearly  express  or  even 
express  at  all  his  views  on  particular  matters.  It 
is  on  this  account,  as  well  as  because  of  the  fact 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  171 

that  our  present  representative  and  party  system 
seems  to  bring  almost  regularly  into  power  so 
many  incompetent  if  not  corrupt  men,  that  the 
people  have  more  and  more  been  limiting  the 
powers  of  representation  which  they  give  their 
representatives,  and  have  been  more  and  more 
assuming  the  power  themselves  to  determine  ques- 
tions of  policy. 

This  is  seen,  in  the  first  place,  in  the  greater 
length  and  detail  of  the  later  state  constitutions. 
Bryce  points  out 1  that  the  first  constitution  of  Vir- 
ginia, of  date  1776,  contained  about  3200  words, 
and  that  the  present  constitution  of  that  state,  of 
date  1870,  contains  17,000  words;  that  the  first 
and  only  constitution  of  New  Hampshire  contained 
apart  from  the  preamble  about  600  words,  while 
the  present  constitutions  of  Missouri,  of  1875,  and 
of  South  Dakota,  of  1889,  contain  more  than  26,000 
words.  The  greater  detail  of  the  later  constitutions, 
containing  as  they  do  many  provisions  of  private 
and  administrative  law,  in  addition  to  constitutional 
law  in  the  scientific  sense  of  the  words,  has  made 
it  necessary  to  amend  them  or  completely  remodel 
them  frequently.  Raccioppi2  thus  calls  attention 
to  the  fact,  that  in  the  eighty-four  years  from 
1776  to  1860,  there  were  69  new  constitutions 
and  100  amendments;  that  in  the  twenty-seven 

1  American  Commonwealth,  3d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  454. 

2  In   his   Nuovi    Limite   e   Freni  Nelle    Institutioni   Politiche 
Americane,  p.  193. 


1/2  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

years  following,  there  were  not  less  than  35 
new  constitutions  and  not  less  than  114  amend- 
ments; that  finally  six  new  constitutions  and  28 
amendments  were  rejected  by  the  people  from 
1876  to  1886.  Finally,  Bryce  says 1  that  Arkansas, 
whose  first  constitution  dates  from  1836,  has  had 
five  constitutions  besides  making  frequent  amend- 
ments, while  Pennsylvania  has  had  four. 

Again,  it  is  not  unfrequently  the  case  that  the 
newer  constitutions  provide  for  submitting  the  de- 
cision of  various  matters  either  to  the  people  of 
the  state  as  a  whole,  or  to  the  people  of  the  par- 
ticular localities  to  be  affected  by  the  decision.2 
This  is  quite  common  in  the  case  of  borrowing 
money  or  undertaking  some  large  public  work,  as, 
for  example,  the  case  of  rapid  transit  in  the  city 
of  New  York.  Further,  as  Bryce  points  out,  the 
legislature  frequently,  when  not  required,  submits 
questions  to  the  people  for  their  consideration, 
in  order  that  after  their  decision  has  been  ex- 
pressed it  may  be  guided  in  its  action  accordingly. 
The  question  of  the  greater  New  York,  which  was 
submitted  in  1894  to  popular  vote,  is  one  of  the 
most  important  recent  instances  of  this  practice. 

Although  it  is  recognized  that  this  practice  must, 
if  carried  much  further,  result  in  the  destruction  of 
the  representative  system,  the  practice  is  generally 

1  op.  «/.,  p.  456. 

2  See  an  article  by  E.  P.  Oberholtzer  on  "  Law-making  by  Popular 
Vote,"  in  Annals  of  American  Academy,  etc..  Vol.  II,  No.  3,  p.  36. 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  173 

favorably  regarded  in  the  United  States  and  is  so 
regarded  because  the  people  do  not,  at  the  present 
time,  believe  that  under  the  present  system  they 
are  being  represented  in  the  various  legislative 
bodies.  But  it  is  very  doubtful  whether  present 
conditions  admit  of  a  much  more  extended  appli- 
cation of  the  principle  of  direct  legislation  of  which 
the  instances  cited  are  examples.  This  is  particu- 
larly true  of  the  method  of  direct  legislation  to  be 
found  in  constitution  making  and  amending.  The 
formalities  to  be  complied  with  are  so  formidable, 
and  the  process  is  so  slow,  that  many  matters  which 
need  attention  cannot  be  attended  to  properly  under 
such  a  system.  Again,  the  method  of  submission 
by  the  legislature  to  the  people  of  questions  upon 
which  it  wishes  their  advice  is  unsatisfactory,  since 
there  is  no  way  of  insuring  that  their  advice  will 
be  taken.  It  may  be  possible  that  certain  questions 
of  municipal  policy,  such  as  the  incurring  of  a  large 
debt  through  the  undertaking  of  an  important  pub- 
lic improvement,  can  be  decided  by  the  city  elect- 
ors, without  harm  to  the  municipal  welfare.  But 
such  questions  must  be  very  simple  and  easy  of 
comprehension.  It  is  certainly  impossible  to  sub- 
stitute absolutely  direct  legislation  for  representa- 
tive municipal  government. 

There  is,  however,  one  part  of  our  governmental 
system  where  direct  legislation  has  been  success- 
fully in  operation  during  our  entire  history.  That 
is  the  town  meeting  in  New  England.  Indeed,  in 


1/4  MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 

the  largest  New  England  city  the  plan  was  in 
operation  up  to  1822,  but  with  the  growth  of  pop- 
ulation the  town  meeting  became  impossible  of 
application  and  had  to  be  abandoned.  As  the  old- 
est of  Teutonic  institutions  and  as  providing  most 
completely  for  a  direct  expression  of  the  people's 
wishes,  it  has  been  the  goal  of  many  interested  in 
governmental  reform,  who  have  suggested  ways  in 
which  it  might  be  adopted,  so  as  to  fit  other  con- 
ditions more  complex  than  those  in  which  it  has 
been  successfully  in  operation  for  so  many  years. 
Two  of  these  plans  have  received  greater  promi- 
nence than  others.  One  is  due  to  Mr.  Albert  Stick- 
ney1  and  has  been  somewhat  further  elaborated 
and  developed  by  Mr.  S.  E.  Moffett  in  his  recently 
published  Suggestions  on  Government.  It  pro- 
poses the  formation  of  permanent  districts  all  over 
the  country,  in  the  city  as  well  as  in  the  country, 
in  which  "  Precinct  Assemblies,"  as  they  are  called, 
shall  be  formed.  These  bodies,  of  from  50  to 
about  1 500  voters  gathered  together  on  the  neigh- 
borhood plan,  shall  elect  the  members  of  the  vari- 
ous legislative  assemblies,  including  the  city  council, 
which  shall  appoint  and  remove  the  chief  executives 
of  the  various  governments.  The  chief  executives 
are  to  have  the  appointment  of  all  subordinates, 
and  in  order  to  make  all  officers  responsible  to  the 
source  of  power — the  people  —  each  appointing 
officer  shall  have  the  power  to  remove  all  his  ap- 

1  Proposed  in  his  book  entitled  The  Political  Problem. 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  175 

pointees,  while  the  people  in  their  precinct  assem- 
blies shall  have  the  right  both  to  recall  at  any  time 
the  officers  they  elect,  and  to  veto,  under  certain  con- 
ditions, any  law  or  resolution  voted  by  their  repre- 
sentatives. The  other  plan,  which  was  published 
twenty  years  ago,  is  due  to  Dr.  Clark,  of  Oswego, 
New  York.  Although  not  so  elaborate  nor  so  com- 
plete in  its  details,  being  proposed  only  for  cities, 
it  is  based  upon  somewhat  the  same  principle  as 
the  one  just  described.  It  discards,  however,  the 
neighborhood  basis  of  the  other  plan,  as  offering 
an  opportunity  for  the  gerrymander  and  the  abuses 
of  the  present  primary  meeting,  and  provides  for 
the  grouping  together  of  the  people  of  large  sec- 
tions of  the  cities  by  lot,  in  groups  of  not  more 
than  250  each.  Each  of  these  groups  is  to  elect 
an  "elector,"  and  the  "electors"  thus  formed  elect 
the  mayor  and  other  elective  officers,  and  the  mem- 
ber representing  the  particular  section  in  the  mu- 
nicipal council  or  other  deliberative  body  of  the 
city  government.  All  such  elected  officers  may  be 
removed  at  any  time  by  a  vote  of  the  "electors." 
This  latter  plan  received  the  approval  of  the  voters 
of  the  city  of  Oswego ;  a  bill  to  provide  for  its 
adoption  was  prepared,  and,  in  1894,  passed  the 
legislature  of  the  state  of  New  York,  but  was 
vetoed  by  the  governor.1 

1  The  plan  is  fully  described  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Cleveland 
and  Minneapolis  Conferences  for  Good  Government,  in  a  paper 
written  by  Dr.  Clark,  p.  524. 


MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 


Such  are  two  of  the  plans  proposed  both  to  re- 
form the  present  unsatisfactory  method  of  repre- 
sentation, and  to  give  the  people  more  control  over 
both  the  officers  whom  they  elect  and  the  legisla- 
tive measures  to  be  adopted.  At  the  present  time 
both  appear  too  radical  to  justify  the  hope  of 
their  adoption.  Both,  further,  are  based  upon  the 
belief  that  the  same  political  activity  can  be  ex- 
pected from  the  urban  as  from  the  rural  citizen. 
Both  assume  that  because  the  town  meeting  has 
worked  successfully  in  the  rural  districts,  it  will 
also  work  well  in  urban  districts.  Both  are  thus 
rather  theoretical  than  practical,  taking  no  account 
of  the  peculiar  conditions  of  modern  urban  life. 
But,  as  will  be  pointed  out  in  the  next  few  pages, 
measures  of  a  similar  character,  or  at  any  rate 
based  on  a  similar  false  analogy,  have  been  woe- 
fully unsuccessful. 

Finally,  it  has  been  felt  by  many  that  the  evils 
that  are  attributed  to  universal  suffrage  may  be 
due  to  the  fact  that  too  much  has  been  demanded 
of  it.  The  principle  of  election  as  a  means  of  fill- 
ing almost  all  offices,  whose  functions  are  not 
merely  clerical  and  ministerial  in  character,  was 
introduced  about  1830.  The  movement  reached 
its  culmination  about  the  middle  of  the  century, 
by  which  time  almost  all  important  state,  county, 
town,  and  city  offices  had  become  elective.  The 
abuse  of  the  appointing  power  in  our  early  politi- 
cal history  was  undoubtedly  largely  responsible 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  1 77 

for  the  general  introduction  of  the  elective  prin- 
ciple. The  adoption  of  this  idea  may  be  due  also 
to  the  overweening  confidence  in  democracy  by 
which  the  early  part  of  this  century  was  character- 
ized. It  was  generally  believed  that  democracy 
had  worked  successfully  in  the  rural  localities 
where  the  elective  principle  had  been  adopted  at  a 
very  early  time,  and  it  was  natural  to  suppose  it 
would  work  well  in  the  cities,  which,  it  must  be 
remembered,  were  by  no  means  so  large  as  now, 
and  in  which  the  population  was  much  more  homo- 
geneous than  now.  But  whatever  may  have  been 
the  justification  for  the  belief  in  democracy,  with 
its  principle  of  election,  which,  of  course,  lies  at 
the  basis  of  all  popular  government,  it  was  soon 
found  that  the  concrete  manifestations  of  the 
people's  will,  expressed  in  accordance  with  the 
way  provided  by  law,  were  in  many  cases  anything 
but  wise ;  that  many  officials  who  were  presumably 
the  people's  choice  were  guilty  of  both  inefficiency 
and  criminal  conduct.  The  experience  through 
which  the  people  of  our  cities  passed  soon  after 
the  elective  principle  was  generally  introduced 
into  the  city  organization  led  them  in  many  cases 
to  abandon  the  idea  of  popular  government  for 
cities,  and  to  resort  to  an  extreme  centralization  in 
the  hope  that  the  state  government,  under  which 
the  municipal  government  of  the  larger  cities  be- 
came so  generally  centralized,  might  represent  a 
more  enlightened  public  opinion  than  it  was  be- 


178  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

lieved  could  be  found  in  the  cities  themselves.  The 
centralization  was  in  some  cases  administrative; 
in  other  cases  it  was  legislative.  But  in  all  cases 
the  city  was  deprived  of  many  of  its  rights  of  local 
autonomy.  Believing  in  the  political  capacity 
of  the  native  population  which,  it  was  thought, 
had  been  amply  proven  in  the  success  attending 
the  national,  and,  to  a  lesser  degree,  the  state  gov- 
ernment, the  reason  most  commonly  alleged  at  the 
time,  and  indeed  at  the  present  time,  for  the  failure 
of  popular  government  in  the  cities,  was  the  pres- 
ence therein  of  so  many  persons  of  foreign  birth, 
who  had  been  admitted  to  participation  in  munici- 
pal affairs  before  they  had  familiarized  themselves 
with  our  ways  of  thinking  and  doing,  before,  in 
other  words,  they  had  been  assimilated.  Believing 
that  this  was  the  cause  of  our  failure,  the  munici- 
pal populations,  or  at  least  the  most  intelligent 
portions  thereof,  were  willing,  as  are  the  people  in 
some  of  the  Southern  states  at  the  present  time, 
where  there  is  a  large  ignorant  negro  population, 
to  surrender  their  political  privileges.  They  hoped 
by  the  surrender  to  get  good  government,  caring 
little,  if  only  the  government  were  good,  what 
might  be  the  method  by  which  it  was  obtained. 

It  is,  however,  to  be  doubted  if  the  cause  as- 
signed for  the  evil  municipal  conditions  of  the 
middle  of  this  century  was  the  correct  one.  "The 
city  of  Portland,  Oregon,1  presents  an  interesting 

1  See  an  article  on  the  "  Municipal  Condition  of  Portland,"  by 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  179 

example  of  the  spontaneous  growth  of  extrava- 
gance and  corruption  in  municipal  affairs  in  a 
place  and  under  circumstances  where  there  would 
seem  to  be  no  inducing  causes.  In  January,  1860, 
it  was  an  isolated  village  of  2917  inhabitants, 
nestled  in  a  little  opening  in  the  apparently  end- 
less forests  of  the  Douglas  fir  that  then  covered 
its  present  site.  Its  growth  has  been  steady  and 
unbroken,  and  it  is  now  a  beautiful  city  of  75,000 
inhabitants  in  the  midst  of  a  cultivated  district, 
with  environments  and  advantages  unsurpassed 
by  any  city  of  its  size  in  the  world.  It  has  been 
particularly  happy  in  the  character  of  its  inhabi- 
tants, and  from  its  very  isolation  has  escaped  the 
great  European  outpouring  to  which  New  York 
and  other  cities  have  been  subjected.  No  gold 
mines  in  its  vicinity  have  developed  the  gambling 
spirit  that  at  one  time  was  so  manifest  in  San 
Francisco,  yet  it  has  prospered  in  perfectly  legiti- 
mate ways  until  it  has  become  one  of  the  wealthiest 
cities  of  its  class  in  the  world.  For  much  of  its 
career  isolated,  with  a  cultivated,  conservative,  and 
American  population,  abundantly  prosperous,  and 
with  rare  surroundings  of  refinement  and  beauty, 
the  people  of  Portland  have  had  an  almost  unique 
opportunity' of  showing  their  capabilities  as  city 
builders,  and  yet,  after  all,  they  have  evolved  only 
the  weak,  corrupt  municipal  government  unfortu- 

Thomas  N.  Strong,  to  be  found  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Minne- 
apolis and  Cleveland  Conferences  for  Good  Government,  p.  432. 


180  MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 

nately  common  to  this  country.  The  people  in- 
tent on  making  money  allowed  a  few  politicians 
from  time  to  time,  by  struggles  among  themselves, 
to  determine  the  right  to  the  possession  of  the  city, 
and  whoever  acquired  control  was  allowed  to  do 
what  he  would  with  all  of  its  departments.  For 
over  thirty  years  not  one  citizen  in  ten  knew  what 
the  annual  tax  levy  was.  At  almost  every  term 
of  the  state  legislature  a  new  city  charter  was 
either  projected  or  enacted,  and  so  absorbed  were 
the  people  in  their  private  affairs,  and  so  easy  were 
they  in  their  fool's  paradise,  that  it  is  said  that  the 
contents  of  the  last  city  charter,  enacted  two  years 
ago,  were  only  known  before  its  passage  to  two 
members  of  the  legislature.  ...  It  is  apparent 
from  this  city's  experience  that  all  of  this  munici- 
pal extravagance  and  corruption  has  grown  under 
American  cultivation  and  upon  American  soil,  from 
causes  inherent  within  themselves.  No  question 
comes  in  of  '  unrestricted  emigration '  or  '  uni- 
versal suffrage.'  The  isolated  condition  of  the 
city  for  so  many  years  has  absolutely  prevented 
the  first,  and  its  steady  growth  as  a  cultivated  and 
moral  community,  and  the  high  character  of  its 
citizenship,  has  minimized  the  evils  of  the  latter. 
It  seems  to  me  that,  encouraged  and  permitted  by 
the  public  indifference  born  of  continued  prosper- 
ity, political  partisanship  is  chargeable  with  almost 
the  entire  mischief." 

While  our  municipal  misgovernment  is  in  large 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  l8l 

part  undoubtedly  due  to  the  indifference  of  the 
people  in  the  cities  to  matters  of  government  so 
long  as  they  may  devote  themselves  to  the  accumu- 
lation of  wealth,  while  this  may  have  been  the  sole 
cause  of  the  misgovernment  of  Portland,  it  is  with- 
out doubt  that  in  almost  all  instances  one  cause  of 
the  trouble  is  to  be  found  in  the  inapplicability  to 
the  government  of  a  large  city  of  the  elective  prin- 
ciple as  the  common  means  of  filling  office.  While 
we  may  give  in  our  adhesion  to  the  general  princi- 
ple of  popular  government,  we  may  still  believe 
that  the  elective  principle  is  not  the  proper  one  to 
be  generally  applied  in  large  centres  of  population. 
Indeed,  the  conditions  are  quite  dissimilar  from 
those  which  exist  in  the  rural  districts  where  the 
elective  principle  had  first  been  tried,  and  where  it 
has  been  undoubtedly  quite  successful  both  in  pro- 
ducing reasonably  good  administration  and  in  ex- 
pressing the  popular  will.  These  conditions  are 
dissimilar  in  two  respects:  In  the  first  place,  in 
the  rural  districts  the  feeling  of  neighborhood  is 
strong,  and  the  people,  knowing  personally  most  of 
the  candidates  who  present  themselves  for  office, 
are  in  a  position  to  make  a  wise  choice.  In  the 
cities,  on  the  other  hand,  the  feeling  of  neighbor- 
hood is  not  strong.  Further,  it  never  can  be 
strong  in  cities  like  the  American  cities,  where 
the  population  is  so  fluctuating  and  changing  as  it 
is.  It  will,  therefore,  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible, 
for  the  people  in  the  cities  to  know  much  person- 


1 82  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

ally  about  the  merits  of  any  large  number  of  can- 
didates. Further,  in  the  cities,  offices  are  much 
more  numerous  than  they  are  in  the  rural  districts, 
and  if  a  great  number  of  offices  is  to  filled,  many 
of  which  are  subordinate  and  comparatively  unim- 
portant, even  the  most  intelligent  elector  is  apt  to 
become  confused,  and  is,  therefore,  liable  to  vote 
the  "straight  ticket"  of  the  party  with  which  he 
acts  on  state  or  national  issues,  regardless  of  the 
fact  that  the  officer  for  whom  he  is  voting  has  no 
duties  which  can  exercise  any  influence  on  the 
issues  of  state  and  national  politics,  thus  allowing 
municipal  questions  to  be  decided  by  other  than 
municipal  considerations.  In  the  "  Report  of  the 
Commissioners  appointed  to  inquire  concerning 
the  Mode  of  Appointing  and  Remunerating  Certain 
Provincial  Officials  now  paid  by  Fees  "  in  Ontario, 
Canada,1  the  commissioners,  after  an  investiga- 
tion of  conditions  in  Canada  and  the  United  States, 
advise  the  retention  of  the  present  system  of  ap- 
pointment. They  say  : 2  "  The  method  of  appoint- 
ment to  office  aims  at  economy  of  power,  unity  of 
purpose,  and  efficiency  of  action ;  the  method  of 
election  subordinates  everything  to  popular  control. 
Now  the  advantage  of  popular  control  is  entirely 
illusory  where  the  electoral  constituency  is  counted 
not  by  hundreds  but  by  thousands."  As  President 
Low  says :  3  "  Greatly  to  multiply  important  elec- 

1  Toronto,  1895.  2  On  P-  25- 

8  Quoted  from  Bryce,  op.  cit.,  1st  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  614. 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  183 

tive  officers  is  not  to  increase  popular  control,  but 
to  lessen  it." 

In  the  second  place,  the  administration  of  a 
municipality  is  more  complex  than  that  of  the 
rural  districts.  The  presence  of  a  vast  number  of 
people  in  a  small  section,  of  itself  presents  prob- 
lems which  require  for  their  solution  a  large 
amount  of  technical  knowledge  and  skill.  The 
rural  highway  becomes  the  city  street,  which  must 
not  only  sustain  an  immense  amount  of  surface 
traffic  to  which  the  rural  highway  is  not  subjected, 
but  must  serve  as  a  means  of  conveying  under  its 
surface  water,  gas,  heat,  electricity,  and  sewerage. 
Often,  in  the  case  of  the  large  cities,  the  street  is 
made  use  of  as  a  means  of  carrying  passengers 
and  merchandise  beneath  its  surface.  The  care 
of  the  public  health  in  the  rural  districts  is  a  com- 
paratively simple  matter,  consisting  in  the  adoption 
of  simple  remedial  measures  when  any  case$of  con- 
tagious disease  appears.  Unobstructed  light  and 
free  circulation  of  air  may  be  trusted  to  act  as 
preventives  to  disease.  In  the  city,  on  the  other 
hand,  greater  care  must  be  taken  to  prevent  the 
existence  of  nuisances,  more  energetic  measures 
must  be  taken  to  stamp  out  contagious  diseases, 
because  of  their  greater  liability  to  spread,  and 
because  of  the  rapidity  with  which  they  will  spread 
if  once  allowed  to  get  a  foothold.  Not  only  do 
branches  of  administration  for  which  there  is  some 
provision  in  the  rural  districts  become  more  com- 


184  MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 

plicated  in  the  cities,  but  also  many  matters  which 
can  in  the  country  be  left  to  private  initiative  be- 
come in  the  city  subjects  of  governmental  action. 
Thus,  we  may  trust  to  a  man's  self-interest  in  the 
country  to  build  his  house  as  he  may  see  fit.  If  it 
falls  or  burns  as  a  result  of  defective  construction, 
he  has  only  himself  to  blame,  and  he  and  his  im- 
mediate family  are  in  the  nature  of  things  the  only 
sufferers.  In  the  city,  however,  the  falling  down  of 
a  building  means  possibly  the  loss  of  many  lives, 
lives  of  persons  who  could  not  individually  protect 
themselves  against  such  a  contingency.  In  case 
of  a  fire,  the  destruction  resulting  from  faulty  con- 
struction of  one  house  may,  notwithstanding  the 
best  remedial  measures,  be  widespread.  In  the* 
country,  again,  we  may  trust  a  man's  self-interest 
to  convey  the  garbage  and  waste  matter  necessi- 
tated by  the  exigencies  of  domestic  life  to  some 
place  ^here  they  will  not  be  offensive  to  him  or 
breed  disease.  In  the  city,  however,  no  private 
initiative  with  the  best  of  intentions  on  the  part  of 
individuals  could  attend  to  the  matter.  In  the 
country  men  may  be  left  to  provide  themselves 
with  good  potable  water.  In  the  city  this  must  be 
done  through  the  exercise  of  some  governmental 
power.  These  things,  if  they  are  to  be  attended  to 
at  all,  must,  in  most  cases,  be  attended  to  by  the  city 
government.  In  attending  to  some  of  them,  the 
highest  amount  of  technical  skill  is  required.  In 
attending  to  all  of  them,  harmony  in  administrative 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  185 

action  and  continuity  in  administrative  policy  are 
absolutely  indispensable,  if  advantageous  results  are 
to  be  expected.  It  is  when  attending  to  such  mat- 
ters as  these  that  the  claim  is  often  made  that  the 
city  is  acting  as  a  business  corporation.  But  it 
is  only  in  so  far  as  these  things  should  be  done 
in  a  reasonable  manner  and  with  the  least  ex- 
pense that  they  can  be  regarded  as  assimilated 
to  business  affairs.  And  in  this  respect  a  city 
differs  in  no  way  from  other  institutions  of  gov- 
ernment, inasmuch  as  the  performance  of  almost 
all  these  duties  requires  the  exercise  of  sovereign 
powers.  These  affairs  are  still  affairs  of  govern- 
ment, and  are  to  be  judged  by  the  criteria  of  gov- 
ernment, rather  than  by  those  of  business.  Thus, 
in  offering  its  citizens  water,  a  city  acts  not  so 
much  for  the  purposes  of  gain  as  because  it  is  be- 
lieved that  water  is  absolutely  necessary  to  the 
welfare  and  health  of  the  people  and  must  be  had 
even  at  great  expense.  But  while  the  resem- 
blance of  municipal  action  to  commercial  action  is 
thus  slight,  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  the  techni- 
cal skill  required  is  as  great,  it  is  indeed  the  same 
in  kind,  as  if  the  matter  were  one  of  business ;  and 
somewhat  the  same  methods  should  in  the  nature 
of  things  be  followed  in  obtaining  it  as  are  fol- 
lowed in  private  enterprises  of  a  similar  character. 
And  it  would  certainly  be  absurd  to  say  that  the 
elective  principle  generally  applied  is  one  of  those 
methods.  As  a  chief  justice  of  Wisconsin  once 


1 86  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

said,  "Where  you  want  skill,  you  must  appoint; 
where  you  want  representation,  elect."1  "This 
rule  must  be  the  guide  to  a  very  large  measure  of 
municipal  reform." 2  Not  only  is  it  true  from 
the  point  of  view  of  theory;  it  is  also  the  teach- 
ing of  experience.  In  England,  France,  and  Ger- 
many, where  municipal  government,  as  compared 
with  the  municipal  government  in  the  United 
States,  has  been  such  a  success,  hardly  a  single 
municipal  officer  who  has  to  do  with  the  techni- 
cal part  of  administration  is  elected  by  the  peo- 
ple. All,  with  the  exception  of  borough  auditors 
and  assessors  to  revise  the  election  lists  in  the 
English  boroughs,  who  are  elected  by  the  voters, 
are  appointed. 

But  what  has  been  said  must  not  be  construed 
as  being  an  arraignment  of  the  elective  principle 
in  toto.  While  it  is  asserted  that  "where  you  want 
skill,  you  must  appoint,"  it  is  as  confidently  believed 
that  "where  you  want  representation,"  you  must 
elect.  Where,  now,  do  we  want  representation  ? 
It  may  be  safely  asserted  that  the  council,  as  the 
legislative  body  of  the  city,  the  ultimate  determiner 
of  its  policy,  should  be  chosen  by  election.  No 
scheme  of  municipal  government  has  ever  pro- 
vided for  an  appointed  city  council,  which,  in  most 

1  See  Proceedings  of  the  Minneapolis   and  Cleveland   Confer- 
ences for  Good  City  Government,  p.  122,  an  article  on  the  "  Munici- 
pal Government  of  Milwaukee,"  by  General  F.  C.  Winkler. 

2  Ibid. 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE  l8/ 

cases,  would  of  necessity  have  to  be  centrally  ap- 
pointed, except  in  such  a  centralized  system  of 
administration  that  Jocal  self-government  was  im- 
possible.1 Such  centrally  appointed  city  councils 
were  provided  by  the  Napoleonic  administrative 
centralization,  but  in  any  country  which  has  even 
the  elements  of  local  government,  the  idea  of  a 
centrally  appointed  council  is  preposterous.  But 
should  the  mayor  be  elected  by  the  people,  or 
appointed  by  the  council  ?  What  does  he  stand 
for,  —  skill  or  representation  ?  That  depends  very 
largely  upon  the  position  of  the  mayor  in  the 
municipal  organization,  and  upon  the  position  of 
the  city  itself  in  the  scheme  of  government.  If 
the  mayor  is  something  more  than  the  president 
of  the  council ;  if  he  is  really  an  executive  officer  to 
a  degree  independent  of  the  council;  and  if  the 
city  and  its  officers  are  called  upon  to  execute  laws 
of  a  general  character,  that  is,  if  the  city  is  an 
important  agent  of  the  general  state  government, 
as  it  is  under  the  scheme  of  American  local  self- 
government,  then  the  mayor  as  well  as  the  council 
stands  for  representation,  and  should  be  elected 
by  the  people.  If  he  is,  however,  merely  the 

1  The  present  Board  of  Estimate  and  Apportionment  of  New 
York  city,  which  discharges  many  of  the  functions  usually  dis- 
charged by  the  city  council,  is  a  partially  appointed,  although  a 
locally  appointed  body.  That  is,  the  mayor,  one  of  its  five 
members,  appoints  two  other  of  its  members,  viz.  the  President 
of  the  Department  of  Taxes  and  Assessments  and  the  Corporation 
Counsel. 


1 88  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

president  of  the  council,  or  its  ministerial  agent, 
and  if  the  city  is  primarily  an  organ  for  the 
satisfaction  of  local  needs,  the  mayor  should  be 
appointed.  American  development  in  municipal 
government  would  seem  to  assign  him  the  first 
position  rather  than  the  second.  The  normal 
American  municipal  organization  vests  the  execu- 
tive power  in  the  city  in  a  mayor  independent  of 
the  council,  and  naturally  and  rightly,  therefore, 
provides  for  his  election.  Beyond  the  council  and 
the  mayor  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  the  principle  of 
election  should  apply.  It  is  indeed  quite  common, 
though  not  by  any  means  universal  in  the  United 
States,  to  provide  for  the  popular  election  of  the 
head  of  the  finance  department  of  the  city.  But  it 
is  doubtful  if  much  advantage  is  derived  from  the 
practice,  and  it  is  certain  that  conflict  and  lack  of 
harmony  in  municipal  administration  often  result. 
Equally  as  effective  control  over  the  finances  of 
cities  may  be  provided  in  some  other  way ;  as,  for 
example,  by  a  central  audit  of  accounts.  In  the 
larger  cities  the  elective  principle  has  already  been 
much  limited,  and  already  much  good  has  resulted. 
Few  persons,  it  is  believed,  would  advocate  a  return 
to  the  old  system  of  election.  But  even  in  the  larger 
cities,  particularly  those  cities  which  discharge  the 
functions  of  counties,  much  more  may  be  done. 
There  is  no  reason  why  registers  of  deeds,  sheriffs, 
county  clerks,  and  coroners  should  still  be  elected. 
The  functions  discharged  by  them  might  be  given 


UNIVERSAL   SUFFRAGE 


I89 


the  cities  where  county  and  city  lines  are  identi- 
cal, or  they  might  be  appointed  by  the  governor, 
as  they  were  originally.  So  long  as  so  many  officers 
are  to  be  elected,  the  voter  will  be  apt  to  be  con- 
fused, and  universal  suffrage  will  be  held  responsi- 
ble for  evils  which  result  really  from  the  fact  that 
too  much  is  demanded  of  it.  Further,  the  reduction 
of  the  number  of  offices  to  be  filled  at  any  one 
election  by  popular  vote  would  facilitate  the  easy 
execution  of  a  more  nearly  perfect  ballot  law  than 
we  now  possess.  The  ballot  law  which  has  recently 
been  so  commonly  adopted  in  this  country  was,  in 
England,  from  which  we  borrowed  it,  framed  for  a 
political  system  where  very  little  demand  was  made 
upon  the  elector  compared  with  what  is  made  upon 
him  under  our  system  of  elective  offices.  Origin- 
ally governing  only  parliamentary  elections,  it  de- 
manded a  vote  for  one  office  merely.  It  has  since 
been  extended  to  municipal  elections.  These, 
however,  come  at  a  different  time  from  the  par- 
liamentary elections,  and  themselves'  have  been 
confined  to  very  few  offices ;  roughly  speaking, 
only  the  members  of  the  local  council.1  Not  only 
will  a  reduction  of  the  number  of  officers  to  be 
voted  for  facilitate  the  adoption  of  a  more  satis- 
factory ballot  law,  but  it  will  also  make  it  much 

1  It  is  true,  in  the  English  cities,  revising  assessors  for  the  elec- 
tion lists  and  borough  auditors  are  elected.  But  when  these 
officers  are  included  in  the  list,  we  find  only  three  to  be  filled  by 
the  elector  at  a  municipal  election. 


IQO  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

more  easy  to  adopt  some  system  of  representation 
or  voting  more  equitable  than  we  now  possess. 
Most  of  these  systems  are  of  necessity  somewhat 
more  complicated  than  the  present  methods  of 
general  ticket  or  district  representation,  with  the 
election  by  a  majority  or  plurality.  This  com- 
plexity, which  is  necessary  because  of  the  desire 
to  obtain  just  representation,  makes  their  adoption 
very  difficult  under  our  present  system  of  numerous 
elective  offices. 

These  are  some  of  the  details  in  which  changes 
will  undoubtedly  be  made  before  the  system  of 
universal  suffrage  in  municipal  government  is 
abandoned.  We  can  well  afford  to  wait  until 
further  experiments  are  made  on  these  lines  before 
abandoning  a  plan  for  the  participation  of  the 
people  as  a  whole  in  the  government,  which  has  so 
much  to  be  said  for  it  from  the  theoretical  point  of 
view,  —  a  plan  which  not  only  has  great  educational 
advantages,  but  which,  if  properly  organized  in  its 
details,  tends  to  avoid  much  of  the  necessary  colli- 
sion between  a  governing  and  a  governed  class. 
Finally,  before  beginning  an  agitation  in  favor  of 
the  abandonment  of  universal  suffrage,  a  result 
which  it  has  been  shown  need  not  even  now  be 
regarded  as  impossible  of  accomplishment,  we  can 
afford  to  wait  and  see  what  are  the  effects  of 
universal  suffrage  in  the  municipal  government  of 
France.  Here  we  have  a  system  of  municipal  gov- 
ernment differing  in  many  details  from  our  own,  — 


UNIVERSAL  SUFFRAGE  19 1 

if  we  can  rightly  be  said  to  have  any  system,  —  a 
system  in  which  municipal  affairs  are  more  clearly 
differentiated  from  central  governmental  affairs, 
which  is  subjected  to  a  responsible  administrative, 
rather  than  to  a  legislative  control,  and  in  which 
the  functions  of  administration  —  that  is,  skill  —  are 
distinguished  from  those  of  legislation,  that  is,  rep- 
resentation. Universal  suffrage  combined  ordina- 
rily with  a  general  ticket  and  election  by  plurality, 
with,  however,  a  longer  residence  qualification  for 
voters  than  is  usually  required  in  the  United 
States,  was  introduced  into  the  municipal  govern- 
ment in  1884,  and  so  far  it  cannot  be  said  that  it 
has  been  a  marked  failure.  Dr.  Shaw,  in  com- 
menting upon  its  effects  upon  the  councils  which 
ultimately  determine  the  municipal  policy,  as  well 
as  elect  city  executive  officers,  says,  that  "The 
municipal  councils  of  France  fairly  reflect  the 
prevailing  standards  of  personal  uprightness  and 
honesty,  and  in  large  towns,  as  well  as  in  smaller 
ones,  the  intelligence  of  the  community  is  very 
well  represented."  He  does,  however,  add  that 
the  effect  of  the  act  of  1884,  which  adopted  uni- 
versal suffrage,  "has  been  to  bring  in  a  larger 
number  of  workingmen's  representatives  in  the 
councils,  and  to  replace  the  more  conservative 
political  elements  by  extreme  radicals  and  social- 
ists." And  he  is  inclined  to  entertain  the  view 
that  "  in  the  present  decade  the  French  councils 
have  been  less  substantial  and  responsible  bodies 


IQ2  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

than  those  of  the  large  English  and  German  towns 
[where  universal  suffrage  does  not  obtain],  while 
far  superior  in  these  qualities  to  those  of  American 
cities  of  corresponding  size." 1 

1  Municipal  Government  in  Continental  Europe,  p.  180. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

MUNICIPAL    GOVERNMENT    AND    THE    NATIONAL 
POLITICAL    PARTIES 

*  AT  almost  every  meeting  which  is  held  at  the 
present  time  to  promote  the  cause  of  municipal 
reform,  it  is  claimed  that  the  interference  of  the 
national  and  state  political  parties  is  responsible 
for  a  large  part  of  the  admitted  evils  of  American 
municipal  government.  *  Clubs  and  associations 
have  been  formed  for  the  purpose  of  calling  atten- 
tion to  the  dangers  resulting  from  the  attitude 
assumed  by  these  political  parties.  One  of  the 
most  recent  state  constitutions  contains  an  article 
intended  to  sever  the  connection  which  exists  be- 
tween municipal  and  national  and  state  politics. 
This  is  fully  explained  by  the  address  of  the 
majority  delegates,  which  says:*"  We  seek  to  sep- 
arate in  the  larger  cities  municipal  elections  from 
state  and  national  elections,  to  the  end  that  the 
business  affairs  of  our  great  municipal  corporations 
may  be  managed  upon  their  own  merits,  uncon- 
trolled by  national  and  state  politics ;  and  to  the 
end,  also,  that  the  great  issues  of  national  and 
state  politics  may  be  determined  upon  their 
o  193 


IQ4  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

merits,  free  from  the  disturbing  and  often  demoral- 
izing effects  of  local  contests."*  Yet,  notwith- 
standing this  complete  recognition  of  the  evils 
resulting  from  the  attitude  of  the  national  political 
parties,  with  the  exception  of  the  adoption  of  the 
remedy  proposed  in  separate  municipal  elections, 
municipal  reformers  have  for  the  most  part  con- 
tented themselves  with  expatiating  upon  the  evils 
of  our  present  conditions,  and  in  calling  upon  both 
all  good  citizens  to  decide  municipal  issues  frere 
from  party  prejudice,  and  the  political  parties  to 
keep  their  hands  off  of  municipal  government. 
But  the  habit  of  determining  municipal  questions 
in  accordance  with  party  considerations  is  at  pres- 
ent too  fixed  in  our  political  life  to  permit  of 
success  following  this  method  of  action.  The 
municipal  election  of  1894  in  New  York  is  a  good 
example  of  this  fact.  The  successful  party  at  this 
election  was  nominally  a  municipal  party.  Its 
platform  laid  great  emphasis  on  the  divorce  of 
municipal  questions  from  state  and  national  party 
considerations.  It  was  in  reality,  however,  a  com- 
bination of  one  of  the  national  political  parties  with 
factions  of  the  other  national  political  party,  and 
of  organizations  small  in  numbers  and  weak  in  real 
voting  strength  which  were  really  based  on  the 
"  non-partisan "  idea,  as  it  is  called.  Notwith- 
standing the  platform  of  the  party  and  its  nomi- 
nally "non-partisan"  character,  its  subsequent  be- 
havior, both  in  its  nominations,  and  in  most  of  the 


NATIONAL  POLITICAL  PARTIES  195 

appointments  made  by  its  nominees  who  were  after- 
wards elected,  and  the  subsequent  attitude  of  the 
majority  of  the  people  of  the  city  of  New  York  as 
seen  in  the  elections  of  1895,  showed  most  clearly 
that  at  the  present  time  the  idea  of  a  municipal 
party,  uninfluenced  by  national  and  state  partisan 
considerations,  had  not  been  clearly  grasped. 

The  questions  may  well  be  asked,  why  is  it  that 
the  national  parties,  and  the  people  as  well,  feel  so 
strongly  that  the  interests  of  political  parties  must 
be  given  consideration,  even  to  the  detriment  of 
the  local  affairs  of  the  cities  ?  Can  we  devise  any 
system  of  municipal  government  which  will  make 
the  cities  a  less  attractive  field  for  exploitation  for 
the  political  parties  ?  In  the  first  place,  why  does 
municipal  government  offer  such  attractions  to  the 
national  political  parties,  and  why  are  the  people 
in  the  cities  governed  in  their  decisions  of  mu- 
nicipal questions  by  party  considerations  ?  The 
reasons  are  three  in  number :  The  first  to  be  men- 
tioned  is  to  be  found  in  the  position  assigned  by 
the  American  law  and  practice  to  the  city.  The 
American  city  is,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  a  most 
important  agent  of  central  government.  Our 
American  principles  of  local  self-government,  and 
our  desire  to  avoid  complexity  in  administrative 
machinery,  have  brought  it  about  that  most  matters 
of  even  general  interest  are  attended  to  by  the 
local  corporations.  In  the  case  of  the  county  and 
the  town,  which  have  comparatively  few  interests 


196  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

peculiar  to  themselves,  the  principle  of  decentral- 
ized administration  works  reasonably  well.  The 
legislature  being  controlled  by  the  same  general 
class  of  people  who  control  the  administration  of 
the  law,  namely  the  rural  population,  the  laws 
which  are  passed  by  the  legislature  reflect  pretty 
clearly  the  desires  of  the  people,  and  there  is  little 
chance  of  conflict  between  the  wishes  of  the  people 
of  the  state  as  a  whole,  and  the  wishes  of  the 
people  in  any  particular  non-urban  locality.  Cen- 
tralization in  legislation  and  decentralization  in 
administration  of  that  legislation  do  not  result  in 
conflict.  In  the  case  of  the  cities,  also,  the  at- 
tempt has  been  made  to  apply  the  same  ideas. 
Cities  attend  to  the  administration  of  a  host  of 
matters  of  general  state  concern  like  the  preserva- 
.tion  of  the  peace,  the  care  of  the  poor,  the  man- 
agement of  the  schools,  the  administration  of 
excise  legislation.  In  some  cases  the  county  and 
•  town  have  been  consolidated  in  the  city  organiza- 
tion in  order  to  avoid  the  necessity  of  keeping  up 
two  systems  of  administration.  In  the  case  of  the 
cities,  however,  the  original  determination  of  the 
policy  with  regard  to  these  matters  of  general  in- 
terest is  made  by  a  population  having  little  con- 
ception of  urban  needs  and  little  patience  with  the 
desires  of  the  urban  population.  Legislative  local 
option  is  persistently  denied  to  the  cities.  Where 
special  regulation  is  necessary,  that  is  obtained  by 
special  legislation  passed  by  the  central  legislature. 


NATIONAL  POLITICAL  PARTIES  197 

The  only  way  in  which  the  city  population  as  such 
can  exercise  any  decisive  influence  over  many 
subjects  is  through  the  election  of  municipal  offi- 
cers. This  influence  is,  however,  a  potent  one,  for 
our  decentralized  administrative  system  predicates 
an  almost  complete  absence  of  central  control ; 
the  administration  of  the  law  by  centrally  uncon- 
trolled municipal  authorities.  These  authorities 
may  administer  the  law  with  great  discretion,  with 
so  much  discretion,  in  fact,  as  entirely  to  alter  its 
character  as  a  rule  of  conduct  to  be  observed  by 
the  citizen.  So  long  as  this  is  true,  state  parties 
which  are  formed  for  the  purpose  (of  advocating 
and  adopting  some  general  principle  must  have 
an  enormous  interest  in  making  their  influence 
felt  in  the  choice  of  municipal  officers.  Thus  take 
the  matter  about  which  there  has  been  so  much 
discussion  recently  in  New  York,  i.e.  the  Sunday 
closing  of  liquor  saloons.  So  long  as  that  is  a 
matter  of  local  determination,  —  and  it  is  under  a 
system  of  centrally  uncontrolled  local  administra- 
tion of  the  excise  law, — the  state  parties  have  a 
vital  interest  in  municipal  administration.  No  one 
who  recalls  the  enthusiasm  excited  at  the  Republi- 
can state  convention  of  1895,  by  tne  resolution 
committing  the  party  to  Sunday  closing  through- 
out the  state,  can  fail  to  admit  that  the  Republican 
party  believes  it  has  an  interest  in  bringing  about 
Sunday  closing  in  the  cities.  No  one  can  blame 
it,  therefore,  for  striving  to  make  its  influence  felt 


198  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

in  the  administration  of  the  law  providing  for 
Sunday  closing  even  if  the  administration  of  that 
law  is  entrusted  to  municipal  authorities.  So  it 
is  with  all  these  matters  of  state  concern.  If 
left  to  uncontrolled  municipal  administration,  they 
are  sure  to  cause  political  parties  to  interfere  in 
municipal  government. 

Further,  a  decentralized  system  of  administra- 
tion, in  accordance  with  which  cities  or  their 
officers  are  made  agents  of  state  government, 
often  results  in  making  the  interference  of  the 
state  parties  necessary  from  something  more  than 
the  mere  theoretical  interest  which  they  may  have 
in  the  adoption  and  application  of  the  general 
principles  on  which  they  are  founded.  If  the  city 
or  its  officers  are,  for  example,  given  the  control 
and  management  of  state  and  national  elections, 
the  state  political  parties  cannot  be  blamed  if  they 
insist  on  having  something  to  say  with  regard  to 
the  filling  of  the  offices  controlling  elections.  More 
than  once  state  and  even  national  questions  have 
been  influenced,  if  not  decided,  by  the  voters  of  the 
cities ;  and  more  than  once  it  has  been  claimed  that 
frauds  by  municipal  officers  in  the  vote  on  state  or 
national  questions  have  contributed  to  the  result. 
Once,  certainly,  namely,  in  1868,  the  suspicion  of 
fraud  was  so  great  that  Congress  instituted  an  in- 
vestigation of  the  matter,  while  for  a  long  time 
after  1868  it  was  so  thoroughly  convinced  that 
fraud  had  been  generally  committed  by  the  local 


NATIONAL  POLITICAL  PARTIES  199 

authorities,  that  it  provided  a  system  of  federal 
supervision  of  elections,  though  recently  this 
system  has  been  abolished.  So  long,  therefore, 
as  the  result  of  our  decentralized  system  of  ad- 
ministration is  the  control  by  the  municipality  of 
matters  of  general  interest,  that  is,  the  local  ad- 
ministration of  general  laws,  so  long  must  we 
expect  national  and  state  political  parties  to  take 
an  interest  in  municipal  government. 

Is  it  possible  now  to  remove  the  temptation  for 
political  parties  to  interfere  in  municipal  govern- 
ment by  having  the  state  government  take  into 
its  own  hands  the  management  of  those  matters 
which  do  not  affect  the  city  primarily,  but  are  of 
interest  to  the  state  as  a  whole?  Undoubtedly 
something  may  be  done  in  this  direction.  Indeed, 
in  the  state  of  New  York  something  of  this  sort 
has  very  recently  been  done.  Thus  the  assump- 
tion by  the  state  of  the  care  of  pauper  lunatics 
and  the  relieving  of  the  localities  of  all  control 
over  this  branch  of  administration  was  a  step  in 
this  direction.  This  step  was  due,  not  so  much  to 
any  feeling  for  the  cities,  as  to  the  belief  that  this 
subject  of  administrative  activity  was  not  gener- 
ally being  properly  attended  to  by  the  localities. 
We  have  a  more  recent  instance  of  the  assump- 
tion by  the  state  administration  of  duties  formerly 
attended  to  by  the  cities  and  localities  generally. 
This  is  seen  in  the  much-talked-of  Raines  Excise 
Law,  which  is  executed  by  a  series  of  state  agents, 


2OO  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

controlled  at  Albany.  Unquestionably  further 
steps  in  the  same  direction  might  be  taken, 
which  would  not  only  make  the  state  political 
parties  less  anxious  to  interfere  with  the  affairs 
of  the  cities  and  localities  generally,  but  would 
also  result  in  better  administration.  Thus  the 
matter  of  prisons  and  jails  is  distinctly  a  part  of 
central  and  not  local  administration.  Further,  in 
other  cases,  while  it  might  be  advisable  to  retain 
local  management,  such  local  management  might 
be  subjected  to  a  more  effectual  central  control. 
Education  and  sanitation  are  matters  which  should 
be  managed  upon  a  uniform  plan.  The  preserva- 
tion of  the  peace  is  also  really  a  function  of 
central  rather  than  of  local  government;  and 
while  the  localities  might  profitably  be  given 
certain  powers  regarding  it,  they  should,  in  a 
properly  organized  system  of  administration,  be 
subject  to  some  central  administrative  control. 
But  it  is  unquestionably  true  that  there  are  many 
matters  of  general  interest  now  attended  to  by 
cities  in  regard  to  which  they  always  should  have 
large  powers.  Such  an  one,  for  example,  is  the 
matter  of  elections.  The  world  over,  where  elec- 
tions are  held,  they  are  largely  in  the  hands  of  the 
local  bodies ;  for  where  party  feeling  is  strong,  if 
the  election  machinery  is  centralized,  the  party 
controlling  the  central  organization  can  register 
its  will  much  more  easily  than  where  the  control 
of  elections  is  left  in  the  hands  of  the  locality. 


NATIONAL  POLITICAL  PARTIES  2OI 

There  may  be  election  frauds  under  the  system 
of  local  control  of  elections ;  but,  taking  the  state 
as  a  whole,  these  are  apt  to  counterbalance  each 
other,  and  the  total  result  for  the  state  is  more  apt 
to  be  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  electors 
than  under  a  system  of  administrative  centraliza- 
tion. One  cannot  read  the  debates  of  Congress 
at  the  time  of  the  recent  repeal  of  the  Federal 
Election  Law,  without  being  convinced  that  this 
consideration  had  an  important  bearing  on  the 
final  result  of  the  deliberations.  It  is  thus  advis- 
able, if  not  necessary,  that  the  control  of  the  elec- 
tion machinery  should  be  in  the  hands  of  the 
localities.1  Such,  further,  has  been  the  solution  of 
this  problem  in  almost  every  municipal  system.  In 
England,  France,  and  Germany  city  officers  have 
very  important  functions  to  discharge  relative  to 
state  elections,  both  in  superintending  the  making 
of  the  voting  lists  and  in  watching  over  the  cast- 
ing of  the  votes,  and  in  their  canvassing.  It  would 
seem  thus  that  we  must  of  necessity  reconcile 
ourselves  to  the  conclusion  that  cities  must,  to  a 
degree  at  any  rate,  remain  as  they  are  at  present, 
the  agents  of  the  general  state  government.  The 

1  If  this  is  not  the  method  provided,  some  method  of  special 
local  elections  for  filling  the  position  of  local  election  officers,  simi- 
lar to  the  one  provided  in  the  New  York  system  for  the  rural  dis- 
tricts, must  be  adopted.  But,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  one  of  the 
greatest  evils  of  our  present  system  of  government  is  the  super- 
abundance of  officers  to  be  elected.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the 
localities. 


202  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

consequent  temptation  to  the  interference  of  politi- 
cal parties  in  municipal  affairs,  while  it  may  be 
somewhat  diminished  by  reducing  the  sphere  of 
state  agency  of  cities,  will  always  exist. 

In  the  second  place,  the  temptation  of  the  politi- 
cal parties  to  interfere  in  municipal  government 
has  been  increased  by  the  existence  of  the  spoils 
system.  The  distribution  of  the  spoils  of  munici- 
pal office  has  been  regarded  as  a  legitimate  means 
of  strengthening  the  state  and  national  political 
parties.  The  spoils  of  municipal  office  have  indeed 
assumed  greater  importance  than  they  formerly  had, 
as  a  result  of  the  fact  that  the  opportunity  for  en- 
joying the  spoils  of  national  and  in  New  York 
state  office  also,  has,  owing  to  the  adoption  of  the 
Civil  Service  Acts  and  Rules,  been  much  abridged. 
A  conviction  that  the  spoils  system  was  responsible 
for  many  of  the  evils  of  municipal  government  led 
to  the  attempt  made  in  many  instances,  previous  to 
the  beginning  of  the  Civil  Service  Reform  move- 
ment, to  limit  the  number  of  offices  at  the  dispo- 
sition of  the  victorious  political  party.  Thus,  we 
often  find  in  city  charters  provisions  adopting  a 
merit  system  of  appointment  for  policemen  and 
firemen.  These  provisions  were,  it  is  true,  so 
crude  as  to  be  of  little  value,  except  as  showing 
the  conviction  of  the  people,  as  represented  in  the 
legislature,  that  the  spoils  system  was  an  evil. 
The  quite  common  provisions  giving  the  members 
of  the  fire  and  police  departments  a  more  perma- 


NATIONAL  POLITICAL  PARTIES  203 

nent  tenure  of  office  than  was  assured  to  the  em- 
ployees in  other  departments  are  greater  evidence 
of  the  desire  to  break  up  the  spoils  system.  In 
the  New  York  charter  of  1873  a  similar  perma- 
nent tenure  was  adopted  for  the  regular  clerks 
and  heads  of  bureaus.  The  Civil  Service  Reform 
movement  has  aided  in  the  extension  of  the  idea, 
though,  with  the  exception  of  the  states  of  New 
York  and  Massachusetts  and  a  few  cities  in  other 
states,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  merit  system 
of  appointment  has  been  generally  adopted.  A 
further  extension  of  the  system  ought  to  have 
much  influence,  not  only  in  bettering  city  gov- 
ernment, but  in  decreasing  the  temptation  of 
the  national  and  state  political  parties  to  inter- 
fere in  municipal  government.  It  is,  however,  to 
be  noticed  that  while  the  Civil  Service  Reform 
movement  has  had  a  most  marked  influence  in  im- 
proving the  national  administration,  its  adoption 
in  the  cities,  particularly  in  the  cities  of  the  state 
of  New  York,  has  not  had  the  success  which  was 
expected  of  it.  Mr.  James  C.  Carter  calls  atten- 
tion to  this  fact  in  his  excellent  address  as  presi- 
dent of  the  National  Municipal  League,  at  a  recent 
meeting  of  that  body.  He  says  the  execution  of 
the  Federal  Civil  Service  Rules  "  devolves  on  the 
President  himself  and  the  heads  of  Departments, 
always  men  of  high  personal  character  and  who 
are  deeply  interested  in  making  them  effective  in 
order  to  save  themselves  from  intolerable  vexation 


2O4  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

and  hostile  criticism.  No  party  can  now  take  on 
itself  the  odium  of  a  large  profligate  partisan 
use  of  federal  patronage.  It  is  otherwise  in  the 
matter  of  municipal  patronage.  No  such  public 
watchfulness  and  criticism  are  exercised."  Does 
not  the  mere  statement  of  these  different  condi- 
tions suggest  the  remedy  ?  If  the  workings  of 
municipal  Civil  Service  Commissions  are  not  sub- 
jected to  public  criticism  because  of  their  obscu- 
rity, can  we  not  obtain  the  desired  result  by  putting 
the  administration  of  the  Civil  Service  laws,  as  has 
been  done  in  Massachusetts,  by  the  Civil  Service 
Law  of  1884,  in  the  hands  of  a  State  Civil  Service 
Commission  ?  It  is  easier  to  watch  the  doings  of 
one  body  than  those  of  a  score  or  more.  It  is 
easier,  also,  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  one  au- 
thority than  on  a  score  of  authorities.  If  there  is  a 
constitutional  objection  to  centralizing  the  admin- 
istration of  the  Civil  Service  laws,  as  there  might 
be  under  a  constitutional  provision  assuring  to  the 
localities  the  right  to  elect,  directly  or  indirectly, 
their  own  officers,  the  grant  to  the  State  Civil  Ser- 
vice Commission  of  large  powers  of  control  and 
supervision  over  local  commissions,  while  reserving 
to  the  local  commissions  the  power  to  administer 
the  law,  would  not  be  open  to  the  same  objection. 
This  was,  indeed,  proposed  by  the  Civil  Service 
Bill  drawn  up  by  the  New  York  Civil  Service 
Reform  Association,  and  laid  before  the  legisla- 
ture of  New  York  during  the  session  of  1896. 


NATIONAL  POLITICAL  PARTIES  205 

Mr.  Carter  seems  to  think  that  the  plan  of  vesting 
the  administration  of  the  Civil  Service  laws  in  a 
State  Commission  "  is  contrary  to  just  principles 
of  municipal  government,  and  affords  little  prom- 
ise of  success."  It  can,  however,  easily  be  shown 
that  the  administration  of  Civil  Service  laws  ap- 
plicable to  municipalities  by  a  state  board  is  no 
more  contrary  to  "just  principles  of  municipal 
government"  than  is  the  determination  of  the 
qualifications  of  municipal  officers  by  the  state 
legislature.  For,  as  has  so  frequently  been  pointed 
out,  uncontrolled  local  administration  of  general 
legislation  practically  gives  local  authorities  a  veto 
power  over  such  legislation.  What  the  state  has 
the  right  to  enact  into  law,  it  ought  to  have  the 
right  to  execute  as  law.  If  we  therefore  admit 
that  Civil  Service  laws  affecting  cities,  both  those 
introducing  appointment  for  merit,  and  those  at- 
tempting to  give  municipal  officers  a  tenure  during 
good  behavior,  are  proper,  we  must  also  admit 
that  their  administration  by  a  state  board  is  also 
proper.  That  the  central  administration  of  mu- 
nicipal Civil  Service  laws  "  affords  little  promise  of 
success  "  is  a  statement  which  the  success  of  Mas- 
sachusetts, where  Civil  Service  laws  affecting  cities 
are  thus  administered,  goes  far  to  disprove.  It  is 
indeed  true,  that  in  England  the  whole  matter  is 
left  to  the  cities  to  regulate  ;  but  on  the  other  hand, 
in  Prussia  the  qualifications  of  many  municipal 
officers,  including  some  who  hold  positions  of 


206  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

great  discretion,  are  determined  by  state  legisla- 
tion which  is  administered  also  by  officers  of  the 
central  government.1 

It  is  believed  that  the  attractions  to  interference 
by  the  political  parties  in  city  government  may  be 
somewhat  diminished,  both  by  a  further  centraliza- 
tion of  state  administration  and  by  the  abolition 
of  the  spoils  system.  Can  the  opportunities  for 
such  interference  also  be  removed  ?  It  has  been 
shown  that  one  of  the  great  opportunities  for  such 
interference  is  to  be  found  in  the  relation  of  the 
cities  to  the  state  legislature,  which,  of  necessity, 
must  always  be  controlled  by  state  and  national 
political  parties.  Anything  which  will  alter  that 
relation  so  as  to  free  the  cities  from  the  continual 
exercise  of  central  legislative  control  through  spe- 
cial legislation,  ought  to  diminish  greatly  the  op- 
portunity of  the  national  and  state  political  parties 
to  interfere  in  municipal  politics.  Particularly 
would  the  taking  out  of  the  hands  of  the  legisla- 
ture the  regulation  of  the  detailed  administrative 
organization  of  municipalities  have  that  result. 
For  so  long  as  the  view  is  entertained  that  the 
spoils  of  municipal  office  may  be  legitimately  used 
to  strengthen  the  state  parties,  so  long  is  the  exer- 
cise by  the  legislature  of  the  power  to  rearrange 
and  change  details  in  city  organizations  extremely 
dangerous,  —  dangerous  because  it  is  so  frequently 
made  use  of  for  party  ends.  The  exercise  of  this 

1  Leidig,  op.  cit.,  pp.  113,  115  ;   Loaning,  op.  cit.,  p.  177. 


NATIONAL  POLITICAL  PARTIES  2O/ 

power  by  the  legislature  is  not  only  dangerous, 
it  also  makes  impossible  the  consideration  of  the 
problem  of  municipal  organization,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  scientific  theory.  If  a  commission  ap- 
pointed for  the  study  of  a  municipal  problem  is 
constituted,  as  it  not  uncommonly  is,  not  of  persons 
who,  by  reason  of  education  or  practical  experience, 
are  fitted  for  the  solution  of  the  problem,  but  of 
those  from  whom  the  greatest  partisan  political 
benefits  may  be  expected  by  the  party  in  power  in 
the  legislature,  what  hope  can  we  entertain  that 
municipal  problems  will  be  solved?  The  people 
of  the  cities  who,  as  municipal  voters,  do  not  care 
much  about  party  politics,  but  do  sincerely  wish 
their  cities  might  be  well  governed,  often  suspect 
the  motives  of  such  commissions :  and,  feeling  as 
they  do,  take  little  or  no  interest  in  what  is  done 
by  them,  and  by  the  legislature  at  their  suggestion. 
Measures  of  the  utmost  local  importance  have  been 
in  the  past  frequently  rushed  through  the  legisla- 
ture without  attracting  much  attention  in  the  locali- 
ties whose  interests  are  fundamentally  affected  by 
them.  The  influence  of  political  parties  through 
their  power  in  the  legislature  over  the  details  of 
municipal  organization  is  undoubtedly  responsible 
for  many  of  the  anomalies  which  we  find  in  munici- 
pal charters.  The  student  of  municipal  govern- 
ment, on  seeing  them,  is  compelled  to  ask  himself, 
not  what  was  the  theory  at  the  bottom  of  this  or 
that  provision,  but  what  party  was  in  control  of 


2O8  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

the  legislature  which  adopted  it,  and  what  it  hoped 
to  gain  by  its  adoption.  So  long  as  the  legislature 
exercises  habitually  such  powers  over  municipalities, 
so  long  must  we  expect  that  no  consistent  theory 
will  be  followed  in  the  organization  of  our  munici- 
pal government,  but  that  it  will  be  governed  en- 
tirely by  the  exigencies  of  party  politics. 

In  the  -second  place,  our  present  system  of  elec- 
tions would  seem  to  favor  the  interference  of  the 
political  parties  in  municipal  government.  This  is 
due  particularly  to  the  fact  that  the  elective  princi- 
ple is  so  generally  employed  for  the  filling  of  of- 
fices, both  state  and  municipal.  Mr.  S.  R.  Moffett1 
says,  that  "whenever  a  citizen  of  San  Francisco 
goes  to  the  polls,  he  is  required  to  assist  in  filling 
from  sixty  to  eighty  different  offices,  and  is  obliged 
to  select  from  among  about  300  candidates." 
While  the  citizen  of  San  Francisco  is  probably 
worse  off,  in  this  respect,  than  the  citizen  of  many 
other  cities,  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  usual 
demands  made  at  the  polls  of  even  intelligent  mu- 
nicipal voters  are  too  great.  No  man  can  be 
expected  in  busy  city  life,  with  its  lack  of  neigh- 
borhood feeling,  personally  to  acquaint  himself 
with  the  merits  of  the  various  candidates,  but  of 
necessity  relies  upon  the  state  or  national  party 
which  reflects  most  clearly  his  opinions,  and  votes 
the  straight  ticket  of  that  party.  If  he  scratches 
his  ballot,  he  scratches  only  a  party  candidate, 

1  Suggestions  on  Government^  p.  90. 


NATIONAL  POLITICAL  PARTIES  209 

about  whom  he  has  been  able,  without  great  ex- 
penditure of  time  and  effort,  to  learn  something. 

It  has  been  hoped  also  by  separating  local  from 
state  and  national  elections  to  give  the  voter  a 
better  opportunity  to  allow  municipal  considera- 
tions to  control  in  the  choice  of  municipal  officers.1 
Several  methods  have  been  devised  for  such  a 
separation.  One  is  to  provide  that  municipal  elec- 
tions shall  take  place  at  a  different  time  of  the 
year  from  the  general  elections.  This  has  been 
done  very  generally  in  the  case  of  the  smaller  cities, 
and  such  an  arrangement  is  the  common  one  in  the 
rural  districts.  In  the  rural  districts  the  plan  has 
been  reasonably  successful.  Competent  officers 
are  commonly  elected,  and  are  often  kept  in  office 
during  long  terms,  although  it  must  be  admitted 
that  even  the  town  elections  are  influenced  con- 
siderably by  political  considerations,  and  are  almost 
universally,  especially  in  times  of  great  political 
excitement,  regarded  as  straws  which  indicate 
the  way  the  political  winds  are  blowing.2  In  the 
smaller  cities  having  local  spring  elections,  as  in 
the  towns,  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  local  ques- 

1  See  the  Address  of  Majority  Delegates,  already  cited,  p.  193. 

2  The  success  of  universal  suffrage  and  majority  rule  in  the  rural 
towns,  notwithstanding  the  influence  on  local  elections   of  state 
politics,  would  seem  to  show  that  neither  system  is  inherently  bad. 
The  success  of  universal  suffrage  in  rural  local  elections  is  undoubt- 
edly due  to  the  fact  of  the  feeling  of  neighborhood  and  to  the  very 
general  knowledge   every  one  in  the  community  has  of  all  the 
candidates. 


210  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

tions  are  not  decided  exclusively  in  accordance  with 
political  considerations.  But  in  most  of  the  larger 
cities  where  local  spring  elections  have  been  pro- 
vided, as,  for  example,  they  were  once  provided  in 
New  York  city,  they  have  been  abandoned  for  the 
very  reason  that  political  considerations  seemed 
under  such  a  condition  of  things  to  have  even  a 
greater  influence  than  under  the  system  of  general 
elections.1  The  reason  for  the  failure  of  such  a 
method  of  municipal  spring  elections  to  prevent 
the  interference  of  national  politics  in  municipal 
affairs  is  alleged  to  be  the  impossibility  of  getting 
out  a  large  vote  at  that  time  of  the  year,  particu- 
larly if  the  citizens  are  called  upon  to  vote  at  a 
general  election  in  the  autumn.  People,  it  is  said, 
are  too  busy  in  a  large  city  to  give  up  the  time 
to  register  and  vote  more  than  once  a  year. 
Another  method  of  separate  elections  has  been 
tried  in  Boston,  and  consists  in  the  provision  that 
the  municipal  election  shall  take  place  one  month 
after  the  state  election,  use  being  made  at  the 
municipal  election  of  the  register  for  state  elec- 
tions. Such  a  method  has  the  advantage  of 
making  two  separate  registrations  of  the  voters 
unnecessary.  But  while  in  some  instances  the 
change  of  votes  has  been  quite  striking,  it  can 
hardly  be  said  that  this  method  has  resulted  in 
preventing  political  parties  from  having  great  in- 

1  See  Bryce,  American  Commonwealth,  last  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  627, 
Note  2. 


NATIONAL  POLITICAL  PARTIES  211 

fluence  in  municipal  elections.1  The  third  method 
has  been  provided  in  the  recent  New  York  con- 
stitution, which  has,  roughly  speaking,  provided 
for  municipal  elections  on  odd  numbered  years, 
and  for  state  elections  on  even  numbered  years. 
The  most  important  exception  to  this  rule  is  to  be 
found  in  the  case  of  the  members  of  the  Assembly, 
who  are  elected  each  year.  This  method  of  sepa- 
rate municipal  elections  has  the  advantage  of  not 
making  as  large  a  demand  on  the  time  of  voters 
in  the  large  cities  as  do  both  of  the  other  methods 
described.  It  has,  however,  the  disadvantage  of 
not  so  clearly  distinguishing  municipal  from  state 
elections.  How  it  will  work  can  be  determined 
only  after  further  experience.  That  it  will  do 
some  good  is  hoped.  That  it  will  cause  inter- 
ference in  municipal  elections  by  political  parties 
entirely  to  cease  cannot  be  expected. 

It  would  seem  that  more  is  to  be  expected  from 
diminishing  the  sphere  of  the  city  as  an  agent  of 
the  state  government,  from  decreasing  the  spoils 
of  municipal  office  to  be  enjoyed,  and  from  dimin- 
ishing the  number  of  municipal  officers  to  be 
elected.  Much  has  been  accomplished  already, 
so  far  as  the  last  point  is  concerned,  in  most  of 
the  large  cities.  That  the  step  has  not  accom- 
plished as  much  as  might  be  hoped  is  due,  un- 
doubtedly, in  large  part  to  the  fact  that  the  spoils 
of  municipal  office  offer  to  political  parties  almost 

1  See  Matthews,  op.  cit.t  p.  178. 


212  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

as  much  temptation  now  as  ever.  But  while  some 
good  is  to  be  expected  from  all  of  these  changes 
which  have  been  proposed,  we  cannot  really  hope 
that  the  political  parties  will  ever  be  driven  out  of 
the  field.  Even  in  England,  where  the  city  is  less 
than  almost  anywhere  else  an  agent  of  state  gov- 
ernment, and  where,  when  an  agent  of  state 
government,  it  is  subjected  to  a  strong  central 
administrative  control,  where  the  spoils  system 
has  no  appreciable  influence,  and  where  few 
officers  are  to  be  elected,  there  are  no  municipal 
parties  to  speak  of.  Mr.  Chalmers l  says :  "  In 
the  great  majority  of  boroughs  the  elections  are 
governed  by  considerations  of  party  politics.  A 
municipal  election  is  regarded  as  a  means  of  feel- 
ing the  political  pulse  of  the  inhabitants,  and  purely 
local  considerations  have  but  little  influence  on  the 
results."2  Dr.  Shaw  points  out,  however,  while 
admitting  that  "  in  recent  municipal  elections  .  .  . 
party  issues  have  been  introduced  to  a  quite  un- 
precedented extent  ...  by  the  unwonted  employ- 
ment of  the  occasion  for  testing  the  strength  on 
the  Home  Rule  question," 3  that  the  council, 
which  consists  of  almost  the  only  elected  munici- 
pal officials  in  the  system,  is  quite  a  permanent 
body,  its  members  being  re-elected  term  after  term 

1  Local  Government,  p.  76. 

2  Such  is  also  the  case  in  at  least  one  Prussian  city.    Leclerc,  La 
Vie  Municipals  en  Prusse,  p.  27. 

3  Municipal  Government  in  Great  Britain,  p.  47. 


NATIONAL   POLITICAL  PARTIES  21$ 

without  even  a  contest.  This  is  said  to  be  particu- 
larly true  of  the  smaller  cities.  One  reason  for 
the  continuance  of  members  of  the  council  for  so 
long  a  term  in  office  may  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
the  idea  of  rotation  in  office  has  never  taken  root 
in  England.  Another  reason  of  this  phenomenon, 
as  well  as  of  the  fact  that  so  many  new  candidates 
receive  no  opposition,  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact 
that  the  English  method  of  nomination  does  not 
make  the  primary  meeting  and  the  party  machine, 
with  all  their  acknowledged  abuses,  necessary,  any 
qualified  citizen  being  practically  at  liberty  to  offer 
himself  as  candidate  subject  to  the  obligation  of 
paying  his  share  of  the  expense  of  printing  the 
ballots,  while  the  system  of  election  does  not  make 
even  a  poll  necessary,  the  law  permitting  the 
returning  officer  to  declare  a  candidate  elected, 
provided  no  one  runs  against  him.  English  aris- 
tocratic traditions  make  it  much  easier  for  the 
party,  which  has  nowhere  greater  influence,  to  be 
governed  from  above  without  the  intervention  of 
the  primary  meeting,  an  apparently  democratic 
institution,  but  in  reality  the  tool  of  the  party 
machine. 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  to  be  useless  to  look 
forward  to  the  time  when  the  state  and  national 
political  parties  will  cease  to  have  an  influence  in 
deciding  municipal  issues.  Indeed,  many  consider 
the  present  system  not  only  necessary  but  of  ad- 
vantage, believing  that  in  the  cities,  where  the 


214  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

distinctions  of  class  are  more  clear  cut  than  else- 
where, the  cleavage  of  distinctively  municipal 
parties  would  be  along  social  and  class  rather  than 
along  political  lines,  as  they  have  been  in  London, 
the  only  one  of  the  English  cities  which  has  de- 
veloped distinctively  municipal  parties.1  But  we 
may  justly  hope  that  a  decrease  of  the  functions 
of  central  government  discharged  by  cities,  or 
the  subjection  of  the  discharge  of  such  functions 
to  greater  central  administrative  control,  and  the 
abandonment  of  the  spoils  system,  will  diminish 
the  attractions  of  municipal  government  for  the 
national  and  state  political  parties,  while  an  in- 
crease in  local  autonomy,  particularly  so  far  as 
the  power  to  arrange  the  details  of  municipal 
organization  is  concerned,  and  a  reduction  in  the 
number  of  elective  officers,  will  lessen  the  oppor- 
tunities of  political  parties  to  exploit  municipal 
government  for  their  own  purposes.  Freed  from 
many  of  their  functions  of  central  government, 
and  able  to  decide  municipal  questions  more  in 
accordance  with  local  considerations,  our  cities 
should  be  able,  if  properly  organized,  to  attend 
to  their  own  affairs  much  more  intelligently  and 
much  more  efficiently  than  they  have  been  able 
to  in  the  immediate  past.  In  the  following  chap- 
ters the  attempt  will  be  made  to  ascertain  the 
proper  form  of  organization  for  the  American  city. 

1  See  Matthews,  op.  cit.,  p.  178. 


CHAPTER    IX 

THE   CITY   COUNCIL 

FINALLY,  the  position  of  the  city  has  an  impor- 
tant influence  on  the  form  of  its  organization.  Be- 
ing in  theory  an  organ  for  the  satisfaction  of  local 
needs,  the  city  should  have  a  body  representative 
of  its  political  population  which  should  have  the 
power  to  determine  its  local  policy.  Not  only  is 
this  true  from  the  point  of  view  of  theory,  it  is 
also  the  teaching  of  experience.  One  of  the  prin- 
ciples at  the  basis  of  municipal  government  in 
England,  France,  and  Germany  is  that  very  large 
powers  of  determining  municipal  policy  are 
vested  in  such  a  representative  body,  which  is 
called  the  municipal  or  city  council^  However 
much  the  system  of  municipal  government  in  these 
different  countries  may  differ  one  from  the  other 
in  other  respects,  in  this  point  they  are  agreed. 
In  England  the  city  council  has  by  law  a  more 
important  position  than  in  either  France  or  Ger- 
many, discharging  what  in  theory  are  administra- 
tive or  executive  as  well  as  deliberative  or  legislative 
functions.  In  Germany  and  France  it  is  confined 
to  the  ^discharge  of  legislative  functions,  while  in 

215 


2l6  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

Germany,  further,  which  is  not  the  case  in  either 
France  or  England,  the  executive  has  a  large 
power  of  suspensive  veto  over  the  deliberations  of 
the  council,  to  be  overcome  only  by  an  appeal  to 
the  proper  authority  of  the  central  administration. 
But  in  all  three  countries  it  is  the  council  which  is 
mainly  to  determine  the  policy  of  the  city  govern- 
ment. Further,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the 
city  council  has  not  been  destroyed  in  the  United 
States,  except  in  a  few  instances  where,  while  it 
theoretically  exists,  it  is  little  more  than  a  name. 
It  is  true  that  everywhere  in  the  United  States 
it  has  lost  considerably  in  power.  As  has  been 
pointed  out,  it  has  been  robbed  of  many  functions 
which  have  enured  to  the  advantage  of  the  execu- 
tive departments  or  the  mayor,  who  has  almost 
everywhere  a  limited  veto  over  its  resolutions. 
The  legislature  haslalso  assumed  the  performance 
of  many  duties  which  the  council  formerly  attended 
to.  But  that  the  city  council  is  dead  in  the  Ameri- 
can municipal  organization,  or  that  it  is  even  gener- 
ally, at  the  present  time,  an  unimportant  authority 
in  the  United  States,  is  a  proposition  which  cannot 
be  entertained  for  a  moment.  In  so  far  as  the  plan 
of  incorporating  municipalities  by  general  acts, 
and  of  preventing  special  legislation  with  regard 
to  cities,  has  been  adopted  and  observed,  the 
powers  of  the  city  council  necessarily  tend  to  in- 
crease. Special  action  by  the  legislature  relative 
to  cities  being  impossible,  large  powers  must  be 


THE    CITY  COUNCIL  21? 

granted  by  the  legislature  in  its  general  acts  to  the 
municipal  council.  Take,  for  example,  the  Gen- 
eral Municipal  Corporations  Act  of  Illinois,  of  date 
April  10,  1872.  This  provides  that  the  council, 
which  consists  of  the  mayor  and  aldermen,  shall 
control  the  corporate  property  and  finances,  appro- 
priate money  and  levy  taxes,  not  to  exceed  certain 
limits,  for  city  expenses ;  may  levy  special  assess- 
ments and  borrow  money  not  to  exceed  five  per 
cent  of  the  tax  valuation,  may  construct  public 
buildings,  provide  for  wharves,  parks,  and  ceme- 
teries ;  has  the  control  of  the  streets,  but  may  not 
grant  street  railway  franchises  for  longer  than 
twenty  years;  may  exercise  large  police  and 
licensing  powers ;  and  has  almost  complete  control 
over  the  municipal  organization.  The  only  limita- 
tion on  its  power  of  organizing  the  official  force  of 
the  municipality  is  found  in  the  sections  of  the 
general  act  providing  that  certain  officers,  namely 
the  mayor,  clerk,  attorney,  and  treasurer,  are  to  be 
elected  by  the  people,  and  that  the  officers  for 
whom  the  council  may  provide  shall  be  appointed 
by  the  mayor  and  confirmed  by  the  council.  All 
appointed  officers  may  be  removed  by  the  mayor, 
but  the  council  may  restore  such  persons  to  office 
by  a  two-thirds  vote.  The  experience  of  Ohio,  to 
which  reference  has  already  been  made,  is  merely 
the  exception  that  proves  the  rule.  The  state  of 
Ohio  was  one  of  the  first,  if  not  the  first  state  in 
the  Union  to  provide  a  general  municipal  corpora- 


2l8  MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 

tions  act,  but,  as  has  been  shown,  the  courts  of  the 
state  have,  in  their  interpretation  of  the  constitu- 
tional provisions  making  such  action  on  the  part  of 
the  legislature  necessary,  had  such  a  narrow  con- 
ception of  a  special  act,  and  have  permitted  the 
legislature  to  make  such  a  minute  classification  of 
cities,  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  regime  of  Ohio 
is  really  one  of  special  incorporation.  The  legisla- 
ture has,  as  a  result,  passed  much  special  legisla- 
tion relative  to  cities,  and  where  the  cities  of  Ohio 
have  councils,  they  are,  in  many  cases,  almost 
devoid  of  power.  A  good  example  of  this  fact  is 
to  be  seen  in  the  organization  of  the  city  of  Cin- 
cinnati, where  most  of  the  work  of  the  city  is 
attended  to  by  the  mayor  and  various  executive 
boards.  Mr.  Charles  B.  Wilby,  in  an  article  on 
the  "Municipal  Condition  of  Cincinnati,"1  says, 
"  The  Board  of  Administration  [which  consists  of 
four  citizens  appointed  by  the  mayor],  aside  from 
the  power  vested  in  the  Police  Board,  transacts 
five-sixths  of  the  business  of  the  city.  Its  author- 
ity covers  that  given  to  the  Department  of  Works 
under  the  Cleveland  charter,  and  includes  many 
other  powers,  those  of  the  Board  of  Control,  In- 
firmary Directors,  Health  Department,  including 
the  appointment  of  the  Health  Officer,  Water 
Works  Trustees,"  etc.  He  says  again:  "The  other 
Boards  are  the  Board  of  Fire  Commissioners,  con- 

1  To  be  found  on  page  313  of  the  Proceedings  at  the  Conferences 
at  Minneapolis  and  Cleveland  for  Good  City  Government. 


THE    CITY  COUNCIL  219 

sisting  of  four  members,  the  Board  of  Supervisors, 
which  performs  the  duty  of  the  Tax  Commission, 
and  Board  of  Revision  and  Equalization,  consist- 
ing of  six  members.  All  of  these  minor  boards 
are  appointed  by  the  mayo :-."  1  In  the  new  charter 
of  Cleveland,  however,  the  council  has  been  given 
a  more  important  position,  having  the  power  to 
confirm  the  mayor's  appointments.2 

Not  only  thus  is  the  council  a  most  important 
organ  of  municipal  government  in  the  most  im- 
portant countries  of  Europe,  and  in  many  in- 
stances in  this  country,  where  it  also  appears  to 
be  growing  in  importance  in  so  far  as  the  idea  of 
general  municipal  corporations  acts  and  the  pre- 
vention of  special  legislation  has  been  adopted, 
but  it  is  also  true  that  the  municipal  reformers  of 
the  present  time  seem  to  be  in  many  instances  in 
favor  of  a  partial,  at  any  rate,  rehabilitation  of  the 
city  council.3 

But  whatever  may  be  the  condition  of  the  cities 

1  Such,   also,  is  the  condition  of  the  city  of  Columbus.      See 
article  of  Mr.  Williams,  on  the  "  Municipal  Conditions  of  Colum- 
bus," Ibid.  p.  323. 

2  See   Blandin,   "Municipal   Government   of  Cleveland,"   Ibid. 
p.  114. 

3  See  an  able  plea  for  the  city  council,  by  Mr.  D.  F.  Simpson, 
in  an  article  on  the  "  Municipal  Government  of  Minneapolis,"  Ibid. 
p.  93,  where  attention  is  called  to  the  fact  that  the  present  govern- 
ment of  Minneapolis,  and  of  most  of  the  cities  in  the  world  which 
have  good  government,  gives  to  the  council  a  most  important  posi- 
tion  in   the  municipal  government.     See  also,  Devlin,  Municipal 
Reform  in  the  United  States,  p.  139. 


22O  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

of  the  world  in  this  respect,  the  municipal  council 
would  seem  to  be  absolutely  necessary  in  every 
system  of  municipal  government,  and  for  two  rea- 
sons: In  the  first  place,  as  has  been  intimated, 
local  municipal  autonomy  would  seem  to  be  impos^ 
sible  without  it.  There  are  many  powers  con- 
nected both  with  the  determination  of  municipal 
policy  and  the  carrying  out  continuously  of  that 
policy  when  once  determined  upon,  which  are  of 
a  legislative  character,  which,  in  other  words,  re- 
semble powers  that  throughout-  our  entire  system 
of  government  are  entrusted  to  a  deliberative  body. 
So  long  as  we  retain  our  present  ideas  of  govern- 
ment, they  will  never  be  entrusted  to  administra- 
tive officers  or  boards  composed  of  merely  a  few 
individuals  who  do  not  owe  their  election  to  the 
people,  who,  in  other  words,  are  not  representa- 
tive of  the  municipality.  If  the  municipal  council 
is  destroyed,  or  what  is  practically  the  same  thing, 
shorn  of  its  powers,  such  powers  will  not  be  con- 
ferred upon  administrative  officers  or  boards,  but 
will  be  exercised  by  the  legislature  of  the  state, 
which  is  generally  regarded  as  more  representative 
in  character  than  these  officers  or  boards  ever  can 
be.  The  destruction  of  the  municipal  council 
means,  therefore,  not  the  destruction  of  the  coun- 
cil or  representative  idea  of  government,  but 
merely  the  transfer  of  local  legislative  powers  to 
a  central  legislative  body.  The  more  important 
the  city  council,  the  less  important  is,  as  a  matter 


THE   CITY  COUNCIL  221 

of  fact,  the  position  of  the  legislature  as  the  organ 
which  is  to  determine  the  policy  of  the  municipal- 
ity. Therefore,  if  municipal  home  rule  or  local 
autonomy  is  of  any  importance,  we  must  reconcile 
ourselves  to  the  existence  of  the  city  council,  and 
must  set  to  work  to  organize  it  in  the  best  possible 
manner. 

In  the  second  place,  even  if  we  conclude  that 
municipal  home  rule  is  possible  without  a  council, 
even  if  we  regard  the  experience  of  both  Europe 
and  our  own  country  as  teaching  us  no  lesson  at 
all  on  this  point,  even  if  we  are  willing  to  base  our 
municipal  organization  on  principles  different  from 
those  which  obtain  in  all  other  parts  of  our  gov- 
ernment, —  even  if  we  concede  all  of  these  things, 
still  is  the  city  council  necessary  in  a  well-or- 
ganized system  of  municipal  government.  For 
one  of  the  principles  which  lie  at  the  foundation 
of  all  government  is  that  the  function  of  determin- 
ing the  policy,  which  we  may  denominate  politics, 
should  be  clearly  distinguished  from  the  function 
of  executing  or  carrying  out  that  policy  which  may 
be  denominated  administration.  If  these  functions 
are  not  clearly  distinguished,  it  is  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  prevent  politics  from  affecting  ad- 
ministration, not  only  in  its  actions,  but  also  in  its 
organization,  with  the  result  that  qualifications  for 
even  clerical  and  technical  positions  in  the  public 
service  soon  become  political  in  character.  While 
it  is  necessary  in  all  governmental  organizations  to 


222  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

separate  politics,  that  is  the  function  of  legislation, 
from  the  function  of  administration,  it  is  particu- 
larly necessary  in  the  case  of  municipal  govern- 
ment, on  account  of  the  technical  character  of  a 
large  amount  of  municipal  administration.  Posi- 
tions in  many  branches  of  municipal  activity  must 
be  filled  by  men  with  large  technical  knowledge, 
if  the  work  of  the  city  is  to  be  carried  on  advan- 
tageously. And  our  past  experience,  not  only 
with  regard  to  municipal  administration,  but  also 
with  regard  to  the  national  and  state  administra- 
tion, proves  beyond  the  peradventure  of  a  doubt 
that  if  politics  are  allowed  influence  in  the  appoint- 
ment to  such  technical  positions,  they  are  not  filled 
by  competent  men.  This  is  the  essential  vice  of 
the  present  charters  of  New  York  and  Brooklyn, 
the  last  of  which  is  often  adduced  as  an  example 
of  the  highest  development  in  American  municipal 
organization  and  as  solving  the  problem  for  this 
country. 

In  these  cities  the  councils  have  been  all  but 
abolished,  particularly  in  New  York,  and  the 
mayor  and  executive  officers  exercise  almost  all 
municipal  legislative  and  political  powers  not 
assumed  by  the  legislature  of  the  state.  The 
heads  of  departments  have  ceased  altogether  to  be 
permanent  in  tenure,  and  it  is  considered  almost 
as  a  matter  of  political  principle  that  each  incom- 
ing mayor  shall  appoint  new  incumbents.  Indeed, 
the  charters  of  both  cities  in  their  present  form 


THE   CITY  COUNCIL  223 

make  a  special  point  of  permitting  each  mayor  to 
secure  heads  of  departments  who  will  represent 
the  principles  on  which  he  himself  was  elected 
and  stands,  although  he  is  given  no  continuing 
power  of  removal.  This  may  have  been  neces- 
sary in  order  to  make  such  a  system  of  municipal 
government  popular  in  character.  But  popular 
municipal  government  has  thus  been  secured  at 
the  expense  of  the  highest  administrative  effi- 
ciency. What  has  actually  been  done  by  such  an 
arrangement  is  to  create  a  municipal  council  in  a 
new  form  which  does  not,  it  is  true,  possess  all  of 
the  powers  of  the  original  council,  but  which  does 
actually  determine  what  shall  be  the  policy  of  the 
city,  so  far  as  that  is  a  matter  for  local  determina- 
tion. The  fault  of  such  an  arrangement  is  both 
that  the  elective  principle  has  been  abandoned  in 
the  very  place  where  it  is  most  needed,  for  "if 
you  want  representation  "  you  must  elect,  and  that 
officers  who  should  be  administrative  have  become 
political  in  character. 

The  attempt  made  in  New  York  for  quite  a 
time  prior  to  1895,  to  make  the  heads  of  executive 
departments  independent  of  the  mayor,  and  to 
give  them  pretty  long  terms  of  office,  is  a  proof  of 
the  desire  to  obtain  a  reasonably  permanent  official 
force,  which  should  be  independent  of  changes  in 
policy  as  determined  by  the  municipal  elections; 
while  the  passage  of  the  Power  of  Removal  Bill  of 
1895,  which  gave  the  mayor  the  power  within  six 


224  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

months  after  assuming  office  to  remove  all  heads 
of  departments,  is  quite  as  good  a  proof  that  it 
was  considered  improper  that  officials  having  as 
much  to  do  in  determining  the  policy  of  the  city, 
as  these  officers  have  under  the  present  New  York 
charter,  should  not  be  representative  of  the  people 
of  the  city.  The  great  change  in  municipal  policy 
brought  about  by  the  elections  of  1894,  forced  the 
adoption  of  the  Brooklyn  principle,  which  certainly 
is  the  proper  one  where  there  is  no  council  pos- 
sessing large  powers.  For  municipal  government 
must  in  this  country  be  popular,  whatever  else  it 
may  be.  It  may  be  efficient  or  not,  as  the  case 
may  be,  but  it  must  be  popular  and  representative. 
The  determination  of  questions  of  policy  being 
placed,  as  it  is  under  the  New  York  and  Brooklyn 
plan,  in  the  hands  of  officers  whose  duties  are 
mainly  administrative,  those  officers  ought,  when 
they  cease  to  represent  the  people  of  the  city,  to 
be  removed  from  the  control  of  the  city  affairs. 

The  probability  of  the  introduction  of  politics 
into  the  administration  of  city  affairs  as  a  result 
of  this  confusion  of  legislative  and  administrative 
functions,  is  greater  where  the  only  way  in  which 
the  people  of  the  city  may  express  their  wishes 
with  regard  to  questions  of  great  local  interest  is 
through  the  administration  of  laws,  general  in 
form,  passed  by  the  state  legislature.  If  there  is 
no  local  option  in  such  matters,  by  means  either 
of  direct  local  legislation  or  the  election  of  a  city 


THE   CITY  COUNCIL  22$ 

council  which  shall  pass  the  necessary  ordinances, 
the  experience  of  this  country  would  seem  to  show 
that  under  a  decentralized  administration,  with 
great  local  self-government,  the  people  will  find  a 
means  of  local  option  through  their  power  to  elect 
officials  who  will  administer  the  law  so  as  to  adapt 
it  to  local  conditions,  thus  making  administrative 
offices  political  in  characte'r.  The  result  of  the 
destruction  of  the  city  council  and  the  transfer  of 
its  powers  to  administrative  officers  or  boards  is 
then  the  intrusion  of  politics  into  administration, 
the  very  thing  which  it  was  hoped  to  avoid  by  the 
differentiation  of  the  mayor  and  the  executive  de- 
partments from  the  original  council. 

Our  journey  in  the  pathway  of  municipal  re- 
form, begun  about  the  beginning  of  the  century, 
has  led  us  to  the  point  from  which  we  started. 
Like  persons  lost  in  a  fog,  we  have  walked 
in  a  circle,  not  being  able  on  account  of  the 
obscurity  of  our  surroundings  or  the  defective- 
ness  of  our  vision  clearly  to  see  where  we  are 
going,  or  even,  it  must  be  admitted,  generally 
understanding  what  point  in  our  journey  we  have 
reached.  The  only  respects  in  which  our  present 
position  differs  from  that  in  which  we  were  when 
we  started  this  so-called  reform  movement,  are  that 
while  originally  we  had  practical  home  rule,  we 
have  now  practically  lost  it.  Certainly  if  the  dis- 
tinction of  the  function  of  deliberation  from  that 
of  administration  is  of  any  value,  the  present  form 


226  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

of   municipal   government,  as  exemplified   in  the 
charters  of   New  York  and  Brooklyn,  cannot  be 
regarded   as   proper.     Certainly,  if   there   is   any 
advantage   in   municipal   home  rule,  that  form  is 
merely  temporary.     By  what  has  been  said  it  is 
not  meant  to  convey  the  impression  that  good  and 
efficient  government  is  not  possible  under  such  a 
form  of  organization.  •  Good  and  efficient  govern-, 
ment  is  possible  under  almost  any  form  of  organi- . 
zation.     More   depends   upon   men  than  devices,  • 
but  it  is  certainly  true  that  it  is  as  easy  for  bad  . 
men  as  for  good,  men  to  control  the  city  govern- 
ment  under  this  system,   and  the   experience  of 
Brooklyn,  which  has  tried  the  plan  in  its  entirety 
longer  than  New  York,  seems  to  show  that  muni- 
cipal government  under  this  system  has  actually 
been  oftener  inefficient,  if  not  absolutely  corrupt, 
than  wise  and  untainted  by  scandal.  _ 

If  we  then  believe  that  a  large  measure  of  mu- 
nicipal home  rule  is  necessary,  that  the  govern- 
ment of  the  city  should  be  popular  in  character, 
and  that  the  functions  of  deliberation  or  determina- 
tion of  municipal  policy  and  of  administration  or 
the  execution  and  carrying  out  of  that  policy  should 
be  kept  distinct,  we  cannot  avoid  the  conclusion 
that  a  city  council  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  mu- 
nicipal organization.  Care  must  be  taken,  how- 
ever, both  in  determining  the  relations  of  the  city 
to  the  central  state  government,  and  the  position 
and  powers  of  the  council  in  the  municipal  organi- 


THE   CITY  COUNCIL  22 / 

zation.  Enough  has  already  been  said  to  show 
that  the  necessary  degree  of  home  rule  may  be 
obtained  by  the  grant  of  large  local  powers  to 
cities,  which  should  be  incorporated  by  general 
act,  and  should  be  allowed  to  determine  for  them- 
selves the  details  of  their  organization,  but  should 
be  subject  to  a  central  administrative  control,  in- 
stead of  the  present  legislative  control  by  means 
of  special  legislation,  where  some  central  control 
over  municipal  affairs,  or  affairs  attended  to  by 
the  cities,  is  necessary.1 

How  shall  we,  however,  determine  the  position 
and  fix  the  powers  of  the  city  council  ?  In  the 
first  place,  it  may  be  said  that  in  a  country  where 
public  officers  feel  a  due  sense  of  responsibility  to 
the  public,  and  where  partisan  politics  has  not 
extended  its  malignant  influence  over  matters  of 
administration,  the  matter  may  be  left  to  the  coun- 
cil itself.  Such  is  the  case  in  England,  where 
almost  all  the  details  of  municipal  administration 
are  left  to  the  city  council  to  arrange.  The  coun- 
cil is  practically  the  only  municipal  authority 
officially  known  to  the  law.  It  may,  if  it  sees  fit, 

1  The  act  of  Illinois,  which  has  been  cited,  is  probably  the  best 
one  in  these  respects  which  has  up  to  this  time  been  passed  in  the 
United  States.  The  methods  adopted  in  Missouri,  California,  and 
Washington  are  also  reasonably  successful.  Their  peculiarity  con- 
sists in  conferring  power  on  cities  to  provide  their  own  charters, 
subject  to  certain  general  limitations.  See  article  by  Mr.  Ober- 
holtzer,  on  "  Home  Rule  for  American  Cities,"  in  Annals  of  Ameri- 
can Academy  of  Social  and  Political  Science,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  736. 


228  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

prostitute  the  municipal  administration  in  the  in- 
terest of  party  politics.     It  may,  if  it  sees  fit,  not 
only  determine  the  policy  to  be  followed  by  the 
city,  but  also  concern  itself  with  details  of  munici- 
pal administration,  making  use  of  its  large  powers 
for  purely  selfish  and  partisan  ends.     There  is  no 
efficient  method  provided  in  the  law  to  prevent 
such  an  abuse  of  its  powers.     It  is,  however,  pre- 
vented from  so  doing,  either  by  a  high  sense  of 
official  responsibility,  or  by  the  existence  of  an 
enlightened  public  opinion  which  would  not  suffer 
such  a  prostitution  of  its  powers.     Probably  both 
causes  are  responsible  for  the  excellent  municipal 
government  which  Great  Britain  enjoys.     It  may 
be  also  that  restricted  suffrage  has  some  influence 
in  producing  the  result  as  well  as  the  great  degree 
of  local  autonomy  and  the  subjection  of  municipal 
administration  to  a  responsible  central  administra- 
tive  control.  ^That  the   English   method   is  the  ] 
ideal  solution  of  the  question  is  hardly  susceptible ' 
of  denial.     The  fact  that  every  branch  of  munici- 
pal activity  is  administered  under  the  control  of  • 
the  council,  brings  it  about  that  the  responsibility 
for  municipal   government   is   absolutely  concen-* 
trated,  and  the  chance  of  conflict  between  hide-* 
pendent  local  authorities  disappears.     The  power 
frequently  to  elect  a  new  council  gives  the  munici- 
pal citizens  an  opportunity  to  control  the  policy  of  • 
the  city,  and  the  concentration  of  power  in  that  • 
elected  council  makes  it  certain  that  the  energies  • 


THE    CITY   COUNCIL  229 

of  municipal  officers  will  be  directed  towards  carry- 
ing out  that  policy  in  its  details,  and  will  not  be 
dissipated  in  vain  struggles  for  supremacy  with 
each  other. 

But  that  such  a  system  can  be  adopted  in  this 
country  at  the  present  time  may  well  be  doubted. 
It  has,  indeed,  been  tried  in  this  country  and 
found  wanting.  It  was  the  original  system  with 
which  we  started,  and  which  we  have  been  almost 
universally  obliged  to  abandon.  The  question 
naturally  arises :  Why  have  we  been  unsuccessful 
while  the  English  have  been  so  successful  ?  Such 
a  question  is  most  difficult  to  answer.  It  may  be 
that  the  reason  is  to  be  found  in  the  democratic 
character  of  our  society,  and  it  may  be  also  that  it 
is  to  be  found  in  our  system  of  government,  which 
at  almost  every  point  attempts  to  secure  good  gov- 
ernment rather  by  provision  of  law,  by  a  system 
of  checks  and  balances,  than  by  the  expression  of 
public  opinion.  The  adoption  of  this  system  of 
checks  and  balances  seemed  at  the  time  of  its 
adoption  to  be  unavoidable.  The  fear  of  tyranny 
led  us  at  the  time  of  the  formation  of  our  govern- 
mental system  so  to  tie  the  hands  of  almost  all  our 
governmental  authorities  as  to  leave  none  of  them 
except  the  courts  with  any  very  large  powers. 
With  the  absence  of  much  real  power  has  come 
a  lessening  of  the  feeling  of  responsibility.  In 
our  constitutions  we  have  tied  the  hands  of  our 
legislatures ;  in  our  municipal  charters  and  muni- 


230  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

cipal  corporations  acts  we  have  tied  the  hands  of 
our  municipal  authorities.  The  legislatures  on 
the  one  hand,  the  municipal  authorities  on  the 
other,  find  themselves  so  hampered  in  the  exercise 
of  the  few  powers  we  have  left  them,  are  so  ac- 
customed to  see  their  decisions  and  resolutions 
declared  void  by  the  courts,  that  they  have  come 
to  feel  that  they  need  not  be  governed  in  their  de- 
liberations by  considerations  of  regard  for  justice 
and  reasonableness,  which  are  left  almost  entirely 
to  the  courts  as  a  matter  of  judicial  determination. 
When  we  add  to  this  fact  the  evil  influences  of  the 
spoils  system,  which  crept  so  imperceptibly  into 
our  governmental  polity,  and  has,  owing  to  its 
long  continuance,  almost  completely  demoralized 
our  public  opinion,  we  find  ourselves  in  a  condition 
where  no  one  can  recognize  that  the  sense  of  official 
responsibility  to  the  public  is  high  enough,  or  public 
opinion  is  enlightened  enough  or  effective  enough 
to  permit  us  to  regard  them  as  sufficient  checks 
upon  the  action  of  the  city  councils  we  are  likely 
to  select.  We  must  rely  in  the  immediate  future 
upon  the  more  formal  checks  on  unwise  or  corrupt 
action  on  the  part  of  the  municipal  councils  which 
we  form,  to  be  found  in  constitutional  provision 
and  legislative  statutes,  and  we  must  trust  to  the 
courts,  which  up  to  the  present  time,  probably 
owing  to  their  greater  powers  and  consequent 
greater  sense  of  responsibility,  have  preserved 
themselves  comparatively  free  from  deteriorating 


THE   CITY   COUNCIL  231 

influences,  to  see  to  it  that  these  checks  are  effect- 
ive. In  other  words,  the  position  of  the  municipal 
council  must  be  determined  very  carefully  in  the 
law,  which  must  prevent  it  from  so  making  use  of 
its  powers  as  to  introduce  politics  into  the  adminis- 
tration of  municipal  affairs.  We  must  confine  it  to 
the  determination  of  the  general  municipal  policy. 
We  must  seek  to  cast  our  city  council  in  the  con- 
tinental rather  than  the  English  mould. 

By  the  law  of  1884  the  French  city  council  is 
carefully  prevented  from  exercising  any  adminis- 
trative or  executive  functions,  which  are  entrusted 
to  the  mayor  and  his  deputies  or  adjuncts.  Indeed, 
the  detailed  organization  of  the  city,  which  is  for  the 
most  part  a  matter  of  local  determination,  is  in  the 
hands  of  the  mayor,  the  council  exercising  powers 
over  it  only  indirectly  through  the  power  of  appro- 
priation. As  Dr.  Shaw  well  says  :  "  The  mayor 
is  the  controlling  spirit  and  the  total  executive 
administration."1  He  has  the  fullest  powers  of 
appointment  and  removal,  the  making  of  contracts, 
the  care  of  public  works  and  city  property,  and  the 
financial  administration,  and  supervises  its  accounts 
and  its  public  institutions,2  observing,  of  course,  in 
all  of  his  actions  the  resolutions  of  the  council, 
which  determine  the  general  policy  to  be  pursued. 
But  in  France  the  council  elects  from  its  members 

1  Municipal  Government  in  Continental  Europe,  p.  316. 

2  See  for  more  detailed  description  of  his  powers,  Goodnow, 
Comparative  Administrative  Law,  Vol.  I,  p.  289. 


232  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

the  mayor  and  his  deputies,  among  whom  the 
mayor  distributes  the  different  executive  depart- 
ments. As  there  is  for  each  of  these  departments 
a  standing  committee  of  the  council,  whose  chair- 
man is  the  deputy  assigned  to  the  management  of 
the  particular  department,  the  whole  work  of  muni- 
cipal government  is  very  largely  under  the  control 
of  the  council,  which  Dr.  Shaw  thinks  without  any 
changes  in  the  law  "will  be  able  to  make  the  mayor 
practically  their  obedient  servant  in  the  perform- 
ance of  his  executive  functions."  "The  mayor 
.  .  .  will  doubtless  long  continue  to  be  entrusted 
with  the  general  oversight  and  control  of  the  ex- 
ecutive work  of  the  commune,  but  I  am  not  dis- 
posed to  believe,"  he  adds,  "that  he  will  always 
hold  so  dominant  a  place  as  the  law  of  1884  seems 
to  contemplate."  Such  being  the  case,  the  position 
of  the  American  city  council  cannot  be  exactly  the 
same  as  the  French,  unless  political  conditions  in 
this  country  change  considerably.  The  French 
plan  will  probably  have  to  be  modified  by  the 
adoption  of  some  of  the  principles  underlying  the 
German  municipal  organization. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  what  was  said  of 
the  system  of  central  control  over  cities  in  Prussia, 
attention  was  called  to  the  fact  of  the  independ- 
ence of  the  executive,  once  appointed  over  against 
the  city  council,  over  whose  resolutions  it  even  has 
a  veto  power.  Some  such  plan  as  this  will  have 
to  be  adopted  in  this  country.  Indeed,  some  such 


THE    CITY  COUNCIL  233 

plan  as  this  has  already  been  adopted  in  this  coun- 
try. It  is  to  be  found  in  the  General  Municipal 
Corporations  Act  of  Illinois,  to  which  reference 
has  already  been  made,  as  worthy  of  imitation  in 
other  respects.  By  this  act  it  is  provided  that 
all  officers  to  be  appointed  shall  be  appointed  by 
the  mayor  and  confirmed  by  the  council.  The  law 
is  defective,  however,  in  making  provision  for  the 
confirmation  of  the  council.  This  principle  has 
been  abandoned  in  most  of  the  later  city  charters 
of  the  United  States,  as  a  result  of  the  conviction 
that  the  responsibility  for  appointment  was  under 
it  too  diffused.  But  apart  from  this  principle,  the 
Illinois  act  is  correct.  It  provides  for  the  organi- 
zation of  the  city  by  local  action.  The  power  to 
determine  the  organization  may  be  left  with  the 
council,  provided  that  the  power  of  appointing  to 
the  positions  in  the  organization,  once  established, 
be  left  with  the  mayor.  The  temptation  of  the 
council  to  remodel  the  city  organization  in  the  in- 
terest of  party  politics  will  be  removed  if  the  coun- 
cil has  no  influence  on  the  power  of  appointment. 
It  may  be  said  that  the  power  of  organization  is 
too  important  to  be  left  in  the  hands  of  a  body 
which  like  the  council  has  done  so  much  in  the 
past  to  forfeit  confidence  in  its  integrity.  Our  ex- 
perience of  the  use  of  the  power  by  the  legislature, 
however,  can  certainly  not  lead  us  to  believe  that 
the  council  would  abuse  it  any  more  than  the  legis- 
lature has  abused  it  in  the  past.  Its  possession  by 


234  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

the  legislature,  further,  is  more  apt  to  lead  to  the 
intrusion  of  party  politics  into  municipal  adminis- 
tration. Indeed,  in  the  past  it  has  been  frequently 
exercised  by  the  legislature  in  the  interest  of  the 
state  and  national  political  parties.  Were  it  in  the 
hands  of  the  council,  the  temptation  would  be  less, 
provided  they  had  no  power  of  appointment,  be- 
cause state  and  national  politics  do  not  in  the 
nature  of  things  and  necessarily  have  so  intimate 
a  connection  with  a  city  council  as  with  a  state 
legislature.  Further,  the  city  council  has,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  more  knowledge  of  local  needs 
than  a  state  legislature  can  ever  have. 

The  giving  the  mayor  the  power  to  organize  the 
detailed  administration  of  the  city  finally  has  much 
in  its  favor.  It  is  true  that  it  would  result  in  an 
enormous  increase  of  his  powers,  but  this  would 
only  be  in  accord  with  the  movement  seen  every- 
where in  our  government  to  increase  the  powers 
of  the  executive  in  the  hope  of  securing  better 
government,  owing  to  the  concentration  of  respon- 
sibility produced  thereby.  The  grant  to  the  mayor 
of  such  large  powers  would  not  further  be  a  viola- 
tion of  the  representative  principle  if  the  mayor 
should  be  elected ;  nor  would  it  violate  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  our  public  law  that  taxes  shall 
be  voted  and  governmental  appropriations  made 
by  a  deliberative  or  legislative  body,  since  the 
council  would  have  the  power  to  veto  any  act  of 
the  mayor  organizing  new  departments,  by  refus- 


THE    CITY  COUNCIL  2$$ 

ing  the  necessary  appropriations.  Th\s  is  practi- 
cally the  French  system.  It  is  also  the  system 
adopted  generally  in  England,  France,  and  Ger- 
many for  the  organization  of  the  executive  depart- 
ments of  the  central  government.  It  is  to  be 
preferred  for  the  reason  that  the  executive,  in  the 
case  of  cities  the  mayor,  is  in  a  better  position  to 
know  the  needs  of  the  administration  than  the 
legislative  body,  and  is  responsible  for  the  actions 
of  his  administration. 

Such,  in  general,  is  the  position  which  the  city 
council  should  occupy.  How  now  should  it  be 
formed?  We  can  all  agree  on  the  general  prin- 
ciple of  election.  The  council  should  further  be 
elected  in  this  country  by  universal  suffrage.  But 
what  shall  be  the  method  of  organizing  the 
voters?  The  district  plan  has  so  often  resulted 
in  the  election  of  incompetent,  if  not  corrupt 
council  members,  that  there  is  quite  a  general 
conviction  that  it  cannot  be  made  the  only  basis 
of  municipal  elections.  In  large  cities,  however, 
local  needs,  which  differ  in  even  the  most  homo- 
geneous municipal  populations,  will  make  it  neces- 
sary to  give  localities  as  such  some  recognition. 
In  smaller  cities  the  need  of  locality  representa- 
tion is  not  so  great,  if  it  exists  at  all.  In  small 
cities  the  general  ticket  may  be  adopted,  as 
it  is  in  the  councils  of  the  smaller  European 
cities.  In  the  larger  cities  there  must  be  a  com- 
bination of  both.  If  the  locality  system  is  to  be 


236  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

adopted,  how  shall  the  election  districts  be  formed  ? 
If  this  is  left  in  the  hands  of  the  council,  our  past 
experience  proves  that  there  is  danger  of  the 
gerrymander.  Perhaps  the  experience  of  foreign 
cities  will  be  of  advantage  here.  In  England  the1" 
districts  are  made  by  the  council  by  a  two-thirds 
vote,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  central  gov- 
ernment at  London,  and  the  number  of  councillors 
to  be  elected  in  each  district  cannot  be  less  than 
three.  In  France,  where  no  section  in  a  city  of 
over  10,000  inhabitants  can  elect  less  than  four 
members,  the  districts  are  made  by  the  General 
Council  of  the  Department,  a  board  similar  to  the 
Board  of  Supervisors  in  New  York,  on  the  initia- 
tion of  a  general  councillor,  or  on  that  either  of 
a  member  of  the  city  council,  or  of  the  prefect 
of  the  department  as  agent  of  the  central  govern- 
ment or  on  the  petition  of  the  electors  of  the  city 
concerned.  In  France  the  districts  are  made 
only  after  an  investigation  has  been  made  of  the 
matter.1  In  Prussia  the  matter  is  largely  left  to 
the  city  to  determine.  In  the  first  place,  the  legis- 
lative body  of  the  city,  the  municipal  assembly,  is 
to  determine  whether  the  district  plan  shall  be 
adopted,  the  general  ticket  being  otherwise  the 
rule.  If  it  determines  to  adopt  it,  the  city  execu- 
tive is  to  attend  to  the  apportionment,  fixing  not 
only  the  limits  of  the  districts,  but  also  the  number 
of  members  to  be  elected  from  each  district.  The 

1  See  Bceuf,  Droit  Administratif,  p.  238. 


THE    CITY  COUNCIL  237 

executive  must,  however,  observe  the  rule,  that  all 
voters  are  to  be  as  far  as  possible  equally  rep- 
resented.1 If  it  is  remembered  that  the  town 
executive  in  Prussia  is  largely  under  central  ad- 
ministrative control,  it  will  be  noticed  that  in  all 
three  countries  the  formation  of  the  districts, 
while  largely  in  the  hands  of  the  local  authority, 
is  subject  to  central  administrative  control.  Fur- 
ther, it  is  to  be  noted  that  in  both  France  and 
England  the  districts  are  not  to  be  so  small  as  to 
be  represented  by  only  one  member,  the  belief 
being  entertained  that  large  districts  are  more  apt 
than  small  ones  to  result  in  the  election  of  com- 
petent council  members. 

If  the  general  ticket  is  adopted,  some  provision 
for  minority  representation  should  be  made.  For 
if  a  majority  of  voters  elect  all  the  members  of 
the  council,  a  large  minority  of  voters  will  be  abso- 
lutely unrepresented  on  that  body.  If  a  plurality 
of  voters  elects  all  members,  the  representatives  of 
a  minority  of  the  whole  number  of  voters  will  be 
in  absolute  possession  of  the  council.  It  has  been 
shown  that  the  form  known  as  limited  voting  tried 
in  New  York  and  Boston  has  either  been  aban- 
doned, or  is  regarded  as  unsuccessful.  The  sys- 
tem of  cumulative  voting,  in  accordance  with 
which  the  voters  have  as  many  votes  as  there 
are  offices  to  be  filled  and  may  combine  their 
votes  as  they  see  fit,  has,  as  recently  applied  to 

1  See  Leidig,  Das  Preussiscke  Stadtrecht,  p.  78. 


238  MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 

legislative  districts  sending  each  three  members, 
been  reasonably  successful  in  Illinois.  Propor- 
tional representation  has  been  proposed  and  ar- 
dently advocated  on  the  ground  of  its  absolute 
proportionality  and  therefore  its  strict  justice. 
But  it  must  be  remembered  that  mathematical 
proportionality,  notwithstanding  its  justice,  is 
really  not  the  desideratum.  What  is  needed  more 
than  anything  else  is  a  system  of  representation 
which  will  produce  a  body  from  which  wise  action 
may  be  hoped.  Such  a  system  must  be  based 
on  the  expectation  that  the  voters  will  array  them- 
selves in  a  few,  preferably  two,  large  parties  and 
that  both  of  such  parties  shall  be  represented 
on  the  city  council.  Such  a  result  is  aided  very 
largely  by  the  existence  of  districts  each  of  which 
will  send  one  or  more  members  to  the  council. 
It  is  not  insured,  however,  by  the  district  system, 
as  for  example,  see  the  elections  in  New  York  in 
1892,  when  166,000  voters  elected  all  the  members 
of  the  council  notwithstanding  a  minority  vote  of 
nearly  100,000.  A  district  system  thus,  while  it 
insures  locality  representation,  does  not  insure  the 
representation  of  minorities.  If  combined  with 
some  system  of  district  representation  where  there 
are  several  members  to  be  elected  in  each  district, 
the  form  of  voting  known  as  preferential  voting, 
heretofore  described,1  will,  if  adopted,  secure  both 
representation  *of  the  locality,  which  is  necessary 

1  Supra,  p.  156. 


THE   CITY  COUNCIL  239 

in  a  large  city,  and  the  presence  of  a  minority 
party  in  the  council,  while  it  will  not  encourage 
voters  to  array  themselves  in  numberless  factions 
as  would  seem  to  be  the  tendency  of  mathemati- 
cally proportional  representation. 

More,  however,  is  to  be  hoped  from  the  applica- 
tion of  correct  ideas  as  to  the  position  and  powers 
actually  to  be  exercised  by  the  council,  than  from 
any  device  for  its  formation.  The  experience  of 
European  cities  —  even  the  large  ones  —  shows 
that  excellent  government  may  be  obtained  from 
city  councils  elected  on  either  the  general  ticket 
or  district  plan,  without  any  provision  for  minority 
representation.  It  may  be  said  that  limited  suf- 
frage has  much  to  do  with  the  result;  but  it  is 
to  be  remembered  that  in  the  French  municipality 
suffrage  is  universal,  a  longer  residence,  namely 
six  months,  in  the  city  being  the  only  limitation 
upon  the  principle  which  is  not  to  be  found  in  this 
country.  In  all  the  European  cities,  the  council, 
however,  confines  itself  to  purely  legislative  work. 
At  least  it  does  not  as  a  matter  of  practice  con- 
found its  political  functions  with  its  administrative 
functions,  where  by  the  strict  letter  of  the  law,  as  in 
England,  it  has  the  latter.  Politics  do  not  thus  creep 
into  administration.  If  this  result  can  be  obtained, 
either  by  public  opinion  or  the  provisions  of  positive 
law,  it  is  believed  that  the  result  will  be  the  same. 

Shall  the  council  which  is  established  consist 
of  a  single  chamber,  or  shall  it  be  given  the 


240  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

bicameral  form  ?  Originally,  the  Anglo-American 
council  consisted  of  a  single  chamber.  It  is  true, 
in  this  single  chamber  there  were  to  be  found  two 
classes  of  council  members,  each  of  which  dis- 
charged somewhat  different  functions,  namely,  the 
aldermen  and  assistants  or  councillors,  but  when 
attending  to  purely  city  affairs  they  acted  as  one 
body.  Such  is  the  form  of  the  present  city  coun- 
cil in  England.  The  French  city  council  consists 
of  one  chamber  also.  The  German  form  of  munici- 
pal council,  however,  where  the  board  form  of  the 
executive  has  been  adopted,  has  some  of  the  char- 
acteristics of  the  bicameral  council,  inasmuch  as 
the  executive  has  the  right  to  veto  the  resolutions 
of  the  legislative  body  proper.  It  will  be  noticed 
that  there  is  to  be  found  in  the  original  Anglo- 
American  city  council  the  germ  of  the  bicameral 
form  in  the  distinction  between  the  two  classes  of 
council  members.  Under  favorable  influences  at 
work  in  this  country,  almost  all  of  whose  legisla- 
tive assemblies  were  bicameral  in  form,  this  germ 
has  borne  fruit,  so  that  at  the  present  time  it  is 
not  uncommon  to  find  the  American  city  council 
consisting  of  two  chambers.  The  latest  opinion 
is,  however,  opposed  to  the  bicameral  idea,  and 
return  to  the  original  English  form  of  one  cham- 
ber is  strongly  advocated.1  It  is  not  unfrequently 

1  Matthews,  City  Government  of  Boston,  p.  13;  Simpson,  "  Muni- 
cipal Government  in  Minneapolis,"  Conferences  for  Good  City  Gov- 
ernment at  Minneapolis,  etc.,  p.  95. 


THE    CITY  COUNCIL  34! 

the  case,  however,  that  where  the  one-chamber 
system  is  adopted,  this  chamber  contains  two 
classes  of  members,  some  of  whom  are  elected  by 
general  ticket  and  some  of  whom  are  elected  on  a 
district  ticket.  This  would  seem  to  be  the  best 
form.  It  at  the  same  time  makes  provision  for 
concentrated  responsibility  and  greater  efficiency, 
insures  locality  representation,  and  makes  it  prob- 
able that  some  of  the  members  of  the  council  will 
be  men  who  are  known  beyond  the  limits  of  their 
municipal  districts. 

It  is,  however,  open  to  the  objection,  that  the 
members  elected  by  general  ticket,  who  would  not 
in  the  nature  of  things  constitute  a  majority  of 
the  council,  may  be  outvoted  by  the  members 
elected  on  the  district  plan.  If  those  elected  by 
general  ticket  form  a  separate  chamber,  their  in- 
fluence would,  of  course,  be  as  potent  as  would 
that  of  the  chamber  whose  members  were  elected 
by  districts.  But  if  these  districts  are  not  so  small 
as  to  elect  only  one  member  each,  the  character  of 
the  district  members  may  be  expected  to  be  such, 
that  some  of  them  at  any  rate  will  unite  with  the 
members  elected  by  general  ticket.  If  at  the 
same  time  the  members  elected  by  general  ticket 
have  a  term  of  office  longer  than  that  of  the  dis- 
trict members,  their  greater  experience  in  city 
government  would  give  them  a  moral  strength 
which  would  go  far  to  counterbalance  the  greater 
numerical  strength  of  the  district  members.  If 


242  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

a  single  chamber  organized  in  this  way  were 
formed,  it  would  avoid  unnecessarily  complicating 
the  municipal  organization,  and  make  efficiency 
and  quickness  of  action  easier  of  attainment  than 
it  ever  could  be  under  the  bicameral  system. 

Should  the  council  members  be  paid?  The 
answer  to  this  question  will  depend  on  the  position 
assigned  to  the  council.  If  it  is  confined,  either 
as  a  result  of  public  opinion  or  of  the  provisions 
of  positive  law,  to  the  discharge  of  mere  delibera- 
tive functions,  salaries  or  compensation  would  not 
seem  necessary.  The  sessions  could  be  fixed  at 
such  a  time  that  they  need  not  interfere  seriously 
with  the  daily  avocations  of  the  members.  Fur- 
ther, it  may  be  seriously  questioned  if  the  payment 
of  salaries  or  compensation  will  result  in  any  ad- 
vantage. If  the  compensation  is  large  enough  to 
permit  those  receiving  it  to  live  without  resorting 
to  other  means  of  livelihood,  the  council  immedi- 
ately becomes  more  or  less  professional  in  charac- 
ter, and  just  the  sort  of  men  are  attracted  to  it  who 
are  the  least  desirable.  For  the  council  should 
reflect  the  wishes  of  the  electors,  and  this  it  can 
never  do  unless  its  members  are  chosen  from  the 
people  as  a  body,  and  not  from  the  ranks  of  pro- 
fessional office-holders  and  politicians.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  salary  is  not  large  enough  to  per- 
mit the  members  to  live  from  its  proceeds,  there 
is  no  particular  reason  for  paying  any  salary  at  all. 
Indeed,  there  is  a  positive  disadvantage  in  paying 


THE    CITY  COUNCIL  243 

it.  For  the  experience  of  all  successful  municipal 
governments  is  that  the  honor  of  membership  of  a 
municipal  council  is  sufficient  to  attract  the  right 
class  of  men.  If  a  small  compensation  is  paid,  the 
honor  is  by  so  much  diminished,  as  the  motives 
for  seeking  the  office  will  not  generally  be  regarded 
as  unmixed.  Closely  connected  with  the  question 
of  compensation  is  the  question  of  compulsory 
service.  Compulsory  service  was  characteristic  of 
the  original  Anglo-American  municipal  system, 
but  is  gradually  being  abandoned.  It  is  interest- 
ing to  note  that  in  Prussia,  where  municipal  govern- 
ment is  very  successful,  compulsory  service  was 
introduced  into  the  cities  in  1808,  and  is  believed 
to  have  had  such  good  results  that  it  has  been 
extended  by  the  recent  reform  legislation  to  most 
local  offices. 

Finally,  should  the  council  be  somewhat  perma- 
nent in  its  tenure,  that  is,  should  only  a  portion  of 
its  members  be  elected,  or  should  it  be  renewed  in 
toto  at  each  municipal  election  ?  Foreign  experi- 
ence is  not  absolutely  conclusive  on  this  point.  In 
England  and  Germany  the  council  is  only  partially 
renewed  at  each  election.  In  France  all  of  the 
council  retire  at  the  same  time  ;  that  is,  unless  the 
members  are  re-elected.  It  is  true  that  the  suc- 
cess of  English  and  German  municipal  govern- 
ment is  rather  more  marked  than  is  that  of  the 
French.  This  may,  however,  be  due  to  the 
greater  local  spirit,  which  has  had  a  larger  oppor- 


244  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

tunity  for  development,  owing  to  the  greater 
length  of  time  during  which  the  cities  have  en- 
joyed local  self-government.  But  it  would  seem 
as  if  the  chances  in  favor  of  good  municipal  gov- 
ernment are  greater  under  a  system  of  partial 
renewal.  One  great  need  of  municipal  govern- 
ment is  continuity.  This  can  be  obtained  only  by 
partial  renewal,  unless  very  long  terms  of  office 
are  provided,  or  unless  the  habit  of  re-electing 
competent  council  members  has  been  acquired. 
Long  terms  of  office  without  frequent  partial  re- 
newal of  the  council  membership  are,  however, 
incompatible  with  the  necessary  popular  control 
over  the  municipal  government.  On  the  other 
hand,  short  terms,  with  the  power  of  changing  the 
entire  membership  of  the  council  at  each  election, 
are  incompatible  with  the  attainment  of  that  con- 
tinuity of  municipal  policy  which  is  so  necessary. 
The  proper  method  would  seem  to  be  to  provide  a 
term  for  the  individual  members  of  either  four  or 
six  years,  and  to  provide  that  every  second  year 
either  one-half  or  one-third  of  the  members  should 
be  re-elected.  This  is  the  English  and  German 
plan,  the  English  municipal  councillors  being 
elected  for  three  years,  one-third  retiring  every 
year ;  the  aldermen,  one-third  in  number  of  the 
council,  being  elected  for  six  years,  one-half  retir- 
ing every  third  year.  In  Prussia  the  members  of 
the  council  are  elected  for  six  years,  one-third  re- 
tiring every  two  years.  In  France,  however,  the 


THE   CITY  COUNCIL  24$ 

term  is  four  years,  and  all  retire  at  the  same  time. 
In  this  country  there  is  no  general  rule  adopted. 
Here,  as  in  so  many  other  parts  of  our  municipal 
system,  we  have  no  accepted  theory. 

However  details  may  differ  in  the  European 
systems,  this  point  is  to  be  noticed,  that  the  terms 
of  all  council  members  are  quite  long.  Further, 
the  practice  of  re-electing  competent  council  mem- 
bers, which  is  almost  universal,  and  which  in  Eng- 
land at  any  rate  is  due  in  part  to  the  system  of 
nomination  and  election,1  of  itself  produces  con- 
tinuity in  municipal  administrative  policy  whatever 
may  be  the  law.  Continuity  in  municipal  admin- 
istration is  more  necessary,  perhaps,  than  in  any 
other  part  of  the  government.  So  much  work  is 
being  devolved  upon  the  modern  city  that  without 
it  nothing  can  be  undertaken  and  pursued  to  a 
successful  conclusion.  In  this  respect  it  is  that  a 
municipal  corporation  resembles  a  business  cor- 
poration. Changes  in  party  feeling  affect  it  less 
than  in  the  case  of  the  state  or  national  govern- 
ment, or,  at  any  rate,  should  affect  it  less  in  a  well- 
organized  system  of  municipal  government.  Pro- 
vision for  the  partial  renewal  of  the  council  every 
one  or  two  years  is  all  the  provision  that  is  neces- 
sary for  voicing  the  wishes  of  the  municipal 
population. 

But  whatever  may  be  our  conclusion  on  this 
point,  the  important  thing  in  municipal  organiza- 

1  For  the  details,  see  supra,  p.  213. 


246  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

tion  is  the  determination  of  the  position  of  the 
municipal  council.  Short  terms  may  answer  the 
purpose  if  the  habit  of  re-election  is  acquired  by 
the  voters.  Whether  a  term  be  legally  long  or 
short,  makes  very  little  difference  in  the  success  of 
municipal  government,  if  the  council,  in  whose 
formation  and  actions  politics  in  the  right  sense  of 
the  word,  not  necessarily  national  or  state  politics, 
but  municipal  politics,  must,  of  necessity,  play  an 
important  role,  does  not  interfere  in  the  daily 
routine  of  administration.  If  it  does  so  interfere, 
administrative  inefficiency  will  inevitably  follow. 
'Let  the  council  be  confined  to  questions  of  policy, 
and  let  the  administration  of  that  policy  be  en- 
1  trusted  to  a  permanent  force  of  officials,  actuated 
by  technical  and  more  or  less  professional  motives, 
and  the  problem  of  municipal  government  is  far 
on  the  way  towards  its  solution.  Whatever  may 
be  the  law  on  the  subject,  that  is  the  actual  condi- 
tion everywhere,  both  in  England  and  Continental 
Europe,  where  municipal  government  is  successful.1 

1  Shaw,  Municipal  Government  in  Great  Britain,  p.  64;  Mu- 
nicipal Government  in  Continental  Europe,  pp.  27,  317. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   CITY   EXECUTIVE 

IN  the  preceding  chapter  the  attempt  has  been 
made  to  show  that  the  existence  of  a  municipal 
council  is  necessary,  both  in  order  to  provide  for 
local  self-government  and  to  keep  politics  out  of 
the  city  administration.  It  has  also  been  shown 
that  if  the  latter  end  is  to  be  attained,  the  council 
must  be  confined  or  confine  itself  to  the  discharge 
of  legislative  functions,  and  that  the  administration 
of  the  municipal  policy  determined  upon  by  the 
council  must  be  entrusted  very  largely  to  the 
mayor,  who,  as  well  as  the  council,  should  be 
elected  by  the  people  of  the  city.  Finally,  it  has 
been  shown  that  the  heads  of  the  city  departments 
should  be  appointed  by  the  mayor  if  it  is  to  be 
expected  that  technical  skill  and  ability  in  these 
positions  will  be  secured.  But  the  best  adminis- 
tration cannot  be  secured  unless  the  further  step 
is  taken  of  assuring  to  such  heads  of  departments 
permanence  of  official  tenure.  Up  to  the  present 
time  the  average  American  municipal  charter  has 
not  laid  any  stress  upon  such  permanence  of  ten- 
ure. Nor  do  any  of  the  most  recent  municipal 
247 


248  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

charters  evince  any  desire  to  secure  it,  by  the  way  in 
which  the  various  executive  departments  have  been 
organized.  Indeed,  it  would  seem  that  the  newer 
municipal  Charters,  with  the  end  in  view  of  secur- 
ing popular  government,  attempt  to  prevent  the 
appointment  of  permanent  heads  of  departments. 
Certainly  the  requirement  so  commonly  found  in 
them,  that  the  heads  of  departments  are  to  be  ap- 
pointed by  each  incoming  mayor,  practically  makes 
it  impossible  for  any  such  permanence  of  tenure 
to  develop. 

The  reasons  for  this  failure  to  secure  perma- 
nence in  official  tenure  are  two :  In  the  first  place, 
the  people  of  the  United  States  have  never  looked 
with  favor  on  permanence  of  tenure  for  officers 
who  have  to  exercise  great  discretion ;  and  conse- 
quently nothing  in  the  shape  of  an  educated  official 
service  has  been  able,  to  develop.  The  theory  of 
legislative  centralization  so  characteristic  of  the 
English  system  of  government  has  had,  as  its  corol- 
lary, that  a  great  deal  of  discretion  in  the  administra- 
tion of  the  mandates  of  the  central  legislature  is  to 
be  allowed  to  the  officers  who  are  to  enforce  such 
mandates,  and  that  these  officers  are  to  be  sub- 
jected to  a  continuous  local  popular  control.  The 
large  administrative  discretion  necessary  in  such  a 
system  of  government  is  made  possible  by  the 
complete  administrative  decentralization  by  which 
this  legislative  centralization  has  always  been 
accompanied.  The  execution  of  the  law  is  thus 


THE   CITY  EXECUTIVE  249 

almost  as  political  in  character  as  its  making.  The 
principle  of  "  rotation  in  office  "  has  been  the  re- 
sult, since  through  it  the  localities  obtained  the 
opportunity  which  under  a  system  of  legislative 
centralization  they  would  otherwise  have  been 
denied,  of  adapting  the  general  law  to  varying 
local  conditions.  The  principle  of  rotation  in 
office  has  always  been  the  scientific  foundation,  so 
far  as  there  has  been  any,  of  the  spoils  system.  • 
Such  a  method  of  obtaining  local  government  has 
undoubtedly  worked  reasonably  well  in  simple  ad- 
ministrative conditions  where  technical  skill  and 
experience  were  not  needed.  But  just  so  soon  as 
these  qualities  are  required,  as  they  are  in  all  cases 
where  administrative  conditions  are  at  all  complex, 
the  system  of  rotation  in  office  is  productive  of 
evil  results  if  applied  to  any  positions  which  are. 
not  really  positions  of  the  greatest  discretion.- 
These  evil  results  are  particularly  marked  in  the 
complex  administrative  systems  of  our  municipali- 
ties and  our  national  government,  wherever  the 
principle  of  rotation  in  office  has  been  adopted. 
Vigorous  and  indeed  partially  successful  efforts 
have  been  made  to  abandon  the  principle  of  rota- 
tion in  office,  but  up  to  the  present  time  those 
efforts  have  been  directed  almost  entirely  towards 
the  lower  branches  of  the  service,  branches  with 
almost  altogether  clerical  and  ministerial  functions. 
Nowhere  has  the  Civil  Service  Reform  movement 
had,  either  as  its  avowed  purpose  or  its  actual  re- 


25O  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

suit,  the  formation  of  a  permanent  service  whose 
functions  were  at  all  discretionary  in  character. 
The  main  efforts  of  the  Civil  Service  Reform 
movement  have  been,  however,  directed  towards 
the  reform  of  the  national  and  central  state  ser- 
vices, although  in  a  few  instances  the  attempt  has 
been  made  to  reach  the  municipal  service.  But 
where  the  municipal  service  has  been  the  object 
of  attack,  the  same  principles  have  been  advocated 
as  in  the  case  of  the  national  service. 

How  far  now  does  the  municipal  resemble  the 
national  service  ?  Is  it  organized  on  the  same 
principles  ?  An  examination  of  municipal  condi- 
tions will  show  that  it  is  not,  so  far  as  the  city 
is  not  an  agent  of  the  central  state  government. 
While  too  much  stress  is  often  laid  on  the  busi- 
ness side  of  municipal  activity,  and  too  little  on  its 
governmental  side,  it  is  none  the  less  true  that 
while  in  the  case  of  the  national  and  central  state 
government,  the  governmental  or  sovereign  side 
of  its  activity  is  the  predominant  one,  in  the  case 
of  the  municipality  it  is  the  technical  non-political 
work  which  gives  the  tone  to  its  government.  In 
the  national  government,  further,  it  is  generally 
the  case  that  what  technical  work  is  done  is  at- 
tended to  by  a  personnel  which  has  considerable 
permanence  of  tenure,  although  the  political  work 
is  superintended  by  officers  who  change  with  each 
administration.  We  have,  however,  in  this  respect, 
as  in  so  many  others,  transferred  to  city  government 


THE   CITY  EXECUTIVE 

the  ideas  which  have  been  obtained  from  a  con- 
sideration of  the  national  government.  We  have 
likened  the  heads  of  city  executive  departments  to 
the  heads  of  the  national  executive  departments, 
have  given  them  in  our  latest  municipal  charters 
a  position  similar  to  the  heads  of  the  national  exec- 
utive departments.  Indeed,  the  system  of  munici- 
pal government  to  be  found  in  the  latest  important 
municipal  charters,  as,  for  example,  that  of  Cleve- 
land, is  spoken  of  as  the  "  Federal  System."  But 
inasmuch  as  the  position  of  the  city,  apart  from 
its  character  as  an  agent  of  the  central  state  gov- 
ernment, is  quite  different  from  that  of  the  national 
government,  any  system  of  municipal  government 
which  is  based  on  the  principles  obtaining  in  our 
national  government  is  seen  to  be  based  on  a 
totally  false  analogy.  Permanence  of  tenure  is 
not  demanded  of  the  heads  of  the  national  ex- 
ecutive departments,  for  the  reason  that  their 
functions  are  mainly  political  in  character.  Per- 
manence of  tenure  is  not  demanded  of  city  exec- 
utive departments  in  the  "federal  system"  of 
municipal  government,  although  many  of  them 
have  no  political  functions  at  all  to  discharge, 
while  others  who  may  have  a  few  political  func- 
tions find  their  main  work  in  superintending  the 
technical  and  professional  work  which  in  the 
national  system  of  administration  is  in  the  hands 
of  a  comparatively  permanent  force.  It  is,  of 
course,  true  that  at  present  not  all  such  technical 


252  MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 

work  attended  to  by  the  national  government  is  in 
the  hands  of  permanent  officials.     This  is  due  to 
the  intrusion  of  the  spoils  system,  which  has  not 
even  yet  been   totally  abandoned.      But   does  it 
follow  because  the  analogy  on  which  the  "  federal 
system "   of  municipal  government  is  based  is  a 
false  one,  that  the  principles  which  are  supposedly 
applicable    to   the   national   government   are   not 
applicable  to  municipal  government,  and  do  not 
have  advantageous   results  when   there   applied  ? 
It  must   be  admitted   they  are  from  the   purely 
theoretical  point  of  view  quite  inapplicable.     Any  • 
system  of  organizing  the  city  executive  is  disad-  • 
vantageous  whose  necessary  result  must  be  to  pre-  . 
vent  permanence  of  tenure  for  officers  who  are  to 
direct  the  administration  of  technical  and  complex  • 
undertakings.     The  only  excuse  for  the  deliberate  • 
adoption  of  such  a  system  is  the  fact  that  these 
officers  are  not  engaged  alone  in  the  discharge  of 
technical  duties,  but  have  at  the  same  time  most  • 
important   political   duties   to   perform.      If   they* 
have  such  political  duties  to  perform  as  they  have  • 
in  most  American  cities,  in  accordance  with  the  • 
mistaken  American  system  of  municipal  organiza-  * 
tion,  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  they  change  • 
with  each  mayor,  or,  at  any  rate,  that  each  new  • 
mayor  be  given  the  opportunity  to  cause  such  a  • 
change. 

Permanent  heads  of  departments  were  provided 
in  the  scheme  of  municipal  government  which  took 


THE   CITY  EXECUTIVE  253 

from  the  city  council  its  political  functions.  This 
plan,  which  was  adopted  in  the  middle  of  this 
century,  has  been  denominated  the  "  board  sys- 
tem," although  the  name  does  not  give  an  exact 
idea  of  its  purpose.  By  this  plan  of  municipal 
government  boards  were  formed  for  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  various  branches  of  municipal  activ- 
ity. They  were  so  constituted  that  generally  the 
terms  of  the  various  members  of  which  they  were 
composed  did  not  expire  simultaneously,  and  thus 
it  was  impossible  for  each  mayor  to  form  entirely 
new  boards.  The  main  reason  for  the  adoption 
of  this  system  was  not  so  much  that  the  func- 
tions discharged  were  deliberative  in  character, 
and  therefore  required  the  formation  of  delibera- 
tive bodies,  that  is,  boards,  for  their  attention,  but 
because  continuity  of  administrative  policy  was 
needed.  But  it  is  also  true  that  where  the  council 
had  lost  its  political  functions,  that  is,  the  power 
to  determine  the  municipal  policy,  these  boards 
had  to  discharge  not  merely  administrative,  but 
also  political  functions.  They  had  not  merely  to 
determine  the  municipal  policy,  so  far  as  that  was 
a  matter  of  local  determination.  They  had  also 
state  political  functions  to  discharge,  either  as  a 
result  of  the  direct  grant  to  them  of  such  func- 
tions by  the  legislature,  or  as  the  result  of  the  fact 
that  they  had  in  their  hands  the  uncontrolled  exe- 
cution within  the  municipal  district  of  laws  general 
in  character  and  of  vital  interest  to  the  state  at  large. 


254  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

The  struggle  between  the  desire  for  popular 
control  of  municipal  government  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  desire  for  permanent  administration  on 
the  other,  is  perhaps  more  marked  in  the  adminis- 
trative history  of  Brooklyn  and  New  York  than 
elsewhere.  Brooklyn  was  one  of  the  first  cities  to 
insist  upon  a  popular  control  over  municipal  ad- 
ministration, and  obtained  it  in  the  present  charter, 
which  not  merely  makes  almost  all  of  the  heads  of 
departments  appointees  of  the  mayor,  but  also  in- 
sists on  the  principle  that  each  mayor  shall  at  the 
beginning  of  his  term  have  the  power  to  appoint 
the  heads  of  almost  all  of  the  departments.  New 
York,  on  the  other  hand,  whose  government  was 
more  complex,  for  quite  a  time  after  Brooklyn  had 
obtained  her  new  charter,  laid  stress  on  the  idea 
of  permanence  in  administration ;  and  provided 
she  secured  that,  was  content  to  live  under  a 
system  of  government  which  was  not  so  popular 
in  character.  Several  years  after  Brooklyn  had 
adopted  her  system  of  popular  government,  New 
York  was  forced,  however,  to  succumb  to  the  de- 
mand for  a  similar  system.  It  is  true  that  this 
demand  was  preceded  by  a  revolution  at  the  polls 
unexampled  perhaps  in  her  history,  caused  by  the 
fact  that  the  party  which  had,  in  the  few  years 
immediately  preceding  1894,  gradually  got  control 
of  all  departments  of  the  city  government,  had 
been  shown  to  be  woefully  unworthy  of  confi- 
dence. The  necessity  of  a  permanent  administra- 


THE   CITY  EXECUTIVE  2$$ 

tive  policy  had  been  so  fully  recognized,  that  it  is 
doubtful  whether  the  demand  for  popular  govern- 
ment would  have  been  strong  enough  to  secure 
the  result,  had  it  not  been  for  the  extraordinary 
condition  of  affairs  existing  at  that  time.  And  it 
yet  remains  to  be  seen  whether  in  the  long  run 
the  new  plan  will  be  as  successful  as  the  old  in 
the  peculiar  conditions  of  New  York  metropolitan 
affairs.  Popular  government  will,  it  is  true,  have 
been  made  possible,  but  permanent  administration 
will  have  been  made  much  more  difficult  of  attain- 
ment. 

Not  only  is  permanence  of  administrative  policy 
made  difficult  under  the  "federal  system,"  but 
also  in  our  present  conditions,  general  politics 
have  a  greater  effect  on  the  lower  branches  of 
the  administrative  service,  as  a  direct  result  of  the 
frequent  changes  in  the  heads  of  departments 
which  the  "  federal  system  "  would  seem  to  neces- 
sitate. £lhe  great  advantage  of  the  "  federal  sys- 
tern,"  however,  is  the  more  clearly  cut  responsibility 
of  all  officers  under  it,  and  their  greater  amena- 
bility to  the  popular  wilL^If  some  means  might 
be  devised  to  insure  that  the  people  would  be  gov- 
erned in  municipal  elections  more  than  they  are 
at  present  by  municipal  considerations,  such  a  sys- 
tem might  be  found  to  work  reasonably  success- 
fully. If,  however,  the  election  of  every  mayor  is 
to  be  determined  exclusively  or  mainly  by  consid- 
erations of  national  or  state  politics,  it  is  ques- 


256  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

/ 

tionable  whether  the  "federal  system  "  with  its 
frequent  changes,  not  only  in  the  mayor's  office, 
but  also  in  the  various  executive  departments  of 
the  city,  notwithstanding  the  greater  powers  given 
to  the  people  under  it,  will  result  permanently  so 
advantageously  to  the  city  as  the  board  system, 
which,  with  all  its  faults,  made  possible  a  perma- 
nent administrative  policy  for  the  city,  and  thus 
tended  to  diminish  the  influence  of  state  and 
national  politics  on  municipal  affairs. 

The  second  reason  for  the  adoption  in  munici- 
pal government  of  the  "  Federal "  idea  is  intimately 
connected  with  the  first,  and  is  to  be  found  in  the 
fact  that  the  former  powers  of  the  council  had  been 
so  generally  taken  f^om  it.  The  refusal  of  the 
council  to  confine  itself  to  political  and  legislative 
matters,  and  its  interference  in  administrative  mat- 
ters had  led  to  the  introduction  of  politics  into 
the  administration.  The  disgust  of  the  people  at 
seeing  their  municipal  government  so  completely 
dominated  by  state  and  national  politics,  caused 
them  to  all  but  destroy  the  council  on  which  they  • 
laid  the  blame.  Had  they,  instead,  insisted  upon 
a  more  nearly  complete  distinction  than  has  yet 
been  made  between  legislation  and  administration, 
it  is  believed  that  greater  benefit  would  have  re- 
sulted. As  has  been  pointed  out,  the  destruction 
of  the  council  has,  in  those  cases  in  which  it  has 
been  accomplished,  had  the  result  of  again  con- 
fusing  political  or  legislative  and  administrative 


THE   CITY  EXECUTIVE 

functions.      Formerly  it   was   the   council   which 
discharged   both   such   functions;    now  it   is   the  > 
heads  of  the  city  departments.     The  present  sys-  ^ 
tern  may  have  the  advantage  over  the  former  in  % 
that  the   responsibility    for    maladministration    is 
more    clearly    defined.      Further,    the    fact   that  * 
fewer  officers  are  elected,  that  where  the  mayor  ' 
appoints  the  other  important  municipal   officers,  . 
he  is  the  only  elected  municipal  officer,  makes  it 
easier  for  the  municipal  citizen  to  cast  his  vote 
intelligently.     It  may  also  be  necessary  that  we 
go  through  this  period  of  absolute  monarchy,  so 
to    speak,   before   we    can    reach   really   popular 
municipal  government.     But  that  it  is  a  perma- 
nent form  of  municipal  government  may  well  be 
doubted.     Under  it  we  obtain  neither  local  auton-  • 
omy  nor  permanent,  and  therefore  efficient,  admin- 
istration.     The  ideal  municipal  system  is  based  on 
both  of  these  principles.      Not  merely  the  ideal 
system,   from    the    point   of   view   of   theoretical 
speculation,  but  the   ideal   system   now  existing. 
Such  a  system,  either  as  a  result  of  positive  law, 
or  of  the  habits  of  the  people,  makes  provision  for 
a  body,  elected  by  popular  vote,  and  easily  con- 
trolled by  the  local  popular  will,  which  determines 
the  policy  of  the  city,  and  for  a  permanent  admin- 
istrative force,  permanent  not  merely  in  the  lower 
ranks,  but  permanent  as  well,  so  far  as  the  direct- 
ing heads  are  concerned,  which  carries  out  the 
policy  determined  by  the  popular  body.     No  sys- 


: 


258  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

tern  of  municipal  government  which  does  not,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  however  the  desired  result  may 
be  accomplished,  do  this,  can  be  regarded  as  suc- 
cessful. Such  a  result  cannot,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  be  obtained  under  the  prevailing  system 
of  municipal  government  in  the  United  States. 
On  account  of  this  fact  the  "federal  system," 
which,  it  must  be  confessed,  has,  until  very 
recently,  had  a  continually  increasing  number  of 
admirers,  must  be  condemned.  As  has  been  said, 
it  may  be  necessary,  as  absolute  monarchy  with  all 
its  abuses  was  once  necessary.  But  like  absolute 
monarchy,  it  is  necessary  only  as  a  stage  in  our 
development,  through  which  we  must  pass  on 
our  way  towards  the  ideal. 

Conceding,  then,  that  the  heads  of  the  city  de- 
partments should  be  permanent  in  tenure,  how 
shall  they  be  formed?  Shall  they  be  single 
heads,  or  boards  ?  This  question  has  usually  been 
discussed  simply  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
character  of  the  functions  discharged,  and  the 
responsibility  for  the  correct  discharge  of  those 
functions.  The  "board  system"  seems  to  have 
been  introduced  at  about  the  time  that  the  coun- 
cil began  to  lose  its  powers.  The  fact  that  the 
powers  which  the  council  lost  were  mainly  delib- 
erative in  character  made  it  practically  necessary 
to  organize  the  authorities  to  which  these  powers 
were  to  be  entrusted,  in  such  a  way  that  delibera- 
tion in  action  on  their  part  might  be.  assured. 


THE    CITY  EXECUTIVE  259 

This  made  the  establishment  of  boards  seem 
necessary,  or  at  any  rate  advisable.  In  many 
cases  also  the  fact  that  the  branches  of  adminis- 
tration for  which  these  departments,  independent 
of  the  council,  were  constituted  interested  the 
state  as  a  whole,  like  the  Police,  Public  Health, 
and  the  School  Administrations,  also  made  it 
necessary  to  adopt  the  board  form.  For,  as  has 
been  pointed  out,  the  general  administrative  sys- 
tem of  the  state  was  very  decentralized,  and  the 
people  of  the  locality  represented  in  the  boards 
had,  under  such  a  system,  really  very  large 
powers  of  adapting  the  general  laws  to  local 
conditions.  These  boards  had  practically  quasi 
legislative  powers.  Another  consideration  that 
made  the  formation  of  boards  necessary  was  the 
fact  that  partisan  politics  had  for  various  reasons 
crept  into  the  administration.  As  the  two  larg- 
est parties  were  comparatively  equal  in  strength, 
and  as  these  executive  departments,  as  has  been 
pointed  out,  had  great  influence  on  the  adminis- 
tration of  general  laws,  it  seemed  advisable  to 
attempt  to  provide  for  a  recognition  of  both  politi- 
cal parties,  on  the  heads  of  these  departments. 
This  could  be  accomplished  only  by  the  adoption 
of  the  board  form  of  organization.  The  fact, 
however,  that  responsibility  for  administration 
under  the  board  form  is  diffused,  has  of  recent 
years  tended  to  discredit  it,  and  the  more  recent 
charters  show  a  decided  tendency  to  abandon  it 


MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

and  resort  to  single-headed  departments.  But 
while  a  proper  arrangement  of  municipal  organi- 
zation might  succeed  in  making  boards  unneces- 
sary, from  the  point  of  view  of  the  character  of 
the  functions  of  executive  departments,  since  by  it 
legislative  functions  could  be  given  to  the  council, 
and  executive  functions  to  the  mayor  and  the 
departments  ;  and  while  undoubtedly  the  single- 
headed  system  insures  greater  responsibility,  the 
fact  still  remains  that  there  are  several  reasons 
of  great  weight  why  the  board  form  should  be 
adopted.  These  are,  in  the  first  place,  the  greater 
permanence  of  tenure  in  the  heads  of  the  city 
executive  departments,  which  is  assured  by  the 
board  form.  This  matter  has  been  already  suffi- 
ciently discussed.  The  second  reason  for  the 
adoption  of  the  board  form  is  to  be  found  in 
the  fact  that  it  is  the  only  form  of  organizing  the 
executive  departments  of  the  city  which  really 
makes  permanently  possible  a  popular,  non-pro- 
fessional administration.  It  does  not,  of  course, 
insure  such  administration ;  it  merely  makes  it 
possible,  which  cannot  be  said  of  the  single-headed 
system.  The  single-headed  system  of  organiza- 
tion does,  it  is  true,  make  possible  more  efficient 
administration,  though  it  does  not  insure  it.  It 
makes  it  possible,  however,  only  by  making  im- 
possible a  popular,  non-professional,  permanent 
administration.  These  statements  need,  perhaps, 
further  explanation.  .The  work  in  practically  all 


THE    CITY  EXECUTIVE  26 1 

^executive  departments  of  cities  of  any  size  is  so 
great  in  extent  and  so  complex  in  character  that 
it  can  be  properly  attended  to  by  one  man,  only 
on  the  condition  that  he  devote  his  entire  time 
to  it  during  his  term  of  office.  Certainly  no  one 
man  can  properly  attend  to  the  work  of  a  munici- 
pal department  unless  he  subordinates  all  other 
work  of  a  private  character  to  the  performance  of 
his  official  duties.  Now,  no  man  can  afford  to 
devote  himself  for  any  length  of  time  to  the  per- 
formance of  official  duties  so  absorbing,  unless 
endowed  with  large  private  means  from  which  he 
can  live  without  resort  to  some  regular  occupation 
as  a  means  of  livelihood,  or  unless  the  emolu- 
ments of  office  are  quite  large,  and  the  experience 
derived  from  the  performance  of  official  duties  is 
going  to  be  of  aid  to  him  in  his  future  career. 
The  result  is  either  that  a  permanent  official  class 
must  be  developed  under  the  single-headed  sys- 
tem, or  else  the  offices  are  monopolized  by  the 
well-to-do  classes  of  people.  The  latter  result  is 
hardly  consistent  with  a  popular  democratic  gov- 
ernment; the  former  means  either  a  permanent 
professional  bureaucracy,  or  that  the  offices  are 
filled  by  a  set  of  men  who  make  politics  their 
profession,  obtaining  their  livelihood  from  the 
emoluments  of  the  various  offices  which  they  fill, 
one  after  the  other,  and  which,  because  they  do 
not  occupy  them  for  any  length  of  time,  and  be- 
cause they  have  not  received  any  adequate  train- 


262  MUNICIPAL   PROBLEMS 

ing,  —  if  they  have  received  any  training  at  all,  — 
they  are  really  not  competent  to  fill.  This  last 
result  is  what  has  followed,  in  the  average  Ameri- 
can city,  —  the  adoption  of  the  single-headed  form 
of  organizing  the  executive  departments.  It  is 
unquestionably  true  that  the  majority  of  impor- 
tant offices  in  the  city  of  to-day  in  the  United 
States  are  filled  in  the  long  run  by  what  are  com- 
monly termed  "  political  hacks  "  ;  that  is,  men  who 
get  their  living  out  of  politics,  who,  if  they  do  not 
resort  to  other  and  illegitimate  methods  of  obtain- 
ing money,  and  are  not  well-to-do,  must  get  their 
living  out  of  the  salaries  which  are  attached,  and 
must  be  attached,  to  the  offices.  They  are,  in 
fact,  the  only  men  to  whom  we  can  look  under  the 
present  system  to  take  office  permanently.  The 
present  mayor  of  the  city  of  New  York  has  more  • 
than  once  publicly  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  • 
he  was  unable  to  persuade  the  business  and  pro-, 
fessional  men  of  the  city  to  take  office. .  Nor  can 
we  blame  the  business  and  professional  classes  of 
the  community  for  the  attitude  they  assume.  Few 
men  can  afford  to  leave  their  regular  occupations 
for  four,  or  even  two,  years,  and  devote  the  greater 
part  of  their  time  and  energy  during  even  the 
shorter  period  to  the  performance  of  official 
duties.  That  once  in  a  while  such  a  man  does  do 
so,  and,  as  is  often  the  case,  meets  with  extraordi- 
nary success,  as  did  the  late  Commissioner  of 
Public  Works  of  Brooklyn,  is  rather  an  evidence 


THE    CITY  EXECUTIVE  263 

of  exceptional  public  spirit  and  a  keen  sense  of 
duty  than  evidence  of  the  excellence  of  the  gen- 
eral system,  which  ordinarily  produces  quite  the 
contrary  results. 

Such   are   then   almost    inevitably   the   results, k 
under  our  present  political  conditions,  of  the  single-  " 
headed  system  of  municipal  executive  departments.   ' 
It  would  be  possible  by  attaching  large  salaries  to- 
the  important  offices  in  the  large  cities,  and   by 
making  the  terms  of  the  office  much  longer,  pref-' 
erably  during  good  behavior,  to  develop  a  really, 
professional  service.    If  single-headed  departments" 
are  to  be  retained,  —  and  that  the  system  has  much 
in  its  favor,  cannot  be  denied,  — that  is  what  should' 
be  done.  '  If  it  were  done,  it  would  be  possible  to  <• 
demand  of  the  incumbents  the  previous  training* 
necessary  to  fit  them  for  the  arduous  and  com-- 
plex  duties  they  are  to  perform.     We  should  then* 
frankly  recognize  what  is  actually  at  the  present* 
time  the  case,  that  these  positions,  i.e.  the  heads* 
of  single-headed  departments,  must  be  held  by  a. 
professional  official   class,    and   by   so   doing  we' 
would  do  much  to  elevate  the  plane  of  that  class,' 
both   as   regards   character   and   ability:    By  the 
more   general  introduction  of  properly  organized 
civil  service  reform  methods  in  the  lower  ranks 
of  the  service,  it  ought  to  be  possible  to  prevent 
these    professional    heads   of    departments   from 
building   up    political    machines.      Politics    would 
thereby  be  kept  out  of  administration,  and  admin- 


264  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

istration  itself  raised  from  the  rank  of  a  trade  to 
that  of  a  profession. 

Such  a  permanent  professional  administration, 
however,  would  not  reflect  as  clearly  as  is  desirable 
the  wishes  of  the  people.  No  system  of  adminis- 
tration is  ideally  a  perfect  one  which  is  entirely 
controlled  by  a  professional  official  class.  Munici- 
pal administration  is  so  complex  and  so  wide  in 
extent,  that  it  is  extremely  doubtful  whether,  under 
any  system  of  organizing  the  mayor's  powers,  the 
influence  of  the  mayor,  serving  for  a  short  term 
only  and  depending  upon  permanent,  professional, 
heads  of  departments  for  the  execution  of  the  mu- 
nicipal policy  in  its  details,  would  be  great  enough 
to  make  the  administration  popular  in  character. 
Such  a  popular  administration  can  be  obtained 
only  through  a  board  system  in  which  the  members 
of  the  various  boards  should  not  be  paid  large 
enough  salaries  to  make  official  position  tempting 
as  a  means  of  livelihood.  It  would,  indeed,  prob- 
ably be  better  to  attach  no  emoluments  whatever 
to  these  positions,  in  order  that  the  motives  of 
those  who  assume  these  offices  might  be  absolutely 
unmixed.  No  emoluments  being  attached  to  these 
positions,  persons  desiring  to  obtain  a  livelihood 
out  of  political  life  would  not  be  attracted  to  them, 
provided  some  method  were  adopted,  which  it 
would  seem  is  quite  possible,  of  preventing  the 
incumbents  of  such  positions  from  making  money 
in  illegitimate  ways.  The  existence  of  the  board 


THE   CITY  EXECUTIVE  26$ 

system  would  make  it  possible  for  the  business  and 
professional  classes  of  the  community  to  assume 
the  care  of  the  public  business  without  making  too 
great  personal  sacrifices.  Indeed,  if  it  were  thought 
best,  compulsory  service  as  in  the  case  of  council 
members  might  be  introduced  as  it  has  bee'n  intro- 
duced in  Prussia.  Compulsory  service  as  munici- 
pal  officer  was  formerly  the  rule  in  both  England 
and  the  United  States.  Such  a  provision  would 
not  be  unjust.  For  the  work  of  almost  all  de- 
partments is  of  such  character  that  it  can  be 
subdivided  and  distributed  among  the  various 
members  of  the  boards  at  the  head  of  the  depart- 
ments. The  work  demanded  of  the  members  of 
these  boards  would  be  much  diminished  if  proper 
methods  of  filling  the  higher  subordinate  posi- 
tions were  adopted.  If,  for  example,  the  Public 
Works  Department  of  the  city  were  placed  in  the 
hands  of  a  board  having  under  its  direction  a  com- 
petent engineer  or  engineers  with  permanent  offi- 
cial tenure  who  would  attend  to  the  details  and 
the  purely  technical  work,  there  would  be  left  for 
the  board  itself  merely  questions  of  policy  to  deter- 
mine, which. could  be  given  to  individual  members 
of  the  board  to  attend  to  with  the  aid  of  the  per- 
manent professional  force.  The  individual  board 
members,  by  the  expenditure  of  a  comparatively 
small  amount  of  time,  that  is  as  compared  with 
what  would  be  demanded  of  one  man  responsible 
for  the  entire  work  of  the  department,  would 


266  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

arrange  all  of  the  preliminaries  which  would  have 
to  be  attended  to  before  any  matter  was  decided 
by  a  full  session  of  the  board.  Such  full  sessions 
could  be  held  often  enough  to  attend  efficiently  to 
the  work  of  the  department,  without  making  it 
necessary  for  any  member  of  the  board,  even  if 
account  is  taken  of  the  individual  work  he  would 
do,  to  devote  all  of  his  time,  or  even  a  large  part 
of  his  time,  to  the  public  business,  to  the  detri- 
ment of  his  private  affairs. 

•  Such  a  method  of  organizing  the  heads  of  mu- 
nicipal departments  not  only  makes  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  municipal  policy  popular  in  character, 
but  it  also  has  the  great  advantage  of  awakening 
and  keeping  alive  local  public  spirit.  The  mere  fact 
that  it  calls  into  public  service  a  large  number  of 
men  who  are  not  in  public  life  for  what  they  can 
get  out  of  it,  tends  to  form  numerous  centres  from 
which  will  radiate  the  best  sort  of  political  influ- 
ences, influences  which  will  be  continuously  at 
work  for  the  amelioration  of  municipal  conditions. 
If  combined  with  such  a  method  of  organizing  the 
heads  of  municipal  departments  there  are  adopted 
proper  methods  of  appointing,  not  merely  the  cleri- 
cal and  ministerial  force  of  the  departments,  but 
also  the  higher  subordinates  who  ought  to  have  a 
professional  and  technical  training,  we  shall  have 
not  only  a  popular  administration,  which  will  en- 
courage the  development  of  public  spirit,  we  shall 
have  also  a  most  efficient  administration. 


THE   CITY  EXECUTIVE  267 

Not  only  is  the  board  system,  when  properly 
organized,  theoretically  the  most  advantageous 
method  of  constituting  the  heads  of  municipal  de- 
partments in  all  cities,  including  even  the  largest,  but 
it  is  practically  the  only  one  which  can  be  adopted 
in  the  smaller  cities.  The  financial  resources  of  the 
smaller  cities  are  not  sufficient  to  permit  them  to 
pay  salaries  for  these  positions.  But  even  in  the 
smaller  cities  the  work  of  one  department  is  too 
much  usually  to  allow  the  demand  to  be  made  of 
any  one  man  that  he  attend  to  it  without  compen- 
sation. If  the  demand  is  made,  the  result  will  be 
that  no  one  who  is  engaged  in  a  regular  occupa- 
tion will  seek  the  offices,  which  will  be  monopo- 
lized by  those  who  are  either  possessed  of  means 
or  hope  to  reimburse  themselves,  for  the  time  they 
spend  in  the  public  service,  through  illegitimate 
means.  This  consideration  had  such  weight  with 
the  commission  appointed  to  draw  up  a  charter  for 
cities  of  the  third  class  of  the  state  of  New  York 
that  they  provided  in  the  form  of  charter  sub- 
mitted to  the  legislature  boards  for  most  of  the 
departments  for  such  cities. 

•"  Finally,  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  the  board  system 
is  the  system  adopted  everywhere  where  municipal 
government  has  been  the  most  successful.  It  is 
the  method  of  organizing  executive  departments 
adopted  in  England,  France,  and  Germany.  In 
England,  as  has  already  been  intimated,  the  heads 
of  municipal  departments  are  the  committees  of  the 


268  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

city  council,  generally  presided  over  by  aldermen, 
who,  it  will  be  remembered,  have  longer  terms  of 
office  than  the  city  councillors,  who  are  the  other 
members  of  the  boards.     In  France  the  same  is 
true,  there  being  a  committee  for  each  department 
at  the  head  of  which  is  the  deputy  of  the  mayor, 
elected  by  the  council  but  assigned  to  the  particu- 
lar department   by  the  mayor.  ^  The  only  differ-  * 
ence  between  the    French   and  the  English  sys- . 
terns  is  that  in  the  former  the  committee,  with  a  . 
deputy  at  its  head,  is  subordinate  to  the  mayor, 
while  in  England  it  is  subordinate  to  the  coun- 
cil.   In  one  case  the  mayor  and  in  the  other  the 
council  has  the  final  power  of  decision.     In  Ger- 
many, however,  the  system  is  somewhat  different 
in  detail,  although  the  principle  of  boards  is  just 
as   universally  adopted.      Here  the  heads  of  de-« 
partments  are  commissions  formed  of  two  distinct* 
elements  :  first,  the  professional ;  and,  second,  they 
non-professional   element.     The   professional  ele-» 
ment  is  to  be  found  in  officers  who  have  had  both' 
a  professional   training  and  often   long   practical, 
experience,  and  who  make  the  administration  of 
municipal   government  their  sole   occupation  and 
find  in  it  their  means  of  livelihood.  They  are,  how- 
ever, chosen  by  the  council  for  long  terms,  if  not 
for  life,  and  must  be  in  most  cases   approved  by 
the  central  administration.     There  is  usually  one . 
of  these  officers  for  each  of  the  departments,  and 
the  administrative  routine  of   the  department  is 


THE    CITY  EXECUTIVE  269 

attended  to  by  him.  The  non-professional  element 
is  to  be  found  in  persons,  either  members  of  the 
council,  or  outsiders  chosen  by  the  council  for  a 
fixed  term,  generally  six  years,  who  are  obliged  to 
serve  for  at  least  three  years  consecutively,  and 
who  act  without  pay.  The  heads  of  departments 
so  organized  are  somewhat  after  the  French 
method,  subordinated  to  the  municipal  executive, 
which  consists  either  of  one  man,  where  the  burgo- 
master system  is  adopted,  or  the  town  executive 
board  (Magistratsrath\  which  is  the  commoner 
method  of  organizing  the  municipal  executive. 
While  the  three  systems  are  alike  in  that  the  work 
of  the  departments  is  carried  on  by  boards  largely 
composed  of  and  absolutely  controlled  by  non- 
professional,  unpaid  members,  and  subordinated 
to  some  common  head,  in  England  the  council,  in 
France  and  Germany  the  executive,  they  differ 
so  far  as  the  relations  of  the  professional  officers 
to  the  heads  of  the  departments  are  concerned. 
In  France  and  England  such  permanent  paid  pro- 
fessional officials  attending  to  administrative  rou- 
tine are  subordinates  of  the  heads  of  departments. 
In  Germany,  however,  they  not  only  attend  to  the 
administrative  routine,  but  are,  as  well,  members  of 
the  boards  themselves.  This  last  fact  is  character- 
istic of  the  entire  Prussian  administrative  system. 
This  method  of  combining  professional  officials 
and  honorary  officials  in  the  same  authority  intro- 
duced into  municipal  administration  by  the  re- 


2/0  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

forms  of  Stein  in  1808,  has  been  extended  by  the  * 
local  government  reforms  of  the  last  twenty-five 
years  to  all  parts  of  the  local  government  system. 
As  care  is  taken  to  give  the  non-professional  ele- 
ment the  actual  control,  the  system  is  essentially 
popular  in  character  and  is  kept  from  becoming 
bureaucratic,  but  the  presence  in  the  administrative 
authorities  of  professional  trained  officials  serving 
for  long  terms  does  much  to  make  the  administra- 
tion efficient  since  it  puts  at  the  disposal  of  the 
administrative  bodies  large  technical  knowledge 
and  wide  experience.  The  Prussian  local  govern-' 
ment  system,  while  of  great  complexity,  is  still  of 
great  interest,  not  only  on  this  account,  but  because 
it  is  one  of  the  latest  developments.  Its  success  ¥ 
will  go  far  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  proper  com- 
bination both  of  centralization  and  local  govern- 
ment and  of  bureaucracy  and  self-government. 

Finally,  if  an  examination  is  to  be  made  of  the  » 
ordinary  method  of  organizing  the  educational 
administration  in  the  American  cities,  which  must 
be  regarded  on  the  whole  as  one  of  the  most 
successful  branches  of  American  municipal  ad- 
ministration, it  will  be  found  that  the  board  system 
is  adopted.1  At  the  head  of  the  administration 
of  the  schools  is  to  be  found  a  school  board,  or 

1  In  New  York  city  it  is  true  that  the  administration  of  schools 
has  given  rise  to  considerable  dissatisfaction.  This  has  been  due, 
however,  not  so  much  to  the  board  form  of  organization  as  to  the 
failure  to  concentrate  the  responsibility  in  one  board.  Indeed,  the 


THE    CITY  EXECUTIVE 


board  of  education,  whose  members  are  elected 
or  appointed  in  various  ways,  and  under  this 
board,  which  concerns  itself  with  the  general 
policy  of  the  schools,  is  to  be  found  a  more  or 
less  professional  force,  with  the  Superintendent  of" 
Schools  at  its  head,  which  under  the  directions 
of  the  Board  of  Education  conduct  the  common' 
schools.-  This  has  had  the  result,  as  every  one 
knows,  of  allowing  politics,  that  is  state  and 
national  politics,  to  have  much  less  influence  over 
the  schools  than  they  have  over  the  other  branches 
of  city  administration  ;  and  it  has  also  had  the 
effect  of  keeping  alive  the  interest  of  the  people 
in  the  schools,  which  are  unquestionably  con- 
sidered one  of  the  most,  if  not  the  most,  impor- 
tant branch  of  municipal  administration,  and  in 
the  proper  maintenance  of  which  the  people  of 
almost  every  city  of  the  United  States  take  the 
greatest  pride.  It  is  also  to  be  noticed  that  often,  - 
in  those  cities  in  whose  organization  the  single-1 
headed  system  predominates,  when  any  great- 
public  work  is  to  be  undertaken  for  whose  suc- 
cessful prosecution  a  continuous  policy  is  desir- 
able, the  work  is  entrusted,  not  to  the  single  head 
of  the  department  of  public  works,  but  to  a 
special  commission  or  board  whose  members  have 
long  terms  of  office.  Such,  e.g.,  was  done  in  New 

recent  attempts  at  reform  have  not  been  directed  towards  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  board  form,  but  rather  towards  the  abolition  of  the  local 
boards  and  the  concentration  of  all  powers  in  the  central  board. 


2/2  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

York  in  the  case  of  the  aqueduct  and  also  in  the 
case  of  rapid  transit.  *  What  is  this  but  a  recogni- 
tion of  the  value  of  the  board  form  in  securing 
permanence  of  tenure  and  continuity  of  adminis- 
trative policy  ?  * 

All  that  remains  to  be  said  relative  to  the  organi- 
zation of  the  heads  of  the  municipal  departments 
concerns  their  relation  to  the  chief  executive.  As 
the  relation  of  the  mayor  to  the  council  has  already 
been  discussed,  what  has  been  said  relative  to  the 
mayor  in  that  connection  will,  when  taken  in  con- 
nection with  what  will  now  be  said  relative  to  his 
relations  to  the  executive  department,  be  sufficient 
to  determine  his  position  in  the  municipal  organi- 
zation. Two  great  defects  in  the  municipal 
organization,  which  has  gradually  sprung  up  in 
this  country  as  a  result  of  the  disintegration  of 
the  formerly  all-powerful  city  council,  are  the 
diffusion  of  responsibility  for  municipal  adminis- 
tration and  the  lack  of  harmony  in  the  action  of 
municipal  authorities.  It  has  been  shown  that  the 
assumption  by  the  state  legislature  of  the  power 
to  organize  the  various  municipal  executive  depart- 
ments has  resulted  in  the  formation  of  a  series  of 
departments  subordinated  to  no  common  superior, 
and  each  acting  very  largely  in  the  management 
of  municipal  business,  in  accordance  with  its  own 
notions  of  what  is  proper  and  expedient.  That 
such  a  system  has  been  productive  of  evil  results 
may  not  be  questioned.  Of  late  years  attempts 


THE    CITY  EXECUTIVE 


2/3 


of  two  kinds  have  been  made  to  decrease  the  in- 
dependence of  these  departments.  In  the  first 
place,  it  has  been  attempted  to  provide  that  the 
mayor,  to  whom  no  general  power  of  removal  is 
usually  given,  shall  have  the  power  to  appoint 
the  heads  of  the  departments  at  the  beginning 
of  his  term,  which  is  usually  a  short  one.  This 
is  the  Brooklyn  plan,  which  has  recently  been 
adopted  as  well  for  New  York.  This%)lan  has,  as 
has  been  pointed  out,  one  very  grave  defect.  It 
practically  makes  permanence  in  tenure  of  the 
heads  of  departments  impossible,  and  thus  effect- 
ually precludes  the  hope  of  obtaining  continuity 
in  municipal  administration.  It  was,  however, 
unavoidable  because  of  the  necessity  of  making 
municipal  administration  popular. 

Sometimes,  however,  as  for  example  in  Boston 
and  Philadelphia,  the  absolute  power  of  removal 
is  given  to  the  mayor  for  all  officers  appointed  by 
him.  In  Philadelphia  such  officers  are  to  serve 
during  the  term  of  the  mayor  appointing  them,  and 
until  their  successors  shall  have  been  appointed. 
This  is  practically  the  Brooklyn  system,  and  is 
open  to  the  same  objections.  In  the  second  place, 
the  attempt  has  been  made  to  secure  unity  and 
harmony  of  action  by  requiring,  in  the  charter,  the 
mayor  to  summon  together  all  heads  of  depart- 
ments at  stated  times.  This  is  provided  in  Phila- 
delphia and  Cleveland.  No  objection  can  be 
advanced  to  such  a  plan,  except  that  if  some  other 


2/4  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

means  be  not  provided  to  secure  harmony  of  ac- 
tion, such  as  some  sort  of  disciplinary  power,  it 
will,  in  many  cases,  be  inefficient.  It  would  seem 
in  the  conditions  of  our  general  administrative 
system,  which  does  not  make  provision  for  any 
disciplinary  power  outside  of  the  power  of  re- 
moval, that  the  mayor  should  be  given  the  power 
of  removal, — not  merely  the  power  to  appoint  new 
officers  at  t^e  beginning  of  his  term,  which  is  a 
practical  recognition  of  the  power  of  removing  the 
appointees  of  his  predecessor,  but  a  power  of  re- 
moval of  a  continuing  character.  Such  a  power 
of  removal  would,  it  is  believed,  have  a  far  better 
influence  in  insuring  permanent  heads  of  depart- 
ments than  a  grant  to  the  mayor  merely  of  the 
power  to  constitute  the  departments  at  the  begin- 
ning of  his  term,  so  as  to  suit  him.  The  temp- 
tation to  any  mayor,  who  is  to  be  held  responsible 
for  the  administration  of  the  city,  to  make  new  ap- 
pointments, is  irresistible.  He  can  never  feel  so 
much  confidence  in  the  appointees  of  his  prede- 
cessor as  he  will  in  persons  whom  he  chooses  him- 
self. If  he  has  no  continuing  power  of  removal, 
he  will  almost  inevitably  make  new  appointments. 
The  continuing  power  of  removal  is  therefore  much 
more  calculated  to  secure  reasonable  permanence 
of  tenure  for  the  heads  of  departments,  than  is  the 
power  merely  to  make  new  appointments  in  the 
beginning  of  each  new  mayor's  term. 

To  such   a   continuing  power  of   removal  two 


THE   CITY  EXECUTIVE  275 

objections  may  be  urged :  in  the  first  place,  our 
past  experience  goes  far  to  show  that  the  absolute 
power  of  removal  is  very  frequently  made  use  of 
for  purely  political  partisan  purposes.  If,  however, 
we  can  so  determine  the  position  of  the  city  and  its 
organization,  that  municipal  government  shall  offer 
fewer  attractions  to  political  parties,  this  objection 
will  lose  much  of  its  force.  The  attempt  has  been 
made  to  show  that  much  can  be  done  »in  this  direc- 
tion. The  other  objection  to  the  continuing  power 
of  removal  is  that  it  will  make  it  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  obtain  the  proper  sort  of  men  as 
heads  of  the  departments.  This  objection  is,  how- 
ever, it  is  believed,  based  on  theory  rather  than  on 
actual  practice.  The  power  of  removal  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States  is  absolute,  but  he 
has  no  difficulty  in  securing  the  services  of  able 
men  and  men  of  high  character  as  heads  of  de- 
partments. The  same  thing  is  true  of  those  cities 
which  have  adopted  the  idea  of  the  absolute  con- 
tinuing power  of  removal..  Further,  if  we  can  once 
get  the  people  to  hold  to  the  view  that  permanence 
of  tenure  is  necessary  for  these  positions,  and  that 
the  principle  of  "  rotation  in  office,"  as  it  is  called, 
must  be  productive  of  evil  results  in  municipal  ad- 
ministration, the  liability  of  arbitrary  removals  will 
be  much  reduced.  Such,  for  example,  is  the  con- 
dition" of  public  opinion  in  England.  The  council, 
a  body  which  cannot  in  the  nature  of  things  feel 
the  same  responsibility  as  an  American  mayor 


2/6  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

feels,  has  absolute  power  of  removal,  but  that  has 
not  had  the  result  of  deterring  men  of  high  char- 
acter from  assuming  positions  of  trust  in  the  city 
government.  It  is  of  course  true  that  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  absolute  power  of  removal  is  not  theo- 
retically necessary.  In  Germany,  for  example,  in 
the  whole  administrative  system,  including  the 
municipal  administration,  the  power  of  arbitrary 
removal  is  unknown.  But  in  place  of  it,  there  has 
been  developed  a  strong  disciplinary  power  which 
may  be  exercised  in  case  a  subordinate  refuses  to 
carry  out  instructions  of  his  superior,  or  is  guilty 
of  any  misconduct  in  office.  This  disciplinary 
power  consists  of  the  power  to  impose  fines,  sus- 
pend from  office,  and  finally  of  a  power  of  removal 
for  cause.  It  is  exercised  by  the  town  executive 
after  a  proceeding  resembling  a  judicial  trial,  and 
appeal  may  be  taken  from  its  decision  to  a  body 
of  a  quasi  judicial  character,  a  body  which,  how- 
ever, is  not  governed  by  the  technical  rules  of  or- 
dinary judicial  procedure.  Some  such  principles 
have  been  introduced  into  our  law,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  adoption  of  the  principle  of  removal  for  cause 
in  the  city  of  New  York.  But  as  appeal  may  be 
taken  from  the  action  of  the  mayor  to  the  courts, 
which  are  governed  very  largely  by  technical  con- 
siderations, they  have  not  had  the  good  results 
that  were  expected  of  them.  In  other  cases  it  has 
been  required  of  the  mayor  that  he  shall  give  the 
person  removed  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  in  his 


THE   CITY  EXECUTIVE  277 

defence,  and  shall  put  on  file  the  reasons  for  his 
action.  Limitations  of  this  sort  would  seem  to  be 
as  large  as  can  with  advantage  be  adopted  in  this 
country.  The  continuing  power  of  removal,  sub- 
ject to  such  limitations,  which  would  decrease  the 
mayor's  actual  power  only  so  as  to  require  that  its 
exercise  be  the  result  of  deliberation  and  of  prob- 
able good  cause,  will,  if  no  emphasis  is  laid  either 
in  the  law,  or  by  public  opinion  upon  the  appoint- 
ment of  new  officers  as  heads  of  departments  by 
each  incoming  mayor,  have  the  advantages  of 
making  possible,  permanence  of  tenure,  and  at 
the  same  time  of  subordinating  all  departments  of 
the  city  government  to  some  common  municipal 
superior. 

The  abandonment  of  the  idea  of  fixed  terms  of 
office  would  also  be  necessary.  For  the  expiration 
of  a  fixed  term  of  office  always  opens  up  the 
question  as  to  the  advisability  of  making  a  change 
in  the  incumbent,  and  exposes  a  mayor  to  the 
temptation  of  making  a  new  appointment.  Fixed 
terms  are  necessary  only  where  there  is  no  power 
of  removal.  If  that  is  given  to  the  mayor,  there  is 
no  excuse  for  a  fixed  term.  Necessary  changes  in 
office  may  be  made  through  the  exercise  of  the 
power  of  removal. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  position  of  the  mayor 
as  outlined  in  what  has  been  said  is  one  of  immense 
importance,  that  the  duties  attached  to  the  office 
will  be  very  arduous.  The  question  may  well  be 


2/8  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

asked :  Will  it  be  possible  to  get  men  of  character 
to  assume  the  position  ?  Will  not  the  same  ob- 
jections which  have  been  shown  to  exist  with  ref- 
erence to  the  single-headed  departments  exist  in 
the  case  of  the  mayor  ?  In  other  words,  can  any 
man  engaged  in  active  business,  or  in  the  carrying 
on  of  a  profession,  be  induced  to  give,  from  the 
time  and  energy  required  by  his  regular  occupation, 
sufficient  time  and  energy  to  perform  the  duties  of 
mayor  properly,  even  during  a  short  term  of  office. 
The  organization  of  the  English  and  German  city 
would  seem  to  indicate  that  the  opinion  of  those 
countries  is  that  this  cannot  be  expected.  In  Eng- 
land, it  will  be  remembered  that  the  council,  of 
which  the  mayor  is  merely  the  president,  is  not 
only  the  legislative,  but  also  in  law  the  adminis- 
trative or  executive  body  of  the  city.  It  is  only 
because  of  an  enlightened  public  opinion  that 
politics  do  not  creep  into  the  administration  of 
municipal  affairs.  The  public  opinion  of  this 
country  not  being  so  intelligent  in  this  respect, 
one  cannot  believe  that  such  a  method  of  solving 
this  question  is  possible  for  the  present,  whatever 
may  be  its  theoretical  advantages.  In  Germany, 
on  the  other  hand,  as  has  been  shown,  the  city 
executive  is  commonly  a  board,  the  members  of 
which  are  assigned  to  the  different  departments, 
while  the  board  itself  supervises  the  actions  of 
these  departments.  The  mayor,  or  burgomaster, 
where  the  board  system  of  city  executive  is  adopted, 


THE   CITY  EXECUTIVE 

is  the  president  of  the  executive  board,  and  is  him- 
self a  professional  officer,  having  a  long  term  of 
office  (if  it  is  not  actually  for  life,  it  may  not  be 
less  than  twelve  years),  receiving  a  large  salary 
and  devoting  his  entire  time  to  municipal  affairs. 
Where  the  board  system  is  not  adopted,  he  is  him- 
self the  city  executive,  and  is  then  also  professional 
in  character.  Such  a  system  has  much  in  its  favor, 
but  it  savors  rather  too  much  of  professionalism  to 
suit  present  public  opinion  in  the  United  States. 
In  France,  however,  we  find  the  mayor  serving 
without  pay,  occupying  a  position  similar  to  the 
position  assigned  to  the  American  mayor  in  what 
has  already  been  said,  a  position  which  the  Ameri- 
can mayor  also  is  rapidly  actually  acquiring  as  a  re- 
sult of  recent  municipal  development  in  the  United 
States.  This  position  both  French  and  American 
experience  would  seem  then  to  show,  is  one  which 
we  can  get  proper  men  to  fill.  The  mayor  is  the 
authority  in  our  municipal  system  which  has  had 
the  most  creditable  record.  The  position  is  one 
of  such  honor  that  it  is  nearly  always  possible  to 
find  some  man  prominent  in  the  business  world 
to  fill  it.  It  is  seldom,  though  it  has  sometimes 
been  the  case,  that  the  mayor  has  been  a  "  politi- 
cal hack."  If  the  reconstitution  of  the  city  depart- 
ments were  not,  as  now  in  this  country,  made  prac- 
tically the  duty  of  each  incoming  mayor,  the  work 
of  the  mayor  would  be  very  much  lightened  and  it 
would  be  easier  than  now  to  get  the  right  men  to 


280  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

assume  the  office.  Of  course,  under  such  a  system 
short  terms  for  the  mayor,  probably  in  no  event 
longer  than  four  years,  and  in  the  majority  of  cases 
no  longer  than  two  or  three  years,  and  frequent 
changes  in  the  incumbents  of  the  office,  are  the 
rule,  although  there  are  not  infrequent  cases  of 
re-election,  as  witness  the  experience  of  Mayor 
Pingree,  of  Detroit.  But  in  the  case  of  the  mayor, 
frequent  changes  are  not  so  disastrous  as  in  the 
case  of  the  heads  of  departments.  For  the  routine 
work  of  the  administration  could  be  carried  on 
by  permanent  boards  and  officers.  The  general 
policy  of  the  administration  should  be  popular  in 
character,  and  this  can  be  obtained  by  giving  the 
people  reasonably  frequent  opportunities  to  express 
their  opinion  in  choosing  the  mayor.  If,  however, 
the  methods  proposed  in  other  chapters  for  de- 
creasing the  influence  of  the  state  political  parties 
over  municipal  elections  are  successful,  and  if  the 
attention  of  the  voters  can  be  confined  to  the  elec- 
tion of  the  council  and  mayor,  it  is  unquestionable 
that  re-election  of  mayors  will  be  more  frequent, 
and  thus  reasonable  permanence  in  the  office  of 
mayor  might  be  secured,  which  is,  of  course,  de- 
sirable if  the  government  suits  the  wishes  of  the 
people. 

7  Such,  then,  is  the  ideal  form  of  organization 
of  municipal  government  for  this  country.  The 
whole  executive  power  should  be  concentrated 
under  the  mayor,  elected  for  a  term  of  not  over 


THE   CITY  EXECUTIVE  28 1 

four  years.  Under  the  mayor  should  be  a  series 
of  boards,  composed  of  unpaid  members  appointed 
by  him  with  terms  not  fixed,  but  subject  to  re- 
moval by  him  at  any  time.  The  mayor  should, 
however,  state  the  reasons  for  his  action,  and  give 
the  officer  removed  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  in 
his  defence.  Under  the  direction  of  each  board 
should  be  permanent  subordinates  who,  where 
their  duties  require  it,  should  have  had  a  previous 
training  for  the  positions  they  occupy,  which 
should  be  both  theoretical  and  practical.  It  is 
of  course  true  that  practical  training  would  in 
many  cases  be  all  that  need  be  required,  and  that 
this  practical  training  would  itself  result  from  mere 
permanence  of  tenure  during  good  behavior.  By 
such  a  system  of  organization,  combined  with  a 
city  council  possessed  of  the  power  of  determining 
the  municipal  policy,  the  municipal  administration 
would  be  both  permanent  and  efficient  and  subject 
to  popular  control,  while  it  would  have  the  in- 
estimable advantage  of  awakening  and  keeping 
alive  local  public  spirit. 


CHAPTER   XI 

THE   METROPOLITAN    CITY 
•% 

OUR  modern  civilization  has  resulted  not  only^  in 

•  giving  greater   prominence  to  urban  life  ;    it  has 
«    also    had  the  effect  of   creating  enormous  cities. 

•  Nothing  that  the  world  has  ever  seen  can  equal 
,  the  enormous  urban  communities  which  are  at  the 

•  present  time  to  be  found  in  almost  every  state  of  the 

•  Western  world.  *  These  great  communities  have 
been  due  not  only  to  the  recent  tremendous  com- 
mercial and  industrial  expansion,  but  also  are  un- 
doubtedly a  direct  result  of  the  substitution  for  the 
small  feudal  state  of  the  last  century,  of  the  pres- 
ent well-defined  and  well-organized  national  state. 
The  growth  of  Vienna  was  due  to  the  prominent 
position  taken  by  Austria  at  the  beginning  of  the 
century.     Berlin  owes  its  recent   development  in 
large  part   to   the  establishment   of   the    German 
Empire.     Paris  and  London,  though  to  a  lesser 
degree,  are  also  instances  of  the  important  influ- 
ence of  politics   on   the   growth   of   metropolitan 
cities.     None  of  these  cities  has  a  favorable  geo- 
graphical situation.     Three  of  them  are  not  even 
seaports ;  indeed,  are  connected  with  the  sea  only 

282 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CITY  283 

because  they  are  situated  upon  either  a  very  small 
river,  or  a  river  upon  which  it  has  been  necessary 
to  spend  much  money  in  order  to  make  it  naviga- 
ble. London,  it  is  true,  is  situated  upon  a  naviga- 
ble river  of  considerable  importance,  a  river  which 
further  in  early  times  was  very  much  more  impor- 
tant as  an  artery  of  commerce  than  it  now  is. 
Once,  however,  their  predominance  determined, 
and  determined  largely  by  political  causes,  the 
changed  conditions  of  modern  commercial  inter- 
course, the  substitution  of  the  railway  for  the  ship, 
have  enabled  large  cities  to  maintain  their  suprem- 
acy notwithstanding  the  development  in  more  fa- 
vorable locations  of  most  important  rivals. 

But  while  most  of  the  great  metropolitan  cities 
of  the  Western  European  world  owe  their  origin 
and  growth  in  large  part  to  political  causes,  geo- 
graphical conditions  may  in  particular  instances  be 
so  favorable  as  to  result  in  the  growth  of  a  metro- 
politan city  which  is  not  due  in  any  way  to  politi- 
cal influences.  No  more  marked  example  of  this 
fact  can  be  adduced  than  the  enormous  metropoli- 
tan district  which  has  grown  up  about  the  mouth 
of  the  Hudson  River.  Favored  by  nature  with  an 
exceptionally  good  harbor,  later  made  the  termi- 
nus of  a  system  of  internal  waterways,  which  is 
probably  unsurpassed  so  far  as  the  fertility  and 
productiveness  of  the  territory  which  it  taps  are 
concerned,  this  district  has  grown  until  it  contains 
a  population  which  is  hardly  exceeded  by  any  other 


284  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

such  district  in  the  world,  and  has  reached  the 
point  which  it  now  occupies  without  ever  having 
been,  except  for  a  very  short  interval,  the  seat  of 
the  government  of  either  the  nation  or  the  state  of 
which  it  forms  so  important  a  part. 

While  municipal  government  generally  presents 
most  important  problems  for  solution,  metropoli- 
tan municipal  government  presents  problems  of  a 
peculiar  nature.  The  peculiarity  of  the  problems 
presented  by  the  metropolitan  city  is  due,  in  part, 
to  the  most  important  cause  of  its  development; 
i.e.  the  fact  of  its  intimate  connection  with  general 
politics,  in  part  to  the  mere  fact  of  its  tremendous 
size.  It  is  due,  in  the  first  place,  to  the  influence 
which  the  metropolitan  city,  as  the  seat  of  gov- 
ernment, has  over  the  country  as  a  whole.  The 
complex  social  conditions  attendant  upon  modern 
industrial  civilization  have  had  a  profound  influ- 
ence on  the  organization  of  the  modern  admin- 
istrative system.  They  have  made  necessary  a 
greater  degree  of  governmental  activity  together 
with  a  greater  centralization  of  governmental  func- 
tions. The  metropolitan  city  when  the  capital  of 
the  nation  is  the  place  of  residence  of  most  of  the 
administrative  departments,  whose  influence  is  felt 
to  the  uttermost  ends  of  the  state.  The  legislative 
body  also,  in  almost  all  cases,  sits  in  a  metropolitan 
city.  It  wi.U  feel  very  much  more  quickly  the 
opinion  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  metropolitan  dis- 
trict than  it  will  those  of  the  people  in  the  outlying 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CITY  28$ 

districts  of  the  state.  In  some  instances  the 
people  of  the  metropolitan  district  have  been  able, 
as  was  frequently  the  case  during  the  French 
Revolution,  to  dominate  the  policy  of  the  legisla- 
ture, although  that  body  is  in  theory  representative 
of  the  entire  state.  Regard  must  therefore  be  had 
in  organizing  the  metropolitan  city  to  the  influence 
which  it  has  over  the  politics  of  the  state. 

It  was  very  largely  on  account  of  the  experi- 
ences of  France  and  Paris  during  the  French 
Revolution,  that  the  founders  of  the  American 
government  resolved  to  place  the  capital  of  their 
nation  at  a  place  where  it  would  be  outside  of  the 
jurisdiction  of  any  one  of  the  states  of  the  Union, 
where  its  inhabitants  would  be  rather  under  the 
direct  control  of  the  national  government  than 
able  to  dominate  its  policy.  Somewhat  the  same 
policy  has  been  pursued  by  most  of  the  states  of 
the  American  Union.  It  is  only  rarely  that  we 
find  the  largest  city  in  the  state  chosen  as  the  seat 
of  the  state  government.  On  this  account  the 
problem  of  organizing  the  metropolitan  city  in 
the  United  States  is  somewhat  simpler  than  it  is 
in  Europe.  Here  the  metropolitan  city  has  been 
due,  as  has  been  pointed  out  in  the  case  of  the 
metropolitan  district  of  New  York,  rather  to  its 
extremely  favorable  geographical  situation  than 
to  political  causes.  Here,  therefore,  the  main 
problem  which  is  presented  to  those  who  are 
attempting  to  frame  an  organization  for  the 


286  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

metropolitan  cities  of  the  United  States,  is  to  be 
found  in  their  size,  in  the  immensity  of  their 
population.  But  while  the  metropolitan  city  in 
the  United  States  does  not  have  the  same  direct 
influence  over  the  central  government  as  does  the 
European  metropolitan  city,  still,  on  account  of 
its  mere  size,  on  account  of  the  number  of  its 
voting  population,  which  is,  at  the  same  time  that 
it  controls  the  politics  of  the  city,  an  important 
factor  in  state  and  national  politics,  the  political 
parties,  which  have  an  enormous  interest  in  city 
government  generally,  have  an  even  greater  inter- 
est in  the  metropolitan  city  than  they  do  in  the 
smaller  cities. 

The  metropolitan  city,  even  in  the  United  States, 
will  also,  on  account  of  its  size,  be  more  generally, 
than  is  the  case  with  the  smaller  cities,  entrusted 
with  the  discharge  of  functions  of  general  state 
government.  In  most  cases  it  will  be  found  that 
in  the  metropolitan  cities  are  consolidated  not 
only  the  city  and  the  town  government,  where 
the  town  exists,  but  also  the  county  government. 
All  the  functions  of  general  state  government, 
which  are  in  the  more  nearly  rural  districts  of 
the  state  discharged  by  the  county  and  town 
authorities,  will  be  conferred  upon  the  authorities 
of  the  metropolitan  city.  The  result  will  be  then 
that  the  authorities  of  the  metropolitan  city,  even 
when  it  is  not  a  political  capital,  will  of  necessity 
have  to  be  subjected  to  a  wider  central  control 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CITY  28? 

than  is  the  case  with  the  authorities  of  the  ordi- 
nary city,  both  in  order  to  prevent  them  from 
exercising  an  undue  influence  on  the  political  life 
of  the  state  as  a  whole,  and  to  keep  them  up  to 
tl\eir  work  as  agents  of  general  state  government. 
/{The  peculiarity  of  the  problems  presented  by  the 
metropolitan  city  is  due  in  the  second  place  to  the 
mere  fact  of  its  tremendous  size.  The  large  size 
of  the  metropolitan  city  will  make  necessary  very 
many  branches  of  municipal  activity  which  it  is 
not  necessary  for  the  smaller  cities  to  assume. 
Thus  the  need  of  some  special  method  of  housing 
the  poor  assumes  real  importance  only  in  the  case 
of  the  largest  cities.  The  greater  demands  upon 
the  metropolitan  city,  resulting  from  the  greater 
population  residing  within  it,  will  also  produce  a 
much  greater  complexity  in  municipal  administra- 
tion, and  this  complexity  in  its  turn  will  make 
necessary  the  highest  degree  of  administrative 
and  technical  skill  in  the  •  discharge  of  municipal 
functions.  Thus  the  enormous  consumption  of 
water  by  the  population  of  the  largest  cities  will 
make  necessary  a  most  complex  system  of  water- 
works, a  system  of  waterworks  which  will  demand 
the  highest  engineering  skill  in  order  that  they 
may  be  properly  constructed  and  maintained. 
The  same  thing  is  true  of  its  sewerage  system, 
and  to  a  lesser  degree  of  the  method  of  cleaning 
its  streets  and  removing  the  debris  occasioned  by 
the  exigencies  of  domestic  life.  The  proper  ad- 


288  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

ministration  of  these  branches  of  local  activity 
is  dependent  upon  a  proper  organization  of  its 
authorities.  Thus  not  only  is  the  relation  of  the 
largest  cities  to  the  central  government  of  the  state 
more  difficult  to  determine  than  is  the  relation  to 
that  government  of  smaller  cities,  but  also  the 
internal  organization  of  the  largest  cities  is  more 
difficult  to  arrange  on  account  of  the  greater  local 
demands  made  upon  them. 

But  not  only  do  the  ordinary  problems  of  mu- 
nicipal government  thus  become  intensified  in  the 
case  of  the  metropolitan  city;  the  metropolitan 
city  also  presents  problems  peculiar  to  itself.  If 
the  history  of  the  development  of  almost  any  one 
of  the  great  metropolitan  districts  is  studied,  it  will 
be  found  that  in  nearly  all  cases  it  has  grown,  not 
from  a  common  centre,  but  from  several  centres ; 
that  it  owes  its  development  to  the  fact  that  the 
growth  from  these  various  centres  has  been  so 
great  that  finally  the  geographical  distinctions 
which  existed  between  them  have  become  almost 
obliterated.  The  metropolitan  city  is  thus  in 
many  cases  a  state  in  miniature.  It  is  true,  that 
on  account  of  its  greater  simplicity  and  of  the 
smaller  number  of  the  causes  of  development,  the 
metropolitan  district  is  much  more  homogeneous, 
both  in  population  and  geographical  conditions, 
than  is  the  ordinary  state ;  but  at  the  same  time  it 
is  also  true  that  the  ordinary  metropolitan  district  is 
more  heterogeneous  than  is  the  ordinary  city.  This 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CITY  289 

greater  heterogeneity  would,  if  there  were  no 
other  more  powerful  influences  at  work,  naturally 
result  in  a  somewhat  decentralized  municipal  or- 
ganization. But  we  usually  find  that  the  political 
influences  to  which  it  owes  its  development  con- 
tinue to  have  an  important  influence  on  the 
organization  of  its  governmental  authorities.  Not- 
withstanding the  great  heterogeneity  of  metropoli- 
tan districts,  their  governmental  authorities  are 
much  more  under  the  control  of  the  central  state 
government  than  are  the  governmental  authorities 
of  the  smaller  cities.  Thus  in  the  case  of  London 
and  Berlin,  the  former  of  which  presents  probably 
greater  heterogeneity  in  origin  and  in  present  con- 
ditions than  almost  any  other  metropolitan  city,  we 
find  the  police  absolutely  taken  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  local  authorities  and  put  under  the  control  of 
the  central  administration.  The  police  of  the  metro- 
politan district  of  London  are  the  only  municipal 
police  in  England  under  the  direct  administration 
of  the  central  government.  Thus  also  in  the  case 
of  Paris,  not  only  is  the  police  under  the  control  of 
the  central  government  of  the  country,  which 
acts  through  a  special  Prefect  of  Police,  but  also 
almost  the  entire  executive  work  of  the  city  is  done 
under  the  direct  supervision  of  the  central  govern- 
ment, while  the  municipal  council  of  the  city  of 
Paris  is  itself  subjected  to  a  much  more  extensive 
central  control  than  is  the  municipal  council  of 
any  other  city  in  the  Republic. 


290  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

But  notwithstanding  this  greater  centralization 
of  the  governmental  institutions  of  metropolitan 
cities,  notwithstanding  this  assumption  by  the  cen- 
tral government  of  the  state  of  duties,  which  in 
the  case  of  other  cities  are  delegated  to  the  munici- 
pal authorities,  in  almost  every  one  of  the  large 
cities  of  Europe  some  consideration  is  paid  to  the 
heterogeneity  of  its  conditions.  Even  in  Paris, 
which  from  time  immemorial  has  been  subjected 
to  a  most  strict  central  control,  great  regard  is  had 
for  the  localities  of  which  it  is  composed,  and 
through  a  somewhat  decentralized  municipal  ad- 
ministration the  endeavor  is  made  to  cultivate  that 
feeling  of  neighborhood,  without  which  perma- 
nently good  government  is  impossible.  The  pres- 
ent form  of  municipal  government  which  Paris 
enjoys,  owes  its  origin,  as  do  almost  all  of  the 
French  administrative  institutions,  to  Napoleon. 
The  elective  mayor  established  by  the  revolution- 
ary legislation  of  1790  had  been  abolished  by  the 
Directory.  Napoleon,  however,  provided  for  Paris 
a  Prefect  similar  to  the  Prefect  to  be  found  in 
the  various  French  departments.  Previous  to  the 
Napoleonic  reorganization  of  Paris,  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Directory,  in  accordance  with  its 
theory  of  cantonal  administration,  also  had  divided 
Paris  into  a  dozen  municipalities.  In  each  of 
these  municipalities  the  Napoleonic  system  placed 
an  officer  called  the  mayor,  who  was  assisted  by 
several  deputies.  The  mayor  and  his  deputies 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CITY  2QI 

were, '  however,  merely  the  local  agents  of  the 
Prefect,  who  was  the  real  executive  of  Paris,  was 
appointed  by  the  central  government,  and  had 
jurisdiction  not  only  over  the  city  or  commune  of 
Paris,  but  also  over  its  surrounding  suburban  com- 
munes, which,  together  with  Paris  itself,  consti- 
tuted the  Department  of  the  Seine. 

The  combination  of  centralization  and  regard  for 
local  needs,  which  was  characteristic  of  the  Napo- 
leonic organization  of  Paris,  is  still  the  leading 
feature  of  the  administrative  organization  of  the 
Paris  of  to-day.  As  the  city  has  increased  in  pop- 
ulation and  extent,  the  original  twelve  sections 
have  been  increased  to  twenty.  The  influence  of 
this  borough  or  sub-municipality  system  cannot  be 
better  described  than  in  the  words  of  Dr.  Shaw.1 
He  says :  "  The  twenty  arrondissements  of  Paris 
are  not  bounded  by  temporary  lines,  nor  are  they 
mere  electoral  divisions  like  American  city  wards, 
or  units  of  representation  like  our  congressional 
and  legislative  districts.  They  are  not  subject  to 
rearrangement  in  order  to  equalize  their  popula- 
tion. Some  are  much  more  populous  than  others, 
and  the  municipal  council,  with  its  four  members 
from  each  arrondissement,  does  not  represent  the 
population  with  mathematical  equality.  But  it  will 
be  found  by  far  more  convenient  to  assign  addi- 
tional members  to  the  more  populous  arrondisse- 
ments than  to  recast  the  lines  in  order  to  create 

Government  in  Continental  Europe,  p.  32- 


2Q2  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

districts  of  equal  population.  The  arrondissements 
are  designated  by  numbers  from  one  up  to  twenty, 
but  they  are  also  named,  and  the  names  are  sug- 
gestive of  much  neighborhood  history  and  local 
tradition.  Inasmuch  as  the  centralizing  adminis- 
trative tendency  is  so  exceedingly  strong  in  Paris, 
it  is  highly  fortunate  in  every-day  practice  that 
the  twenty  arrondissements  should  have  gained 
each  its  own  sense  of  permanent  neighborhood 
identity.  It  is  true  that  the  people  of  the  arron- 
dissements have  no  local  elective  bodies.  Never- 
theless, there  is  a  neighborhood  life  that  centres 
in  the  commodious  mairie  building  of  each  arron- 
dissement.  The  twenty  divisions  make  it  easy  to 
distribute  and  apportion  the  numerous  administra- 
tive tasks  that  bring  the  government  into  contact 
with  the  people.  Thus  the  arrondissement  be- 
comes the  ready  and  natural  unit  for  the  admin- 
istration of  the  school  system.  Moreover,  instead 
of  dealing  with  the  central  authorities  of  the  pre- 
fecture at  the  Hotel  de  Ville,  the  people  have  only 
to  go  to  the  familiar  mairie  of  their  own  arrondisse- 
ment to  report  births  and  deaths  and  to  conform 
with  all  the  rules  and  regulations  touching  the 
record  of  vital  statistics.  It  is  here,  as  I  have 
already  remarked,  that  the  civil  ceremony  of  mar- 
riage is  performed  by  the  maire  of  the  arrondisse- 
ment. Here  the  registration  of  voters  is  made 
and  kept,  election  arrangements  are  made,  and  jury 
lists  are  selected.  It  is  here,  also,  that  the  youths 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CITY  293 

of  the  arrondissement  are  registered  for  pur- 
poses of  military  obligation.  From  the  mairie  of 
the  arrondissement  proceed  the  assessment  and 
collection  of  all  taxes.  For  minor  licenses  and 
privileges  it  is  sufficient  to  make  application  at 
one's  own  mairie.  Through  this  agency  the  won- 
derful popular  loans  of  the  municipality  and  of 
the  state  reach  the  small  investors  of  Paris.  The 
mairies  form  ideal  library  centres,  and  they  con- 
tain the  reading-rooms,  and  the  branch  reference 
and  circulating  libraries  of  the  municipality.  Obvi- 
ously the  arrondissement  forms  a  local  centre  for 
all  work  of  public  relief  and  charity.  It  will  be 
found  to  contain  its  local  branches  of  the  munici- 
pal savings  bank  system,  and  also  its  branch,  of 
the  Mont-de-Pittt)  the  great  municipal  loan  agency 
or  pawnbroking  shop.  Thus  the  arrondissement 
of  Paris  is  the  local  administrative  unit.  It  is  the 
institutions  thus  centred  in  the  twenty  districts 
that  come  into  contact  with  the  daily  life  of  the 
people.  The  maire  and  his  three  adjuncts  are 
appointees  of  the  central  prefecture  and  are  re- 
garded as  the  Prefect's  local  agents.  But  they  are 
not  capriciously  removed  or  shifted  about,  and  they 
grow  into  the  exercise  of  a  very  strong  neighbor- 
hood influence  and  authority  with  every  motive  for 
faithfulness  to  the  welfare  of  the  people  with  whose 
affairs  from  the  cradle  to  the  grave  they  are  so  in- 
timately associated.  .  .  .  All  discretionary  author- 
ity and  all  deliberative  functions  belong  to  the 


294  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

government  of  the  metropolis  as  a  whole  [which 
it  is  to  be  remembered  is  highly  centralized  under 
the  central  government].  But  the  carrying  out  of 
as  large  an  amount  as  possible  of  the  executive 
work  is  assigned  to  the  agencies  or  bureaus  which 
the  central  authorities  have  established  in  each 
one  of  the  sub-municipalities.  The  title  of  maire, 
conferred  upon  the  chief  functionary  at  the  mairie 
building  of  every  arrondissement,  is  well  calculated 
to  emphasize  the  dignity  and  permanence  of  the 
neighborhood  regime  and  the  lasting  identity  of 
the  arrondissement' s  territorial  bounds." 

Similar  provision  is  made  by  the  Municipal  Cor- 
porations Acts  of  Prussia  for  the  development  of 
neighborhood  feeling.  These  provide  that  the 
city  authorities  may  divide  the  city  in  case  of  large 
population  or  of  great  extent  of  territory  into  dis- 
tricts, at  the  head  of  each  of  which  is  placed  a 
district  overseer  and  a  deputy.  These  are  to  be 
chosen  from  among  the  voters  of  the  districts  by 
the  municipal  authorities;  and  to  them  the  mu- 
nicipal authorities  may  delegate  such  powers  as 
they  see  fit.  These  powers,  when  delegated,  are 
to  be  exercised,  however,  under  the  direction  and 
supervision  of  the  central  town  executive.  In 
both  Paris  and  in  the  larger  cities  of  Prussia  it  will 
thus  be  seen  that  the  necessity  for  decentralizing 
the  government  of  the  largest  cities  has  not  seemed 
so  great  as  to  demand  the  formation  of  minor 
municipal  corporations  with  elective  bodies  and  all 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CITY  2Q5 

the  machinery  of  government,  but  it  is  believed 
that  all  that  is  necessary  has  been  done  when  pro- 
vision has  been  made  for  a  decentralization  of  the 
administration  of  the  municipal  policy  which  itself 
is  determined  by  the  central  city  council. 

In  the  metropolitan  district  of  London,  however, 
a  totally  different  policy  has  been  pursued.  Lon- 
don is  probably  the  most  marked  example  we  have 
of  a  great  metropolitan  district  which  has  had 
several  separate  centres  of  growth.  The  term 
"  City  of  London "  is  applicable  only  to  a  very 
small  portion  of  the  metropolitan  district,  the 
original  incorporated  historic  city  of  London. 
Around  this  original  city  there  gradually  grew  a 
fringe  of  country  villages,  which  extended,  owing 
to  the  general  commercial  prosperity  of  the  metro- 
politan district,  until  their  limits  joined.  During 
the  period  that  they  were  largely  rural  in  character 
they  had  been  governed,  as  were  the  rural  districts 
of  England,  by  the  ordinary  parish  authorities. 
Gradually  a  central  administration,  which  consisted, 
however,  of  several  independent  authorities,  was  de- 
veloped. The  most  important  change  in  the  chaos 
resulting  from  a  long  period  of  development  and 
somewhat  haphazard  legislation  was  made  in  1855, 
at  about  the  same  time  that  the  metropolitan  police 
was  formed  and  placed  under  the  control  of  the 
Home  Secretary.  In  1855  Parliament  enacted 
the  Metropolis  Management  Act.  This  divided 
the  area  outside  of  the  "City"  into  thirty-eight 


296  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

districts.  Twenty-three  of  these  consisted  of 
single  parishes,  and  the  remaining  parishes  were 
grouped  into  fifteen  districts.  These  thirty-eight 
districts  were  permitted  to  attend  to  most  of  the 
matters  which  had  been  attended  to  by  the  former 
parish  authorities,  while  there  was  formed,  for  the 
management  of  the  central  administration  of  the 
metropolis,  a  Metropolitan  Board  of  Works.  This 
body  attended  to  public  works  interesting  the 
entire  metropolitan  district.  Later  on,  changes 
were  made  in  the  direction  of  centralizing  other 
branches  of  administration  such  as  schools  and 
public  charity,  and  in  1888  the  attempt  was  made 
to  provide  that  the  metropolitan  district  of  London, 
which  had  theretofore  formed  parts  of  four  coun- 
ties, should  be  formed,  into  the  administrative 
county  of  London.  At  the  head  of  this  adminis- 
trative county  of  London  was  placed  a  county 
council,  organized  somewhat  after  the  manner  of 
the  ordinary  county  council  in  the  rural  districts. 
This  body  has  been  given  considerably  larger 
powers  than  were  possessed  by  any  one  of  the 
former  central  authorities  of  the  metropolitan  dis- 
trict, its  main  powers,  however,  being  those  for- 
merly possessed  by  the  Metropolitan  Board  of 
Works.  Most  of  the  other  central  authorities 
were  allowed  to  exist,  such  as  the  London  School 
Board  and  the  Metropolitan  Guardians  of  the  Poor. 
Very  recently  it  has  been  proposed  further  to 
centralize  the  administration  of  the  metropolitan 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CITY  297 

district  under  the  London  County  Council.  An 
abstract  of  the  report  of  the  Commission  appointed 
in  1894  to  recommend  a  proper  scheme  of  govern- 
ment for  the  metropolitan  district  is  to  be  found 
in  Dr.  Shaw's  work  on  Municipal  Government  in 
Great  Britain)-  In  this  report  the  commissioners 
express  their  belief  in  the  necessity  of  the  continu- 
ance of  conditions  which  have  grown  up  largely  as 
a  result  of  the  historical  development  of  the  metro- 
politan district.  They  believe  that  it  would  be 
inadvisable  to  sacrifice,  for  the  sake  of  uniformity 
and  administrative  centralization,  local  bodies  which 
have  been  more  or  less  efficient  in  the  performance 
of  their  duties.  The  report  says :  "  A  considera- 
tion of  the  evidence  we  have  received  confirms  the 
opinion  suggested  by  the  course  of  previous  inqui- 
ries and  of  legislation,  or,  in  other  words,  by  the 
historic  development  of  the  metropolis,  that  the 
government  of  London  must  be  entrusted  to  one 
body  exercising  certain  functions  throughout  all 
the  areas  covered  by  the  name,  and  to  a  number 
of  local  bodies  exercising  certain  other  functions 
within  the  local  areas  which  collectively  make  up 
London,  the  central  body  and  the  local  bodies  de- 
riving their  authority  as  representative  bodies  by 
direct  election,  and  the  functions  assigned  to  each 
being  determined  so  as  to  secure  complete  inde- 
pendence and  responsibility  to  every  member  of 
the  system."  "London  ...  is  one  large  town 

1  Appendix  3. 


298  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

which  for  convenience  of  administration  as  well  as 
from  local  diversities  comprises  within  itself  sev- 
eral smaller  towns,  and  the  application  of  the  prin- 
ciples, and  still  more  of  the  machinery  of  municipal 
government  to  these  several  areas,  must  be  limited 
by  conditions  arising  from  this  fact."  They  sug- 
gest further  on,  that  the  functions  to  be  entrusted 
to  the  local  authorities  shall  be,  first,  sanitary  ad- 
ministration generally;  second,  maintenance  of 
highways  other  than  main  roads,  including  the 
regulation  of  locomotive  traffic  and  tramways  upon 
them,  and  small  street  improvements ;  third,  valua- 
tion and  assessment  and  registration  of  voters; 
fourth,  the  provision  and  maintenance  of  small 
open  spaces  and  mortuaries;  fifth,  powers  as 
regards  electric  lighting  and  (as  regards  certain 
small  gas  companies)  the  gas  supply ;  sixth,  the 
administration  of  the  Overhead  Wires  and  the 
Sale  of  Food  and  Drug  Acts.  In  order,  however, 
to  provide  for  uniformity  in  the  administration  of 
those  matters  entrusted  to  the  local  authorities,  the 
commission  proposes  that  these  local  authorities 
shall  be  subjected  to  somewhat  the  same  sort  of 
administrative  control  to  which  the  local  author- 
ities throughout  the  country  generally  are  sub- 
jected. They  propose  in  detail  that  this  control 
shall  consist,  first,  of  the  power  of  the  central 
municipal  body  to  frame  by-laws  under  which  the 
local  bodies  shall  work,  e.g.  for  sanitary  matters 
generally,  for  locomotive  traffic  on  highways  other 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CITY  299 

than  main  roads,  regulating  the  formation  of  new 
streets,  drainage  of  buildings,  and  so  on.  In  the 
second  place,  that  power  shall  be  given  to  the  cen- 
tral authority  to  act  in  case  of  default  by  the  local 
authority  and  to  hear  appeals  from  the  action  of 
the  local  authority  in  the  proper  cases.  In  the 
third  place,  that  the  consent  of  the  central  author- 
ity shall  be  necessary  in  order  that  certain  actions 
on  the  part  of  the  local  authorities  shall  be  valid, 
e.g.  in  the  case  of  making  loans  or  of  the  closing  of 
streets  for  repairs.  It  is  proposed  also  on  account 
of  the  danger  of  lack  of  uniformity  in  methods  of 
assessments  for  the  purposes  of  taxation,  if  left 
in  the  charge  of  the  local  authorities,  as  is  the 
case  at  present,  that  this  matter  shall  be  attended 
to  under  the  immediate  direction  of  the  central 
authorities,  so  as  to  secure  uniformity  throughout 
the  metropolitan  area.  Finally,  in  order  to  provide 
for  some  personal  connection  between  the  local 
authorities  and  the  central  authority  of  the  metro- 
politan district,  they  recommend  that  the  members 
of  the  central  body  elected  for  any  district  should 
be  ex  officio  members  for  the  local  governing  body 
of  the  district. 

It  will  be  seen  that  there  is  a  great  difference 
between  the  continental  method  of  decentralizing 
metropolitan  municipal  government  and  the  Eng- 
lish method  as  seen  in  the  present  conditions  of 
the  metropolitan  district  of  London,  and  in  the 
recommendations  of  this  commission.  Whereas 


3OO  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

on  the  continent  the  districts  which  may  be 
formed  in  the  metropolitan  or  larger  cities  are 
merely  administrative  districts,  for  the  purpose 
of  aiding  in  the  administration  of  the  entire  city 
government;  and  whereas  the  officers  in  these 
districts  are  merely  representatives  of  the  central 
body,  and  are  acting  under  its  direction  in  the 
execution  of  a  policy  to  be  determined  by  that 
central  body,  the  English  idea  of  decentralization 
is  very  much  the  same  as  has  been  adopted  for 
the  relations  of  the  localities  generally  to  the 
central  state  government.  It  is  recognized  by  the 
English  method  that  the  various  districts  of 
the  general  metropolitan  district  are  to  have  a 
sphere  of  government  of  their  own,  just  as  much 
as  the  ordinary  county  corporation  or  the  city 
corporation  has  a  sphere  of  government  of  its 
own,  distinct  from  the  general  government  of  the 
state.  It  is  true  that  in  the  management  of 
its  affairs  the  districts  of  the  general  metropoli- 
tan district  are  to  be  subjected  to  a  central  con- 
trol, but  any  one  who  has  made  a  study  of  the 
recent  development  of  local  government  in  Eng- 
land will  at  once  remember  that  the  localities 
generally  throughout  England  are  subjected  to  a 
similar  central  control.  Attention  must  be  called 
also  to  the  fact  that  in  Prussia  the  determination 
as  to  what  degree  of  decentralization  shall  be 
adopted  in  a  particular  city,  is  to  be  made  by  the 
municipal  authorities  themselves,  and  not  by  the 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CITY  301 

central  legislature  of  the  state.  This  is  only  in 
accord  with  the  general  continental  principle  of 
granting  to  local  authorities  large  powers  with 
regard  to  purely  local  matters.  It  has,  of  course, 
the  great  advantage  of  permitting  each  municipal- 
ity, which  feels  that  a  decentralization  of  its  mu- 
nicipal administration  is  necessary,  to  work  out 
by  itself,  as  the  result  of  its  own  experience,  the 
detailed  plan  which  it  deems  will  be  best  suited 
to  its  peculiar  local  conditions.  While  the  conti- 
nental plan  permits  a  decentralization  of  all 
branches  of  activity  in  which  the  municipal  gov- 
ernment of  the  metropolitan  district  is  engaged, 
the  English  plan,  although  granting  larger  powers 
to  the  local  districts  with  regard  to  the  matters 
which  are  entrusted  to  them,  still  absolutely  deter- 
mines that  certain  of  the  affairs  of  government 
of  the  metropolitan  district  are  not  capable  of 
decentralization,  and  must  therefore  be  attended 
to  by  the  central  municipal  authorities.  That 
both  the  English  and  the  continental  methods 
of  decentralizing  the  government  of  the  metro- 
politan city  have  been  reasonably  successful  is 
seen  from  the  testimony  of  the  commissioners, 
whose  report  has  been  quoted  from,  and  from  Dr. 
Shaw's  description  of  the  "sub-municipality"  sys- 
tem of  Paris,  as  he  calls  it,  which  has  already  been 
given  somewhat  at  length.  Which  system  would 
be  the  preferable  one  in  American  conditions  it  is 
difficult  to  say.  The  English  method  is  more  in 


3O2  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

accord  with  existing  American  conditions.  The 
Prussian  scheme  meets  more  fully  the  legitimate 
demands  of  municipal  home  rule,  but  if  adopted, 
should  be  confined  exclusively  to  purely  municipal 
matters.  We  have  had  recently  in  New  York  an 
example  of  the  evil  which  may  result  from  giving 
to  local  authorities  within  the  municipality  any 
powers  with  regard  to  matters  which  are  of  gen- 
eral concern.  The  way  in  which  the  schools  in 
New  York  were  managed  under  a  system  of 
municipal  decentralization  must  ever  be  a  warning 
to  us  to  be  extremely  careful  in  the  delegation  of 
administrative  powers,  affecting  the  entire  metropo- 
lis, to  boards  of  local  managers. 

As  regards  the  concrete  suggestions  of  the 
London  commission  appointed  for  the  purpose 
of  decentralizing  the  metropolitan  administration, 
there  are  some  which  to  the  ordinary  American 
would  appear  to  be  extremely  unwise.  Such,  for 
example,  is  the  care  of  the  public  health.  It  would 
be  extremely  inadvisable  in  the  present  social  con- 
ditions of  New  York,  for  example,  to  permit  any 
body  owing  its  powers  to  local  election  very  large 
control  over  public  health.  All  that  could  safely 
be  given  to  a  local  body  would  be  merely  supple- 
mentary powers.  As  regards  such  matters  as  the 
public  health,  the  wiser  method  to  follow  would 
unquestionably  be  the  method  adopted  in  Paris 
and  in  the  German  cities,  that  is,  to  recognize 
that  the  administration  should  be  decentralized 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CITY  303 

but  at  the  same  time  subjected  to  central  admin- 
istrative control.  It  is,  indeed,  probable  that  this 
method  would  be  the  better  one  to  adopt  in  every 
case.  For  in  the  larger  cities  of  America  the  pop- 
ulation is  extremely  fluctuating.  It  is  fluctuating 
not  only  because  people  are  continually  entering 
and  leaving  the  city,  but  also  because  of  the  fact 
that  people  are  continually  changing  their  resi- 
dences within  the  boundaries  of  the  city.  Dis- 
tricts are  continually  changing  in  character.  With 
such  a  fluctuating  population,  it  would  be  extremely 
difficult  to  cultivate  a  feeling  of  neighborhood. 
While  this  fluctuating  population  and  its  conse- 
quence, the  difficulty  if  not  impossibility  of  the 
development  of  local  neighborhood  spirit,  would 
probably  preclude  us  from  adopting  a  system  of 
decentralization  which  has  worked  with  compara- 
tive success  in  the  metropolitan  district  of  London, 
it  would  by  no  means  make  it  impossible  to  adopt 
the  scheme  of  sub-municipalities  which  has  been 
established  for  so  long  a  time  in  Paris,  and  whose 
establishment  is  recognized  as  proper  by  the  Mu- 
nicipal Corporation  Acts  of  Prussia.  Whatever 
success  we  might  have  through  it  in  cultivating 
the  feeling  of  neighborhood,  which  all  must  agree 
would  be  so  useful  in  bettering  municipal  condi- 
tions, it  certainly  would  have  the  effect  of  making 
the  city  government  much  more  approachable  than 
it  is  now  to  the  ordinary  municipal  citizen.  If  a 
large  metropolitan  city  is  formed,  the  distances 


304  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

from  one  part  to  another  will  naturally  be  very 
great.  It  becomes  a  matter  of  considerable  diffi- 
culty for  the  ordinary  municipal  citizen,  who  is 
pretty  thoroughly  occupied  in  the  transaction  of 
his  ordinary  business,  to  communicate  as  often  as 
he  might  wish  and  as  often  as  it  is  advisable  that 
he  should  communicate  with  the  proper  central 
authorities  of  the  city  government.  Municipal 
decentralization  is  particularly  necessary  in  the 
American  system  of  government,  which  relies  so 
much  upon  the  action  of  the  individual  citizen 
for  the  discharge  of  governmental  functions. 
Thus  it  is  unquestionably  the  fact  that  the  ordi- 
nary American  municipal  officer  does  not  con- 
sider that  it  is  his  duty  to  see  that  the  laws, 
which  he  is  put  in  office  to  execute,  are  observed, 
but  merely  to  see  that  complaints  of  individuals 
with  regard  to  the  violation  of  the  law,  if  made 
with  sufficient  persistence,  shall  be  examined,  and 
if  considered  advisable,  attended  to.  A  great 
burden  is  thus  thrown  upon  every  individual  citi- 
zen to  see  that  the  officers  of  the  government 
actually  have  the  law  observed.  It  is  true  that 
under  our  ordinary  system  of  municipal  govern- 
ment many  of  the  large  and  important  depart- 
ments of  the  city  government  have,  in  different 
parts  of  the  city,  a  special  local  office,  but  these 
local  offices  are  not,  under  our  present  system,  at 
all  concentrated.  The  police  station  in  a  given 
district  is  to  be  found  in  one  part  of  that  district ; 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CITY  305 

the  police  court  is  to  be  found  in  another ;  there 
is  generally  no  local  office  for  the  schools  of  the 
district  outside  of  the  school  buildings  in  which 
the  schools  are  held.  In  certain  cases,  however, 
it  is  also  true  that  the  departments  have  no  local 
office  whatever.  It  thus  becomes  necessary  for 
the  individual,  upon  whom  so  much  reliance  is 
placed  to  see  that  the  law  be  executed,  to  make 
quite  a  search  before  he  is  able  to  determine 
where  he  may  bring  complaints  of  violation  of 
the  law  which  he  thinks  ought  to  be  remedied. 
Now  if  some  such  system  of  decentralization  as 
has  been  provided  in  the  French  system  as  seen 
in  Paris  were  adopted,  there  would  be  in  each 
of  the  great  divisions  into  which  the  metropoli- 
tan city  was  permanently  divided,  one  office,  where 
any  individual  who  had  any  complaint  to  bring 
might  go,  and  it  is  unquestionable  that  the  laws 
would  be  much  better  executed  than  they  are  at 
present,  and  at  a  much  less  expense  of  time  and 
energy  upon  the  part  of  the  individual  citizen. 

Such  is  probably  as  far  as  we  could,  with  wis- 
dom, go  in  the  path  of  decentralization  in  the 
present  conditions  of  metropolitan  municipal  life 
in  the  United  States.  It  might  be  that  in  time,  as 
a  result  of  the  development  of  neighborhood  feel- 
ing which  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  would  develop 
from  this  degree  of  decentralization,  we  might  be 
able  to  go  still  further  and  adopt  some  of  the 
recommendations  made  by  the  commission  ap- 


306  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

pointed  to  devise  a  plan  for  the  decentralization  of 
London.  But  in  considering  their  recommenda- 
tions it  must  be  remembered  that  this  local  neigh- 
borhood feeling  is  already  in  existence  in  the 
metropolitan  district  of  London.  The  people  of 
London  have  always  been  accustomed  to  act  more 
or  less  vigorously  in  the  local  communities  of  which 
the  metropolitan  district  is  composed.  In  the 
metropolitan  district  of  New  York,  for  example, 
such  is  not  at  all  the  case.  The  people  here  are 
not  even  accustomed  to  act  very  vigorously  in  the 
municipal  life  of  the  cities  of  which  the  metropoli- 
tan district  is  composed.  Having  been  so  long 
under  the  control  of  the  legislature,  they  are  more 
accustomed,  when  they  desire  to  make  any  change 
in  municipal  policy,  to  have  recourse  to  the  legis- 
lature than  to  resort  to  the  local  officers  who  in 
the  past  have  had,  and  now  have,  so  little  to  say  as 
to  the  determination  of  municipal  policy. 

This  problem  of  the  administrative  decentraliza- 
tion of  the  larger  cities  once  determined,  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  see  why  it  would  be  impossible  or  even  so 
extraordinarily  difficult  for  us  to  develop  a  proper 
system  of  municipal  government  for  the  metropoli- 
tan city.  It  is  true,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  that 
municipal  problems  are  intensified  in  the  larger 
cities  ;  but  at  the  same  time,  if  the  city  is  assigned 
its  proper  position  in  the  governmental  polity,  and 
if  an  organization  can  be  adopted  which  will  ex- 
clude as  far  as  possible  national  and  state  politics 


THE  METROPOLITAN   CITY  307 

from  control  over  municipal  affairs,  there  is  no 
reason  why  a  large  city  should  not  be  governed  as 
well,  even  under  the  regime  of  universal  suffrage, 
as  is  a  small  city.  Indeed,  it  is  believed  that  at 
the  present  time  the  government  of  the  larger 
cities  of  this  country  is  as  good  as,  if  not  better 
than,  the  government  of  the  smaller  ones. 

In  conclusion  it  may  be  said  that  all  attempts 
at  municipal  reform  in  this  country  must  bear  in 
mind  that  the  municipality  should  be  in  fact,  as  it 
is  in  theory,  at  the  same  time  an  organization  for 
the  satisfaction  of  local  needs  and  an  agent  of  the 
state  for  the  administration  of  matters  in  which 
the  state  as  a  whole  has  a  vital  interest.  One  of 
the  results  of  this  position  is  that  sufficiently  large 
powers  of  local  government  should  be  granted  to 
the  city  authorities  to  permit  of  the  development 
of  local  pride  and  of  efficient  municipal  adminis- 
tration. The  attempt  has  been  made  to  show  that 
the  continental  method  of  granting  such  powers 
by  general  act  subject  to  the  limitations  of  the 
general  statute  law  which  may  give  certain  powers 
to  the  central  state  authorities,  is  the  proper 
method  for  providing  for  the  performance  of 
purely  local  work  by  the  municipal  authorities. 
A  further  result  of  the  position  of  the  city  is  that, 
as  the  agent  of  the  general  state  government,  it  is 
absolutely  necessary  that  it  should  be  subjected  to 
some  central  control.  This  central  control  should 


308  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

not  be  exercised  as  it  has  been  heretofore  in  the 
United  States,  by  the  legislature,  which  is  unfitted 
for  such  a  task.  It  is  unfitted  for  such  a  task, 
both  because  of  its  irresponsibility,  which  results 
in  an  inefficient  exercise  of  the  control,  and  be- 
cause, if  such  large  powers  are  given  to  the  legis- 
lature, it  is  extremely  probable  that  they  will  be 
made  use  of  in  the  interest  of  state  and  national 
politics,  which  of  necessity  have  so  great  an  influ- 
ence upon  its  actions.  The  necessary  control 
should  be  exercised  by  some  responsible  adminis- 
trative authority.  Further,  in  order  to  prevent 
the  national  and  state  political  parties  from  inter- 
fering in  matters  of  purely  municipal  concern,  — 
from  dominating  the  municipal  policy,  —  the  city 
should  cease  as  far  as  possible  to  be  the  agent  of 
the  central  state  government.  The  state  should 
assume  itself  the  administration  of  those  matters 
in  which  it  is  alone  interested,  leaving  to  the  city 
the  administration  merely  of  those  matters  in  which 
the  city  alone  is  interested  or  in  which  both  the 
state  and  the  city  have  considerable  interest  in 
common.  Further,  the  demands  of  municipal 
autonomy  and  of  the  ideal  municipal  organization 
require  that  there  should  be  formed  a  council  whose 
functions  shall  be  to  determine  the  policy  of  the 
city,  and  an  executive  force  under  the  control  of 
the  mayor,  which  shall  attend  to  the  carrying  out, 
in  its  details,  of  the  policy  determined  upon  by  the 
city  council.  This  executive  force  should  be  so 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CITY  309 

organized  as  to  promote  the  permanence  in  tenure 
not  only  of  officers  who  have  merely  ministerial 
functions  to  perform,  but  also  of  those  who  are  to 
superintend  the  technical  and  professional  work 
which  all  cities  must  undertake.  It  should  ulti- 
mately be  organized  also  in  such  a  way  as  to 
promote  popular  non-professional  administration. 
This  can  be  secured  only  through  the  formation  of 
boards  whose  members,  like  the  members  of  the 
council,  should  serve  without  pay,  have  quite  a  long 
term  of  office,  but  should  be  subject  to  removal  by 
the  mayor,  who  should  give  to  every  officer  to  be 
removed  an  opportunity  to  be  heard  in  his  defence. 
If  such  a  scheme  were  adopted,  thus  defining 
more  clearly  than  at  present  the  position  of  the  city, 
and  more  clearly  differentiating  than  at  present 
deliberative  or  political  from  executive  or  adminis- 
trative functions,  it  is  believed  that  national  and 
state  political  parties  would  have  much  less  interest 
in,  and  opportunity  for,  interfering  with  municipal 
affairs,  and  that  the  principle  of  universal  suffrage, 
which  has  so  many  things  to  be  said  in  its  favor 
from  the  theoretical  point  of  view,  could  still  be 
applied  with  advantage  in  the  election  of  those  few 
officers,  that  is,  the  members  of  the  council,  and 
the  mayor,  who  would  be  elected  by  the  people. 
It  might  be  necessary  in  the  case  of  these  elective 
officers  to  provide  for  some  method  of  minority 
representation.  The  method  which  has  most  to 
be  said  in  its  favor  is  the  one  which  is  the  most 


310  MUNICIPAL  PROBLEMS 

simple.  This,  it  has  been  shown,  is  the  method 
of  preferential  voting,  as  described  above.1  This 
method  may  be  applied  in  the  case  both  of  the 
election  of  the  members  of  the  council  and  the 
mayor. 

"The  path  of  municipal  reform,"  says  Mr. 
Matthews,2  "  seems  to  lie  not  in  radical  changes  in 
the  suffrage,  nor  in  the  overthrow  of  representa- 
tive institutions,  but  along  the  more  prosaic  lines 
of  conservative  experiment.3  .  .  .  There  is  no 
reason  to  anticipate  failure  if  we  restrict  our 
efforts  to  the  development  and  application  to  city 
government  of  that  theory  of  limited  democracy 
which  is  the  special  invention  and  political  prop- 
erty of  the  American  people.  .  .  .  We  must  rely 
on  the  American  genius  to  solve  the  problem  of 
democratic  city  government,  not  by  sudden  or  revo- 
lutionary reforms,  not  through  methods  thrust  by 
socialistic  agitation  upon  communities  like  some 
in  Switzerland  which  have  lost  the  virility  to  re- 
sist ;  but  by  slow  degrees  in  the  Anglo-American 

1  See  supra,  p.  156. 

2  In  his  valedictory  address  to  the  city  council  of  Boston,  which 
is  published  under  the  name  of  "The  City  Government  of  Boston," 
p.  181,  and  contains  many  valuable  suggestions  for  the  municipal 
reformer. 

8  "  Such  as  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  elective  officers,  the  sub- 
stitution of  a  single  legislative  branch  for  the  dual  system,  the  aboli- 
tion of  the  district  system  of  representation,  the  concentration  of 
executive  business  in  the  mayor,  fewer  departments,  longer  terms  of 
office,  the  civil  service  rules,  and  the  limitation  of  indebtedness." 


THE  METROPOLITAN  CfTY  311 

way  in  which  all  our  political  institutions  have 
been  developed.  A  certain  inefficiency,  a  certain 
waste,  must  be  conceded  as  part  of  the  price  we 
must  pay  for  the  blessings  of  free  institutions, 
and  success  cannot  be  attained  without  the  most 
thoughtful  study  and  unceasing  vigilance  and 
effort;  but  there  ought  to  be  no  doubt  of  the 
ultimate  capacity  of  the  American  people  to  work 
this  problem  out  as  they  have  so  many  others." 


INDEX 


Administration,  city.  See  Execu- 
tive, city. 

Administration  in  England,  condi- 
tion of,  55,  90,  Chap.  VI. 

Administrative  centralization,  ten- 
dency towards,  in  national  and 
state  governments,  82;  in  local 
government,  84. 

Administrative  control,  central. 
See  Central  administrative  con- 
trol. 

Administrative  courts,  in  France, 
105 ;  in  Prussia,  99, 102. 

Administrative  decentralization  in 
larger  cities.  See  Local  auton- 
omy. 

Administrative  functions,  lack  of 
separation  of,  from  legislative, 
16,  224 

Aldermen.    See  Council,  city. 

Appointment  of  officers,  elective 
principle  vs.,  181-190;  general 
rule,  1 86. 

Assessment  of  property,  central 
control  over,  84. 

Audit,  inefficiency  of  local,  13,  138. 

Audit  in  England,  central,  108, 137- 
143 ;  conditions  of,  before  intro- 
duction of  central  control,  138 ; 
development  of  central,  139 ;  effi- 
ciency of  central,  139-143 ;  ineffi- 
ciency of  local,  13, 138  ;  statistics 
of  appeals,  141. 

Auditors,  district,  English,  139; 
appeals  from  decisions  of,  140- 
142. 


Bicameral  form  of  city  council,  in- 
troduction of,  16 ;  opposition  to, 
240,  241. 

Board  system,  in  educational  ad- 
ministration, 270;  in  foreign 
countries,  267-270;  introduction 
of,  in  U.  S.,  258 ;  objections  to, 
259;  reasons  for  adoption  of, 
258-272. 

Borough  in  England.  See  Corpora- 
tions, municipal  (England). 

Borrowing  power,  central  adminis- 
tration, control  over,  in  England, 
131 ;  distinction  between,  and 
power  to  tax,  66 ;  referendum  in 
case  of,  172. 

Boston,  first  charter  of,  i. 

California,  educational  qualification 
of  suffrage  in,  147. 

Central  administrative  control  ac- 
companied by  large  local  powers, 
87,  97,  105,  143 ;  extended  to  ap- 
pointment of  local  officers  in 
France,  92;  in  France,  91,  92, 
104,  105 ;  in  Prussia,  97-104 ;  no 
further  centralization  involved 
by,  86 ;  origin  and  growth  in 
France  and  Germany,  91;  over 
formation  of  election  districts, 
237;  remedy  for  interference  of 
state  politics  in  city  administra- 
tion, 200;  spoils  system  not  a 
necessary  adjunct  of,  88;  ten- 
dency towards,  in  local  govern- 
ment, 84. 


314 


INDEX 


Central  administrative  control 
(England),  effects  of,  111-144; 
in  elementary  education,  126- 
130;  in  local  finance,  130-143; 
in  police,  121-126,  130,  137 ;  in 
poor  relief,  112-116,  130,  137;  in 
public  health,  116-121,  130,  137; 
introduction  of,  91,  no,  112;  or- 
ganization of,  95,  105-109;  re- 
strictive influence  of,  132,  137 ; 
superiority  of,  to  legislative  con- 
trol, 132-137;  by  the  legislature 
improper,  308 ;  courts  not  adapted 
to  exercise,  69,  81 ;  methods  of, 
in  England  and  on  the  continent 
contrasted,  94,  95 ;  necessity  of 
some  sort  of,  26,  27,  30,  63,  77, 
80;  organization  of,  68;  proper 
authorities  to  exercise,  are  ad- 
ministrative, 82.  See  Special  leg- 
islation and  state  control. 

Centralization,  failure  of  elective 
principle  has  produced,  177 ;  in 
France,  91.  See  Legislative  cen- 
tralization, etc. 

Charters.    See  Municipal  charters. 

Check  and  balance  system,  in  muni- 
cipal government,  230. 

Cities,  causes  of  the  growth  of,  282- 
285. 

City  government,  in  London,  295- 
299 ;  in  Paris,  291-294. 

Civil  service  reform,  application  of, 
to  municipal  service,  250-252 ;  in 
England,  205 ;  in  federal  govern- 
ment, 203, 250-252 ;  in  Mass.,  203- 
205 ;  in  New  York,  202,  204 ; 
relation  of  central  control  to,  204 ; 
relation  of,  to  discretionary  offi- 
cers, 249. 

Classification  of  cities,  due  to  posi- 
tion of  the  courts,  45 ;  in  Ohio, 

41-45- 

"  Clauses  Acts,"  England,  55. 
Congress,  power  of,  over  suffrage, 

148. 


Constabulary.     See  Police. 

Constitutional  limitations,  causes 
of  failure  of,  relating  to  special 
legislation,  76,  78 ;  effect  of,  on 
special  legislation,  41-47,  74 ; 
utility  of,  74,  75. 

Constitutions,  state,  extension  of 
recent,  171 ;  referendum  in,  172. 

Corporate  functions,  distinction 
between,  and  governmental  func- 
tions, 26,  60,  185 ;  to  be  deter- 
mined by  courts,  61. 

Corporations,  municipal  (England) 
audit  of  accounts  in,  108,  137  et 
seg. ;  election  of  officers  in,  189 ; 
enumerated  powers  of,  34;  ex- 
emption of,  from  central  audit, 
137;  financial  powers  of,  108; 
general  grant  of  powers  to,  48-50 ; 
in  fifteenth  century,  34;  more 
local  organs  than  in  the  U.  S., 
56;  no  control  over  poor  relief, 
106 ;  no  control  over  school  ad- 
ministration, 107 ;  police  in,  107, 
124,  125;  political  capacity  of, 
25.  33.  341  public  health,  107, 
117,  120;  special  legislation  in 
reference  to,  53-57 ;  sphere  of 
early,  33,  49,  105 ;  under  Tudors 
and  Stuarts,  49. 

Corporations,  municipal  (France), 
cause  of  efficient  government  in, 
5°.  S2  >  general  grant  of  powers 
to,  48,  50,  51 ;  position  of,  191 ; 
universal  suffrage  in,  190. 

Corporations,  municipal  (Prussia), 
financial  administration  of,  102; 
modern  conception  of,  96;  Mu- 
nicipal Corporations  Act,  93,  96, 
294;  police,  loo ;  public  health, 
100 ;  school  administration,  101; 
sphere  of,  100-104,  294- 

Corporations,  municipal  (U.  S.), 
agents  of  the  state,  23,  195-202, 
307, 308 ;  civil  service  in,  202-206 ; 
classification  of,  41-45;  compe- 


INDEX 


315 


tence  of,  determined  by  the  law 
of  torts,  59;  complexity  of  the 
administration  of,  183 ;  construc- 
tion of  powers  of,  78  ;  context  of 
sphere  of,  57-62 ;  corporate  (busi- 
ness) functions  of,  24,  25,  185, 
307 ;  effect  of  position  upon  po- 
litical position  of,  29 ;  upon  legis- 
lative interference,  31 ;  effect  of 
spoils  system  upon,  31 ;  enu- 
merated powers  of,  34 ;  govern- 
mental functions  of,  25, 185,  307  ; 
method  of  electing  council,  150 
et  seq.  ;  necessity  of  state  control 
over,  26,  27 ;  of  local  and  general 
concern,  25,  89 ;  proper  position 
of,  26;  selection  of  officers  in, 
181-190;  suffrage  in,  145  et  seq.; 
supremacy  of  the  legislature  over, 
22 ;  taxing  power  of,  35 ;  uni- 
versal suffrage  in,  29. 

Corporations,  private,  method  of 
incorporation,  79. 

Council,  city,  American,  must  be 
like  French,  largely,  231;  as  a 
legislative  body,  220,  221,  247; 
bicameral  form  of,  240-242 ;  com- 
pensation of,  242;  compulsory 
service  in,  243 ;  continuity  in,  244, 
245  ;  deprived  of  power,  3,  4,  6- 
12,  77,216,  256,  258,272;  distrust 
of  American,  5, 10, 71 ;  early  his- 
tory of,  in  U.  S.,  2,  3;  English, 
system  inapplicable  to  U.  S.,  229 ; 
formation  of,  239-242;  growing 
importance  of,  216,  219;  impor- 
tance of  the  position  of,  246 ;  in 
England,  i,  3,  51,  215,  227,  240, 
243 ;  in  France,  104, 215,  231, 240, 
243 ;  in  Germany,  215, 240, 243 ;  in 
Illinois,  217,  233;  in  Ohio,  217; 
in  New  York  city,  223  ;  in  Prus- 
sia, 97,  103,  232,  243 ;  local  mu- 
nicipal autonomy  impossible 
without,  220 ;  loss  of  financial  and 
legislative  power,  6-12 ;  methods 


of  election  of,  150-170,  186,  235- 
239 ;  necessity  of,  220-227  ;  need 
of,  of  larger  powers,  233 ;  posi- 
tion and  powers  of  more  impor- 
tance than  form  of,  239;  power 
of,  in  England  over  organization, 
51,  229 ;  power  of,  to  divide  city 
into  election  districts,  236 ;  re- 
election of  members  of,  245 ;  rep- 
resentative character  of,  215; 
tenure  of,  243-245;  transfer  of 
powers  to  legislature,  216.  See 
Tenure,  Corporations,  Elections, 
etc. 

Council  system,  not  destroyed  but 
transferred,  n. 

County,  city  contrasted  with,  195; 
incorporation  of  English,  34. 

Courts,  central  control  of,  in  New 
York,  80 ;  competence  of  muni- 
cipal corporations  to  be  delimited 
by,  61 ;  control  of  over  municipal 
corporations,  68  ;  control  of,  im- 
paired by  jury  trials,  69 ;  unsuit- 
ability  of  control  through,  70. 
See  Administrative  courts. 

Cumulative  voting,  constitutional- 
ity, 154 ;  effects  of,  155 ;  faults  of, 
155,  156;  in  England,  156;  in 
Illinois,  154,  156, 168,  238 ;  modi- 
fication of  the  system  of,  156- 

158. 

Curative  acts,  causes  of  the  need 
of,  36 ;  constitutionality  of,  37. 

Death-rate  in  England,  cause  of 
decrease  of,  120,  121 ;  decrease 
in,  118-121;  due  to  fever,  119; 
due  to  zymotic  diseases,  119;  in 
urban  and  rural  districts,  119, 
120;  statistics  as  to,  117,  118. 

Debts,  local,  central  administrative 
control  over,  136. 

Decentralization,  tendency  of,  to 
increase  state  and  national  influ- 
ence, 30,  63,  78,  195,  202;  of 


INDEX 


administration,  39;  of  adminis- 
tration in  England,  90 ;  adminis- 
trative, in  metropolitan  cities. 
See  Local  autonomy. 

Democracy,  effect  of,  upon  exten- 
sion of  elective  principle,  177. 

Departments.     See  Executive,  city. 

Dongan  charter,  New  York,  2. 

Education,  as  a  qualification  for 
suffrage,  147,  148 ;  elementary 
(Eng.),  central  administrative 
control  over,  126-130,  137;  con- 
dition of,  128-130 ;  efficiency  of, 
130;  improvement  in,  128;  not 
attended  to  by  borough  councils, 
56 ;  relation  of  borough  to,  107 ; 
statistics  of,  129. 

Educational  administration,  board 
system  in,  270 ;  centralization  in, 
83 ;  in  Prussia,  101. 

Educational  department,  power  of, 
127. 

Election  districts,  formation  of,  in 
foreign  cities,  236. 

Elections,  by  general  ticket,  152, 
161,  169,  235 ;  district  plan  of 
municipal,  235;  in  New  York 
city,  194,  210,  211 ;  in  San  Fran- 
cisco, 208;  interference  of  na- 
tional political  parties  in  mu- 
nicipal, 196-202;  interference  of 
political  parties  due  to  present 
system  of,  208 ;  local  control  of, 
200;  municipal,  in  England,  189, 
212;  on  the  continent,  158 ;  sep- 
arate municipal,  194,  209-211. 

Elective  principle,  extreme  exten- 
sion of,  176,  185,  188,  208;  lim- 
itations of,  185,  186;  misgovern- 
ment  of  cities  due  to,  181. 

Enumerated  powers,  grant  by,  not 
found  on  the  continent,  48, 50, 51 ; 
of  English  and  American  munici- 
palities, 34,  53,  71 ;  origin  of  the- 
ory, 34,  78;  theory  of,  makes 


legislative  interference  necessary, 
36,  37,  46,  57,  72. 

Excise  laws,  enforcement  of,  64; 
in  New  York,  197,  199. 

Execution  of  law,  central  control 
over,  in  England,  in,  139;  cen- 
tral control  over,  in  France,  104 ; 
central  control  over,  in  Prussia, 
99;  question  of,  transferred  to 
local  authorities  by  administra- 
tive decentralization,  40,  64,  197, 
225,  248. 

Executive,  city,  attempts  to  secure 
harmonious  action  in,  273-277 ; 
board  system  of,  253,  258-272; 
cause  of  increase  of  the  power 
of  the,  256;  compensation  of, 
261-266 ;  compulsory  service, 
265 ;  formation  of,  254,  258-272, 
280;  in  Brooklyn,  222,  224,  254, 
273 ;  in  Cincinnati,  218  ;  in  Eng- 
land, 216,  235,  268,  269,  278 ;  in 
France,  216,  231,  232,  235,  268, 
269,  279,  290 ;  in  Germany,  216, 
235,  268-270,  278;  in  Illinois, 
217,  233 ;  in  New  York  city,  222, 
223,  254;  in  Prussia,  232,  269, 
270;  increasing  powers  of,  216; 
lack  of  harmonious  action  in, 
272;  national  executive  com- 
pared with,  250-252;  need  of 
permanence  of  tenure  of,  247, 
254, 260 ;  professional  service  for, 
261-266,  278,  279;  relation  of 
chief,  to  the  departments,  272- 
277, 308 ;  selection  of,  273  ;  single- 
headed  form  of,  see  "  Federal 
system  "  ;  tenure  of,  see  Tenure. 

Executive  departments,  heads  of, 
appointment  of,  by  governor,  5, 
6;  how  chosen,  5,  6,  15,  188;  in 
New  York,  223;  independence 
of,  12  et  seq.;  lack  of  unity,  13, 
14 ;  separation  of,  from  mayor,  5 ; 
tenure  of,  6.  See  Executive, 
city. 


INDEX 


317 


Federal  Election  Laws,  repeal  of, 
150,  201. 

"  Federal  system  "  of  city  govern- 
ment, advantages  of,  255,  257 ; 
disadvantages  of,  255,  257,  261- 
263 ;  of  executive  departments, 
251-258 ;  permanent  administra- 
tion difficult  under,  255, 257, 261 ; 
responsibility  more  easily  ob- 
tained under,  255,  257. 

Fever,  effect  of,  upon  death-rate  in 
England,  119. 

Fifteenth  Amendment,  exclusion  of 
negroes  forbidden  by  the,  147; 
provisions  of,  as  to  suffrage, 
148. 

Finance,  local,  central  administra- 
tive control  over,  in  England, 

130-143- 

Financial  administration  in  Eng- 
land, 130-137;  in  France,  104; 
in  Prussia,  102. 

Financial  control,  lack  of  local,  12, 

13- 

Financial  powers,  municipal  coun- 
cil deprived  of,  7 ;  limitations  on, 
a  cause  of  special  legislation,  47  ; 
need  of  state  control  over,  65-67 ; 
recent  reaction,  7. 

"  Forced  fractions,"  system  of,  164- 
167. 

Fourteenth  Amendment,  not  man- 
datory, 149 ;  provisions  of,  as  to 
suffrage,  148. 

Franchises,  street,  74;  street  rail- 
way, in  New  York,  80. 

"  Free  list  plan,"  constitutional  ob- 
jections to,  164;  in  Switzerland, 
164-166 ;  objections  to,  164-167 ; 
provisions  of,  161-164. 

General  Acts,  beneficial  results  of, 
on  continent,  48-52;  beneficial 
results  of,  in  England,  50,  52; 
failure  of,  in  United  States  due 
to  enumeration  of  powers,  57; 


tendency  to  abandon  strict  con- 
struction, 61. 

Germany.    See  Prussia. 

Gerrymandering,  effect  of  cumu- 
lative voting  on,  155 ;  produced 
by  locality  representation,  152. 

Governmental  functions,  distinc- 
tion between,  and  private  func- 
tions, 26,  60;  taxing  power  a, 
35,  65 ;  to  be  determined  by  the 
courts,  61. 

Government,  municipal,  causes  of 
lack  of  a  theory  of,  18-21 ;  need 
of  separation  of  legislation  from 
administration  in,  221 ;  want  of 
any  consistent  theory  of,  18,  207. 

Home  rule,  impossible  without 
city  council,  220;  necessity  of, 
226 ;  present  lack  of,  225. 

Illinois,  cumulative  voting  in,  154, 
156,  168;  Municipal  Corpora- 
tions Act  of,  217,  233. 

Indebtedness,  need  of  state  con- 
trol over,  67.  See  Financial  pow- 
ers, Borrowing  power. 

Judicial  control,  supplemented  by 
legislative  control,  71. 

Judicial  functions,  in  early  Ameri- 
can cities,  3;  in  English  boroughs, 
2. 

Judiciary,  control  over  private 
rights  transferred  to,  78. 

Legislation,  direct.  See  Referen- 
dum and  Town  meeting. 

Legislative  centralization,  in  Eng- 
land, 90,  93 ;  in  France,  91 ;  in 
Germany,  91,  92. 

Legislative  control  over  borrowing 
powers,  73.  See  Special  legisla- 
tion. 

"  Limited  voting."  See  "  Free  list 
plan." 


INDEX 


Local  autonomy,  in  America,  301- 
306 ;  in  London,  295-299, 302 ;  in 
Paris,  291-294 ;  in  Prussia,  294 ; 
provisions  for,  in  England  and 
on  the  continent  contrasted,  299- 
302. 

Local  Government  Board,  consti- 
tution of,  96,  107  ;  powers  of,  56, 
108,  109,  112,  130,  137,  139. 

Local  self-government,  causes  of 
loss  of,  9,  10,  38 ;  English,  modi- 
fied by  central  control,  144 ;  loss 
of,  in  American  cities,  9 ;  theory 

of,  33- 

London,  city  government  of,  295- 
299 ;  police  in,  289. 

Massachusetts,  civil  service  in,  203- 
205. 

Mayor,  appointment  vs.  election  of, 
187 ;  concentration  of  power  in, 
13 ;  method  of  election  of,  158- 
160,  164 ;  position  of,  in  foreign 
countries,  278,  279 ;  in  Illinois, 
233;  power  of,  in  France,  104, 
231,  232,  290,  292-294;  power 
of,  to  appoint  and  remove,  273- 
277;  power  of,  to  organize  ad- 
ministration, 234,  308. 

Minority  representation,  district 
system  does  not  guarantee,  238. 
See  Proportional  representation. 

Misgovernment,  city,  due  to  disin- 
tegration of  city  council,  272 ;  due 
to  elective  principle,  181 ;  due  to 
false  idea  of  the  position  of  the 
city,  31 ;  due  to  indifference,  180, 
181 ;  due  to  political  partisan- 
ship, 180;  national  and  state 
politics,  193,  206-208  ;  possibility 
of,  under  any  form  of  organiza- 
tion, 226;  relation  of  universal 
suffrage  to,  150, 170, 176, 178, 190. 

Municipal  administration,  general 
state  administration  not  distin- 
guished from,  9-12. 


Municipal  charters,  English,  i,  2. 

Municipal  charters  (U.  S.),  con- 
sidered as  laws,  not  contracts, 
9,  35 ;  origin  of,  i ;  total  non- 
uniformity  of,  15. 

Municipal  corporations.  See  Cor- 
porations, municipal. 

Municipal  Corporations  Acts,  1835, 
1882,  England,  50,  52. 

Municipal  council.  See  Council, 
city. 

Municipal  officers.    See  Officers. 

Municipal  organization.  See  Or- 
ganization, Council,  Executive, 
etc. 

Municipal  problems,  intensified  by 
enormous  size  of  cities,  287 ;  new, 
arise  as  city  grows,  288 ;  peculiar 
nature  of,  due  to  consolidation 
of  town,  county,  and  city  govern- 
ments, 286. 

National  government,  municipal 
government  modelled  after,  15,17. 

Neuchatel.    See  Switzerland. 

New  York,  administrative  central- 
ization in,  83;  civil  service  in, 
202,  204;  constitutional  amend- 
ment of  1875,  80;  pauper  luna- 
tics in,  199 ;  recent  tax  legislation 
in,  83 ;  Report  of  Commissions 
for  cities  of  second  and  third 
class,  85. 

New  York  city,  causes  of  growth 
of,  283 ;  charter  of  1830, 3 ;  coun- 
cil in,  223 ;  deprived  of  power 
of  organization,  4 ;  Dongan  char- 
ter of,  2 ;  election  of  1894  in,  194 ; 
elections  in,  210,  211 ;  excise  laws 
in,  197,  199;  executive  in,  222; 
first  English  charter  of,  i ;  pres- 
ent charter,  8,  222. 

Officers,  appointment  of  municipal, 
in  France,  104;  in  Prussia,  97; 
appointment  vs.  election,  181- 


INDEX 


319 


190 ;  central  control  over,  97, 104 ; 
election  of,  carried  to  extreme, 
176-182;  police,  considered  as 
local  officers,  58  ;  qualifications 
of,  in  England  and  Prussia,  205 ; 
tendency  to  limit  powers  of,  171. 
See  Council  and  Executive. 
Ohio,  classification  of  cities  in,  41- 

45- 

Organization,  municipal  control 
of  council  on  continent  over,  51, 
227 ;  history  of,  in  U.  S.,  Chap.  I. ; 
power  of  council  over,  in  Eng- 
land, 54. 

Paris,  city  government  of,  291-294 ; 

police  in,  289. 

Parish,  incorporation  of  English,  34. 
Parliament,  English,  supremacy  of, 

90,93- 

Party  system,  relation  of,  to  the 
character  of  persons  elected,  170. 

Pauperism.  See  Poor  law  admin- 
istration. 

Police,  administration  of,  in  Berlin, 
London,  Paris,  289,  295 ;  central 
administrative  control  over,  108, 
121-126,  130,  137  ;  condition  of 
in  England  prior  to  1856,  122- 
124;  improvement  in,  124-126; 
in  Prussia,  100 ;  relation  of  bor- 
ough council  to,  56,  107. 

Police  commissions,  appointment 
of,  6. 

Political  parties,  influence  of,  upon 
municipal  elections  in  England, 
212;  influence  of  national,  not 
entirely  removable,  212,  213 ; 
national  and  state,  193 ;  separa- 
tion of  municipal  from  national 
and  state,  194-214,  308,  309; 
union  of  national  and  municipal, 
due  to  extension  of  elective  prin- 
ciple, 208  ;  due  to  position  of  the 
city,  195-202;  due  to  spoils  sys- 
tem, 202-206. 


Politics,  introduction  of,  into  ad- 
ministration, 224;  effect  of 
national  and  state,  on  cities.  See 
Political  parties. 

Poor  law  administration  (Eng- 
land) ,  central  administrative  con- 
trol over,  112,  116,  130,  137; 
conditions  prior  to  1834,  64,  113, 
114 ;  effect  of  Poor  Law  Amend- 
ment Act,  114-116;  not  under 
borough  council,  56;  reform  of, 
106, 112-116;  statistics  regarding, 
"5- 

Poor  Law  Board,  established,  106. 

Preferential  voting,  adoption  of,  in 
municipal  elections,  238 ;  appli- 
cation of,  to  election  of  mayor, 
159, 160 ;  constitutionality  of,  157  ; 
provisions  of,  156-160. 

Private  rights,  special  legislation 
relating  to,  forbidden  by  consti- 
tutions, 75,  78,  79. 

Professional  service,  a  result  of 
single-headed  executive  depart- 
ments, 261-263 ;  in  foreign  coun- 
tries, 268-270,  279;  lack  of,  in 
administration,  37;  not  possible 
in  small  cities,  267. 

Prohibition.     See  Excise. 

Property,  acquirement  and  man- 
agement of  city,  in  England,  130 ; 
as  a  qualification  for  suffrage, 
148. 

Proportional  representation,  con- 
stitutionality of,  160,  164 ;  cumu- 
}ative  voting,  154-156 ;  effects  of, 
155,  165,  170;  federal  idea  op- 
posed to,  150 ;  "  Free  list  plan  " 
of,  161-167  '•  importance  of  party 
machine  increased  by,  168 ;  im- 
propriety of,  in  municipalities, 
151,  153;  in  England,  156;  in 
Illinois,  154, 156, 168 ;  in  Switzer- 
land, 161,  164;  preferential  sys- 
tem, 156-160. 

Prussia,  administrative  courts  in, 


320 


INDEX 


\ 


99  ;  cause  of  efficient  municipal 
government  in,  50  ;  centralization 
in,  91,  92;  city  government  in, 
294  ;  general  grant  of  powers  in, 
48,  50,  51  ;  Municipal  Corpora- 
tions Act  of  1808,  93,  96,  294; 
police  in,  100,  289  ;  public  health 
in,  100. 

Public  health  (England),  central 
control  introduced,  106,  116,  130, 
137  ;  conditions  of,  prior  to  1848, 
117;  improvement  in,  118-121; 
relation  of  borough  council  to, 
56. 

Public  law,  application  of,  to 
municipal  corporations,  58,  60, 
69. 

Railways,  street,  franchises  of,  in 

New  York,  80. 
Raines  Excise  Law,  execution  of, 

X99. 
Referendum,  effect  of,  on  represen- 

tative system,  172  ;  in  recent  state 

constitutions,  172. 
Removal,  mayor's  power  of,  273- 

277;  power  of,  in  foreign  coun- 

tries, 275  ;  President's  power  of, 

275. 

Representation,  locality  principle 
of,  not  suited  to  cities,  151. 

Representative  system,  effect  of 
referendum  on,  172. 

Representatives,  character  of  our, 
170;  effect  of  referendum  on, 
172  ;  tendency  to  limit  powers  of, 
171. 

Responsibility,  increased  feeling  of, 
under  the  "  federal  system,"  255, 
260  ;  lack  of  feeling  of,  due  to  the 
disintegration  of  the  council,  272  ; 
lack  of  feeling  of,  due  to  the 
system  of  checks  and  balances, 
229;  to  large  powers  of  courts, 
230;  to  spoils  system,  230. 

Rotation  in  office,  evils   of,  219; 


idea  of,  not  found  in  England, 
213. 

Rural  districts,  death-rate  in,  in 
England,  120;  loans  to,  1892, 
133. 

Sanitation.    See  Public  health. 

Schools.    See  Education. 

Separation  of  powers,  independ- 
ence of  mayor  and  executive  de- 
partments due  to  idea  of,  5 ;  not 
applicable  to  local  government, 

IS- 

South,  the,  suffrage  in  the,  147, 178. 
Special  legislation,  central  adminis- 
trative control  contrasted  with, 
in  England,  134,  135 ;  due  to  de- 
centralization, 30;  due  to  false 
ideas  of  state  legislature,  35;  due 
to  enumeration  of  powers,  36, 37, 
46,  57 ;  due  to  lack  of  considera- 
tion, 57 ;  due  to  miscomprehen- 
sion of  competence  of  city,  31, 
38,  77 ;  evil  results  of,  lacking  in 
England,  54 ;  general  act  of  incor- 
poration causes  decrease  in,  216 ; 
general  conditions  of,  9,  10-12, 
31;  in  England,  53-57, 71,  72;  in 
New  York,  8 ;  in  Ohio,  41-45, 
218 ;  large  portion  of,  is  curative, 
37  »  legislative  centralization  in- 
creases, 39;  local  self-govern- 
ment prevented  by,  38;  made 
necessary  by  theory  of  enume- 
rated powers,  36,  37,  46,  72,  75, 
76;  by  limitations  on  financial 
powers,  47;  necessity  of,  under 
American  system,  72,  73,  78,  80; 
Parliament  (English)  not  pro- 
hibited from  passing,  54;  pre- 
vention of,  by  formalities  in 
Parliament^^ ;  by  central  con- 
trol", 55,  56;  prohibition  of,  as  to 
private  rights,  75;  recent  state 
constitutions  forbid  but  do  not 
prevent,  40-47,  74  ;  relation  of,  to 


INDEX 


321 


"Clauses  Acts,"  55;  unknown 
upon  the  continent,  95. 

Spoils  system,  a  cause  of  interfer- 
ence of  national  political  parties 
in  city  government,  202-206;  in 
state  and  national  governments, 
88;  not  a  rteeessary  adjunct  of 
central  control,  89;  not  perma- 
nent, 89. 

State  control  over  cities,  extent 
and  kind  of,  determined  by  the 
competence  of  the  city,  26-28; 
judicial  control  as  a  form  of, 
inadequate,  69;  danger  of  exces- 
sive, 27 ;  necessity  of,  26,  27,  30, 
^Si  68,  77,  80;  organization  of, 
68 ;  tendency  of  decentralization 
to  increase,  30.  See  Special  leg- 
islation, and  Central  control. 

State  government,  functions  of,  200. 

Streets,  franchises  of,  74. 

Suffrage,  constitutional  limitations 
of,  160;  educational  qualifica- 
tions for,  147 ;  effect  of  position 
of  the  city  upon,  145 ;  in  France, 
190 ;  in  the  Federal  Constitution, 
148 ;  in  the  South,  147,  178 ;  left 
to  the  states  to  determine,  150; 
limitation  of,  possible,  146,  148. 

Suffrage,  universal,  adoption  of, 
made  necessary  by  governmental 
character  of  the  city,  29, 145 ;  ad- 
vantages of,  190 ;  in  France,  190 ; 
not  necessarily  permanent,  146, 
148 ;  people  not  opposed  to,  150 ; 
responsibility  of,  for  present  evils, 
150, 170,  176,  178,  239. 


Switzerland,  proportional  represen- 
tation in,  161, 164, 166,  167. 

Taxation,  power  of,  conditions  of 
exercise,  35 ;  need  of  state  con- 
trol over,  65. 

Tenure,  abandonment  of  fixed 
terms,  277 ;  in  the  board  system, 
253,  260-263 1  ne£d  of  permanent, 
for  city  executive,  247,  260  et  seq., 
308 ;  of  city  council,  243-245 ;  of 
city  executive,  247  et  seq. ;  of  city 
executive  in  Brooklyn,  254,  273 ; 
opposition  to  permanent,  248, 254. 

Ticino.    See  Switzerland. 

Torts,  liability  of  municipal  cor- 
porations for,  59,  62,  68. 

Town,  city  contrasted  with,  195. 

Town  meeting,  adaptation  of,  to 
cities,  175,  176;  introduction  of, 
universally,  173, 176. 

Uniformity,  lack  of,  produced  by 
uncontrolled  local  administra- 
tion, 64. 

Urban  districts,  death-rate  in,  in 
England,  119, 120;  loans  to,  1892, 
133- 

Veto,  power  of  central  administra- 
tion over  resolutions  through,  98 ; 
power  to,  choice  of  officers  by 
city  councils,  97. 

Voting.    See  Suffrage. 

Zymotic  diseases,  effect  of,  upon 
death-rate  in  England,  117. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


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